S/14268 of 25 November 1980

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UNITED
NATIONS

	Security Council	Distr. GENERAL
		S/14268 25 November 1980 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED
UNDER RESOLUTION 446 (1979)

CONTENTS

Letter of transmittal

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Mandate and composition of the commission
B. Activities of the Commission at Headquarters

II. VISIT TO THE AREA
A. Organization of the visit
B. Visit to Jordan (26-28 September 1980
(a) Meetings with His Highness the Crown Prince of Jordan and with government official
(b) Hearings held in Amman
C. Visit to the Syrian Arab Republic (28-29 September 1980)
Meeting with government officials
D. Visit to Egypt (29 September-1 October 1980)
(a) Meetings with His Highness the Crown Prince of Jordan and with government officials
(b) Hearings held in Cairo
E. Statement by the Secretary-General of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization
F. Meeting in Tunisia with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States
G. Meeting with officials of the Tunisian Government
H. Audience with His Majesty the King of Morocco, Chairman of the Committee on Jerusalem of the Islamic Conference

III. INFORMATION ON THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND ON THE DEPLETION OF WATER RESOURCES IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

A. Information on settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem
(a) Introduction
(b) Implementation by Israel of its settlement policy
(c) Acquisition of land
(d) Jerusalem
B. Depletion of water resources in the occupied Arab territories
(a) Introduction
(b) Importance of the availability of water in the area
(c) Interest of Israel in obtaining additional water resources
(d) Depletion of water resources in the West Bank
(e) Israel's policies concerning the control of water resource sin the occupied Arab territories
(f) Depletion of the water resources in the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip
(g) Information relevant to other natural resources

IV. OBSERVATIONS

A. Impact of the settlement policy on the living conditions of the Arab population
B. Impact of the settlement policy on the economic life of the Arab population
C. Impact of the settlement policy on the demography of the occupied Arab territories

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions
B. Recommendations

SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONY

Annexes

Letter of transmittal

25 November 1980

In our capacity as members of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979), we have the honour to submit to you herewith the report prepared by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 465 (1980).

This report was adopted unanimously today, 25 November 1980.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(Signed) Leonardo MATHIAS, Portugal, (Chairman)

Julio de ZAVALA, Bolivia

Kasuka Simwinji MUTUKWA, Zambia

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Mandate and composition of the Commission

1. The present report is the third 1/ which the Commission has the honour to submit to the Security Council in implementation of its mandate as determined in paragraph 4 of resolution 446 (1979) which reads as follows:

"The Security Council ... establishes a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council ... to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem."

2. Following the submission of the Commission's second report, the Security Council adopted at its 2203rd meeting on 1 March 1980 resolution 465 (1980) which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

Taking note of the reports of the Commission of the Security Council established under resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in documents S/13450 and Corr.1 and S/13679,

Taking note also of letters from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/13801) and the Permanent Representative of Morocco, Chairman of the Islamic Group (S/13802),

Strongly deploring the refusal by Israel to cooperate with the Commission and regretting its formal rejection of resolutions 446 (1979) and 452 (1979),

Affirming once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

Deploring the decision of the Government of Israel to officially support Israeli settlement in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967,

Deeply concerned over the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing that settlement policy in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences for the local Arab and Palestinian population,

Taking into account the need to consider measures for the impartial protection of private and public land and property, and water resources,

Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city,

Drawing attention to the grave consequences which the settlement policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Recalling pertinent Security Council resolutions, specifically resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, as well as the consensus statement made by the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1976,

Having invited Mr. Fahd Qawasmeh, Mayor of Al-Khalil (Hebron) in the occupied territory, to supply it with information pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure,

1. Commends the work done by the Commission in preparing the report contained in document S/13679;

2. Accepts the conclusions and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the Commission;

3. Calls upon all parties, particularly the Government of Israel, to cooperate with the Commission;

4. Strongly deplores the decision of Israel to prohibit the free travel of Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh in order to appear before the Security Council, and requests Israel to permit his free travel to the United Nations Headquarters for that purpose;

5. Determines that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

6. Strongly deplores the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

7. Calls upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories;

8. Requests the Commission to continue to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, to investigate the reported serious depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources, with a view to ensuring the protection of those important natural resources of the territories under occupation, and to keep under close scrutiny the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Requests the Commission to report to the Security Council before 1 September 1980, and decides to convene at the earliest possible date thereafter in order to consider the report and the full implementation of the present resolution."

3. The term of Bolivia as a member of the Security Council having expired on 31 December 1979, the President of the Council announced on 16 June 1980 that a decision had been taken to maintain the original composition of the Commission, i.e., Portugal (Chairman), Bolivia and Zambia.2/ The Council further decided on 20 August to extend the deadline for the submission of the present report until 25 November 1980.3/

B. Activities of the Commission at Headquarters

4. In the course of its work, which resumed on 18 June, the Commission paid particular attention to the discussions which during that period were taking place on matters related to its mandate in both the Security Council (5 June, 27 and 30 June and 20 August), and the General Assembly which held its seventh emergency special session, on the question of Palestine, between 22 and 29 July 1980.

5. More specifically the Commission had on its table the following resolutions:

(i) For the Security Council:

471 (1980) of 5 June 1980 condemning assassination attempts on the lives of the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh; 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 regarding the status of Jerusalem; and 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980 censuring Israel for the enactment of the "basic law" on Jerusalem proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City.

(ii) For the General Assembly:

resolution ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980 regarding the question of Palestine.

6. Furthermore, the Commission was kept informed of relevant publications recently or currently published by other organs of the United Nations.

7. After having studied again its terms of reference as renewed and clarified by the Council in resolution 465 (1980), the Commission decided to focus its efforts on two specific goals: first, to obtain as much information as possible on the developments which had occurred in the area since its last report, giving special attention to the question of depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources; and secondly, to ascertain from the parties directly concerned their views on those developments.

8. On that basis the Commission decided to seek assistance again from the Governments concerned. Accordingly letters were addressed to the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic expressing appreciation for the help the Commission had already received from their respective Governments when preparing its previous reports and requesting them to provide any new available information that would have a bearing on the Commission's tasks.

9. A letter was sent also to the Permanent Representative of Israel. In that letter, the Commission, regretting Israel's lack of response to the Commission's repeated appeals for cooperation, expressed the hope that the Israeli Government would reconsider its position and provide any relevant information which the Commission would take into consideration when drafting its next report.

10. In a letter addressed to the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Commission, recalling with appreciation the assistance already received from that organization, appealed for further assistance.

11. Similar letters were addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and to the Chairman of the Special committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

12. The Commission, having considered that the League of Arab States might be in a position to provide substantial information, decided to request its assistance also.

13. At its 27th meeting, on 27 August, the Commission was provided with a slide and sound presentation by a representative of the Jordanian Mission on the situation now prevailing on the West Bank of the Jordan River, including Jerusalem. The Jordanian representative also informed the Commission that more information would be made available to it, either at Headquarters or preferably on the spot if the Commission decided to visit the area again in order to make an evaluation of the situation there since its last visit.

14. In response to the Commission's letters, several Governments expressed their keen interest in the renewal of its efforts, and offered their full assistance.

15. The Governments of Jordan, Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that should the Commission decide to visit their capitals, meetings could be arranged with government officials and possibly individual witnesses who would be heard by the Commission.

16. Also the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization informed the Commission that Chairman Arafat would appreciate the opportunity to meet with the Commission whenever it visited the area.

17. Meanwhile the Commission took note of the contents of a letter dated
8 July 1980 addressed to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Portugal by the Permanent Mission of Israel, in which the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. recalled his Government's position with regard to the Commission's mandate and stated that the position had remained unchanged. 4/

18. After further consultations with the parties concerned, the Commission reached the conclusion that in order to report usefully to the Council, it should not only obtain as much information as possible on recent incidents but also make an evaluation of the earlier finding brought to the attention of the Council after the Commission's visit to the area in May-June 1979. Such an evaluation, it was felt, could be more comprehensive if conducted on the spot. Accordingly, despite the short time which could be devoted to such a visit, a decision was taken by the Commission at its 28th meeting, on 11 September, to make a second visit to the area.

19. In view of that decision, the Commission felt that the meeting envisaged with the representatives of the League of Arab States could take place in Tunis with the Secretary-General of that organization. The Tunisian Government, having been informed of the Commission's intention to visit Tunisia, proposed that a meeting be held also with government officials, a proposal which the Commission gratefully accepted.

20. The Commission also decided to seek an audience with His Majesty King Hassan II in his capacity as President of the Committee on Jerusalem of the Islamic Conference, a decision which was welcomed by the Government of Morocco.

21. On the eve of its departure the Commission met at Headquarters with
Mr. Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, who examined with the members matters relating to the Commission's mandate and assured them of the full support of his Government, although, to his regret, he could not personally be in Cairo at that time.

22. Also the Commission, bearing in mind the unique character and spiritual dimension of Jerusalem, decided to send new letters to those of the representatives of the great monotheistic religions who, as indicated in the second report, had informed the Commission of their views on Jerusalem, in order to ascertain whether they had any new elements to add to their previous communications.

23. A reply dated 10 November 1980 was received from the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches and may be found in annex IV.

24. In his reply dated 14 November 1980, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See, referring to its communication of 3 December 1979, the text of which was included in the second report, 5/ said that he had no new element to provide to the Commission.

25. The present report is based on elements of information which have been gathered from various sources both at Headquarters and during the visit to the area. In addition to the present introductory chapter, it contains four parts, i.e. chapter II, which relates the Commission's visit to the area; chapter III, which describes the prevailing situation relating to settlements in the occupied Arab territories with particular emphasis on the question of water resources there; chapter IV, devoted to observations; and chapter V, which contains the Commission's conclusions and recommendations.

26. The present report was unanimously adopted on 25 November 1980.

II. VISIT TO THE AREA

A. Organization of the visit

27. During its visit to the area, the Commission was composed of the following members:

Ambassador Leonardo Mathias (Portugal), Chairman

Ambassador Julio de Zavala (Bolivia)

Dr. Kasuka Simwinji Mutukwa (Zambia)

28. They were accompanied by Mr. Fernando Neves from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations.

29. The Commission decided that, as during the previous visit, it would hold consultations with the government authorities concerned and also receive at hearings, or individual interviews oral or written materials by other authorities, organization or private individuals.

30. In that connexion, it was decided that the rules of procedure which the Commission intended to follow during those hearings would be the same as those it had applied during the first visit.6/

31. The Commission organized its visit to the area as follows: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - 26-28 September; the Syrian Arab Republic - 28-29 September; the Arab Republic of Egypt - 29 September to 1 October; Tunisia - 1-3 October; and the Kingdom of Morocco - 3-4 October 1980.

32. During its visit the Commission held consultations with the government authorities concerned and with other authorities speaking on behalf of relevant organizations. It also received testimony from private individuals.

33. In the course of the meetings held in that regard, tireless efforts were expended on a critical and analytical examination of the pertinent issues and clarification of the various points raised by members of the Commission. The Commission benefited from those extensive exchanges of views, which proved most useful in providing additional information and in further elucidating matters previously brought to its attention. The Commission would therefore like to express its most sincere appreciation to all the authorities and individuals concerned for their cooperation.

B. Visit to Jordan (26-28 September 1980)

(a) Meetings with His Highness the Crown Prince of Jordan and with government officials

34. On 27 September 1980, the Commission had a working meeting in Amman at the Ministry for Occupied Territories Affairs, where it was received by
Mr. Hassan Ibrahim, Minister of State for Occupied Territories Affairs. Also present at the meeting were Mr. Shawkat Mahmoud, Under-Secretary, Ministry for Occupied Territories Affairs, and other government officials.

35. After welcoming the members of the Commission, the Minister of State said that the Government of Jordan had noted with grave concern that, as a result of the persistence of Israel in its settlement policies and practices, the situation in the occupied territories, with particular reference to the West Bank, was becoming increasingly difficult. The Government had therefore felt it necessary to create a new ministry, the Ministry for Occupied Territories Affairs, which had been put specifically in charge of following closely the developments in the areas concerned, and in particular, to undertake practical efforts to alleviate the deteriorating living conditions of the Arab population of the occupied West Bank.

36. Reviewing the situation in the West Bank the Minister of State observed that Israel had not complied with the terms of Security Council resolutions 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979 or 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980. He pointed out in that regard that Israel had neither ceased the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, as called for in the former resolution, nor had it dismantled the existing settlements, as called for under the terms of the latter. On the contrary, Israel was establishing, constructing and planning new settlements, as well as expanding those already established.

37. In that connexion the Minister of State drew attention to a plan said to have been announced in Israel, 7/ under which 46 Israeli settlements were to be set up in the occupied Arab territories by the end of 1983, at a cost of 32 billion Israeli pounds. 8/ By a subsequent amendment 22 more settlements would be added to the original 46. The policy of settlements was therefore very much active in all the occupied territories including the Golan Heights and Gaza, where roads were being built and electricity and water systems installed in preparation for the establishment of further Israeli settlements, thus causing the Arab population to despair and leave.

38. In its efforts to include the Arab population to remain on the West Bank, the Government of Jordan was providing financial support, through the Jordanian Palestinian Commission, to projects there, such as those providing housing or educational facilities. By recent decision, however, Israel was endeavouring to stop the flow of funds from Jordan. Mr. Ibrahim noted in that regard that those new restrictions by the occupying authorities not only hampered Jordan's efforts to assist the Palestinians in their plight but had also to be seen as a direct obstacle to the generous initiative of the Arab countries, which at the 1978 Baghdad Summit had established a special fund for that very purpose.

39. Another instance of non-compliance by Israel with the aforementioned Security Council resolutions was a decision adopted by the Israeli Cabinet on 16 September 1979, which allowed Israelis to purchase lands and property in the occupied West Bank, including Jerusalem.

40. Turning to the question of Israeli settlements, the Minister of State said that, between March 1979 and September 1980, 28 new settlements had been established in the West Bank and 4 existing settlements further expanded. As to the extent of the land which had been confiscated on the West Bank during the same period, he said that it amounted to some 300 million square metres, thus bringing the total of the land confiscated on the West Bank to one-third of the full area.

41. Israeli policy towards the people of the occupied territories, according to the Minister of State, had become more severe in the last months, as evidenced, for example, by the deportation of mayors from the West Bank, attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh, destruction of crops in Hebron, curfews established to confine people to their homes, heavy fines or imprisonment for political activity, punitive destruction of private houses and indiscriminate killing of young students.

42. The Minister of State also drew attention to the changes brought to existing Jordanian law in the West Bank concerning education and labour which gave Israel full control in those two fields. He noted further that whenever members of the Jordanian staff who had remained in the Jordanian Administration in the occupied West Bank after 1967 had to quit for retirement or any other reason, their posts were systematically taken over by Israeli officers.

43. Concerning Jerusalem, the Minister of State said that in addition to the land and properties already confiscated, as previously reported, there was a new plan to expropriate 79 million square metres and to build 12,000 housing units in the north and east of the city. This would affect 27 Arab villages and could lead to the emigration of 130,000 Arab citizens. Furthermore, in connexion with the decision by the Israeli Prime Minister to move his office to east Jerusalem, Arab families living in that area had been ordered to vacate their dwellings.

44. The intervention of Israeli authorities to control every sector had not spared the religious authorities who were now required to submit to new regulations making it compulsory to obtain written authorization from the Israeli Ministry of Religion in order to erect a building or even to repair or maintain existing structures.

45. In conclusion, the Minister of State for Occupied Territories Affairs appealed to the Commission to convey to the Security Council the conviction of the Jordanian Government that in the recent months the situation in the occupied territories had taken a turn for the worse and that Israel had launched an all-out effort to establish itself as the permanent and final authority in the area.

46. In the same afternoon of 27 September 1980, the members of the Commission were received by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Information, Mr. Adnan Abu Odeh, who was accompanied by other government officials. He welcomed the members of the Commission on their second visit to Jordan. The fact that the conclusions and recommendations in its two reports had been accepted and approved by the Security Council was, he said, a testimony of the accuracy and objectivity maintained by the Commission, as also demonstrated by resolution 465 (1980) which was adopted unanimously, that the situation would improve. Unfortunately, things had become only worse on account of the negative response of Israel, which had decided to ignore that resolution, like so many others on the Middle East question.

47. Reviewing the course of events on the West Bank since the Commission's last visit in 1979, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the total number of Israeli settlements had gone up from 78 to 106, an increase of 28. Moreover the so-called "Drobles plan" had called for the gradual establishment of additional settlements in the West Bank by 1983.

48. As the establishment of new settlements necessitated the expropriation of new Arab land, the amount of land that had so far passed under direct Israeli control had increased from 27.5 per cent to 33.3 per cent of the West Bank. Furthermore, four of the existing settlements had been expanded during that period.

49. Adverse developments had also occurred in the field of human rights: the repression of Arab liberties in all aspects of life had further increased the frustrations of the Arab inhabitants on the West Bank and was making the conditions of daily life intolerable. He gave specific instances, such as the expropriation of the property of a high-ranking leader, the expulsion of mayors and their deportation from the West Bank, and an attempt on the lives of other mayors, two of whom, gravely hurt, were still in serious condition.

50. With the deterioration in relations between the Israelis and the Arab inhabitants, coupled with the deliberate aggravation of Arab conditions, the people of the West Bank were becoming more and more demoralized and anxious to leave their occupied land, if only to guarantee certainty of future to their children. In fact it appeared that Israel was purposely promoting such a feeling. It was common, for instance, for the Israelis to subject young schoolchildren to hard and intimidating interrogation at police stations in order to create fear and other psychological problems both for the children themselves and their families.

51. Mr. Adnan Abu Odeh also gave a general assessment of the relations between Israel and its neighbours and of the attitude of Israel on the Middle East problem itself. He said that the level of bitterness between the people of Israel and those of the neighbouring countries had reached a point even higher than in 1967. In fact, despite the prevailing conditions of occupation relations had started to improve and there had been a promising possibility of accepting coexistence. But then Jewish religious fanatics, led by the Gush Emunim Movement, had increased their activities on the West Bank, culminating in the establishment of settlements which were nothing but a clear act of aggression in violation of international law.

52. In that connexion the Acting Foreign Minister identified three patterns of relations between Israel and its neighbours as follows:

(i) The case of the Egypto-Israeli initiative, which was an attempt to normalize relations between the two countries;

(ii) The Jordanian pattern, based on the observance of the cease-fire;

(iii) The Lebanese pattern, based on the mobilization of forces and intermittent military engagements (that pattern, he said, was potentially the most dangerous one because it gave Israel a pretext for its policy of expansionism).

53. Referring to Israel's intransigent and adamant attitude, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Israel derived encouragement from the unreserved support it was receiving from the United States; that privileged treatment, he said, constituted a big obstacle for the aspirations of the Palestinian people and for the attainment of a peaceful solution concerning the occupied territories.

54. Mr. Abu Odeh expressed doubts concerning Israel's efforts to justify the establishment of its settlements in the occupied territories on the basis of internal or external security. The real problem in the present circumstances, he said, was not one of security but one of acceptability. Israel felt that it was an alien and isolated body in the area, and feared that its isolation was bound to increase with every sign of solidarity and cohesion within the surrounding components.

55. Consequently Israel had found its safeguard in being a divisive element both inside the occupied territories and outside, where it purposely incited warlike activities which, because of its present strong military position, it could control: that actually explained the present situation in Lebanon.

56. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs concluded that Israel could afford such an attitude only because its alliances left it with the option of war or peace while, for the present, the Arab countries had only the option of peace. The fact that Israel was taking advantage of its present position to obstruct the just expectations of the Arab countries was creating nothing but bitterness and frustration.

57. On 28 September, His Highness Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal received the Commission. Present at the meeting was also Dr. Bassam Sakat, Director of the Economics Department of the Royal Scientific Society. At that meeting an extensive exchange of views took place on the subject of settlements, in particular the impact of those settlements on the future of the West Bank. The exchange covered also Israel's policies affecting the economic and social developments in the area as well as the prospects of peace.

58. The Crown Prince said that by early September 1979 Israel had established 106 settlements and confiscated 183,000 hectares of land in the West Bank. He also pointed out that exploitation of the west Bank resources was not limited to land only but was practically extended to all its resources including water, manpower and the area's external trade.

59. The Crown Prince also indicated that, in establishing those settlements, Israel had undermined the agriculture and economic life of the West Bank by expropriating large areas of farm land and utilizing the available water resources for the benefit of the settlements.

60. Regarding the external trade of the area, Israel followed a policy aiming at linking the economy of the West Bank to that of its own territory. In the process it had resorted to various practices which gave Israel full control over the economy of the area, transforming it into a market for its products, resulting in a trade surplus to its advantage.

61. At the same time Israel subjected the trade from East to West Bank to restrictions and levied exorbitant duties on imports from Jordan. Another example of controlling the area's economy was to place Israeli labels on West Bank industrial and agricultural products, making it impossible for Jordan or other Arab countries to accept the import of such products.

62. Referring to the restriction of development opportunities for the Arabs in the occupied West Bank, Prince Hassan said that the level of Jordanian investments channelled into the West Bank was being subjected to strict regulations established by the occupying Power. Financial restrictions imposed by Israel rendered Jordanian promotion of Arab agriculture and industry in the West Bank very difficult. Promotion of only vertical growth in both sectors was possible but any attempt to encourage development of the West Bank, such as in a programme recently suggested by UNDP, was negated. In fact, all endeavours to preserve the Arab identity in the West Bank through educational planning or otherwise were being blocked by Israel. Furthermore, he said, there was a deliberate attempt by Israel to treat the West Bank as a political and economic zone separate from the Gaza Strip and to link the West Bank to the Israeli economy.

63. The Crown Prince continued saying that when Jordan agreed to an "open bridge" policy between the East and the West Bank it had in mind the necessity to maintain a contact with Arab inhabitants in the West Bank so that a part of their economic, trade and social needs would be met. He pointed out that that policy had been adopted mainly for humanitarian reasons which could not be ignored.

64. Crown Prince Hassan reminded the Commission that Jordan's position concerning Jerusalem and the West Bank had been repeatedly stated. On Jerusalem, he said that Jordan considered the Holy City as an integral part of the West Bank. It was an essential problem which, once solved, could lead to a comprehensive solution.

65. The Crown Prince stressed that Israel continued to deny the rights of the Palestinians and was attempting to impose on them a solution which ignored those rights. In his view, the idea of so-called "autonomy" was not the answer because, while giving Israel economic and political advantages, it ignored the wishes, aspirations as well as the inalienable rights of the people under occupation and therefore could not be considered the solution to the problem.

66. Referring to Israel's contentions that the population of the West Bank had rather increased since 1967 and that the settlements did not adversely affect its growth, the Crown Prince indicated that contrary to those contentions the population of the West Bank had decreased. At present the annual growth rate in the West Bank was only 1.2 per cent while in the East Bank it was 3.4 per cent.

67. Other aspects of economic difficulties encountered by the West Bank population were mentioned by Dr. Bassam Sakat, who cited three particular areas in which Israel was concentrating its efforts with the ultimate objective of making the West Bank economy dependent on Israel, namely production (labour), land and capital. In pursuit of that objective, large industrial Israeli complexes were being established in the midst of densely populated Arab areas and, while the Arab enterprises had been financially hurt as a result of the closing of all Arab banks in the occupied territories, the Israeli Government lent continuous support to Israeli industrial enterprises, making Arab industries less competitive and eroding their ability to survive.

68. The Crown Prince's statement was highlighted by a presentation of slides on Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) as well as statistical charts. Comments made during the presentation emphasized Israel's determination to strengthen its presence in the West Bank by fortifying its settlements and by surrounding Jerusalem with a ring of residential buildings practically cutting it off from the rest of the West Bank.

69. The presentation indicated also that the real advantage which Israel was deriving from its occupation was not the enforcement of its security but the alleviation of its national economic plight through the control and exploitation of the occupied Arab territories.

(b) Hearings held in Amman

70. During its stay in Jordan the Commission had the opportunity of having six witnesses who had expressed the wish to appear before it. A summary of each statement received by the Commission can be found in annex I to the present report.

71. Among those statements, the Commission noted with particular interest that of Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib (Witness No. 2), who was the Mayor of Jerusalem when he was expelled from that city in 1968. Mr. El-Khatib, who had already testified before the Commission in 1979, 9/ said that since his last appearance, Israel's policy of judaizing Jerusalem by eliminating Arab presence and history had been systematically enforced. He referred in particular to the archeological excavations which, pursued despite United Nations and UNESCO resolutions, were gravely damaging Moslem shrines and driving away Arab inhabitants; the taking over of Arab public services such as the Electricity Company of Jerusalem, a case presently pending to the Old City of Jerusalem, for which Arab inhabitants in the coveted area had been evacuated, and work on which had started; the law declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel; and the closure of one of the few remaining Arab educational institutions on the West Bank. Mayor El-Khatib insisted that the time was running short before the trend became irreversible.

72. Another witness (no. 3), described the incidents which had taken place in Hebron in connexion with the establishment of settlements in that area. He said that a military post had first been set up in the hills overlooking the town. It had soon been transformed into a settlement that proliferated on expropriated lands, despite the inhabitants' protests. Describing the ceaseless provocations endured by the population, which led to molestations, a period of famine and cases of deaths, he emphasized that those instances of violence were not the acts of unruly individuals but were well known to the authorities who sometimes instigated them.

73. The fourth witness was a university professor, who said he had been summarily deported three months earlier for an unknown reason. He described to the Commission the difficulties of Arab teachers and students, strictly controlled in their teachings and studies and frequently threatened by the occupying authorities. He felt that his unexplained expulsion was meant to be a warning to his colleagues.

74. Witnesses Nos. 5 and 6 dwelt on the question of the confiscation of Arab lands by the Israelis, through the brutal process of direct and sudden confiscation or the more subtle means of water resource depletion, which unavoidably brought despair and surrender among the farmers.

75. In that connexion Witness No. 6 referred elaborately to the case of the village of Al-Auja, near Jericho, already brought to the attention of the Council,10/ where citrus plantations had been ruined as a result of the unilateral diversion of the water resources that used to feed the village spring for the exclusive use of the newly established Israeli settlements.

C. Visit to the Syrian Arab Republic (28-29 September 1980)

Meeting with government officials

76. The Commission travelled to Damascus on Sunday, 28 September 1980. It was received the following morning by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nasser Kadour. Mr. Taher Houssami, Deputy Director of International Organizations, was also present. The Vice-Minister welcomed the members of the Commission on their second visit to Syria, and pointed out that the existence of Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories was a matter that portended extreme danger for the area. He assured the Commission of the full cooperation of his Government.

77. Turning to the developments which had taken place in the occupied Golan Heights since the last visit of the Commission, the Vice-Minister said that Israel had officially declared its intention to establish five new settlements in the Golan Heights by the end of 1981. These new settlements would bring the total number to 35, since at present there were already 23 official settlements and 7 posts. The following locations were indicated for the proposed new settlements:

(i) At Sukayk, on the road leading to Mas'adah;

(ii) At the slope of Mountain Qata, near Lake Mas'adah;

(iii) Near Tell Abu Qatif, i.e., near the village of Ayn Ayshah;

(iv) At Mazra'at Quneitra;

(v) Near the village of Dabbusiyah, adjacent to the Al-Rahhad River.

78. Mr. Nasser Kadour explained that the posts to which he had referred were described by Israel as control towers and that, according to Israel, those posts necessitated military fortifications, which meant that barracks for soldiers had to be constructed around them. A chain reaction was thereby established in a subtle manner, intended to disguise the actual intentions of the occupying authorities: first to establish posts in the guise of protective units for the nearby settlements, and then to establish military fortifications for the protection of the protective posts, which thereafter became actual settlements.

79. He added that, in continuation of its endeavours to absorb the remaining Arab population, Israel was pursuing the destructive policies which had been reported to the Commission during its previous visit to the area.11/ Those included biased educational programmes, compulsory nationality registration and, of course, absolute control of manpower, economic, industrial and agricultural activities.

80. He also noted that Israel's refusal to cooperate with the Commission was not only consistent with its past record of defiance of United Nations decisions but that, in the present circumstances, it expressed the clear intention of Israel to hide form the Security Council the truth about the disastrous conditions prevailing in the occupied Arab territories.

81. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs also emphasized that at the core of the problem in the Middle East, which had started in 1947, was the failure to deal with the rights of the Palestinian people. For that reason, he said, it was highly regrettable that Egypt had felt it appropriate to go on its own and, abandoning the Arab cause, had decided to enter into bilateral relations with Israel in complete disregard of the Palestinian issue. In doing so, Egypt, the largest country in the Arab world, had left the battlefield, and the alliance which it had signed with Israel had changed the balance of power.

82. Mr. Nasser Kadour added that, considering that Israel depended totally on the support of its allies, it was incumbent on the Arab States to develop their own forces and achieve solidarity. Once the gap in the balance of power was eliminated, he said, then meaningful negotiations between the parties concerned could be undertaken on a basis of parity. In Syria's view such negotiations should then preferably be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

83. As to the prerequisites of a comprehensive and lasting peace upon which such negotiations could be centered, the following were suggested:

(i) The withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Arab territories;

(ii) The implementation by Israel of the relevant articles of the Charter of the United Nations prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force;

(iii) The recognition by Israel of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination and an independent State; and

(iv) The implementation by Israel of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the matter, in particular, General Assembly resolution ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980 on the question of Palestine.

84. Concluding his statement, the Vice-Minister pointed out that, while Israel had repeatedly stated its need to keep the Golan Heights under its control as an area of the greatest strategic significance, the same reason of security applied to Syria concerning that region, which was an integral part of Syrian territory and which therefore the Government of Syria would never abandon.

D. Visit to Egypt (29 September-1 October 1980)

(a) Meetings with government officials

85. On 29 September the Commission arrived in Cairo. The following morning, it was received at the Prime Minister's Office by Mr. Fouad Mohyeldeen, Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt. Also present at the meeting was Dr. Samir Ahmed, Under-Secretary for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

86. The Deputy Prime Minister said that Egypt was following with great concern the crucial issue of settlements in the occupied Arab territories; it was deplorable that, in spite of numerous condemnations by the international community, Israel had continued to establish a substantial number of settlements in those territories.

87. Israel sometimes claimed that its settlements were built on public property, although in fact it was also using privately-owned land. It also claimed that some of its settlements were created for the purpose of military security, but security for Israel could not be found in building settlements, whatever their type, size or geographical locations; Israel's security could be guaranteed, as President Sadat had declared, only through fostering good relations with its neighbours.

88. Mr. Mohyeldeen said that the dismantling and relinquishing of settlements from the Sinai had established a precedent that henceforth could be applied in dealing with other occupied territories. As such, the existence of Israeli settlements in any occupied Arab territories should no longer be considered as a sign of permanent Israeli presence there.

89. The Deputy Prime Minister also pointed out that when Egypt felt that the negotiations for the autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank were not going as expected, it had suspended the negotiations. President Sadat, in exchanging letters with Prime Minister Begin, had included the following reasons for the suspension of negotiations: the decision to annex Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the establishment of additional settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and the renewed repression of the Arab population.

90. The Deputy Prime Minster assured the Commission of his appreciation for its continued efforts and expressed the hope that the pressure of public opinion could be exerted in favour of a solution for the crucial question of settlements.

91. He also pointed out that while his Government felt that it might be easier to start the peace process concerning the occupied territories within the Gaza Strip, Egypt would not agree to separate the question of Gaza from the issue of the West Bank as a whole.

92. On the same day, the Commission was received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Dr. Usama El-Baz, First Under-Secretary, and afterwards held a working session with Dr. Samir Ahmed, Under-Secretary for International Organizations. Ambassador Ahmed Ezzat Abdel-Latif, Director, Department of Palestine Affairs, and other government officials also attended those meetings.

93. Dr. El-Baz expressed Egypt's appreciation for the work of the Commission. He said in particular that, despite Israel's refusal to cooperate, the work of the Commission was most useful not only for its impact on international public opinion but also in fostering the position of those in Israel who questioned the wisdom of the settlements policy in the occupied territories. Dr. El-Baz assured the Commission of the continuing cooperation of his Government in particular by providing to it all available information in furtherance of the Commission's tasks.

94. In the course of his remarks, Dr. El-Baz reiterated the conviction of the Government of Egypt that, without resolving the Palestinian question, there would be no solution to the Middle East problem as a whole and consequently no peace in the area. With that premise in mind, Egypt had decided to enter into direct negotiations with Israel, a process which was still continuing. However, he said, the experience of the Egyptian negotiators had been one of disappointment because of the negative stance of the Israeli authorities, who had deliberately shown insistence on protocol and procedural issues rather than willingness to deal with the substance of the matter. Consequently, there had been a series of setbacks which led to unavoidable suspensions of the negotiations.

95. Nevertheless, the Government of Egypt felt bound not to put a final stop to the negotiation process, in the deep conviction that, because of its commitments, Israel for the first time had found itself bound by its own signature regarding some aspects of the Palestinian rights.

96. Noting furthermore that the absence of such a negotiation process would not have restrained Israel from continuing its construction of further settlements, Dr. El-Baz emphasized that the dialogue started at and embodied in those agreements had introduced a new dynamism in the situation with legal and psychological consequences for both sides. For the Arabs, it had demonstrated that the physical presence of the settlements was not an irreversible phenomenon, and for the Israelis it had destroyed the myth that the establishment of a settlement in an Arab territory conveyed a guarantee of permanent Israeli presence in that area.

97. Thus when, as a result of direct negotiations, an Israeli settlement, highly and extensively developed, was relinquished to an Arab authority, a legal and historical precedent had been established in El Arish, which would have been considered inconceivable previously.

98. Egypt also felt that the negotiation process afforded an opportunity to enlighten public opinion both inside and outside Israel regarding the real consequences of the settlements policy; in particular, it focused attention on the fact that contrary to Israel's claims, the establishment and maintenance of settlements in the occupied territories constituted a liability far more than an element of security for that country. Indeed, daily incidents demonstrated that those settlements were the main source of friction between the Israelis and the Palestinians, often generating serious acts of violence, which by their very existence contradicted Israel's security claim.

99. Dr. El-Baz noted in that regard that during the negotiations, the Egyptian delegation had requested the Israeli representatives to provide any evidence justifying the security value of each settlement. The Israeli representatives had failed to put forward any consistent and coherent explanation concerning the settlements as guarantees for Israel's security. Instead, they had resorted to their well-known claims of so-called historical and biblical rights.

100. Nevertheless, a moratorium on further construction of Israeli settlements during the period of the direct negotiations had been the subject of an oral agreement. But Israel had reneged on that agreement, as amply demonstrated.

101. Recalling that Egypt regarded the Israeli settlements as utterly illegal and constituting a direct obstacle to peace, Dr. El-Baz pointed out that Egypt's stand corresponded to the position of the United Nations as indicated in Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

102. Turning specifically to the question of the Gaza Strip, Dr. El-Baz stated that Gaza was part of the Palestinian entity whose territorial integrity must be preserved. Therefore, Egypt would never accept an agreement on Gaza separate from the West Bank. Both Gaza and the West Bank had to be subjected to the same legal process and the inhabitants of those areas as a whole must be granted their inalienable rights, including, naturally, their right to self-determination. For that reason, Egypt believed that the voting rights of the inhabitants of East Jerusalem should be exercised there and not anywhere else as had been suggested as a compromise.

103. However, he said, if it were felt appropriate, the implementation of the autonomy plan could well start in the Gaza Strip which, because of its small size, would be administratively easier to organize. Then, if successfully conducted, such experience would facilitate Israel's acceptance of the idea that the evolution towards autonomy did not automatically lead to mass violence and terrorism.

104. As to the final agreement concerning the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, Dr. El-Baz stressed pointedly that Egypt did not claim in any way to speak for the Palestinians in that account. The Camp David framework, he said, was only a transitional arrangement intended to provide a basis for the final settlement which should be reached as a result of direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

105. Following that meeting the Commission held a working session with Dr. Samir Ahmed, Under-Secretary for International Organizations.

106. After recalling the position of the Egyptian Government on the question of the Middle East and the Government's particular concern regarding the pursuance by Israel of its settlement policy, despite the moratorium which had been agreed upon at Camp David, the Under-Secretary gave information on the settlements in the Gaza Strip.

107. According to the most recent information, the seven settlements which had been reported previously to the Commission were still active; and one of them, Kfar Darom, a Nahal military settlement established near the refugee camp of Mughasi, had been doubled to accommodate 400 settlers.

108. Since then three new settlements had been established: one close to Gaza, called Nahal Taadeel, where some 4000 settlers lived; one near Rafat, called Holeet, which contained some 300 housing units; and another one between Dier El Balah and Khan Yunis, which had joined its agricultural activities with the two other settlements of Katif A and Katif B, already reported upon, thus bringing the total number of settlers of those three settlements from 550 to more than 1000. In addition, a settlement called Beit Lahat was under construction north of Gaza.

109. Commenting on the purpose of the Israeli Government in pursuing a policy which was everywhere condemned as contrary to all relevant tenets of international law, Dr. Ahmed refuted the "untenable" biblical claims on the basis of which some Israeli leaders were referring to the West Bank as Judea and Samaria, as well as the "security myth" which, he said, was not even supported in high levels of the Israeli military command, which considered that in case of war the current situation in those territories would be fraught with danger.

110. The real purpose of those operations, he said, was to separate by a demographic line the Arab and Jewish populations which had originally lived together. Then, by pushing away that line and filling the land vacated by the Arabs with Israeli settlers, a political and even geographical transformation of the area was taking form which, once completed, would render virtually impossible the return of those Arab lands to their legitimate owners.

111. Egypt, the Under-Secretary continued, faced with the practical reality that it was no longer feasible in the present circumstances to resort to war as a means of resolving the Middle East question, had taken the only course of action which was left open toward the search for a comprehensive peace in the area.

112. As a result of its initiative, the Egyptian Government was heartened by the fact that for the first time in history, Israel had appended its signature to certain concepts of legal and political relevance for the Palestinians, a step which heretofore would have been considered inconceivable. Thus, Israel had acknowledged the existence of the Palestinian issue and had pledged itself to participate in solving the Palestinian question in all its aspects. It had agreed to withdraw the Israeli military government and its civilian administration from the West Bank and Gaza and have them replaced by an elected Palestinian authority, which at the end of a specific transitional period would hold direct negotiations with Israel towards self-determination for the Palestinians.

113. In his view, Egypt's initiative in the matter had also another consequence of importance. For years, public opinion had been made to believe that, if no negotiations were taking place, it was the fault of the Arabs. Now that an agreement had been signed and that furthermore a main Power, the United States, had testified that a verbal moratorium on the establishment of further settlements had been jointly agreed upon, the situation was reversed, and Israel was henceforth held accountable to international public opinion in the event that it reneged on any part of it.

114. Dr. Samri Ahmed added that Egypt would faithfully support any effort of the United Nations which could lead towards the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the area.

(b) Hearings held in Cairo

115. During its stay in Egypt, the Commission heard six witnesses who had expressed the wish to appear before it. As with the hearings held in Amman, the Commission decided to append a brief summary of each of the statements received in Cairo in annex I to the present report.

116. Those six witnesses, most of whom had come from the Gaza Strip, spoke about the living conditions of the population in that area. They said that before 1967 the Gaza Strip, with its small size of 360 square kilometres, with an Arab population of some 600,000 and scarce resources, was already overpopulated. The arrival of thousands of Israeli settlers had rendered the situation hopeless.

117. They confirmed the plight of the inhabitants, as it had already been reported to the Commission during its previous visit 12/ and said that the policy of expropriation of land to establish new settlements or expand others had been ruthlessly pursued. They added that by now the compulsory payment for every cubic metre of water, even when taken for private family wells, had been generalized while by contrast, water was free for the settlers. They also said that a recent order by Israeli military authorities prohibiting construction in a wide area had rendered the relocation of refugees even more difficult.

118. Complaining about the provocations which, they said were currently being made by armed settlers who could not be taken to court for their actions, they described the situation as one of despair and requested the Commission to make their statements known to world opinion.

E. Statement by the Secretary-General of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization

119. On 29 September, the Commission had a meeting in Damascus with Mr. Mohammed Zuhdi Nashashibi, Secretary-General of the PLO Executive Committee.

120. Mr. Nashashibi conveyed to the Commission the deep regrets of Chairman Arafat who, being outside the area to pursue his efforts for peace between Iraq and Iran, could not come himself despite his personal wishes and the considerable importance which his Organization attached to the work of the Commission.

121. Mr. Nashashibi gave an account of his experience as a Palestinian who had been expelled from his own land. He then pointed out the biased attitude of zionism which, while advocating the right for the Jews to be recognized as a people, was systematically hostile to any Palestinian entity, rejecting even the right of the Palestinians to return to their land as well as their right for self-determination.

122. He added in that connexion that while the existence of Israel had been the result of an international decision taken by the United Nations some 35 years ago, the right of the Palestinians to independence and sovereignty was the result of a long and continuous process. The fact that that process had been hampered by the expansionist policy of zionism, despite the repeated and pressing decisions taken by the United Nations on the matter, would not put a stop to that historic process.

123. The duplicity of the Israeli Government in its approach to the question appeared also from its attempted justifications for its illegal occupation of Palestine. Depending on circumstances, Israel spoke of political borders, security borders, hydraulic borders and, when one applied, it claimed those supposedly established by the Bible. Needless to say, such an approach had little to do with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with international law as a whole.

124. Criticizing the Camp David Agreement, Mr. Nashashibi said that the idea of self-rule as envisaged in its context was a clear denial of the very existence of the Palestinian people. It was nothing but an attempt to legalize the occupation of Arab territories, justify the Israeli settlements and put a final stop to any hope that the Palestinians, who under duress had been compelled to leave their country, could ever return there. Meanwhile Israel's grip on those territories continued unabated.

125. Referring to a presentation which the PLO had made recently to an industrial conference of Arab States, Mr. Nashashibi described the measures used by the occupying authorities to suffocate Arab business. He said that Arab industries were prevented from importing basic materials from Arab countries so that they would be compelled to buy Israeli materials only. The manpower was entirely controlled by Israeli authorities. As to the finished products, if not sold inside Israel or the occupied territories, they had to be shipped through Israeli ports where automatically Israeli labels were affixed on them. As a result of this, Arab countries were prevented from accepting goods which in fact had been produced by Arabs.

126. Banking facilities were also used as a means of pressure. Arab banks having been closed or taken over, it was extremely difficult for Arab industries to obtain financial assistance; thus the competition was practically impossible with Israeli enterprises which, by contrast, were receiving full support from their banks.

127. As to international aid, which as a general rule is made available to any developing country, including Israel, the Israeli authorities did not allow contributions to be received by the Palestinians in the occupied territories from Arab or other international sources.

128. Mr. Nashashibi added that that lack of financial support was not hampering only the industry but the farmers as well, whether as individuals or grouped in cooperative societies.

129. Pointing out that the purpose of Israel in doing so was to drive the Arab population to despair and to compel them to leave, the Secretary-General of the Executive Committee appealed to the Commission to draw once again the attention of the Security Council to the plight of the Palestinians who, faced with the continuing development of foreign settlements, were being driven out of their own land.

F. Meeting in Tunisia with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

130. On 2 October 1980 the Commission was received by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Mr. Chedly Klibi, at the headquarters of the League in Tunis. Mr. Klibi was accompanied by Mr. Mohamed El-Arbi Daoudi, Director for Palestinian Affairs and other officials.

131. The Secretary-General of the Arab League welcomed the members of the Commission and expressed the hope that the Commission's work would lead to the establishment of peace in the area. He noted that the question of Palestine must be examined from two standpoints - i.e. the outrages, injustices, wrongs and other acts which were being perpetrated in the occupied territories; and the interconnexion between the problems inherent to those territories and the Middle Eastern question as a whole.

132. Concerning the situation in the occupied territories, he said that, through threats of imprisonment, exile or even attempted murders, Israel was tightening its strangle hold on the mayors; controlling all aspects of the public administrative and educational systems. Recently the world had witnessed in attacks against Palestinian leaders a return by Israel to the very methods of terrorism which were practiced before the establishment of that State by such organizations as the Irgun and the Stern.

133. While those acts of persecution were being perpetrated, the Israeli military authorities were establishing settlements, in complete disregard of condemnations by world organs as contrary to basic principles of international law and in spite of warnings from friendly Governments, including its main supporter.

134. Indeed the two operations were linked because the real purpose of the settlement policy was to drive out the Arab inhabitants from the occupied territories so as to replace them with a Jewish population. That plan was in conformity with the declarations made by various Israeli leaders since the establishment of the State of Israel. Thus in 1971 the former Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, had declared that the border of Israel lay wherever there were Jews and not where a mere line had been drawn on a map; and similarly in 1973 the former Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, after pointing out that Israel would never leave nor abandon any of its settlements, had said that the borders of Israel reached wherever the Israeli army marched, and that every Zionist generation had the task of extending those borders. The fact that the present Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, insisted on referring to the West Bank as Judea and Samaria showed that despite the United Nations stand on the matter, he also considered those areas an integral part of Israel.

135. In view of such a clear design, the Secretary-General of the Arab League wondered what the sense was of the negotiations undertaken between Israel and Egypt. Indeed the Egyptian Government was wasting its time while Israel kept pursuing the consolidation of its objectives under the cover of internationally publicized negotiations.

136. Although the United Nations was commendably attaching great importance to the human aspect of the consequences of the occupation and to the oppressive acts which were taking place in the occupied territories, it should not be ignored that those crimes, in violation of human rights, had as their major political objective the final obliteration of an entire people. Israel was in search of its "espace vital", its "lebensraum". It was therefore expelling Arab inhabitants so that the occupied territories thus vacated could become an integral part of Israel.

137. Mr. Klibi added that an end should be put to the conspiracy currently prevailing against the Palestinians. The United Nations, with all its power, should take the necessary measures which would ensure the liberation of the occupied territories and place them temporarily under an international administration prior to a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations by which the Palestinian people could freely express their wishes.

138. Pointing out that the unabating activities of Israel in the occupied territories were rendering the situation more difficult every day, the Secretary-General of the Arab League emphasized that all States could help to facilitate the achievement of a just solution which alone could consolidate a comprehensive and lasting peace in the area. For that reason, he said, the European initiative - even though its outcome was uncertain - was welcomed as a well-intentioned endeavour.

139. Mr. Klibi then appealed to the Commission to do its utmost not only to alleviate the burden of oppression imposed on the inhabitants of those occupied territories but above all to focus attention on the fact that what was happening there was only a prelude to the eclipse of a people who, numerically and qualitatively, was by no means inferior to the Jewish people. Indeed, the vitality and distinction of the Palestinian people had come to be recognized at the international level by their determination to preserve their identity and their resolve to right to the end in order to achieve freedom and true self-determination.

G. Meeting with officials of the Tunisian Government

140. While in Tunisia, the Commission had the opportunity to pay a courtesy call on the Tunisian Government authorities and to have an exchange of views with them.

141. On 2 October, the Commission was received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri, Secretary-General of the Ministry. Ambassador Ridha Bachbaouab, Director, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, and Ambassador Mohamed Amamou, Director, Arab Affairs, and other government officials of the Foreign Ministry were also present.

142. The Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry welcomed the Commission and said that his Government regarded the situation in the Middle East with the greatest apprehension. Tunisia categorically condemned the settlement activities of Israel which constituted a fundamental tenet of zionism, and was convinced that the continuation of those activities in defiance of United Nations resolutions created an acute problem which should be considered with the utmost concern by the Security Council.

143. Noting that in addition to its moral and political authority the Council possessed other means of action under Chapters IV and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry emphasized that his Government considered that if the credibility and respectability of the world Organization were to be maintained, the United Nations should bring pressure upon those of its members who were in a position to exert influence on Israel.

144. Mr. Mestiri felt that the time factor was of great importance when dealing with the Israeli settlements problem in so far as any delay would be exploited by the Israelis to establish more settlements and deprive the Arab population of its own land. The United Nations, he pointed out, had already provided in various resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 242 (1967), a framework for the solution of the Middle East question which would guarantee secure and recognized borders for all concerned. The only short-coming in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) was its failure to provide for the establishment of a Palestinian State and for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Palestinian people.

145. Turning to the question of the settlements, Mr. Mestiri spoke of the changes in the demographic structure resulting from the establishment of those settlements and the consequent expulsion of the Arab population from those areas. The ultimate objective of the Israeli settlements policy, he added, was the destruction of the Palestinian entity. In that context, he felt that the United Nations had a basic role and a fundamental duty to reverse the situation.

146. On the question of Jerusalem, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry voiced the grave concern of Tunisia which, he said, was shared by almost 1 billion Moslems all over the world in connexion with the purported annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel. He noted in that connexion that the Tunisian community, which had been living for generations in East Jerusalem, had been expelled by Israel and forced to flee to other Arab countries.

147. Mr. Mestiri stated that Tunisia favoured a solution of the Middle East problem through peaceful negotiations and considered that the United Nations should take the appropriate initiative in that regard.

H. Audience with His Majesty the King of Morocco, Chairman of the Committee on Jerusalem of the Islamic Conference

148. On 4 October, at Ifrane, Morocco, the Commission was received in audience by His Majesty King Hassan II. Addressing the Commission as Chairman of the Committee on Jerusalem of the Islamic Conference, King Hassan stressed the necessity of establishing a global, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

149. After observing that, if a new conflict should break out in the region, it would be of infinitely graver proportions than in the past, owing to the ever-growing military capacity of the parties concerned, the King stated that, in order to be lasting, such a peace must guarantee security without humiliating anyone.

150. Jerusalem, he said, was a special problem within the context of the occupation by Israel of Arab territories, an unjust occupation that was incompatible with the most elementary principles of international law. What was in question in the case of the Holy City was not only the exercise of a right to sovereignty over a territory but also the administration of a spiritual centre of world-wide significance. Thus, by attempting to alter the status of the Holy City with the intention of making it the capital of the Jewish state, Mr. Begin's Government had trampled on the dignity of both the Arab world and the Christian world.

151. King Hassan added in that regard that, when the Arabs had requested the Holy See and other Christian authorities to join in their efforts, they had ipso facto recognized that the question of Jerusalem also had a Christian dimension. Consequently, he said, it was expected that the future status of the City would take into account the moral and material contribution of Christianity; it was interesting to note that, whereas there were differences of opinion even among the Moslems on other aspects of the question of Palestine, there was, with respect to the future of Jerusalem, agreement of principle not only among the Moslems themselves but apparently between them and the Christians.

152. That was probably why Mr. Begin's Government systematically turned down every opportunity to negotiate on the Holy City, a matter on which it doubtless felt too vulnerable. However, the King added, that was also precisely why any negotiations should begin with Jerusalem, the possible key to a solution for the over-all question of the occupied territories. Jerusalem could thus serve as a starting point in peace efforts. Such efforts would initiate a process that would subsequently extend to the other occupied territories.

153. As to the strategy which the Arabs were thinking of adopting, through the Committee on Jerusalem, in order to exert the necessary pressure on Israel, it would be necessary to establish economic sanctions covering petroleum or other products, which the Islamic Conference would coordinate in order to make them fully effective. If an embargo were to be imposed, it would be strictly applied by Morocco. The King then alluded to the "Jihad", and explained that the word basically signified a global struggle in which all the potentialities of the Moslem world were mobilized, both at the cultural and information levels and in the economic, political and military fields. He emphasized, however, that only as a last resort wold recourse be had to war, as the final stage in efforts to attain an objective.

154. It must be realized that Israel benefited from two important means of assistance in addition to help from its allies. First, it received the unconditional support of most members of the Jewish faith; and second, thanks to their control of the mass media in many countries, it benefited from the ignorance of the rest of the world concerning the situation prevailing in the areas concerned.

155. The least that should be secured for the Holy City was the status quo ante of 1967, leaving aside for the time being the question of sovereignty, which could only be settled simultaneously with the other territorial questions concerning the occupied territories. It would therefore appear desirable to entrust the administration of Jerusalem to spiritual leaders under some form of guardianship arrangement. That would be a provisional measure, pending an ultimate solution, which could be achieved through negotiations once the voices of reason with Israel succeeded in making themselves heard. But as long as the Government of Mr. Begin persisted in speaking of Judea and Samaria to designate the West Bank of Jordan, no such solution could be contemplated.

156. After affirming that the goal was the recognition of the right to security and survival of all the States of the region, including a Palestinian State, King Hassan expressed the hope that one day the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, united in a joint effort, would be in a position to compete with the most powerful by virtue of their human potential and the intellectual and material resources available to them.

157. During the exchange of views which followed, King Hassan dwelt on the advantages to be derived by the Commission from seeking an opportunity of having contact with the Holy See, not only because Christianity, and especially the Vatican, had an important role to play in solving the question of Jerusalem but also out of deference to the remarkable personality of His Holiness the Pope, whose advice and support could facilitate the efforts being undertaken.

III. INFORMATION ON THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND ON THE DEPLETION OF WATER RESOURCES IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

A. Information on settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem

(a) Introduction

158. In resolution 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979 by which the Commission was created, the Security Council determined that "the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories, occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East".

159. In its two previous reports, the Commission indicated that, despite the Council's appeals to Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and, in particular not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories, Israel was pursuing its policy of settlements.

160. On the occasion of its recent visit to the area, the Commission endeavoured to obtain additional information and to compare the present situation with that which it had brought to the attention of the Council in its two previous reports following its first visit in May 1979.

(b) Implementation by Israel of its settlement policy

161. In its first report the Commission indicated that between 1967 and May 1979, Israel had established altogether 133 settlements in the occupied territories, consisting of 79 in the West Bank, 29 in the Golan Heights, 7 in the Gaza Strip and 18 in the Sinai.13/

162. According to recent information, the settlements which have been established since then or which are under construction in the various occupied territories number as follows: 28 in the whole West Bank, including 5 which were already under construction in May 1979 but had not been reported to the Commission at the time; and 4 in the Gaza Strip. In addition, one settlement was founded in the Golan Heights during 1980 and 5 new ones are planned there by the end of 1981.

163. As a whole, therefore, leaving aside the Sinai area, where settlements have been vacated, Israel has established 33 new settlements since the adoption by the Council of its resolution 446 (1979) referred to above, bringing the total number to 148.14/ In addition, a number of the existing settlements have been expanded, sometimes to more than twice their original size.

164. With the active support of the Government of Israel, the number of settlers has also increased. According to information available to the Commission, a report from the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office indicated that since the present Government came to power in 1977, the number of settlers in the West Bank alone had risen from 3,200 to 17,400. Those figures do not include the settlers in East Jerusalem and the Jerusalem area which by now number approximately 80,000.

165. Furthermore, the Commission's attention was again drawn to the so-called "Master plan for the development of settlements in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983", which was prepared by Mr. Matatiahu Drobles, Director of Settlement Affairs, World Zionist Organization.

166. That plan, which in its original form called for the establishment of 46 new settlements to be built in the West Bank by 1983 with a view to housing 27,000 families, has already been amended to add 22 more settlements to be established there by the same date.

167. In addition to an extensive building programme the Drobles plan, as it is generally referred to, is said to provide for the construction of a highway and road system which would effectively implement the division of the West Bank into 22 districts. In each of those districts settlements would be established, thus giving credence to information previously reported to the Commission that the location of the settlements in the West Bank was planned with the aim of "compartmenting" the Arab population. 15/

168. It should also be noted that the settlement policy is not limited to rural areas. Thus, in connexion with the West Bank, the commission was informed that the Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing had submitted a plan for the establishment in Hebron of 200 housing units for settlers. Similarly, in addition to Hebron, the towns of Beit Jala and Al-Bireh are now surrounded by Israeli settlements. As a result of this, those towns are not only barred from expanding but also threatened with a reduction in their present limits. In fact, that has already been the case for an important part of Al-Bireh and almost one-third of Beit Jala which were taken away for the expansion of Jerusalem.

169. As to the Gaza Strip, witnesses heard in Cairo testified to the Commission that large areas of lands had been delineated by the occupying authorities and declared out of bounds for any Arab construction. That division caused fear among the inhabitants that a development programme might be under contemplation there also.

(c) Acquisition of land

170. In order to implement the establishment of new settlements and the expansion of existing ones the occupying authorities have taken not only public land, but also privately owned land. The Commission was informed that the extent of the land confiscated in the West Bank had increased from 27 per cent of the total area in May 1979 to 33.3 per cent last September. No precise figure has been given for additional confiscation of land in the Golan Heights. However, on the basis that only 5 Arab villages have been left and that only some 8,000 inhabitants have been able to remain out of the original population of 142,000, it seems fair to conclude that the occupying authorities control virtually all the land.

171. Similarly in the Gaza Strip, according to witnesses, confiscation of land is final; however, no reliable figures have been made available to show the extent of the land confiscated so far.

172. In the West Bank, some judicial actions have been taken by Arab inhabitants in an attempt to protect their rights, but apparently without any significant result.

173. It may be worth recalling in this regard the various methods used by the Israeli authorities to acquire land or property. Those methods, which were described in the first report, 16/ may be summarized as follows:

(i) Acquisition of public lands allocated for public facilities or for the expansion of municipal zones;

(ii) The expropriation of privately owned land by invoking the Emergency Law, which in its revised form authorized military governors to declare certain areas as zones closed for military purposes;

(iii) The confiscation of "Absentees' property"; and

(iv) The compulsory sale of land under military pressure.

174. This time, however, the particular attention of the Commission was drawn to another aspect of the matter, namely that the establishment of a settlement in the occupied territories is by no means a static event, but, the beginning of a dynamic process of expansionism. In such circumstances, the chances are not equal between the Israeli settlers and the Arab inhabitants, and the Commission was repeatedly informed of increased harassment of the Arabs, particularly those living close to the neighbouring settlements. It was noted in that regard that such harassment, which in the past was essentially initiated by the occupying authorities, was now frequently resorted to by the settlers themselves, acting without any restraint from the military authorities, for the purpose of bringing the Arab owners to despair thus causing them to abandon their coveted land.

(d) Jerusalem

175. Deep concern about the unilateral transformation of East Jerusalem has been expressed by every authority with whom the Commission has had an opportunity to exchange views.

176. The Commission was reminded that shortly after the 1967 war, East Jerusalem was the subject of an illegal and unilateral decision by Israel to annex the Holy City and to incorporate it into the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality. Then a special policy was applied to the Holy City to alter its demographic character by creating conditions for the replacement of the Arab inhabitants with a Jewish population through an intensive programme of settlement.

177. Despite United Nations resolutions opposing any measures which could alter the demographic character of the Holy City, the construction programme by Israel which started several years ago has been actively pursued. According to recent information, by early 1980 six major new residential suburbs housing over 50,000 Israelis had been practically finished, thus encircling the 110,000 Palestinians who were still living in East Jerusalem and separating them from the rest of the West Bank. Furthermore, a plan was announced last March for the construction of a wide living complex in the district of Beit Hanina. In addition, the Commission was also informed of the existence of another plan called the "Greater Jerusalem Plan" which is reported to be under implementation. That plan would lead to the additional expropriation or dispersion of some 130,000 Arab inhabitants living in 27 villages in order to include the area concerned within the city limit of "Greater Jerusalem".

178. On several occasions the Commission was also reminded of Israel's recent announcement that Jerusalem had become the united capital of Israel. Following that so-called "basic law", although it was censured by the Security Council, initiatives were taken by the Israeli authorities to transfer into East Jerusalem not only the Office of the Prime minister - a move which raised international concern - but also a number of official services and several ministries.

179. As to the building to be used by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the work is said to be proceeding. Arab properties adjacent to it have already been confiscated and several Arab families have been ordered to vacate their nearby houses due to be demolished.

B. Depletion of water resources in the occupied Arab territories

(a) Introduction

180. Early in the course of its examination of the situation relating to settlements in the occupied Arab territories including Jerusalem, the Commission came upon three basic elements regarding the question of water resources in those territories, namely: that the use and control of water resources there was a matter of vital importance for the economic and social life of the Arab inhabitants; that a significant part of those water resources was used by Israel to sustain its own economic viability and that of its settlements; and that the Israeli authorities were manipulating the allocation of water in the occupied territories as a means of economic pressure for political purposes against the Arab population there.

181. The matter was brought to the attention of the Security Council. At the 2203rd meeting on 1 March 1980, the Council adopted resolution 465 (1980), which requested the Commission to continue to examine the situation in the territories, it also requested the Commission to investigate the question of the depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources, with a view to ensuring their protection.

182. Accordingly during its recent visit to the area, the Commission sought to obtain as much additional information as possible on the matter. It also examined relevant documentation published by Governments, international bodies, organizations or private experts.

183. The following account contains a summary of the information so obtained, all gathered from sources considered reliable. The Commission undertook efforts to check and verify the accuracy of the information so received, where necessary, with representatives of those Governments which had expressed willingness to cooperate with the Commission.

(b) Importance of the availability of water in the area

184. An adequate supply of water for drinking, personal hygiene and other domestic purposes is essential to public health and well-being. Furthermore, in many rural areas, the amount of water available for agricultural irrigation and animal consumption is considered as one of the most determinant factors of success or failure in agriculture and animal husbandry. But when the question of water availability arises in connexion with an arid land, it may become a key to life and eventually a major cause of conflict.

185. Such has been the case in the area concerned where, because of climate and geography, water resources are scarce, the only permanent sources being the Jordan River and its tributary system and the subterranean aquifer.

186. The Jordan River flows southward in the rift which extends from northern Syria across the Red Sea into Egypt. It is formed in the Hulah Basin in northern Israel by the confluence of 3 separate headwater springs - the Hasbani, the Banias and the Dan - which rise in Lebanon, Syria and Israel respectively. These converge about 25 kilometres above Lake Tiberias to form the Upper Jordan which, enlarged by numerous springs, flows in a narrow channel to Lake Tiberias. At the southern end of the Lake, it is joined by its main tributary, the Yarmouk which forms part of the border between Syria and Jordan. It then flows through the Jordan Valley to the Dead Sea. As the Jordan River reaches the Dead Sea, its salinity increases. Although the river is not navigable, its waters are valuable for irrigation but do not solve the problem of water shortage in the area. The situation is rendered more complex by the fact that the Jordan basin forms a single hydrologic unit; and that, furthermore Israel and the West Bank constitute a single natural and geological region for the exploitation of underground water and the collection of surface run-off water.

187. Therefore, in an area which is so politically divided, whoever controls the sources of the water supply and its subsequent use retains powerful means of determining the level of the economic activity of the whole area with significant social and political consequences.

188. For that reason, over the years numerous plans have been drawn up for the utilization of the water resources of the Jordan River.17/
Any attempt to find a comprehensive solution to the Middle East question has generally been accompanied with proposals concerning the distribution of water resources, such as the Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region which was prepared at the request of UNRWA and proposed in 1955. Essentially for political reasons, that plan as well as all the others were not found acceptable by some or all of the parties concerned and no peaceful solution could be found to the water problem, which has never ceased to be crucial. It should be noted in that regard that until 1967, many of the incidents which took place between Israel and its Arab neighbours had their origin in attempts by one side or the other to control, divert or use unilaterally the water resources of the area. Bitterness is still vivid on that regard: for instance, the Commission was reminded of a military action conducted by Israeli troops before 1967 against the village of Qalqilia, located just across the Israeli-Jordanian border, as a result of which 11 artesian wells were purposely destroyed. 18/

189. The availability of water resources in the area has always been recognized as a matter of paramount importance. In this connexion it may be recalled that in an article published in 1956 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which analyzed the essentials of the Israeli water programme submitted by the Israel Ministry of Finance to the Jerusalem Conference of World Zionist Leaders in October 1953, the author concluded that while Israel's concerted efforts to carry out all the preliminary stages of those long-range plans had had a striking success, it was also clear that within the limits of its then existing water resources, Israel could not complete many of the projects needed to relieve its heavy dependence on food imports. 19/

190. After the 1967 war, Israel gained almost full control of the main sources of water in the area and since then has strictly organized the system of water distribution in the occupied territories with close links to its own national water system.

(c) Interest of Israel in obtaining additional water resources

191. The present population of Israel is given as 3,903,700. 20/ The Arab population in the West Bank is estimated at 673,000; in addition in 1979 there were some 91,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank including 76,000 living in the Jerusalem area. 21/

192. From the time of its establishment in 1948 until 1967 Israel's annual water consumption rose by more than 600 per cent. 22/ During that period, Israel obtained one third of its annual water requirements by drilling artesian wells and pumping water from the water aquifer system that also contains the water reserves for the West Bank. As its water needs have increased since then, Israel has continued to avail itself of this source of water. It is estimated that the water retained in underground aquifers amounts to 600 million cubic metres per year (MCM). This, in addition to 250 MCM of surface run-off and the waters of the Jordan River, makes a total potential of 850 MCM,23/ of which only 620 MCM is reported to be easily usable. 24/ According to available figures, Israel is currently drawing some 500 MCM from the aquifer,25/ thus leaving about 120 MCM of water for all the inhabitants of the West Bank.

193. In a recent study submitted at the United Nations Water Conference, the representative of Israel indicated that the total known feasible water resources in Israel amounted to 1,700 MCM which he said was sufficient to irrigate about 10 per cent of the gross area. Adding that the coastal area contained ground water supplies but that excessive over-all withdrawal rates must therefore be avoided to prevent sea-water intrusion, he said that the amount of water presently utilized in Israel exceeded 20 per cent of the utilizable portion of Israel's water potential.26/

194. Considering that it is estimated that by 1985 Israel's total requirements will rise to approximately 2,000 MCM, 27/ additional water sources are clearly needed.

195. In that regard Israel has reported a number of experiences with cloud seeding and weather modification for creation of artificial rain, desalinization of sea water, reclamation and purification of water from sewage, and development of water-saving technologies.27/ However, either on account of prohibitive costs, uncertainty or the small yield of expected results, or because of the long span of time required to obtain the requisite product, none of the proposed measures has given confident optimism for filling the projected deficit in Israel's water supply. Accordingly, internal pressure has been exerted on Israeli authorities to increase Israel's water supply from West Bank sources.

(d) Depletion of water resources in the West Bank

196. According to figures quoted by the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society "Agricultural sector and water resources in the West Bank." from a study by Hisham Awartani, 30/ average individual total water consumption on the West Bank amounts to 142 cubic metres per year compared to 537 cubic metres in Israel. Of that amount, 13 cubic metres is used for domestic consumption in the West Bank and 86 cubic metres in Israel. The total amount of water used for agriculture in Israel is about 15 times greater than the corresponding amount used on the West Bank (1,325 MCM to 90 MCM per annum).

197. The combined annual total for industrial and domestic use in Israel amounts to 395 MCM as compared to 10 MCM for the West Bank. Furthermore, the present circumstances of occupation make it inevitable that the total quantity of water left for use on the West Bank must be shared between the Arab population and the Israeli settlers. It is reported that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are presently using about 15 MCM of water per year, 5 million of which is spent in the agricultural sector. Future agricultural development in those settlements, it is estimated, may require as much s 50 MCM of water annually. 31/

198. The above figures tend to justify the growing apprehension among the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank for their own survival in view of their present deprivation, which is exacerbated by Israel's catering to the needs of an increasing number of its settlers. Such is the extent of deprivation that, according to the information received so far, the economic activity of a number of the Arab inhabitants has already been reduced to subsistence level, as the water originally available to them has been turned to the benefit of the Israeli settlers. In some cases, it has been reported that Arab villagers have been forced to abandon their exsiccated farmlands in order to find an alternative livelihood elsewhere.

199. Since 1967 the Israeli Water Company, Mekorot, has drilled 17 deep-bored wells to serve Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley alone, many of the new wells in close proximity to the existing Arab wells in the area, numbering 88. During 1977-1978 the 17 Israeli wells produced 14.1 MCM of water (i.e. approximately 830,000 CM per well), as compared to 9.9 MCM from the 88 Arab wells (i.e. approximately 112,500 CM per well),32/ a yield by far inferior to their earlier output. That situation was attributed to two main factors: the depletion of the available amount of ground water diverted to the exclusive use of the Israeli settlers, and the restrictive control imposed on the Arab population by the occupying Power concerning the water resources. 33/

(e) Israel's policies concerning the control of water resource sin the occupied Arab territories

200. All matters concerning the exploitation, distribution and use of water in Israel are under the direct control of the Israel Water Commission. Two companies, Mekorot (Israel Water Company) and Taahal (Water Planning for Israel Company) both operating under that Commission, as well as the Commission's Department for Water Allocation and Certification, are entrusted with supply and management of water resources to all users under Israeli rule. Since 1967, the Israeli Water Commission, through its Department of Water Allocation and Certification, has taken over direct control of the water supply in the occupied Arab territories. 34/

201. The policies and objectives attributed to the Israeli authorities with regard to the handling of water resources in the occupied territories, particularly in the West Bank, have already been referred to by the Commission in its previous reports. In the course of the examination of the information made available to it, the Commission came across evidence that most of the Israeli practices in that regard fell under the following categories: measures based on claims of national security requirements; restrictive measures aimed at controlling the search for, and the development and use of, water by the Arab population; and practices resulting in quantitative reduction of, and subsequent qualitative damage to, the water made available to them.

202. A number of instances were pointed out to the Commission in substantiation of those practices. Thus, the Commission was told that in the early days of the occupation, Israeli authorities under the claim of security blew up 140 Arab pumps installed on the West Bank of the River Jordan. As a result of that action, the Arab farmers were prevented from pumping water from the river for agricultural irrigation whereas the Israeli settlers in the area were allowed to continue to do so. Also, in the summer of 1979, Israeli military authorities destroyed the irrigation canals alongside many of the citrus and banana plantations in the district of Al-Jiftlik on grounds of establishing a new security belt, thus causing the desiccation and destruction of extensive areas of crops.

203. As to any endeavours by Arab farmers to undertake water development projects, it was said that they were systematically discouraged by the occupying authorities. In contrast, new hydrological surveys have been undertaken by the Israeli settlement authorities in cooperation with the Mekorot Company to meet the water needs of the Israeli agricultural settlements. On the basis of those surveys, Mekorot has since 1968 drilled altogether 30 new artesian wells in the West Bank for the exclusive use of the Israeli settlements. Moreover, a number of wells belonging to those whom Israel calls Arab absentee owners are now being used exclusively for the settlements. Furthermore, since the early seventies, all users have been required to install meters on their wells to enable the Israeli authorities to check on the water used. Only meager quantities of extraction from Arab wells are permitted, and penalties are imposed for pumping in excess of the authorized limits.

204. The drilling of any new artesian wells or deepening of existing ones is forbidden without special permits. Since 1967 no such permit has been granted to any Arab inhabitant in connexion with irrigation wells; and under heavy public pressure, only seven permits have been granted for the purpose of boring wells for domestic purposes.35/

205. It is worthy of note that under no circumstances are Arab inhabitants permitted to drill wells close to the borders of Israel. The rejection of such a request by the inhabitants of Nablus in that regard is a case in point. In contrast, as already stated, many Israeli wells have reportedly been drilled in close proximity to existing Arab wells and springs, with a most detrimental effect on the quality and quantity of water made available to Arab inhabitants.36/ In some cases, village wells and springs have dried up altogether. Specific references were made in that regard to the villages of Al-Auja, Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Bardala, Tel-el-Beida, and Kardala whose water supply had been drastically diminished owing to the new wells dug for Israeli settlements within a few hundred metres of the existing Arab springs or wells.

206. That policy was said to be followed in disregard of the vital interest of the Arab population. Thus in the instance of the village of Tel-el-Beida, Mekorot advised the neighbouring Israeli settlement of Mehola in 1968 that a planned new well for the settlement would adversely affect the five neighbouring Arab wells and springs; nevertheless the proposed Israeli well was dug, and as a result of it, the output of water from the central spring of Tel-el-Beida fell from 80 cubic metres per hour before 1970 to barely 5 cubic metres per hour in 1976. 37/

207. It happened that in such cases the occupying authorities offered to the Arab inhabitants concerned, as an alternative arrangement, to have their water provided by the Israeli settlement. That offer was made, for instance, to the inhabitants of Bardala at the time their well's pump had to be reset deeper. The Mekorot Company then offered to connect the village's water supply to that of the neighbouring Israeli settlement in exchange for closing the village well. The villagers refused the offer, for fear of becoming dependent on the shims of the settlers and they reset their pump. But thereafter, a second Israeli well was drilled in the immediate vicinity, raising the fears of the villagers that after their well dried up they would be compelled anyway to buy water from the Israeli settlement on a per-person basis. In that connexion the Commission was reminded that in the Bardala/Tel-el-Beida area mentioned above, 11 springs and all but one of the eight Arab artesian wells had dried up.

(f) Depletion of the water resources in the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip

208. Although evidence of the Israeli water policies is documented mostly in connexion with the West Bank, similar practices have been experienced by the Arab inhabitants in the Golan Heights and in the Gaza Strip. Before 1967, according to information provided by the Syrian authorities, more than 140,000 Arab inhabitants in the Golan Heights were using 12.5 MCM per year. Presently, barely some 8,000 of the original Arab inhabitants still remain in the Golan Heights, while the number of Israeli settlers is estimated at 6,400. Additional plans have been announced to increase the number of settlers up to 10,000 by the end of 1981 and 50,000 by 1985, of whom 20,000 are expected to be settled in agricultural and industrial villages. 38 In order to meet the water requirements of the settlers by then, the Israeli plan calls for increasing the water supply in the Golan Heights to a level of consumption amounting to 46 MCM which may deprive the Arab population of its own supply.

209. With regard to the Gaza Strip, the Commission received information similar to that already reported above concerning, in particular, the restrictions imposed on the amount of water that could be used for irrigation by the Arab inhabitants who furthermore had to pay high prices for each cubic metre of water, while by contrast water was free for Israeli settlers. Furthermore, it was repeatedly pointed out to the Commission that the Arab inhabitants in Gaza, like those in the West Bank and the Golan Heights, were deprived of any possibilities of developing their own water resources.

(g) Information relevant to other natural resources

210. Information was also received about a decision taken last August by the Israeli Cabinet by which it had approved in principle a plan to construct a canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Dead Sea. The proposed route for that canal would start at the village of Katif in the Gaza Strip north of Khan Yunis, and run in a southeastern direction across the Negev desert to Ein Bokek on the Dead Sea. Full details of the plan and the impact of the canal are not yet known. However, the Commission feels it appropriate to draw the Council's attention to the plan which, according to data reported to the Commission, might, through a drastic rise in the water level, alter the mineral content of the Dead Sea, damage its ecology and endanger Jordan's mineral works on the eastern shore.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

211. With the submission of this third report, the Commission considers that it has fulfilled the mandate which was originally entrusted to it by Security Council resolution 446 adopted on 22 March 1979, i.e. "to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem", and which was first renewed on 20 July 1979 and again on 1 March 1980 together with an additional request to investigate the reported depletion of water as one of the most important natural resources of those territories.

212. During that period of 20 months the Commission has followed closely the developments in the occupied Arab territories and has also had the opportunity not only to receive the views of government and other officials, leaders of organizations and private individuals, all of those directly concerned with the question, but also to reassess periodically the accuracy of its earlier findings through renewed or additional contacts. The Commission cannot but deplore that despite the repeated appeals it has made, in particular, on 13 April, 28 September 1979 and 18 June 1980, it has been unable to obtain the cooperation of the Government of Israel.

213. In concluding this report the Commission would like therefore to give both its assessment of the present situation and its views on the trend of developments which it has carefully observed during the period of its mandate.

214. Concerning the present situation, the Commission has been informed that since the adoption by the Council of resolution 446 (1979) referred to above which also called upon Israel "... not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories", Israel has established 33 additional settlements and expanded the size of a number of others.

215. The establishment and expansion of those settlements has led to further confiscation of Arab lands. In the West Bank, for instance, the extent of the land confiscated has increased from 27 per cent of the total area in May 1979 to 33.3 per cent in September 1980.

216. As foreseen by the Commission in its last report, 39/ the pursuance of that settlement policy has led to a further deterioration in the situation in the occupied Arab territories. The Commission considers that that deterioration has been felt in particular in the human, economic and demographic areas.

A. Impact of the settlement policy on the living conditions of the Arab population

217. The consequences of the settlement policy on the living conditions of the Arab population have already been described in the first report of the Commission. 40/.

218. During its last visit the Commission was informed that the situation in that regard had further deteriorated. Among the means of repression, both individual and collective, the most frequently cited were the imposition of heavy fines or even imprisonment for anything which could be described as "political activity"; the establishment of curfews and sometimes the isolation of a city bringing further hardship to the population, as was the case in Hebron; the destruction of crops and of private houses; and the control of water resources.

219. Arab leaders who dare oppose Israel's policies are subjected to particular harassment which may include confiscation of their property or expulsion as was the case examined by the Security Council in May 1980.

220. The occupying authorities have taken control of the educational field including the programme of studies and the texts to be used, in a further attempt to discourage the Arab population from remaining in the area. Students have been arbitrarily arrested. As a most disconcerting example of harassment, the attention of the Commission was again drawn to cases of arrest of young school children. Such cases had previously been reported to the Commission.41/ It was said that such arrests had become a method used to frighten the Arab population in the context of creating conditions adverse to their remaining in the territories. Children were said to be submitted to harsh and intimidating interrogation by police and military authorities.

221. The Commission considers therefore that by its consequences on the living conditions of the Arab population in the occupied territories Israel's policy of settlement is a constant cause of violation of the basic human rights of the Arab inhabitants.

B. Impact of the settlement policy on the economic life of the Arab population

222. The Commission was given a number of examples showing that by its settlement policy Israel has undermined the economic life of the occupied territories.

223. Concerning agriculture, Israel has expropriated large areas of land and utilized the available water resources, essentially to the benefit of its settlers.

224. It is the considered view of the Commission that water, being such a scarce and vital commodity in the area, should be shared by the inhabitants on equitable terms. It is therefore in the interest of all the legitimate users to ensure that a mutually acceptable mechanism is established which will guarantee such equitable distribution.

225. Israel has imposed strict financial regulations on the activities of local populations concerning industry. At the same time all the Arab banks have been closed or taken over. Meanwhile, large industrial Israeli complexes which benefit from Government's support are being established in the midst of densely populated areas, thereby undermining existing Arab businesses which in any case are compelled to buy basic materials from Israel.

226. As a whole, the occupying authorities have taken control of the resources and public facilities in the territories, including manpower and the public services. The de facto control of the Electricity Company of Jerusalem, a matter presently pending before an Israeli court, is a case in point.

227. The Commission considers as credible the statement made by government authorities that a main advantage which Israel is deriving from its occupation is the alleviation of its national economic difficulties through the control and exploitation of the occupied Arab territories.

C. Impact of the settlement policy on the demography of the occupied Arab territories

228. Concern about demographic changes resulting from the settlement policy have been repeatedly expressed to the Commission, as reflected extensively in the Commission's previous reports.

229. In the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, where the Arab population is still considerable, the policy of harassment is generally construed as an endeavour to force the Arab inhabitants to leave their lands which could thereafter be settled by Israelis.

230. In the Golan Heights the Arab population has been reduced to 6 per cent of its number in 1967, and the number of villages to 3 per cent, while at the same time the number of Israeli settlers has almost matched that of the remaining Arab population, and the number of settlements is now above that of the Arab villages.

231. In the Jerusalem area alone there are approximately 80,000 settlers while the remaining Arab population there numbers barely 110,000.

232. The Commission considers that time has come to explore the possibility of having a United Nations presence established in the area as a first step to ensure normalization of the situation and to create a congenial atmosphere for negotiations by the parties under United Nations auspices on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions. In that framework consideration should be given to the return of the refugees and other persons forced to leave their homes.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

233. In the fulfillment of its mandate and during its contacts with government authorities, pertinent organizations and private individuals directly concerned, the Commission has examined the situation in the closest manner possible as the previous reports so indicate. The Commission has noted deep anxiety about what was unanimously considered as a continuous process of deterioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, which is marked by heightened tensions and increased conflict and could lead to a major conflagration.

234. Consequently after having carefully examined all the elements of information which the Commission has been in a position to gather in the implementation of its mandate, the Commission would like to reaffirm the entirety of the conclusions contained in its two previous reports; and more specifically the following:

(a) The Israeli Government is actively pursuing its wilful, systematic large-scale process of establishing settlements in the occupied territories;

(b) A correlation exists between the establishment of Israeli settlements and the displacement of the Arab population;

(c) In the implementation of its policy of settlements, Israel is resorting to methods - often coercive and sometimes more subtle - which include the control of water resources, the seizure of private property, the destruction of houses and the banishment of persons in complete disregard for basic human rights;

(d) The settlement policy has brought drastic and adverse changes to the economic and social pattern of the daily life of the remaining Arab population; and is causing profound changes of a geographical and demographic nature in the occupied territories including Jerusalem;

(e) Those changes constitute a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and of the relevant decisions adopted by the Security Council in the matter.

235. Consequently, the Commission wishes to reiterate that Israel's policy of settlement, by which, as an example, 33.3 per cent of the West Bank has been confiscated to date, has no legal validity and constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the area.

236. In view of the recent deterioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, the Commission considers that Israel's settlement policy, with the unjustified sufferings which it imposes on a defenseless population is an incitement to further unrest and violence.

237. The Israeli policy of settlements has led to major displacements and dispossession of Palestinians, adding to the ever-growing number of refugees with all the attendant consequences.

238. Available evidence shows that Israeli occupying authorities continue to deplete the natural resources, particularly water resources in the occupied territories for their advantage and to the detriment of the Palestinian people.

239. As water is a scarce and precious commodity in the area, its control and apportionment means control of the most vital means of survival. It would seem therefore, that Israel employs water both as an economic and even political weapon to further its policy of settlements. Consequently, the economy and agriculture of the Arab population is adversely affected by the exploitation of water resources by the occupying authorities.

240. On Jerusalem, the Commission has noted with grave concern that tension and confrontation between Israel and the Islamic world have increased, especially following the enactment of a "basic law" in the Israeli Knesset, proclaiming change in the character and status of the Holy City, which has also affected Christendom.

B. Recommendations

241. In view of the observations and conclusions above, the Commission would like to make the following recommendations.

242. After a thorough assessment of the situation, and in the light of the numerous recommendations of the United Nations which are yet to be implemented to deal with the potentially explosive dangers therein, and in the light of the information available, the Commission has come to the conclusion that appropriate ways and means under the auspices of the United Nations should be found to arrest the situation in the interest of the parties involved, and in the interest of peace and security in the region and the world at large.

243. In the Commission's view, the problem of settlements and occupation raises fundamental problems for peace. The longer they continue to persist the greater the potential for escalating the conflict. Mutual trust and acceptance through coexistence will be rendered difficult if not impossible in the area of the opportunities are missed. The Commission perceived a clear consensus in favour of a negotiated settlement and believes that the international community should take advantage of that favourable climate to advance the resolution of the problem. The Commission is of the view that the settlements policy is one of the major components at the core of the conflict in the area.

244. In that context the Commission considers that the persistent refusal of Israel to heed the repeated appeals of the Security Council on the matter should be censured.

245. The Commission once again deems it necessary to reiterate its earlier recommendation that the Security Council, bearing in mind the inalienable rights of the Palestinians to return to their homeland, again draw the attention of the Government and people of Israel to the disastrous consequences which the settlement policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

246. The Commission is of the view that Israel should be made aware of the serious deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories resulting from its policy of settlement and called upon, as a matter of urgency, to cease the establishment, construction, expansion and planning of settlements in those territories.

247. In view of the vital importance of water resources for the prosperity of the occupied Arab territories and of the serious depletion of those resources as result of intensive exploitation by the Israeli authorities, mainly for the benefit of the Israeli settlements the Commission recommends that appropriate measures should be sought for an equitable allocation of water resources in the area outside of any political considerations.

248. With regard to Jerusalem, bearing in mind what was already stated in its previous reports, the Commission again strongly recommends that the Security Council urge the Government of Israel to implement fully the Security Council resolutions adopted on that question as from 1967, including resolution 478 (1980), by which the Council determined, inter alia, that the "basic law" on Jerusalem must be rescinded forthwith, and to desist from taking any further measures which would change the status of Jerusalem, including the pluralistic and religious dimensions of that Holy City.

249. The Commission wishes to reiterate its recommendation that the Security Council adopt effective measures to prevail on Israel to cease forthwith its settlements policies in all aspects in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

ANNEXES

Contents

I. Summaries of testimony

II. List of settlements

III. List of new settlements planned for 1981

IV. Communication received by the Commission in connexion with paragraph 23 of their report

V. Documents received by the Commission and retained in the custody of the Secretariat

Annex I

SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONY

1. In the course of its second visit to the area, the Commission heard individual testimony in addition to the discussions with government officials and with the representatives of pertinent organizations in the countries visited.

2. The substantial part of those discussions has been reflected in the body of the report. Also in the report can be found an analysis of the testimony received.

3. Individual summaries of the testimony have been prepared by the Secretariat. They are reproduced in this annex in the order in which the witnesses appeared before the Commission, i.e., 6 in Amman and 6 in Cairo as follows:

I. Amman, Jordan - 27 September 1980

Witness No. 1: Mrs. Aisha Musa

Witness No. 2: Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib

Witness No. 3: Anonymous

Witness No. 4: Dr. Walid Mustafa

Witness No. 5: Anonymous

Witness No. 6: Anonymous

II. Cairo, Egypt - 30 September 1980

Witness No. 7: Anonymous

Witness No. 8: Anonymous

Witness No. 9: Anonymous

Witness No. 10: Anonymous

Witness No. 11: Anonymous

Witness No. 12: Anonymous

I. JORDAN

Witness No. 1 - Mrs. Aisha Musa

1. The first witness said that she was from the town of Qalqilia and that at the beginning of July 1980, she visited her son, Anis Dolleh, who had been imprisoned in Ashqlan. When she wanted to visit him for the second time, she was unable to do so because there was a hunger strike going on in the Ashqlan prison. Later on, when she visited him she found him complaining of maltreatment. Before her fourth intended visit she learned that her son had died.

2. The Mayor of Qalqilia, Haj Ameen Al Nasr, was informed of the death by the Red Cross. She said that she wanted to bury her son in the Qalqilia and that she tried every avenue for 22 days to get the body from the Israeli authorities but was unsuccessful.

Witness No. 2 - Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem

3. The witness said that during his previous testimony before the Commission a/ he had outlined Israel's acts of aggression against the Holy City and the Palestinian people, of which he had been in a position to have knowledge in particular, until his expulsion from Jerusalem on 7 March 1968.

4. He indicated his intention this time to draw attention to specific actions which had occurred since his last appearance.

(i) Excavations conducted in the Holy City

5. Mr. El-Khatib said that Israel had continued its illegal digging inside the city walls, especially around such holy Islamic Shrines as the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Dome of the Rock. In that area, he said, the excavations were essentially concentrated on the southern and western sides of the Al Aqsa Mosque, where the Israelis carried out diggings of various depths, from 10 to 14 metres, in an area 50 metres wide. This was done in spite of the various resolutions which UNESCO had adopted on the matter, condemning these excavations and appealing to Israel to desist forthwith from continuing the excavations undertaken unlawfully. As a result of that work, one building had collapsed and 26 others were so badly damaged that several hundreds of inhabitants had to be evacuated. The witness added that such vandalism was all the more deplorable in view of a letter published in the London Times of 17 August 1972 by a leading archaeologist, Dr. Kathleen Kenyon, describing those historic buildings as unique treasures of the Islamic Mamluk period, and emphasizing that similar treasures existed only in Cairo. The witness indicated that he had sent a communication to UNESCO on the matter.

(ii) Arbitrary measures against the Electricity Company of Jerusalem

6. Mr. El-Khatib stated that the Electricity Company of Jerusalem was the largest share-holding company on the West Bank with shares owned by approximately 2,000 Arabs. It was supplying electricity to around 300,000 inhabitants and 131 industrial enterprises.

7. On 31 December 1979, an order had been issued by the Israeli Minister of Energy and the Military Commander of the West Bank to the Electricity Company of Jerusalem to sell its undertaking as defined in its concession. The sale was to become effective on 1 January 1981. The purpose was to integrate the Arab company into the Israeli system.

8. On the same day, the Chairman of the Board conveyed to the Minister of Energy the company's protest and rejection of that arbitrary measure which was contrary to international law and requested the Minister to reconsider the decision.

9. The Israeli occupation authorities refused to reconsider the matter and the company submitted the case to the Court where it is still pending.

(iii) Expropriation of Arab lands around Jerusalem

10. The witness referred also to an article published in the Jerusalem Post of 8 November 1974 under the headline "For the construction of a fortress in Jerusalem", which described the construction made by Israel on expropriated Arab lands during the period 1968-1973 and the Israeli settlements, which had been established in the northern and eastern parts of the city after 1967. Since then, the witness said, the Israeli authorities continued to expropriate more of the Arab lands around Jerusalem. The most important case happened in February 1980, when the Israeli authorities took 600 dunums from the village of Abu Dees, south of Jerusalem. On 11 March 1980, Israel further expropriated 1,000 dunums from the village of Al Isawiya, east of Jerusalem. The purpose of these expropriations was, according to Israeli sources, to establish new settlements to accommodate 60,000 settlers. But, clearly enough, it was also to encircle the whole city of Jerusalem and to cut it from the rest of the West Bank.

(iv) Closure of the Arab Science College of Abu Dees

11. Mr. El-Khatib stated also that on 16 March 1980, the Board of Abu Dees' Faculty and its benevolent society had been taken by surprise by an order issued by the Israeli military authorities to close the Faculty within two weeks on the pretext that, with three other universities and 12 Arab institutions in the West Bank, the Palestinian students had sufficient educational facilities.

12. The Board of the Faculty submitted a complaint supported by a report made by English educators and experts to the effect that the West Bank institutions would not be able to absorb more than 30 per cent of the students of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities closed the Faculty on 1 April 1980.

(v) Law declaring Jerusalem the "undivided capital" of Israel

13. Mr. El-Khatib recalled that since 1947 the international community had refused to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Despite subsequent decisions adopted by international organizations, in particular since 1967, refusing to recognize the annexation of the remaining part of Jerusalem to Israel, the Israeli Parliament, on 20 July 1980, enacted a law declaring Jerusalem the "undivided Capital" of Israel. In his particular capacity as Mayor of Jerusalem Mr. El-Khatib strongly objected to that decision.

(vi) Decision to transfer the Prime Minister's office

14. As to the well-known decision to establish the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem, Mr. El-Khatib said that offices were being built for that very purpose on lands taken by force from their Arab owners. He recalled that that action had been examined by the Security Council which had declared that decision null and void and called for the restitution of the lands to their Arab owners. The witness added that among the families who had fallen victim to that expropriation was his own family, which had lost 60,000 square metres of "waqf" land on which the Israeli construction for those offices had already started. Recently, it was reported that those offices would be shortly ready for occupancy and that the office of the Prime Minister would be transferred there in accordance with previous planning.

Witness No. 3 - Anonymous

15. The witness said that he was going to talk about what he had witnessed himself in Hebron which, after Jerusalem, was the other most important target of Israel's colonization. A number of settlements were established on the hills overlooking the town, the largest one being that of Kiryat Arba. The inhabitants of Hebron had protested and demonstrated against the establishment of that settlement, which was done by force. In response, the Israeli authorities had assured them that the settlement was only a military camp and that no civilian would ever inhabit it. But soon after, Israeli settlers came to the area, most of them belonging to a religious group of fanatics. The settlements were then expanded and Arab villages demolished and Arab lands expropriated for the use of the settlement. To take Arab lands and properties, the Israeli authorities had used the same methods as in the past. Recently, they had also occupied the hills of Alfa'abera and Al Dabyieh. The Arab inhabitants submitted the case to the Court, where it was still pending. But, while by taking the case to Court the pursuit of expropriation had suspended, the inhabitants were still forbidden to build on their land pending the Court's decision. Meanwhile the settlers of Kiryat Arba were engaged in ceaseless acts of provocation and aggression against the local inhabitants, whose complaints to the Israeli authorities were systematically ignored.

16. After the establishment of Kiryat Arba, the Ibrahim Mosque - a deeply revered Islamic shrine - became the target of the settlers. They first demanded the right to visit the Mosque, then later on to pray in it; and finally they had taken over the control of two thirds of it. The Jews were provoking the Moslem worshippers by acts of profanity and desecration with the acquiescence and sometimes encouragement of the Israeli authorities. Complaints by the municipality of Hebron, as well as the inhabitants, having been to no avail, a serious situation developed.

17. A month later an attack was conducted on settlements, and a number of people were killed. A curfew was imposed for 17 days, after which the Mayor of Hebron and the Sharia Judge of Hebron were informed that a meeting had been arranged for them with the Minister of Defense; but instead of going to that meeting they found themselves expelled to Lebanon.

18. With the establishment of the curfew in Hebron all outside communications were cut, including telephone services. The authorities forbade any food to enter the city, including food which had been sent by the people of Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem. Famine prevailed and milk was very scarce. Babies and older people died as a result of these restrictions.

19. During the curfew some people were taken by force from their homes to the police station for interrogation. They were threatened, tortured and then those who were let free to return home found themselves exposed to the patrolmen who, during the curfew were allowed to shoot anyone found in the street. The witness referred specifically to the case of an old man who, after having been beaten up at the police station, was given a paper which he was told would permit him to return home safely. The old man was not aware of the contents of the paper, which, to the contrary, encouraged any patrolmen he might meet to beat him again.

20. Also during the curfew Arab houses were entered by force, those inside were violently treated, belongings were destroyed and the food, which was so scarce, was spilled on the ground or mixed together to make it inedible.

21. Those actions were not the act of unruly individuals. The military authorities had full knowledge of them; and in fact when an indignant soldier started speaking about it he was threatened by his authorities that if he spoke to the press about those acts he would appear before a military tribunal.

22. Among the numerous acts of violence committed against citizens, the witness recalled that one day he saw two young men who were taken away by force. He was informed later that they had been locked in a room with two wild dogs which mauled them. The witness saw the wounds himself and said that medical reports on the incident had been made.

23. The witness concluded by saying that the aim of those actions was to expel Arab landowners by law or by fear in order to bring foreigners to live in their place.

Witness No. 4 - Dr. Walid Mustafa

24. The witness said that he was the Chairman of the Geography Department and a member of the academic community of Nablus. He was deported on 23 July 1980 on the basis of an amendment which had just been brought to a standing military order. That amendment authorized Israeli military authorities to control the appointment of teachers and the subjects to be taught, as well as eventually the closing of any educational establishment.

25. The witness pointed out that such a law, which of course did not apply to the Israeli school system, was particularly damaging because there were not enough universities and high schools for Arab students in the occupied territories. That law, the witness said, was published early in July and he was deported on 23 July. Since the final end-of-term examinations were to start on 26 July, the head of the university asked that the witness - who was the only teacher with a Ph.D. in Geography in the west Bank - be allowed to stay until the end of the semester; but that request was denied.

26. The witness did not know the reason for his deportation. The soldiers who took him away said that they knew nothing about it and his request to see the military commander in Nablus was not answered. He was not even allowed to take his books with him nor to receive his payment from the University, nor to visit his 70-year-old mother, who still lives in Jerusalem.

27. In conclusion the witness expressed the view that his case was intended to be an example to other Arab teachers.

Witness No. 5 - Anonymous

28. The witness said that he had just come from the West Bank to address the Commission.

29. About one and a half years before, the military authority in Nablus had summoned him to let him know that 950 dunums of land belonging to 100 families were going to be expropriated. He protested, saying that those lands were the main source of livelihood of the people of the village. In reply the authorities told him that there were other ways of earning a livelihood, for example, working in Israel. The villagers decided to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, pointing out that the lands were private land inherited from generation to generation. The Court rejected the claim on the grounds that the order had come from the military authorities of the West Bank, and that the lands should be used solely for military purposes. Since then, nevertheless, most of the land has been sold and 600 additional dunums requisitioned.

30. The witness insisted that although the two major targets for Israeli settlements were Jerusalem and Hebron, in fact the real goal was the colonization of the whole of the occupied territories. He noted in that connexion that just a few days before the Commission arrived, an Israeli group came to visit a neighbouring area and everyone feared that there again they were planning for the establishment of a new settlement. Even land, which had been occupied by force with such complete lack of procedure that its seizure had been ruled illegal by the Court had not yet been returned to its Arab owners.

31. The pressure was relentless. About a week previously, the military authorities in Nablus had notified the mayors and chiefs of the municipality of the new restrictions concerning the use of underground water resources. Financial support which used to come from Jordan to help the villagers had been forbidden while additional pressure was being put on agricultural owners through high taxation.

32. The witness added that he hoped that the members of the Commission would be able to see with their own eyes the misery of the people living in the occupied lands and to convey the facts in its report.

Witness No. 6 - Anonymous

33. The witness said that he worked as a university professor in the occupied territory. People in his village watered their land from the spring of Al-Auja, but now the output of water was no longer sufficient because the Israelis had dug four artesian wells which produced 15,000 cubic metres of water to irrigate their own settlements. The amount of water thus pumped from those wells had brought the flow of Al-Auja spring to a mere trickle, especially because of the lack of rain. Furthermore, in spite of the low level of rainfall, the pumping of water from the artesian wells by the Israeli settlers had been increased, thus further diminishing the water which could have been used by the Arab inhabitants. The villagers had asked for authorization to dig a well for each family both for drinking and irrigation purposes. Their request had been rejected and their loss was considerable. An appeal to the military authorities went unheard.

34. Moreover, even the very limited supply of water allocated to the Arabs was sometimes stolen by the settlers during the night. The villagers set up a guard to protect their supply, but two days later a curfew starting at 7 p.m. was imposed by the military authorities.

35. There were several settlements around the witness's village which absorbed the villagers' manpower. This led to great losses during the harvest because of the scarcity of labour. Moreover, a decision was taken that any Arab worker employed in the settlements who also worked for the Arabs would be dismissed by the settlers. Even Arab children of 9 and 10 years of age were also put to work by the Israeli settlers.

36. The witness continued that even the situation of those who worked for the settlers was miserable because of the constant rise in prices in the occupied territories.

II. EGYPT

Witness NO. 1 - Anonymous

37. The witness introduced himself as a Palestinian residing in the Gaza Strip. Since 1968, the Israeli authorities had established a number of settlements surrounding the Strip from all directions, isolating it from Egypt and even isolating the villages from each other. Recalling that Gaza was small in area, densely populated and poor in resources, the witness added that the arrivals of new settlers who, in addition to expropriating the land also depleted the water resources, had created insufferable difficulties which led many Palestinians to despair and to leave. This in fact was clearly the aim of the policy pursued by the occupying authorities. It should be noted in that connexion, he said, that a few weeks previously the military authorities in Gaza had issued an order whereby Arabs were prohibited from constructing in an area stretching from Eritz Street in Gaza City to the cease-fire lines and one kilometre from the seacoast eastward, thus rendering even more difficult the relocation of refugees.

Witness No. 2 - Anonymous

38. The witness said that after 1967, Israel started to build settlements in the Gaza Strip. A number of settlements were established, mainly in six localities. To do so, large areas of land had been expropriated.

39. Settlers in those settlements, most of them religious fanatics, were allowed to carry arms in the midst of a defenceless population. Constant provocations by the settlers caused many incidents, in particular in Dir El-Balah and Rafah. The Arab victims were left without recourse, because they were not allowed to bring such matters to Court, while by contrast for any act of violence committed by a Palestinian, a collective punishment was imposed.

40. Concerning the depletion of water resources, the witness said that water consumption was free for the settlers but that the Arabs had to pay 8 Israeli pounds for each cubic metre. b/

41. There was no doubt for the witness that the location of the settlements around the Strip was made with a view to confine the Palestinians and in particular to isolate them from any contact with Egypt.

Witness No. 3 - Anonymous

42. The witness said that Israel, under the pretext of security purposes continued to establish settlements in the Gaza Strip.

43. Recalling that the Gaza Strip was small in size and endowed with very modest resources, he pointed out that, with a population of more than a half-million, the area was already over-population. The arrival of the Israeli settlers had rendered the situation hopeless.

44. Those settlements, the witnesses said, had been established in strategic locations and the presence of settlers who were armed, caused great fear among the inhabitants.

45. Arabs in the Gaza Strip were treated as second class citizens. They had no rights even for their daily business. As an example, he indicated that since all imports were controlled by the Israeli Chamber of Commerce, the inhabitants were prevented from importing goods or materials needed for their small industries.

46. Pondering on what the inhabitant should look for in the future, even if the current negotiations between Egypt and Israel led to the so-called self-rule in the area, he wondered whether in such case the lands taken away would be returned to the people of Gaza or whether the Israeli settlements would be maintained as a state within a state.

Witness No. 4 - Anonymous

47. The witness said that the establishment of settlements was bound to delay the process of peace and expressed the conviction that in fact they would prevent the Palestinian people from regaining their rights.

48. Talking about the difficulties encountered by the farmers in Gaza, the witness said that the amount of water to be used for irrigation was restricted and that the users had to pay high prices for the very water which they had dug themselves. He also informed the Commission of the most recent restriction imposed by the Israeli authorities, prohibiting construction in a wide area.

Witness No. 5 - Anonymous

49. The witness said that the total area of Gaza was 360 square kilometres, which was distributed as follows: houses occupied 180 square kilometres; orchards, farms and agricultural land covered 90 square kilometres; roads and the like covered 10 square kilometres and 70 square kilometres had been so far used for Israeli settlements, leaving aside 10 square kilometres from the total area of the Strip.

50. The population of Gaza was approximately 600,000 including the refugees. He noted that before the establishment of those settlements, the Strip was already suffering from over-population.

51. Settlements had been established in such a way as to surround the Strip from all directions. While the settlers could go anywhere, the inhabitants were restricted in their movements particularly in the area close to the settlements. As to the water resources, water was supplied at no cost and with no limitation to the settlers, while Arab farmers' consumption was restricted to definite amounts and a high price had to be paid.

52. Speaking of specific cases of expropriation for the establishment of settlements, the witness said that in the village of Beit Lahya 500 dunums had been taken from one inhabitant and 200 dunums from another one. He gave their names. A number of other settlements had been built on lands which had been distributed in 1962-1963 by Egypt to the inhabitants as part of development projects and where, since then, Arab families had lived. He emphasized that the lands confiscated to establish settlements were arable lands.

Witness No. 6 - Anonymous

53. The witness said that immediately after the occupation of Gaza in 1967, the Israeli authorities had fenced the Strip with barbed wires. Then in Beit Lahya they had confiscated lands belonging to two inhabitants for the purpose of creating two settlements. Arabs were not allowed to be found in the vicinity of settlements. In the process of expropriation, houses were demolished, including those of refugees whose dwellings had been built by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

54. The witness said also that a number of Palestinians who had left the Strip to visit relatives abroad or in the West Bank had been denied re-entry. He also mentioned that farmers were restricted from shipping their products to the West Bank, and that all shipments had to go through Israeli ports and be labelled as Israeli products.

Annex II

LIST OF SETTLEMENTS
A comprehensive, cumulative and up-dated list of all the known Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including any additional information on the settlements contained in the previous list (see S/13450/Add. 1, annex III) and information on projected settlements.

A. Israeli settlements on the West Bank

NAME	DATE FOUNDED	LOCATION	TYPE	ECONOMIC BASE	LAND USED (IN DUNUMS)	ORIGINAL LAND OWNERS
1. Atrot	1970	Jerusalem: N. edge, near airport	Industrial zone	61 factories	10,000	Arab residents of Beit Hanina village
2. Neve Ya'acov	1973	Jerusalem: north of town	Residential suburb	2,500 housing units	10,000	Arab residents of Beit Hanina village
3. Ramot	1973	Jerusalem: north-west, near Nabi Samwil	Residential suburb	750 housing units (8,000 units planned)	30,000	Arab residents of Beit Iksa village; 100 Arab homes demolished
4. Ramat Eshkol	1968	Jerusalem: north side	Residential area	1,700 housing units	600	Arab land (expropriated)
5. French Hill	1969	Jerusalem: north side, along Jerusalem-Ramallah road	Residential area	2,100 housing units	15,000	Arab land; land from Catholic convent
6. Nahalat Defna		Jerusalem: north side	Residential area	250 housing units	270	Arab families and Waqf properties
7. Gilo Sharafat (Gilo)	1973	Jerusalem: south near Beit Jala	Residential suburb	1,200 housing units out of 10,000 planned	4,000	Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Beit Jala, Beit Safafa and Sharafat
8. East Talpiot	1973	Jerusalem: east side south of Jabal Al-Mukabber where UN headquarters was situated	Residential suburb	1,000 housing units (3,000 planned)	20,000	Arab residents of Jerusalem, Sur Bahir, Sheikh Sa'ad and UN enclave expropriated
9. Jewish Quarter (Old City of Jerusalem)	1967	Jerusalem: "Old City" between western wall of Al Aqsa Mosque and Latin Convent	Residential area	320 housing units and shops		160 Arab houses demolished, 600 homes expropriated, 6,500 Arab residents evacuated
10. Hebrew University	1969	Jerusalem: north side	University campus	Offices, classrooms, dormitories and hospital		Expansion of pre-1948 old university for which land expropriated
11. Sanhedria Extension	1973	Jerusalem: north side	Residential area	250 housing units		Former demilitarized zone, entirely expropriated
12. Shiloh	1976	East of Nablus-Ramallah road	Gush Emunim		15,00080 to 90	From villages of Turmus Ayya, Qaryut, Abu-Elfalah and El-MaghirehDunums closed off, almond trees cut down
13. Kochav Hashahar	1975	North-east of Taiyyibe village	Nahal, then Kibbutz	Agriculture	4,000	Land from Dier Jarir and Kufur Malik; water from Ain Samia, Ramallah's sole water source
14. Ofra (Settlement planned for expansion (for details see annex III, below). (Ba'al Hatzor)	1975	East of Ramallah on Jericho road	Gush Emunim	Workshops and agriculture	350	100 dunums from Ain Yabrud village, 250 dunums from Silwad village
15. Mevo Horon	1969	Latrun salient	Moshav	Agriculture2 wells	16,000	Land from Yalu, Imwas and Beit Nuba villages, destroyed by Israel after 1967 war
16. Beit Horonb	1977	Mid-way on Ramallah-Latrun road, near Tira	Gush Emunim		150	Initial takeover of Arab land
17. Mevo Horon Dalot (Matatyahu)	1977	Latrun area; 3 km from armistice line		Agriculture		DMZ - (Midya Arab village prior to 1948)
18. Kfar Ruth	1977	Latrun area; 1 km south-east of Shayelet settlement		Agriculture		DMZ - (site of Midya village), thousands of dunums of irrigated lands)
19. Givat Hamivtar	1975	On north side of Jerusalem		350 housing units		Land area entirely expropriated
20. Canada Park	1976	Latrun salient: on Latrun-Ramallah road	Jewish National Fund Park		4,200	Land of destroyed villages of Yalu, Imvas and Beit Nuba (including 1,500 dunums of orchards)
21. Ramonimb	1977	North-east of Taybeh and Rammun villages; north of Ramallah-Jericho road	Nahal		300	Residents of Taybeh village (expropriated lands)
22. Beit El	1977	North of Ramallah-Nablus road	Gush Emunim		35	Arab land. Settlement to expand on 250 dunums of expropriated land
23. Giv'onb	1977	North-west of Jerusalem; near El-Jib village	Gush Emunim			Ex-Jordanian military base. 5,000 dunums needed to be expropriated from El-Jib village
24. Shayelet (Mevo Hori'im)	1977	Latrun area	Moshav	Agriculture		DMZ land (site of Arab village of Midya)
25. Neve Zuf (Nabi Saleh)	1977	North-west of Ramallah; near Beir Nidham	Gush Emunim		400	Closed off, including 100 dunums of wheat fields and almond trees of Nabi Saleh villagers
26. Mehola	1968	Jordan valley: north end of West Bank	Nahal until Nov. 1969, then moshav	Field crops, metal factory1 well and1 reservoir	3,000	Residents of Bardala and Ain el-Beida villages. Water supply of villages depleted by wells of Mehola
27. Argaman	1968	Near end of Damya-Nablus road	Nahal until May 1971, then moshav	Agriculture5 absentee wells and1 reservoir	5,000	Arab agricultural land, including 1,000 dunums from Marj al-Naja
28. Nev Massunh	1976	Jordan valley: south of Nablus-Damiya road			800	Residents of Arab villages of Al-Ajajra and Jiftlik
29. Massuah	1970	Jordan valley: just south of No. 28	Nahal until May 1974, then kibbutz	vegetables, fishpond, water from Hamra1 well,2 reservoirs	3,000	Residents of Al-Ajajra and Jiftlik villages, "expropriated land"
30. Phatza'El B	1977	South of settlement No. 29	Rural settlement		1,500	Arab land
31. Phatza'El	1970	End of south-west road from Aqraba	Moshav	Vegetables,3 wells"600 cubic metres per hour"1 reservoir	3,000	Residents of Fazayil village
32. Tomer	1976	Jordan valley: south of settlement No. 31		Hothouse vegetables	Unknown as construction still going on
33. Gilgal	1970	Jordan valley: south of settlement No. 32	Nahal until May 1973 then moshav	Vegetables, citrus, field crops	3,300	Arab land "plan to pump water from Jordan river"
34. Netiv Hagdud	1976-1977	South of Gilgal settlement No. 33	Nahal to become moshav		Unknown as construction still going on
35. Mivsom (Na'aran)	1977began construction	Jordan valley: near Arab village of Awja	Nahal to become moshav			Land expropriated from residents of Al-Awja village
36. Yitav	1970	West of Al-Awja village	Nahal until Oct. 1976 then kibbutz	Vegetables, field crops	2,000	Arab land from Al-Awja village "including that of absentee owners", water from Ain Al-Awja and two wells nearby
37. Almog	1977	Jordan valley: north-west of Dead Sea	Nahal			Water supply drawn by 12-inch pipeline from well near Aqbat Jaber, Jericho refugee camp
38. Kalia	1968	Jordan valley: north-west of Dead Sea	Nahal until 1975, then kibbutz	Vegetables, dairy, vineyards, fishponds		Previously Jordan army camp, water supply from Wadi Keit west of Jericho
39. Mitzpe Shalem	1970	Dead Sea: west shore	Nahal then kibbutz	Date palms, vegetables	over 50
40. Malki Shua	1976	North edge of West Bank: south of Mt. Gibboa; access road from Beit Sheen	Nahal
41. Ro'I	1974	"Limit of settlements" road (LS); north end	Nahal; moshav by 1978	Agriculture	2,500	Tubas village residents, land cultivated with wheat
42. Bega'ot	1972	LS road, north end; south of Ro'I (No. 41)	Moshav	Poultry, vegetables, citrus	5,000	Tamun village, land closed off
43. Hamra	1971	LS road: on east West Nablus-Damiya road, in lush valley. Farm land	Moshav	Vegetables, flowers, citrus, poultry; 1 well, 2 reservoirs, 12-inch water pipeline to Massauh (No. 29) in Jordan valley	450	Land from Bab al-Nagab village; valley land near Damiya Bridge 450 dunums of "absentee owner groves"
44. Mekhora	1973	LS road: south of Hamra (No. 43)	Nahal until July 1976, then moshav	Vegetables, fruit	4,000	From Bab al-Nagab, Beit Dajan and Beit Furik villages water supply includes 1 well, 3 reservoirs
45. Gitit	1972 Aug.	LS road: near east-west Aqraba valley road	Nahal until Dec. 1975, now kibbutz	Vegetables, field crops	5,000	Land from Aqraba closed off, sprayed with defoliants early 1972
46. Ma'al Ephraim	1972	LS road: on east-west Aqraba valley road	Regional centre		200	Arab land
47. Nevo Shiloh (Givat Adum)	Nov. 1976	South of Ma'ale Ephraim settlementNo. 46			1,300	Residents of Turmus Ayya, Abu-Fallah and al-Mughayyir villages
48. Mishor Adomin (Ma'ale Adomin)	Nov. 1974	Dominates Jericho-Jerusalem road	Industrial estate and army base; Gush Emunim settlers	Industry	(81,000)	70,000 dunums closed off Oct. 1972 by army, additional 700 dunums expropriated from villages of Abu dis, Umaryya and Issawyya 10,000 dunums from Silwa; 300 dunums from Silwa and Anota
49. Mizpeh Jericho	early 1978	East of Mishor Adomin settlement (No. 48) overlooking Jericho				Land expropriated from above-mentioned villages
50. Reihan (Nei'ami, Bet)	1977	North-west of Jenin, 3 km beyond armistice line	Nahal, 1978 kibbutz	Agriculture		Arab land
51. Dotan (Sanur)	Oct. 1977	Along Nablus-Jenin road in Sanur valley	Gush Emunim			Land of pre-1967 Jordanian police station near Sanur village
52. Natal Ma'ale	Jan. 1978	East of Nablus-Jenin road	Gush Emunim		550	Land confiscated from Silat Al-Dhaha village including 25 olive trees
53. Shomron	Oct. 1977	On Nablus-Jenin road			1,680	Kufr Sur village
54. Sal'it (Tsur Nathan Bet)	Aug. 1977	South-east of Tullcarm	Nahal		1,000	Kufr Sur village half of land privately owned (cultivated), half common land for grazing
55. Elon Moreh (Qaddum)	Dec. 1975	Near Nablus-Qalqilya road	Gush Emunim		300	Arabs of kufr Qaddum village
56. Qaruay-Shomron	Oct. 1977	South side of Nablus-Qalqilya road, near Jinsafut village	Gush Emunim		150	Taken from villages of Jinsafut, Hajj and kufr Laqif
57. El Qana (Settlement planned for expansion (for details see annex III, below). (Mes'ha Pe'erim)	April 1977	South-east of Qalqilya	Gush Emunim Nahal		10300	Site of former Jordanian police station from Mes'ha village
58. Tafush (Bareget)	Jan. 1978	Along Nablus-Ramallah road 13 km south of Nablus			150	Arab villagers of Yasuf
59. Haris	Feb. 1978	2 km west of Nablus-Ramallah road, near Salfit junction	Nahal 2 km access road built		800	300 dunums expropriated for military camp 500 dunums of pasturage closed off from villages of kufr Haris, Harda and Salfit
60. Har Gilo	1976	In Beit Jala village area	Residential suburb		400	Grapevines and fruit trees expropriated from beit Jala residents, June 1976
61. Efrat	1978	On road south of Bethlehem			7,000	Expropriated land, most of which cultivated
62. Takoah	June 1975	South-east of Bethlehem near Hebron	Nahal		3,000	Land expropriated from Rafidya village
63. Elazar	Oct. 1975	South of Bethlehem	Religious moshav	Chemical laboratory electronics	350	Vineyards expropriated from hadar village, 1973
64. Rosh Tzurim	July 1969	North of Hebron (Etzion bloc)	Kibbutz	Poultry	3,000	Incluidng site of pre-1948 settlement plus expropriated land from nahalin village
65. Alon Shvot	July 1969 settlers, 1972	North of Hebron (Etzion bloc)	Regional centre for religious Jews	Yeshiva students plus families commute to Jerusalem	1,200	Land expropriated in 1969 from Arabs
66. Kfar Etzion	Sept. 1967 first settlement on the West Bank	North of Hebron (Etzion bloc)	Kibbutz	Some agriculture, a factory		Site (1943-1948) of Jewish settlement and cultivated land (vineyards)
67. Migdal Oz	1977	West of Hebron (Etsion bloc)	Kibbutz	Agriculture	1,000 to 2,000	Residents of Beit Umar village, closed first as military area600 plum and almond trees uprooted in Dec. 1977
68. Qiryat Arba Settlement planned for expansion (for details see annex III, below).	1970	Adjoins town of Hebron	Urban settlement	Factories, services, some commute to Jerusalem401 housing units	4,250	Individuals from Hebronand Halhul, of which 1,500 dunums expropriated
69. Yattir	July 1977	South of Hebron, near armistice line	Gush EmuniumMoshav		17,000 planned to be fenced	Pasture land
70. Zohar
71. Sailat Dhahr	1978	On Nablus-Jenin road			550	Expropriated from Arab residents of Sailat Dhahr
72. Anatot	Late 1978	North of Jerusalem			3,000	Expropriated from residents of Anata village
73. Ya'afu Horom	1978	Near Arab village of Yatta; west of Hebron
74. Tretseh
75. Jericho	Approved 1978	Jericho area
76. Zif	1978	South of Hebron	Under construction
77. Neweimeh	1979	Near Jericho
78. New Kfar Etzion	1979	On road between Bethlehem and Hebron
79. Huwara	1979	Few miles east of Nablus	600 settlers already live there
80. Tell kebir	1979; still under construction	New location/village of Deir El Hatab in the district of Nablus
81. Karney Shomron (b)	mid-Juen 1979	On the main road betwen the towns of Nablus and Tulkarm, 3 kilometres west of the Settlement of Karney Shomron (a)
82. Karney Shomron (d)	Sept. 1979	south of the settlement Karney Shomron 9a)			Scheduled to accommodate 100 families initially and 300 families after 5 years
83. Reihan	Sept. 1979	in the district of Jenin/third settlement			to accommodate 50 families initially and 100 after 5 years
84. Elazar	Sept. 1979	District of Kfar Etzion in the vicinity of another settlement, Eliazar
85. Yafit	second half of 1979	in the district of Jiftlik			500	confiscated land from Arab owners in the Jordan Valley
86. Gebeiot Oz (b)	beginning of 1980	between the villages of Haikh, Iskandar and Kafr Salim in the district of Jenin
87. Reihan (e)	1980	east of the settlement of Reihan 9b), in the district of Jenin
88. Eidan	July 1980	middle part of Wadi Araba, south of the Dead Sea	presently populated by 17 families and due to be joined by a further 20
89. El Qana (b)	July 1980	east of the settlement of El Qana, west of Nablus			111	Government-owned land - previously sealed off
90. Karney Shomron (h)	began construction Sept. 1979	8 km west of Karney Shomron 9a)	scheduled to accommodate 100 families initially and 300 more after 5 years
91. Ma'ale Adomim	1979	north-east of Jerusalem (El-Khan El Ahmer)
92. Ma'ale Adomim (c)	1979	East Jerusalem			400	Lands belonging to Jerusalem
93. Mehola 9b)	1979	north of the Jordan Valley	consists only of military tents
94. Nahal Maoz	1979	north-east of Hebron in the district of Al Yaghama	established as a camp to protect settlements in the district
95. Ariel (b)	1979	in the district of Salfit, next to the settlement of Ariel (Haris)			1,330	Villages of Mardeh and Sikaka
96. Leona	1980	on the Jerusalem-Nablus				Village of Al-laban
97. Beit El (b)	1980	in the district of Ramallah				Village of Beitein
98. Efrat (town)	mid-October 1979	West Bethlehem, centrally located in relation to the Kfar Etzion			1,300	Village of Al Khudr
99. Giv'a Hadasha	decision on its establish-ment -mid-October 1979	in the vicinity on another settlement, Giv'on, district of Ramallah			85	confiscated land, belonging to the village of El-Jib
100. Matatyahu	1976	district of Ramallah			600	private land of inhabitants of the village of Naalein
101. Giv'on (b)	1977	district of El-jib, north-west of Jerusalem
102. Elon Moreh (Work on settlement suspended following Isareli Supreme Court order. Instead a new settlement was started (Tell Kebir) as an alternative. Elon Moreh settlement was not abandoned.)	June 1979	5 kilometres south of Nablus			1,300	villages of Rujeeb and Aurta
103. Neve Tzuf	Sept. 1979	between the villages of Deir Ballout and Aboud, north of Ramallah			900
104. Dotan	1977	south of Jenin, near the village of Araba	scheduled to accommodate 150 families initially and rising to 500 within 5 years		100
105. Airel (Haris) Settlement planned for expansion (for details see annex III, below).	1977		currently inhabited by 30 jewish families		500	villages of Kafr Haris (Salfit)
106. El Qana	1977	in the district of Abu-l-Qarnain on the Nablus road	scheduled to accommodate 500 jewish families		150	K of area previously privately owned by Arab citizens
107. Tafvah	1978	in the district of Jenin				village of Taffouha

Source: List of settlements, maps, information supplied by the Government of Jordan as of September 1980.

B. Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights

NAME	DATE FOUNDED	LOCATION	TYPE	ECONOMIC BASE	LAND USED (IN DUNUMS)	ORIGINAL LAND OWNERS
1. Neve Ativ	1971	South slope of Mount Hermon	Moshav	Ski-station/400 dunums apples at Benia'sspring	Total land of village	Syrian village, dab'at azzayat
2. Snir	1967	Edge of ex-DMZ; pasture on Golan	Nahal up to 1968, then kibbutz	Agriculture		Syrian village lands
3. Har Odem	1976	Mount Oden/between Mas'ada and Bugatha villages	Moshav	Industrial base established	200	Syrian nature reserve 200 dunums from Bugatha
4. El Rom	1971	North, near Bugatha	Kibbutz	Agriculture (apples)	Total land of Ainkharja, some land Bugatha	Syrian village Ainkharja and some land from Bugatha
5. Merom Golan	July 1967	North; west of Quneitra	Kibbutz	Cattle, 6,000 dunums field crops	6,000	Agricultural land west of Quneitra
6. Ein Zivan	1968	North; west of Quneitra	Kibbutz	Agriculture, 340 dunums orchards in Quneitra valley	340 orchards	Agricultural land west of Quneitra; near former Syrian village, Ain Ziwane
7. Katzrin	1973	Centre-west; near Yaacov Bridge across Jordan River	Industrial centre, field-school	Industries (200 housing units under construction)		Near Syrian village, Qasrine
8. Keshet	1974	Originally in Quneitra then at Khusniya	Religious moshav; Gush Emunim settlers	Plans for field-school, botanical garden, wood-working, agriculture		Syrian town, Khusniya
9. Ani'em	1976	South of Kazrin (No. 7)	Industrial; moshav	Industries		Syrian village land, Qasrine
10. Yonatan (Yonati)	1975	Tel faraz, south of Keshet (No. 8)	Bnei Akiva religious youth movement	Agriculture
11. Sha'al	1976	Centre	Moshav	Agriculture, industries planned		Syrian village
12. Gamla	1976	Overlooks Lake Tiberias	Moshav	Agriculture		Syrian village lands
13. Ramot	1969	Overlooks Lake Tiberias	Moshav	Agriculture		Syrian village land
14. Merkaz Hisfin (Khisfin)	1973	South Golan	Rural centre			Syrian town, Khisfin
15. Ramat Magshimim	1968	South-east 1.8 km from buffer zone	Moshav	Agriculture, cattle		Former Syrian army base
16. Avni Eltan	1976	South Golan	Moshav	Agriculture
17. Nov (Hab)	1972	South Golan	Moshav	Agriculture, reservoir nearby
18. Geshur	1969	South; moved west due to 1974 disengagement	Nahal	Field crops
19. Eli-Al (El-Al)	1968	South Golan	Nahal until May 1973, then moshav	Agriculture
20. Givat (Yo'av)	1968	South Golan; adjoins No. 21	Histadrut Moshav	field crops, poultry, cattle
21. Herkaz Bnei Yahuda	1972	South Golan; joint entrance with No. 20	Rural centre
22. Ne'ot Golan	1968	South: overlooks Lake Tiberias	Moshav	Agriculture	100 dunums field crops
23. Afik	1967	South Golan	Nahal until 1972, then kibbutz	Agriculture		Near Syrian town Fiq
24. Kfar Haruv	1973	South: overlooks Lake Tiberias	Kibbutz	Agriculture		Near Syrian village Kafr Hared
25. Mevo Hamma	1968	South: overlooks Lake Tiberias	Kibbutz	Agriculture; tourism at Hamma Springs, pasture	25,000	Syrian village at Hamma Springs
26. Urtal	1978	Centre-west	Kibbutz	Industries planned		Syrian village land
27. Dalhmiya
28. Har Shifon
29. Dalhmiya
30. Natur	1980	5 kilometres South-West of Ramat Maghshimim

Source: List by the Syrian Government: information on settlements - Ann Lesch.

C. Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip

NAME	DATE FOUNDED	LOCATION	TYPE	ECONOMIC BASE	LAND USED (IN DUNUMS)	ORIGINAL LAND OWNERS
1. Netzarim	1972	4 km south of Gaza City; between north-south highway and coast	Nahal became moshav	Agriculture	700	Land expropriated from Abu Madyan Arab tribe, early 1971
2. Kfar Darom	1970	South of Mughazi refugee camp, east side of north-south highway	Nahal until 1978, then kibbutz	Glasshouse vegetables	200 enlarged to 400
3. Netzer Hazani	1973	North of Khan Yunis	Nahal until 1977, then moshav	Glasshouse vegetables	300	State land
4. Katif A	1973	West of Netzer Hazani settlement (No. 3) between Dier El Balah and Khan Yunis	Moshav	Glasshouse vegetables	1,000
5. Katif B	1978	Close to Katif A settlement		Glasshouse vegetables	1,000
6. Katif C	1979	Close to Katif A and B
7. Morag	1972	On coast between Khan Yunis and Rafah	Nahal, then kibbutz	Agriculture	12,000	Land expropriated from UmmKalb village, El Abadella, Khan Youness early 1971
8. Eretz Azoor	1969	North-east of Gaza City		Industries	800
9. Nahal Taadeel	1972	Close to Gaza and Nahal Dir El Balah next to El Ogool		Agriculture	4,000	State land
10. Holeet	1977	Close to Rafah			300 housing unit
11. Beit Lahat (under construction)		North Gaza

Source: List of settlements nd map provided by the following: the Government of Egypt, Majib Al-Almad, Special Representative, Political Department, palestine Liberation Organization; Ann Lesch, former representative in the Middle East of the American Friends Service Committee, from part of her testimony before the Sub-Committee to the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, 19 October 1979.

Annex III

LIST OF NEW SETTLEMENTS PLANNED FOR 1981

New settlements planned on the West Bank

Name	Location
1. Na'men (a) ) 2. Na'men (b) ) 3. Na'meh (c) ) 4. Almog (b) ) 5. Beit Ha'ria ) 6. Mitzpe Yeriho (b) )	all around the town of Jericho

New settlements planned in the Golan Heights

Name	Location
1. Sukayk	Village of Sukayk, Wasit/Mas'adah Road
2. Ram Lake	On the slope of Mount Qata at Mas'adah
3. Name of settlement not yet determined	Tell Abu Qatif, near village of Ayn Ayisha at Mazra'at Quneitra
4.
5.	At the village of Dabbusiyah

Source: Information provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Annex IV

COMMUNICATION RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSION IN CONNEXION WITH
PARAGRAPH 23 OF THE PRESENT REPORT

Letter dated 10 November 1980 from the Commission of the churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Commission

In response to your request to provide new settlements to be brought to the attention of the Security Council related to the mandate of the Commission which you chair, I have the honour to submit the enclosed "Statement on Jerusalem" adopted by the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches during its meeting held in Geneva, 14-22 August 1980. In order to facilitate your task, I also include provisional translations of the text into French and German.

(Signed) Dwain C. EPPS
Executive Secretary

Statement on Jerusalem adopted by the Central Committee of
the World Council of churches during its meeting in Geneva,
14-22 August 1980

1. On the basis of previous World Council of Churches statements the Central committee opposes the Isareli unilateral action of annexing East Jerusalem and uniting the city as its "eternal capital" under its exclusive sovereignty.

2. This decision is contrary to all pertinent United Nations resolutions. It dangerously undermines all efforts towards the just solution of the Middle East problem and thus jeopardizes regional and world peace.

3. The Central Committee reiterates the statement on jerusalem issued by the World Council of Churches Assembly in Nairobi, 1975, which stressed that the tendency to minimize jerusalem's importance for any of the three monotheistic religions should be avoided. The destiny of Jerusalem should be viewed in terms of people including Christians as well as Jews and Muslims and not only in terms of shrines. Therefore, just as the future status of jerusalem has been considered part of the destiny of the Jewish people, so it cannot be considered in isolation from the destiny of the Palestinian people, and should thus be determined within the general context of the settlement of the Middle East conflict in its totality.

4. The Central Committee calls the member churches to exert through their respective Governments all pressure on Israel to withhold all action on jerusalem, the future of which should be included in the agenda of official negotiations involving Israel and the Palestinians on self-determination and on the solution of the Middle East conflict.

5. Recognizing that Jerusalem is a focus of the deepest religious inspiration and attachment for all Christians in the world, the Central Committee urges the World Council of Churches to undertake an active role in expressing the concerted Christian voice and to aid churches in fully assuming their role as partners in deciding the future character of Jerusalem.

6. The Central Committee also urges the General Secretary to explore, in consultation with member churches int he area and the Vatican, possibilities of trying to find the best solution to the problem of jerusalem through all appropriate and effective means and ways such as convening jointly or separately international consultations or any other approaches or actions on Jerusalem. The General Secretary should also explore possibilities of consultations with the Muslim and Jewish communities concerned with the future character of Jerusalem in order to seek ways to consolidate justice and human coexistence in the City of Peace.

ANNEX V

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSION AND RETAINED
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE SECRETARIAT

I. Documents received from the Government of Jordan

Awartani, Hisham M. "West Bank Agriculture: A New Outlook". Research Bulletin No. 1. (Nablus-West Bank: Al Najah National University, November 1978).

_______________. "Water resources and water policies on the West Bank". Research Bulletin No. 2. (Nablus: Al Najah National University, october 1979), (in Arabic)

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal, A Study on jerusalem (London and New York, Longman, 1979)

"Agricultural sector and water resources in the West Bank", Royal Scientific Society, to be published before the end of 1980

Jerusalem, a report prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Committee of the Occupied Territories, 1980

"Jordan Valley Ara/Mekorot/Settlements: Amount of pumping water from the artesian wells during 1977/1978 for irrigation" (in Arabic)

Report on Israeli settlements in the West Bank of Jordan, May 1979 to September 1980. (in Arabic)

The Significance of Some West Bank Resources to Israel (rev. ed.), Economics Department, Royal Scientific Society, April 1979.

A transcript from a sound and slide show on isareli settlements in the West Bank, prepared by the Office of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan, May 1980.

II. Documents received from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic

"Israeli settlements in the Golan" (in Arabic)

"Information concerning Israel's violations in the occupied territory of the Golan" (in Arabic)

"Isareli action in the Golan during the period 1979-1980" (in Arabic)

Map of settlements in the Golan

III. Documents received from the Government of Egypt

"Isareli settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip"

Performance Report: Egypt and the Palestinian Question, 1945-1980 (Cairo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Information Service).

IV. Documents received from the Palestine Liberation Organization

Paper, "Water resources and policies int he West Bank"

Terzi, Zehdi Labib, Memorandum on the water resources of Palestine.

V. Documents received from witnesses in Amman, Jordan

Witness No. 2 (Ruhi El-Khatib

Copy of his testimony before the Security council Commission (in Arabic), enclosing:

Map of Jerusalem showing the "Israel Plan to expropriate and demolish the Arab Moslem Properties within the Old City and the Evacuation of its Occupants"

Copy of an Order dated 31 December 1979 issued by the Isareli Minister of energy and the Military Commander of the West Bank notifying the Jerusalem district Electricity Company of the purchase of the company's undertaking by the Government of Israel, effective 1 January 1981

Copy of a letter dated 31 December 1979 from the Chairman of the Board of the Jerusalem Electricity Company addressed to the Israeli Minister of Energy protesting and rejecting his notice of purchase; copy of identical letter addressed to the Military Commander of the West Bank

Letter from Dr. Kathleen Kenyon regarding tunnelling along the western wall of the Haram esh-Sherif (The London Times, August 1972)

A/35/158. Letter dated 28 march 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement issued by Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib in which he strongly deplored the latest act of aggression perpetrated by the Isareli occupation authorities in the Jerusalem area.

Witness No. 4 (Dr. Walid Mustafa)

Copies of documents relating to Law No. 16, concerning education in the West Bank (in Arabic)

Witness No. 5 (Anonymous)

Copies of documents relating to confiscated lands on the West Bank (in Arabic)

------

FOOTNOOTS

1/ The first and second reports were submitted tot he Council on 12 July 1979 (S/13450 and Add.1) and 4 December 1979 (S/13679) respectively.

2/ See S/14000.

3/ See S/14116.

4/ See S/13450, paras. 17 and 23 and S/13679, para. 15.

5/ S/13679, annex B.

6/ S/13450, paras. 34 to 36.

7/ The so-called, "Master Plan for the Development of Settlements in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983", prepared in October 1978 by M. drobles, Department for Rural Settlement of the World Zionist Organization.

8/ Approximately equal at the time to 1.77 billion US dollars

9/ S/13450/Add.1, witness No. 15.

10/ See document S/13679, para. 44.

11/ S/13450, chap. II, sect. C (a).

12/ S/13450, sect. E(b).

13/ S/13450, para. 220.

14/ For a list of settlements, see annex II to the present report.

15/ S/13450, para. 225.

16/ S/13450, para. 201.

17/ Following is a chronological list of such "Development Plans" as provided by K.B. Doherty in a study entitled "Jordan Waters Conflict" in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Series. See: International Conciliation, No. 553, May 1965.

Chronological List of Water Development Plans

	Year Proposed
Ionides Survey Lowdermilk Proposal Hays Plan MacDonald Report All Israel Plan Bunger Plan Israeli Seven-Year Plan Main Plan* Cotton Plan* Arab Plan (revised)* Baker-Harza Plan Unified Plan* Israeli Ten-Year Plan National Water Plan East Ghor Canal Project Arab Headwater Diversion	1939 1944 1948 1951 1951 1952 1953 1953 1954 1954 1955 1955 1956 1956a 1958b 1964

*Regional development plans.

The plan became operational in 1964 and was to be completed by 1969.

/ The project became operational in 1961.

18/ S/13450, para. 97.

19/ International Conciliation No. 506, January 1956, p. 248.

20/ Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, vol. XXXI, June 1980. According to the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (vol. XXXIV, No. 10, October 1980) the population of Israel at mid-1979 stood at 3,780,000, and the United Nations Demographic Yearbook (30th ed., 1978) gave the population of Israel for 1978 as 3,690,000 "including data for East Jerusalem and Israeli residents in certain other territories under occupation by Israeli military forces since June 1967".

21/ 1979 estimates reported by Jordan, in particular the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, Economic Department, in the revised edition of The Significance of Some West Bank Resources to Israel (April 1979).

22/ Israel Economic Development, issued by the Economic Planning Authority Prime Minister's Office, Tel Aviv, 1968, p. 378.

23/ "Agricultural Sector and Water Resources in the West Bank," a study to be published before the end of 1980 under the auspices of the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, Economics Department.

24/ "Israel drains West Bank Water Resources," a study by Rami Khouri, water expert, published in Al Ra'i on 13 September 1979.

25/ Ibid.; see also Hisham Awartani (Chairman, Department of Economics, Al Najah National University, Nablus, West Bank), Water Resources and Water Policies on the West Bank, Bulletin No. 2, October 1979.

26/ Saul Arlosoroff, Deputy Water Commissioner, Israeli Ministry of Agriculture - Water development and management, Proceedings of the United Nations Water conference, vol. I, Part 4.

27/ Sources: Uri Davis, Antonia E.L. Maks, John Richardson, "Israel's Water Policies, in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Beirut, Winter 1980, No. 34; and, Significance of Some West Bank Resources to Israel, revised Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, Economics Department, April 1979.

28/ Davis, Maks, Richardson, op. cit.

29/ "Agricultural sector and water resources in the West Bank."

30/ Awartani, water Resources and Water Policies on the West Bank, op.cit.

31/ The West Bank-Gaza Economy: Problems and Prospects, report prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (96th Congress, second session, 1980).

32/ Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank including Arab Jerusalem since 1967, report dated May 1979 submitted to the Commission by the Government of Jordan; and Hisham M. Awartani, West Bank of Agriculture "A New Outlook", Research Bulletin No. 1, Al-Najah National University, Nablus, West Bank, November 1978.

33/ The question of the adverse impact of the Israeli wells drilled in proximity to existing Arab wells was repeatedly brought to the attention of the Commission in particular by individual witnesses.

34/ Davis, Maks, and Richardson, op.cit.

35/ Paul Quiring, "Israeli Settlements and Palestinian rights", Middle East International (London), October 1978, No. 88. The Awartani study (Bulletin No. 2, op. cit.) identifies the location of five of those wells as follows: two in Nablus and one each in Qalqilia, Tulkarm and Jenin. There are also seven wells owned by the Israeli Military Administration in the vicinity of Israeli settlements which provide drinking water to those settlements and to some Arab villages. However, the ultimate purpose of these wells located at Qabatiya, Beit Ayba, Arraba, Al Fari'a, Bethlehem, Al Zawiya and Shabtin, is to cater for the interests of the adjacent Israeli settlements.

36/ Through technological advances, Israeli wells can be drilled to depths of 300 to 500 metres, whereas the existing Arab wells are limited to a depth of no more than 100 metres. There is little doubt, according to Jordanian assessments, about the effect on the Arab wells and springs of the proximity and depth of Israeli wells. In fact, Jordanian law prohibits the drilling, under areas of the same artesian pressure, of any new wells within 2 kilometres of an existing well. Also, for areas under the same water table systems, no two wells must be drilled within 500 metres of each other.

37/ Awartani, Water Resources and Water Policies on the West Bank, Quiring, op. cit.; Ann Lesch, "The impact of Israel's settlements," Palestine Human Rights Bulletin, September 1979, No. 22.

38/ Davis, Maks and Richardons, op.cit.

39/ S/13679 para. 51.

40/ S/13450 III, A (b).

41/ S/13450, para. 56.

a/ See first report of the Commission S/13450/Add.1, annex II, witness No. 15.
b/ Approximately equal to $US 0.50.

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