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INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON
2. On 4 June, Israeli aircraft conducted some eight raids around Beirut, starting at 1315 hours GMT, with overflights continuing until around 1500 hours GMT. The targets included the Sabra camp in south Beirut, the area of the Sports Stadium and the Western perimeter of the airport. The Israeli aircraft attracted heavy anti-aircraft fire. There was heavy loss of life and destruction.
3. In southern Lebanon, at about 1500 hours GMT, intense exchanges of fire commenced between positions of the armed elements (Mainly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese National Movement), on the one hand, and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the de facto forces (Christian and associated militias) on the other. The exchanges of fire involved or affected the following on the one side, in Lebanon, Tyre and its vicinity, Nabatiyah, Chateau de Beaufort and the Kaukaba-Hasbaya area and, on the other side, Marjayoun in southern Lebanon, and the areas of Nahariya, Qiryat Shemona and Metulla in Israel.
4. In light of these serious developments, and before noon in New York, I urgently appealed to all concerned to desist from hostile acts and to make every effort to restore the cease-fire.
5. Later that day, after consultations with the members of the Security Council, she President of the Council made a statement on their behalf, urgently appealing to all the parties to adhere strictly to the cease-fire that had been in effect since 24 July 1981 and to refrain immediately from any hostile act likely to provoke an aggravation of the situation (S/15163).
6. On 5 June, heavy exchanges of artillery fire continued, involving or affecting the same general areas as on the preceding day. In addition, there were intensive Israeli air-strikes reported in the areas of Hasbaya, Chateau de Beaufort, Nabatiyah, Aichiye and Arnoun. On the same day, there were Israeli air-strikes the vicinity of Beirut and Damur, and Israeli naval vessels joined in the exchanges of fire that occurred in the Tyre area.
7. In view of the continuing hostilities, the build-up of Israeli forces and the very real danger of further escalation, I and my colleagues remained in continuous contact with the parties concerned, urging them to restore and maintain the cease-fire. Further, with the objective of the Council in view, I made an urgent appeal for a simultaneous cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time. I asked the parties to adhere to my appeal by no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982.
8. Later that evening, the Security Council met and unanimously adopted resolution 508 (1982), calling upon all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982. The Council also requested all Member States which were in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by Security Council resolution 490 (1981) could be respected. I was asked to report as early as possible and not later than forty-eight hours after the adoption of the resolution.
9. Immediately thereafter, I instructed the Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant-General Callaghan, to use every possibility of following up on my appeal to the parties and the subsequent resolution of the Security Council.
10. The same evening, the PLO reaffirmed its commitment to stop all military operations across the Lebanese border while reserving its right to respond in case of any Israeli aggression. The Permanent Representative of Israel informed me that, while Israeli reactions were in exercise of its right of self-defence, the resolution of the Security Council would be brought before the Israeli Cabinet.
11. Despite all efforts throughout the night, it was not possible to effect a cease-fire. Indeed, hostilities escalated dangerously, with Israeli air strikes resuming shortly after 0600 hours local time. In this connexion, Mr. Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, in response to a message from me, informed me that, in spite of heavy Israeli air-strikes after the scheduled time of the cease-fire, he had given orders to all PLO units to withhold fire for a further, unspecified period. This was conveyed to me before the Israeli ground operation started.
12. in the morning of 6 June, in a meeting arranged by General Callaghan to discuss the implementation of resolution 508 (1982), General Eitan, Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, stated that the IDF intended to launch a military operation into Lebanon at 0900 hours GMT (1100 hours local time), which was 28 minutes later, in order that "Israel would no longer be within PLO artillery range". He indicated that there was need for the IDF to pass through or near positions, and he expected that UNIFIL would raise no physical difficulty to the advancing troops. General Callaghan objected in the strongest terms to General Eitan's statement and protested against this totally unacceptable course of action.
13. Immediately after the meeting, General Callaghan issued instructions to all UNIFIL units for the standing operating procedures to be put into effect. They were instructed to block advancing forces, take defence measures and stay in their positions, unless their safety was seriously imperilled.
14. At around 0900 hours GMT (110 0 hours local time), Israeli ground forces, including a very large number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers, moved into Lebanese territory in strength. They advanced along three main axes: in the west, along the coastal road; in the central sector, towards Ett Taibe and Akiya Bridge and in the eastern sector, through the Kafer Chouba-Chebaa area.
15. In accordance with instructions, UNIFIL troops attempted to prevent the entry and advance of the Israeli forces. On the coastal road, for example, Dutch soldiers planted obstacles before advancing Israeli tank column; one tank was damaged; the obstacles, however, were pushed aside, as was the Dutch guardhouse. Tank barrels were pointed at UNIFIL soldiers during the entire encounter, likewise, in the other battalion areas, obstacles were forcibly removed and bulldozed. At Khardala Bridge, a small Nepalese position stood its ground for two days, despite harassments and threats. On the morning of 8 June, their position as partially destroyed/and some 100 Israeli tanks began to cross the bridge. Despite the efforts of UNIFIL, from the start of the invasion, the overwhelming strength and weight of the Israeli forces precluded the possibility of stopping them, and UNIFIL positions in the line of the invasion were thus overrun or by-passed.
16. In the evening of 6 June, the Security Council met again and unanimously adopted resolution 509 (1982) in which the Council demanded that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally Recognized boundaries of Lebanon; and further demanded that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph 1 of resolution 508 (1982), which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border. The Council also called on all parties to communicate to me their acceptance of the resolution within twenty-four hours.
17. In the evening of 7 June, I submitted a report to the Council containing the texts of the replies received from the parties regarding resolution 509 (1982) (see IS/1517 8) .
18. By 7 June, Israeli forces, comprising more than two mechanized divisions, with full air and naval support, had reached positions north of the UNIFIL area of deployment. Over the next three days, intense fighting was reported in numerous areas of Lebanon, but UNIFIL has no direct information on those events, which occurred outside its area of operation.
18. On 8 June, the Security Council met again, but no resolution was adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member.
20. In the prevailing circumstances and as an interim measure, I have instructed General Callaghan to ensure that all UNIFIL troops and UNTSO observers attached to the Force continue to man their positions unless their safety is seriously imperilled and to provide to the fullest extent possible protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area. In doing so, UNIFIL is to work in consultation with the Lebanese authorities whenever possible, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with such United Nations agencies and programmes which may be in a position to help. I further instructed him to remain in touch with all the parties with a view to working out, at the earliest possible opportunity, practical arrangements for the implementation of resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982). To this end, General Callaghan met again with General Eitan on 7 June and, on 8 June, when he was able to reach Beirut, he met with Mr. Iskaff, the Lebanese Minister for Defence, with General Khoury, the Lebanese Army Commander, as well as with Mr. Abu Walid and other senior PLO representatives.
21. Despite the difficult and dangerous situation that now prevails, all UNIFIL troops and UNTSO observers have remained in their positions, including those in the Tyre barracks, Chateau de Beaufort and in the enclave. The Israeli.forces have imposed restrictions on the movement of UNIFIL on the coastal road and in the enclave. UNIFIL headquarters has nevertheless been able to restore communications with, and supplies to, the various battalions.
22. I regret having to report that a Norwegian soldier was killed by shrapnel on 6 June. Further, the IDF has taken prisoner 62 Lebanese army soldiers who were serving under the operational command of UNIFIL. This was protested to the IDF with the demand that they be returned to UNIFIL. Despite this, the IDF has handed over the prisoners to the de facto forces, an action that has been most vigorously protested.
23. In the past days, General Callaghan has been in contact with the IDF concerning the urgent humanitarian needs of the civilian population in southern Lebanon that have resulted from the intense hostilities. The reports I have received indicate extreme shortages and hardship, and it appears necessary to me, in such circumstances, that the United Nations do all it possibly can to alleviate the desperate suffering. With this in view, I have requested the Israeli Government to extend the fullest co-operation to UNIFIL, the humanitarian agencies and programmes of the United Nations, and the ICRC in their endeavours to be of assistance. In particular, there is need for an early and swift assessment of relief requirements and for access by United Nations personnel and the ICRC to those who are suffering so that aid can reach them without delay. I have requested an early indication from the Israeli Government that practical arrangements can be made by United Nations personnel to attain these humanitarian ends. So far, only limited supplies from UNIFIL stocks have reached the population of Tyre.
24. A further addendum, also containing my observations on UNIFIL, will follow.