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UNITED
NATIONS

1949.I.13
31 December 1948

YEARBOOK
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS

1947-48






DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

9. The Question of Palestine

a. ORGANIZATION OF THE ad hoc COMMITTEE ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

(1) Establishment and Terms of Reference of the ad hoc Committee

During its second session, the General Assembly, at its 90th meeting on 23 September 1947, established an ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, composed of all Members, and referred to it the following agenda items for consideration and report:

"Question of Palestine": item proposed by the United Kingdom (A/286).

Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine ("UNSCOP") (A/364).

"Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the Recognition of its Independence as One State": item proposed by Saudi Arabia (A/317) and Iraq (A/328).

(2) Organization of the ad hoc Committee

At its first meeting on September 25, 1947, the Committee elected H. V. Evatt (Australia) Chairman, Prince Subha Svasti Svastivat (Siam) Vice Chairman and Thor Thors (Iceland) Rapporteur. It also decided to invite the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine to be represented at its deliberations in order to supply such information or render such assistance as the Committee might require. The invitation was accepted, and representatives of both organizations attended all meetings of the ad hoc Committee.

b. SUMMARY OF AGENDA OF THE ad hoc COMMITTEE

(1) Question of Palestine

The representative of the United Kingdom, in a letter to the Secretary-General dated April 2, 1947, had requested, on behalf of his Government, that the "Question of Palestine" be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular annual session. In the same communication, the representative of the United Kingdom had requested the convening of a special session of the Assembly "for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee" to prepare for the consideration of the question of Palestine at the subsequent (second) regular session.211/

(2) Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)212/

The report of the Special Committee (A/364) related the events leading up to the establishment of UNSCOP and gave a summary of its activities. It surveyed the elements of the conflict with relation to geographic and demographic factors, relevant economic factors, Palestine under the Mandate and the conflicting claims, and dealt with the question of the religious interests and Holy Places in Palestine. The report also reviewed the main proposals previously propounded for the solution of the Palestine question.

The Committee made twelve recommendations, eleven of which were adopted unanimously and the twelfth by a substantial majority.

The report contained a majority proposal for a Plan of Partition with Economic Union and a minority proposal for a Plan for a Federal State of Palestine.213/ Reservations and observations of certain members of the Committee were included in the report.

(a) SUMMARY OF UNSCOP'S ACTIVITIES

Pursuant to the request of the United Kingdom, the General Assembly had convened at Flushing Meadow, New York, on April 28, 1947, and, on May 15, 1947, had established and instructed a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).

UNSCOP was composed of representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia, and was given the "widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine"; it was under instructions to report its recommendations to the Secretary-General not later than September 1, 1947.214/ It actually completed its work on August 31.

The Special Committee held its first meeting at Lake Success on May 26. From that date until August 31, 1947, when the report was signed, the Committee held 16 public and 36 private meetings.

After an exploratory discussion, UNSCOP agreed to create a Preparatory Working Group which would produce some suggestions on various organizational matters for the Committee's consideration.

Justice Emil Sandstrom (Sweden) was elected Chairman of the Special Committee and Alberto Ulloa (Peru) Vice-Chairman.

UNSCOP members arrived in Palestine on June 14 and 15, meeting in Jerusalem for the first time on June 16, 1947 (its fifth meeting in all). The Special Committee subsequently visited various parts of Palestine to gain a first-hand impression of conditions.

In response to a request from the Special Committee, the Government of Palestine and the Jewish Agency for Palestine appointed liaison officers. The Palestine Government's liaison officer was D. C. MacGillivray, while Aubrey S. Eban and David Horowitz served as liaison officers of the Jewish Agency.

At the same meeting, the Special Committee was informed by the Secretary-General of the decision of the Arab Higher Committee to abstain from collaboration with UNSCOP.215/ While the Special Committee expressed its hope of securing the co-operation of all parties, it decided not to take any formal action, considering that the Chairman had made an appeal by radio for full co-operation shortly after arriving in Palestine.216/

The question of addressing a further request for co-operation to the Arab Higher Committee was discussed again at the 22nd and 23rd meetings of UNSCOP on July 8, 1947. It was decided to address a letter to the Arab Higher Committee and to state therein that UNSCOP had noted with regret the decision of the Arab Higher Committee not to co-operate, and to repeat the Special Committee's invitation for full co-operation as expressed by the Chairman in his broadcast appeal of June 16.

On July 10, 1947, a letter was received from Jamal el-Husseini, Vice-Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee. The communication stated that the Arab Higher Committee found no reason to reverse its previous decision to abstain from collaboration.217/

In addition to hearing representatives of the Palestine Government and of the Jewish Agency, the Special Committee also heard representatives of a number of other Jewish organizations and religious bodies, as well as Chaim Weizmann, to whom the Special Committee granted a hearing in his personal capacity.

Upon the suggestion of some members of UNSCOP, the Committee resolved to invite the Arab States to express their views on the question of Palestine. It was decided that a letter to this effect should be addressed by the personal representative of the Secretary-General to the consular representatives in Jerusalem of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Transjordan, and to the Government of Yemen through the Consul General of Lebanon. To the Arab States in conference among themselves was left the choice of a time and place mutually convenient to them and to the Special Committee.

Letters of acceptance were received from Egypt (A/AC.13/49 and 56), Iraq (A/AC.13/50), Lebanon (A/AC.13/51), Saudi Arabia (A/AC.13/62) and Syria (A/AC.13/58) with the information that Beirut, Lebanon, had been designated as the place of meeting.

The Consul-General of Transjordan replied for his Government (A/AC.13/52) that, since Transjordan was not a Member of the United Nations, it was not prepared to send a representative outside the country to give evidence, but that it would welcome the Special Committee or any of its members who might wish to pay a visit for that purpose to Transjordan.

On July 20, UNSCOP proceeded to Lebanon, and on the following day paid an informal visit to Damascus, the capital of Syria. On July 22, the Special Committee met in Beirut to hear the views of the Arab States expressed by the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamid Frangie.

On July 25, several members of the Special Committee ■ the Chairman and the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, Netherlands, Peru and Yugoslavia ■ paid a visit to Amman, capital of Transjordan, where they had an exchange of views with King Abdullah and members of his staff.

In addition to oral testimony, UNSCOP received many written statements from various persons and organizations.218/

A number of petitions addressed to the Special Committee asked its intervention in securing the release of prisoners and detainees. The Committee decided that these and similar appeals to investigate the methods of the British police in Palestine, the conditions of Jews in Yemen and the plight of refugees in Aden fell outside UNSCOP's terms of reference. The Committee also rejected petitions that it visit camps for Jewish detainees on Cyprus or permit these detainees to appear before it in Jerusalem to give evidence.

UNSCOP also recorded its concern over acts of violence which had occurred in Palestine since its arrival, declaring that such acts constituted a flagrant violation of the General Assembly's resolution of May 14, 1947.219/

On July 28, 1947, the Special Committee began work on the drafting of irs report in Geneva, Switzerland. Between August 8 and 14, the Committee had decided, by vote of 6 to 4, with 1 abstention, to set up a sub-committee to visit displaced persons' camps. During its tour, the Sub-Committee visited camps at or near Munich, Salzburg, Vienna, Berlin, Hamburg and Hanover, and met the Austrian Chancellor, the Military Governor of the United States zones of Germany and Austria and several United States and United Kingdom officials in charge of displaced persons' affairs, as well as officials of the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization. The Sub-Committee was under the Chairmanship of J. D. L. Hood (Australia) .

The Special Committee also established a sub-committee to study the question of religious interests and Holy Places in Palestine. The status of Jerusalem was also referred to that Sub-Committee, which was under the chairmanship of A. I. Spits (Netherlands). Its suggestions, with various amendments, were incorporated into both the majority and the minority plans eventually submitted by UNSCOP. The recommendations regarding the City of Jerusalem, which were embodied in the Majority Plan of Partition with Economic Union, were inspired by proposals made in the same Sub-Committee by the representatives of Canada, Netherlands, Peru and Sweden. The representatives of India, Iran and Yugoslavia disagreed with these latter recommendations, while reservations made in the Sub-Committee by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Guatemala and Uruguay were later withdrawn.

The drafting of the report occupied UNSCOP members during eleven meetings and a number of informal gatherings and was completed at the 52nd meeting on August 31, 1947.

b) GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

The eleven unanimously adopted resolutions of the Committee were:

That the Mandate should be terminated and Palestine granted independence at the earliest practicable date (recommendations I and II);

That there should be a short transitional period preceding the granting of independence to Palestine during which the authority responsible for administering Palestine should be responsible to the United Nations (recommendations III and IV);

That the sacred character of the Holy Places and the rights of religious communities in Palestine should be preserved and stipulations concerning them inserted in the constitution of any state or states to be created and that a system should be found for settling impartially any disputes involving religious rights (recommendation V);

That the General Assembly should take steps to see that the problem of distressed European Jews should be dealt with as a matter of urgency so as to alleviate their plight and the Palestine problem (recommendation VI);

That the constitution of the new state or states should be fundamentally democratic and should contain guarantees for the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for the protection of minorities (recommendation VII);

That the undertakings contained in the Charter whereby states are to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations should be incorporated in the constitutional provisions applying to Palestine (recommendation VIII);

That the economic unity of Palestine should be preserved (recommendation IX);

That states whose nationals had enjoyed in Palestine privileges and immunities of foreigners, including those formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, should be invited to renounce any rights pertaining to them (recommendation X);

That the General Assembly should appeal to the peoples of Palestine to co-operate with the United Nations in its efforts to settle the situation there and exert every effort to put an end to acts of violence (recommendation XI).

In addition to these eleven unanimously approved recommendations, the Special Committee, with two members (Uruguay and Guatemala) dissenting, and one member recording no opinion, also approved the following twelfth recommendation:

"RECOMMENDATION XII. THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN GENERAL

"It is recommended that

"In the appraisal of the Palestine question, it be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general."

(c) MAJORITY PROPOSAL: PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

According to the plan of the majority220/ (the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), Palestine was to be constituted into an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem. The Arab and the Jewish States would become independent after a transitional period of two years beginning on September 1, 1947. Before their independence could be recognized, however, they must adopt a constitution in line with the pertinent recommendations of the Committee and make to the United Nations a declaration containing certain guarantees, and sign a treaty by which a system of economic collaboration would be established and the economic union of Palestine created.

The plan provided, inter alia, that during the transitional period, the United Kingdom would carry on the administration of Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations and on such conditions and under such supervision as the United Kingdom and the United Nations might agree upon. During this period a stated number of Jewish immigrants was to be admitted. Constituent Assemblies were to be elected by the populations of the areas which were to comprise the Arab and Jewish States, respectively, and were to draw up the constitutions of the States.

These constitutions were to provide for the establishment in each State of a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation and an executive body responsible to the legislature. They would also contain various guarantees, e.g., for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites, and of religious and minority rights.

The Constituent Assembly in each State would appoint a provisional government empowered to make the declaration and sign the Treaty of Economic Union, after which the independence of the State would be recognized. The Declaration would contain provisions for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites and for religious and minority rights. It would also contain provisions regarding citizenship.

A treaty would be entered into between the two States, which would contain provisions to establish the economic union of Palestine and to provide for other matters of common interest. A Joint Economic Board would be established consisting of representatives of the two States and members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to organize and administer the objectives of the Economic Union.

The City of Jerusalem would be placed, after the transitional period, under the International Trusteeship System by means of a Trusteeship Agreement, which would designate the United Nations as the Administering Authority. The plan contained recommended boundaries for the city and provisions concerning the governor and the police force.

The plan also proposed boundaries for both the Arab and Jewish States.

(d) MINORITY PROPOSAL: PLAN OF A FEDERAL STATE

Three UNSCOP members (the representatives of India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposed an independent federal state. This plan221/ provided, inter alia, that an independent federal state of Palestine would be created following a transitional period not exceeding three years, during which responsibility for administering Palestine and preparing it for independence would be entrusted to an authority to be decided by the General Assembly.

The independent federal state would comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State. Jerusalem would be its capital.

During the transitional period a Constituent Assembly would be elected by popular vote and convened by the administering authority on the basis of electoral provisions which would ensure the fullest representation of the population.
The Constituent Assembly would draw up the constitution of the federal state, which was to contain, inter alia, the following provisions:

The federal state would comprise a federal government and governments of the Arab and Jewish States, respectively.

Full authority would be vested in the federal government with regard to national defence, foreign relations, immigration, currency, taxation for federal purposes, foreign and inter-state waterways, transport and communications, copyrights and patents.

The Arab and Jewish States would enjoy full powers of local self-government and would have authority over education, taxation for local purposes, the right of residence, commercial licenses, land permits, grazing rights, inter-state migration, settlement, police, punishment of crime, social institutions and services, public housing, public health, local roads, agriculture and local industries.

The organs of governments would include a head of state, an executive body, a representative federal legislative body composed of two chambers, and a federal court. The executive would be responsible to the legislative body.

Election to one chamber of the federal legislative body would be on the basis of proportional representation of the population as a whole, and to the other on the basis of equal representation of the Arab and Jewish citizens of Palestine. Legislation would be enacted when approved by majority votes in both chambers; in the event of disagreement between the two chambers, the issue would be submitted to an arbitral body of five members including not less than two Arabs and two Jews.

The federal court would be the final court of appeal regarding constitutional matters. Its members, who would include not less than four Arabs and three Jews, would be elected by both chambers of the federal legislative body.

The constitution was to guarantee equal rights for all minorities and fundamental human rights and freedoms. It would guarantee, inter alia, free access to the Holy Places and protect religious interests.

The constitution would provide for an undertaking to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

There would be a single Palestinian nationality and citizenship.

The constitution would provide for equitable participation of representatives of both communities in delegations to international conferences.

A permanent international body was to be set up for the supervision and protection of the Holy Places, to be composed of three representatives designated by the United Nations and one representative of each of the recognized faiths having an interest in the matter, as might be determined by the United Nations.

For a period of three years from the beginning of the transitional period Jewish immigration would be permitted into the Jewish State in such numbers as not to exceed its absorptive capacity, and having due regard for the rights of the existing population within that State and their anticipated natural rate of increase. An international commission, composed of three Arab, three Jewish and three United Nations representatives, would be appointed to estimate the absorptive capacity of the Jewish State. The commission would cease to exist at the end of the three-year period mentioned above.

The minority plan also laid down the boundaries of the proposed Arab and Jewish areas of the federal state.

(3) Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the Recognition of Its Independence as One State

The representative of Saudi Arabia, in a letter (A/317) dated July 7, 1947, and addressed to the Secretary-General, requested, on behalf of his Government, that the following item be placed on the agenda of the next (second) regular annual session of the General Assembly:

"The termination of the mandate over Palestine and the recognition of its independence as one State."

The same request was addressed to the Secretary-General by the representative of Iraq in a letter (A/328) dated July 14, 1947.

C. INITIAL STATEMENTS OF PARTIES IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED

During its second meeting on September 26, 1947, the ad hoc Committee agreed to hear the views of the representatives of the three parties immediately concerned in the Palestine question - i.e., the United Kingdom (as Mandatory Power), the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine - before embarking upon a general debate. The report of the Special Committee on Palestine was introduced by its Chairman, Justice Sandstrom, during the second meeting of the ad hoc Committee.

(1) United Kingdom Viewpoint

The representative of the United Kingdom placed the views of his Government before the ad hoc Committee at the second meeting on September 26, 1947. Congratulating UNSCOP on the way in which it had carried out its task, he declared that the United Kingdom Government was in substantial agreement with the twelve general recommendations.222/ In particular, the United Kingdom Government endorsed and wished to emphasize three of these recommendations: Recommendations I (Termination of the Mandate) and II (Independence), both of which were an exact expression of the guiding principle of British policy, and Recommendation VI (Jewish Displaced Persons). Concerning the latter, the United Kingdom Government believed that the entire problem of displaced persons in Europe, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, was an international responsibility demanding urgent attention. His Government would make proposals in this connection subsequently.

The United Kingdom Government endorsed without reservation the view that the Mandate for Palestine should now be terminated.

He recalled that the representative of the United Kingdom had informed the General Assembly during its first special session that His Majesty's Government would be in the highest degree reluctant to oppose the Assembly's wishes in regard to the future of Palestine. At the same time, he further recalled, the United Kingdom representative had drawn a distinction between accepting a recommendation, in the sense of not impeding its implementation by others, and accepting responsibility for carrying it out by means of a British administration and British forces in Palestine.

The attitude of the United Kingdom Government remained as then stated, the representative of the United Kingdom said. His Government was ready to co-operate with the Assembly to the fullest extent possible. He could not easily imagine circumstances in which the United Kingdom would wish to prevent the application of a settlement recommended by the Assembly. The crucial question for His Majesty's Government was, however, the matter of enforcement of such a settlement.

His Government was ready to assume responsibility for implementing any plan on which agreement was reached by the Arabs and the Jews. If, on the other hand, the Assembly were to recommend a policy which was not acceptable to both parties, the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it, and the Assembly should therefore provide, in such a case, for some alternative authority to implement it. Specifically, the United Kingdom Government was not prepared by itself to undertake the task of imposing a policy in Palestine by force of arms; as to the possibility of his Government's participation with other Governments in the enforcement of a settlement, his Government would have to take into account both the inherent justice of the settlement and the extent to which force would be required for its implementation.

In the absence of a settlement, the United Kingdom Government must plan for an early withdrawal of British forces and of the British Administration from Palestine.

In conclusion, the representative of the United Kingdom declared that if no basis of consent for a settlement could be found, it seemed to him of the highest importance that any recommendations made by the General Assembly should be accompanied by a clear definition of the means by which they were to be carried out.

(2) Viewpoint of the Arab Higher Committee

Addressing the ad hoc Committee at the third meeting on September 30, 1947, the representative of the Arab Higher Committee stated that it was obviously the sacred duty of the Arabs of Palestine to defend their country against all aggression, including the aggressive campaign being waged by the Zionists with the object of securing by force a country ■ Palestine ■ which was not theirs by right. The raison d'être of the United Nations was, he said, to assist self-defence against aggression.

The rights and patrimony of the Arabs in Palestine had been the subject of no fewer than eighteen investigations within 25 years, and all to no purpose. Commissions of inquiry had either reduced the national and legal rights of the Palestine Arabs or had glossed them over. The few recommendations favourable to the Arabs had been ignored by the Mandatory Power. For these and for other reasons already communicated to the United Nations, it was not surprising that the Arab Higher Committee should have abstained from the nineteenth investigation (i.e., UNSCOP's) and refused to appear before the Special Committee.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee concluded from a survey of Palestine history that Zionist claims to that country had no legal or moral basis. In particular, he denied the legal or moral justification of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine, both of which, he declared, had been laid down by the Zionist Executive and the United Kingdom Government. As a result of Anglo-Zionist co-operation, Palestine's Jewish minority was placed in a privileged position vis-à-vis the Arab majority, while Arabs were being made the victims of discrimination.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee emphasized the importance of the problem of immigration into Palestine. He accused the Mandatory Power of having overstepped the provisions of Article 6 of the Mandate by permitting Jewish immigration into Palestine to the detriment of the political, social and economic rights of the Palestine Arabs. If any room existed in Palestine for an increase in population, that room should be left for its natural increase. He emphasized the increasing determination of the Arabs to oppose all immigration.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee stated that, yielding to Zionist pressure, the United Kingdom Government had failed to implement its own decision, made in 1939, that Jewish immigration into Palestine must cease and that Palestine must become an independent unitary state within a fixed time.

No people would be more pleased than the Arabs to see the distressed Jews of Europe given permanent relief. But Palestine already had absorbed far more than its just share, and the Jews could not impose their will on other nations by choosing the place and manner of their relief, particularly if that choice was inconsistent with the principles of international law and justice and prejudicial to the interests of the nation directly concerned. He recalled the relevant resolutions concerning refugees and displaced persons passed by the General Assembly on February 12 (8(I))223/ and December 15 (62(I)),224/ 1946, in that connection and mentioned the offer of the United Kingdom, made more than 40 years ago, to place Uganda at the disposal of the Jews as a national home, and, more recently, the efforts of the U.S.S.R. to create a Jewish national home in Biro-Bidjan.

Both places had more to offer the Jews than the tiny country of Palestine, but the Zionists had turned them down. The Zionists did not want Palestine for the permanent solution of the Jewish problem nor for the relief of the distressed Jews they wanted power; they had political ambitions and designs on strategically important Palestine and the Near East.

Then, too, it would be illogical for the United Nations to associate itself with the introduction of an alien body into the established homogeneity of the Arab world, a process which could only produce a "new Balkans".

The solution of the Palestine problem was simple. It lay in the Charter of the United Nations in accordance with which the Arabs of Palestine, constituting the majority of the population, were entitled to a free and independent state. He welcomed the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom that the Mandate should be terminated and its termination followed by independence, and expressed the hope that the United Kingdom Government would not, as in the past, reverse its decision under Zionist pressure.

Declaring that, once Palestine was found to be entitled to independence, the United Nations was not legally competent to decide or impose Palestine's constitutional organization, the representative of the Arab Higher Committee outlined the following principles as the basis for the future constitutional organization of the Holy Land:

1. That an Arab State in the whole of Palestine be established on democratic lines.

2. That the Arab State of Palestine would respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality of all persons before the law.

3. That the Arab State of Palestine would protect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities.

4. That freedom of worship and access to the Holy Places would be guaranteed to all.

He added that the following steps would have to be taken to give effect to the above mentioned four principles:

(a) A Constituent Assembly should be elected at the earliest possible time. All genuine and law abiding nationals of Palestine would be entitled to participate in the elections of the Constituent Assembly.

(b) The Constituent Assembly should, within a fixed time, formulate and enact a Constitution for the Arab State of Palestine, which should be of a democratic nature and should embody the above-mentioned four principles.

(c) A government should be formed within a fixed time, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution, to take over the administration of Palestine from the Mandatory Power.

Such a program was the only one which the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to adopt, and the only item on the Committee's agenda with which the Arab Higher Committee would associate itself was Item 3.225/ i.e., the item proposed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee said he had not commented upon the UNSCOP Report because the Arab Higher Committee considered that it could not be used as a basis for discussion. Both the majority and the minority plans contained in the Report were inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Arabs of Palestine were solidly determined to oppose with all the means at their disposal any scheme which provided for the dissection, segregation or partition of their country or which gave to a minority special and preferential rights and status.

(3) Viewpoint of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

The representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, addressing the ad hoc Committee at the fourth meeting on October 2, 1947, praised the Special Committee for its conscientious labours and good faith. The Jewish Agency had regarded it as an inescapable obligation to co-operate fully with the United Nations and had placed all the required information and data at the disposal of UNSCOP, while the Arab Higher Committee had refused to heed repeated UNSCOP invitations for co-operation. It was strange that, after having flouted its authority, the Arab Higher Committee asked the United Nations to support the Arab stand.

The representative of the Jewish Agency said that it would appear from the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom that the latter did not intend to accept the General Assembly's impending recommendation on Palestine. If this be so, he wondered why the United Kingdom had asked the Assembly to place the Palestine problem on its agenda. Given the present realities of the Palestine situation, the undertaking of the United Kingdom Government to implement any settlement agreeable to both Jews and Arabs meant very little and did not advance the solution of the Palestine problem at all.

He welcomed the announcement that British troops were to be withdrawn at an early date, adding that this made a decision even more urgent than it had been at the time of the (first) special session.

On behalf of the Jewish Agency, he supported ten of the eleven recommendations unanimously adopted by UNSCOP. The exception was Recommendation VI (Jewish Displaced Persons). The Jewish Agency, he said, did not disapprove of this recommendation but did wish to call attention to the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine, a fact noted both by the Anglo-American Committee and by UNSCOP. While hoping that nations would welcome displaced persons wishing to emigrate to countries other than Palestine, the Jewish Agency considered that it would be unjust to deny the right to go to Palestine to those who wished to do so.

The representative of the Jewish Agency regarded the twelfth recommendation (The Jewish Problem in General) as unintelligible. He called it a mere postulate which, moreover, had not been accepted unanimously by the Special Committee. The "Jewish Problem in General" was, he said, none other than the age-old question of Jewish homelessness, for which there was but one solution, that given by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate: the reconstitution of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

The solution proposed by the minority of the Special Committee was unacceptable to the Jewish Agency; although it referred to "States", it actually made provision only for semi-autonomous cantons or provinces. Palestine would become an Arab state with two Jewish enclaves. The Jews would be frozen in the position of a permanent minority in the proposed federal state, and would not even have control over their own fiscal policies or immigration. It entailed all the disadvantages of partition without the compensating advantages of a real partition: statehood, independence and free immigration.

The majority proposal was not really satisfactory to the Jewish people, either. According to David Lloyd George, then British Prime Minister, the Balfour Declaration implied that the whole of Palestine, including Transjordan, should ultimately become a Jewish state. Transjordan had, nevertheless, been severed from Palestine in 1922 and had subsequently been set up as an Arab kingdom. Now a second Arab state was to be carved out of the remainder of Palestine, with the result that the Jewish National Home would represent less than one eighth of the territory originally set aside for it. Such a sacrifice should not be asked of the Jewish people.

Referring to the Arab States established as independent countries since the First World War, he said that 17,000,000 Arabs now occupied an area of 1,290,000 square miles, including all the principal Arab and Moslem centres, while Palestine, after the loss of Transjordan, was only 10,000 square miles; yet the majority plan proposed to reduce it by one half. UNSCOP proposed to eliminate Western Galilee from the Jewish State; that was an injustice and a grievous handicap to the development of the Jewish State.

The representative of the Jewish Agency also criticized the UNSCOP majority proposal concerning Jerusalem, saying that the Jewish section of modern Jerusalem (outside the Walled City) should be included in the Jewish State. He reserved the right to deal at a later stage with other territorial modifications.

If this heavy sacrifice was the inexorable condition of a final solution, if it would make possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign control of its own immigration, then the Jewish Agency was prepared to recommend the acceptance of the partition solution, subject to further discussion of constitutional and territorial provisions. This sacrifice would be the Jewish contribution to the solution of a painful problem and would bear witness to the Jewish people's international spirit and its desire for peace.

In spite of the heavy sacrifices which the Jewish State would have to make in this matter also, the Jewish Agency accepted the proposal for an economic union, terming it a promising and statesmanlike conception. The limit to the sacrifices to which the Jewish Agency could consent was clear: a Jewish State must have in its own hands those instruments of financing and economic control necessary to carry out large-scale Jewish immigration and the related economic development, and it must have independent access to those world sources of capital and raw materials indispensable for the accomplishment of these purposes.

The Jews of Palestine wanted to be good neighbours of all the Arab States. If their offer of peace and friendship were rejected, they would defend their rights. In Palestine there had been built a nation which demanded its independence, and would not allow itself to be dislodged or deprived of its national status. It could not, and would not, go beyond the enormous sacrifice which had been asked of it. It would not be cowed by idle threats.

The representative of the Jewish Agency urged that the transitional period leading to the establishment of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine be made as short as possible; at any rate, shorter than the two-year limit proposed by UNSCOP. He favoured an international authority to be entrusted, under United Nations auspices, with the task of administering Palestine during the transitional period.

d. GENERAL DEBATE

In the general debate, which began during the ad hoc Committee's fifth meeting on October 4, 1947, and ended during the sixteenth meeting on October 16, 1947, opinion was sharply divided. Proponents of the UNSCOP majority plan in general held that the claims of Jews and Arabs both had merit and that no perfect solution of the Palestine problem could be devised. Under the circumstances, a compromise solution was indicated. The partition plan would demand sacrifices from both sides; but, in its emphasis on economic union, it laid the foundation for the eventual development of friendly relations among the two contending parties. Without committing themselves to all the details of the UNSCOP majority plan for partition with economic union, they would support the plan in principle, as the best and most equitable that could be achieved at present. Participants in the general debate who expressed themselves in these or similar terms were the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Haiti, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, United States, Uruguay and U.S.S.R. The representatives of Colombia and El Salvador dealt with particular aspects of the Palestine problem displaced persons, appeals for an end to violence without taking a stand on UNSCOP's majority and minority plans as such. The representative of China, declaring that he could not support the UNSCOP majority or minority plan, urged that new efforts be made to secure Arab-Jewish agreement on a solution of the Palestine problem. Other Committee members held that the Assembly had no right under the Charter to decide to partition Palestine or to enforce such a decision. Representatives of several Arab States formally proposed that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice be obtained on this legal aspect of the question before the Assembly proceeded to act on the UNSCOP majority recommendation. Holding that partition violated both the Charter and a people's democratic right to self determination, the representatives of the Arab States Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen declared themselves in favour of an independent unitary state embracing all of Palestine, in which the rights of the minority would be scrupulously safeguarded. These Arab States were supported in their opposition to the partition plan by the representatives of Afghanistan, Argentina, Cuba, India, Iran, Pakistan and Yugoslavia, although not all of the latter explicitly expressed themselves in favour of the Arab States' objective of a unitary Palestine. Yugoslavia, in particular, strongly supported UNSCOP's minority recommendation for a federated state, and India indicated a preference for a large measure of autonomy for areas of the future state of Palestine having Jewish majorities.

Following the conclusion of the initial general debate, the ad hoc Committee, during its seventeenth and eighteenth meetings on October 17 and 18, 1947, once again heard representatives of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab Higher Committee reaffirm their positions.

e. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED DURING THE GENERAL DEBATE

In the course of the general debate, seventeen proposals were submitted to the ad hoc Committee.

El Salvador proposed (A/AC.14/3) that the General Assembly call on the Jewish Agenda and the Arab Higher Committee to appoint three representatives each to confer, under United Nations auspices, with a view to reaching agreement on a settlement of the Palestine question.

Uruguay suggested (A/AC.14/10) that 30,000 Jewish children be admitted to Palestine at once on humanitarian grounds.

Colombia submitted two proposals, the first (A/AC.14/11) being in the nature of an appeal to all interested parties to abstain from violence, the second (A/AC.14/12) calling for the creation of a special committee to study the observations and suggestions contained in the report of UNSCOP in so far as these deal with the problem of Jewish displaced persons, i.e., General Recommendations VI and XII and Sections VI and VII of the minority proposal.226/

Guatemala proposed (A/AC.14/13) acceptance, with certain modifications, of the UNSCOP majority plan, to be implemented by an international military police force composed of contingents contributed, on a proportional basis, by States Members other than permanent members of the Security Council, the cost of maintaining such a force to be borne by the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The United Kingdom proposed (A/AC.14/14) that each Member of the United Nations "adopt urgent measures for settling a fair share of displaced persons and refugees in its country" and co-operate with other nations through the International Refugee Organization, or its Preparatory Commission, in the development of overall plans to accomplish this end.

Sweden and the United States jointly proposed (A/AC.14/16) that the Committee accept the basic principles of the unanimous UNSCOP recommendations, as well as the UNSCOP majority plan, as the basis for its own recommendations to the General Assembly concerning the future government of Palestine.

The United Stares proposed (A/AC.14/17) the formation of a sub-committee to draw up a detailed plan for the future government of Palestine in accordance with the majority plan and the unanimous recommendations of UNSCOP, and to incorporate this plan in the form of recommendations to be transmitted to the ad hoc Committee not later than October 27, 1947.

Canada submitted an amendment (A/AC.14/23) to this proposal of the United States. Under the Canadian amendment, the sub-committee was to be given the following additional terms of reference:

"To consider the exercise of administrative responsibility in Palestine during the transitional period, including the possibility of the application of Chapter XII of the Charter; [and]

"To consider methods by which recommendations of the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question . . . [based on the UNSCOP majority plan] would be put into effect."

The Netherlands (A/AC.14/18) called on the Committee to draft "(a) proposals for a fair and practicable solution of the Palestine question, as far as possible acceptable to both parties involved; (b) recommendations for the adequate and effective implementation of this solution, and (c) recommendations for an early solution of the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons".

Yugoslavia recommended (A/AC.14/19) the immediate admission to Palestine of all Jewish refugees detained in Cyprus.

Uruguay proposed (A/AC.14/20 and Corr. 1) acceptance of the UNSCOP majority plan as a basis for discussion in the ad hoc Committee with these modifications: that the territory of Galilee remain under the jurisdiction of the Jewish State, that the Arab city of Jaffa be transferred to the Arab State, that the Arab town of Beersheba be transferred to the Arab State, that the Jewish district of the new City of Jerusalem be included in the territory of the Jewish State, and that the Arab district of the new City of Jerusalem be included in the Arab State. Uruguay further proposed the establishment of a special ad hoc committee to study the plan for an economic union of Palestine, if the UNSCOP majority plan were adopted. Uruguay further proposed that the United Nations should take over the government and administration of Palestine during the transitional period (i.e., until September 1, 1949, at the latest) referred to in Section B of the UNSCOP majority report, these functions to be exercised by a Provisional Council composed of five members appointed by the General Assembly, three to be chosen from citizens of Member States, and two to be appointed on the proposal, respectively, of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee. Decisions of this Provisional Council should be by a simple majority, except that all proposals voted for by both the Arab and Jewish representative on the Council, or introduced by them jointly, should be considered as adopted. Uruguay further proposed the following substantive proposal "in view of the letter and the spirit of Recommendation No. XII adopted by a majority vote of the Special Committee on Palestine...":227/

"The creation of a Jewish State will be the territorial solution for the European Jewish problem and will permit to reparate in part the terrible damage suffered under the Nazi persecution by the Jewish people, which is still exposed to new wrongs and racial discrimination."

Finally Uruguay reiterated its earlier proposal to admit at once into Palestine some 30,000 Jewish children from displaced persons camps in Europe and other places of detention or assembly.

Iraq proposed (A/AC.14/21) that the General Assembly submit the following "legal point" to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the Charter:

"Did not the pledges given by Great Britain to the Shereef Hussein of Mecca and her subsequent declarations, promises and assurances to the Arabs that in the event of Allied victory the Arab countries would obtain their independence include Palestine and its inhabitants?"

Syria submitted two proposals. The first of these (A/AC.14/22) proposed that the General Assembly recommend

"that the United Kingdom prepare as soon as possible an agreement under Article 79 of the Charter and submit it for approval to the General Assembly authorizing Great Britain, as administering authority, to complete her task in Palestine during the transitionary period in accordance with the said agreement, which shall contain the following provisions:

"1. That a Sovereign State for the whole of Palestine be established on a democratic basis,

"2. That a Constituent Assembly shall be elected at the earliest possible date, all genuine and law-abiding nationals of Palestine being entitled to vote,

"3. This Constituent Assembly shall within a fixed period formulate and enact a Constitution for the State of Palestine which shall be of a democratic character and contain provisions

"(a) guaranteeing human rights, fundamental freedoms and the equality of all persons before the Law,

"(b) guaranteeing the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities,

"(c) safeguarding the Holy Places and guaranteeing freedom of worship and access to the Holy Places to all.

"4. That a government shall be formed within a fixed period in accordance with the terms of the Constitution to take over the administration of Palestine from the administering authority."

The second Syrian proposal (A/AC.14/25) called for the addressing of a request for an advisory opinion to the International Court of Justice concerning the following questions:

"1. Are the terms of the Act of Mandate [i.e., United Kingdom Mandate for Palestine] . . . consistent or not consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations . . . and with the fundamental rights of peoples and their right to self-determination and International Law?

"2. Is a forcible plan of partition . . . consistent with the objectives of the mandate and with the principles of the Charter and with the ultimate fate of mandated territories referred to in Chapter XII of the Charter?

"3. Does the plan of partition in its adoption and forcible execution fall within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly?"

Egypt also proposed (A/AC.14/24) that a request for an advisory opinion be addressed to the International Court of Justice. The Egyptian proposal would have submitted the following two questions to the Court: Does it lie "within the competence of the General Assembly to recommend any of the two solutions proposed by the majority or by the minority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine"? and, Does it lie "within the rights of any Member State or group of Member States to implement any of the proposed solutions without the consent of the people of Palestine"?

Lebanon suggested (A/AC.14/26) that the General Assembly,

"Recognizing the danger that assistance in transport arms and money, to immigrants destined for Palestine is calculated to accentuate the existing tension in that country and to endanger peace in the Middle East

"Recommends that the Governments of Members of the United Nations refrain, and prohibit their nationals, from giving assistance in any form whatsoever to the said immigrants."

Finally, Syria verbally suggested, at the nineteenth meeting of the ad hoc Committee on October 21, 1947, the establishment of a sub-committee to study the agenda items jointly proposed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia for the creation of a unitary, independent state embracing all of Palestine. At the same meeting, Syria further proposed the establishment of a sub-committee composed of jurists to consider the Assembly's competence to take and enforce a decision (as distinct from making a recommendation) and to deal with the legal aspects of the Palestine Mandate. The question of referring the whole issue to the International Court of Justice could be discussed after the ad hoc Committee had received the report of the committee of jurists, the representative of Syria declared.

f. ESTABLISHMENT OF SUB-COMMITTEES

Following the conclusion of the general debate and the hearing of statements by the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, the ad hoc Committee, at its nineteenth meeting on October 21, 1947, discussed its future procedure. The Chairman proposed that no vote should be taken at that stage on matters of principle, but that the Committee should establish:

1. a Conciliation Group, which would try to bring the parties together, as suggested by El Salvador and the Netherlands;

2. a sub-committee (Sub-Committee 1), entrusted with drawing up a detailed plan based on the majority proposals of the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), as provided by the draft resolution of the United States, amended by Canada;

3. a sub-committee (Sub-Committee 2), to draw up a detailed plan in accordance with the proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq for the recognition of Palestine as an independent unitary stare, and the proposal to the same effect submitted by the delegation of Syria.

The Chairman's plan received wide support. Several delegations, however, urged that the Committee should itself make decisions on matters of principle and then entrust to a sub-committee the working out of details. A proposal to this effect was moved by the representative of the U.S.S.R., but was rejected by a vote of 26 to 14. The Committee then approved the procedure suggested by the Chairman.

The question of the composition of the three subsidiary bodies proposed by the Chairman was considered by the ad hoc Committee at its twentieth meeting, on October 22, 1947.

As regards the Conciliation Group, the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur were authorized, if they succeeded in initiating the conciliation process, to co-opt other Members to assist them in their task.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. proposed that Sub-Committee 1 be composed of fifteen members, including all the members of the Security Council. This proposal was rejected by a vote of 32 to 6. The ad hoc Committee then decided to authorize its Chairman to name the members of both Sub-Committees 1 and 2. Both Sub-Committees were asked to submit their reports not later than October 29, 1947, subject to an extension of that time limit if necessary.

With regard to the various draft resolutions228/ which the Committee had not yet considered, it was decided at the twentieth meeting that (1) the discussion of the draft resolution by Sweden and the United States approving the principles of UNSCOP's majority plan (A/AC.14/16) should be deferred until the report of Sub-Committee 1 had been received; (2) the various resolutions proposing to amend the UNSCOP majority plan should be referred to Sub-Committee 1; (3) the Colombian draft resolution on acts of violence (A/AC.14/11) should be considered when the ad hoc Committee discussed its recommendations to the General Assembly; (4) either Sub-Committee was empowered to take up and consider any or all written proposals before the ad hoc Committee which it deemed relevant to the performance of its functions, such as the draft resolutions relating to the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons. (A proposal by the representative of Colombia to set up a special sub-committee to study this latter problem was rejected by a vote of 19 to 4.)

(1) Composition of Sub-Committees

By virtue of the authority vested in him by the ad hoc Committee, the Chairman on October 22 appointed the following Members to serve on the two Sub-Committees:

Sub-committee 1: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, United States, Uruguay, U.S.S.R., Venezuela.

Sub-Committee 2: Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.

(2) Reports of Sub-Committees

(a) REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 1 (A/AC.14/34)

At its first meeting on October 23, 1947, Sub-Committee 1 elected
K. Pruszynski (Poland) as Chairman and E. Rodriguez Fabregat (Uruguay) as Rapporteur.

Representatives of the United Kingdom and of the Jewish Agency accepted invitations to attend all meetings of the Sub-Committee to furnish information and assistance. A similar invitation extended to the Arab Higher Committee was declined on the grounds that the Arab Higher Committee was prepared to assist and give information only regarding the question of the termination of the Mandate and the creation of a unitary state of Palestine.

Sub-Committee 1 held 32 meetings. To expedite its work it organized seven working groups as follows:

Working Group on the Holy Places, under the charge of K. Lisicky (Czechoslovakia).

Working Group on Citizenship, under the charge of the Rapporteur.

Working Group on International Conventions and Financial Obligations, under the charge of J. Garcia Granados (Guatemala).

Working Group on Economic Union, under the charge of Mr. Granados.

Working Group on Boundaries, under the charge of the Chairman and Rapporteur.

Working Group on implementation, composed of representatives of Canada, Guatemala, U.S.S.R. and United States.

Working Group on the City of Jerusalem, under the charge of
Mr. Lisicky.

In its report (A/AC.14/34) Sub-Committee 1 recommended the adoption of a draft resolution embodying a Plan of Partition with Economic Union, along the general lines of the UNSCOP majority plan (two independent states, an international regime for the City of Jerusalem and economic union of these three units).

As regards the Holy Places and the question of citizenship, the recommendations of Sub-Committee 1 virtually coincided with those of the UNSCOP majority plan.

As regards international convention, Sub-Committee 1 unlike UNSCOP recommended that disputes about their applicability and continued validity be referred to the International Court of Justice.

The Sub-Committee's recommendations on financial obligations unlike UNSCOP's proposal provided for the creation in Palestine of a Court of Claims to settle any disputes between the United Kingdom and either state respecting claims not recognized by the latter.

The Sub-Committee, while accepting the recommendations of UNSCOP regarding economic union, adopted certain technical modifications designed to strengthen the powers of the proposed Joint Economic Board while ensuring the widest measure of autonomy to the future states.

As for boundaries, the Sub-Committee, accepting the recommendations of UNSCOP in principle, proposed certain changes with a view to reducing, as far as reasonably possible, the size of the Arab minority in the Jewish State, and to taking into account considerations of security, communications, irrigation and possibilities of future development.

Among the most important suggested changes was that the Arab sections of Jaffa placed in the Jewish State in the UNSCOP majority plan should be excluded from the Jewish State and created as an Arab enclave, thus reducing the Arab minority in the Jewish State by between 78,000 and 81,000, depending on whether the Karton quarter of Jaffa, which is inhabited by both Jews and Arabs, was included in the proposed Arab enclave. The final decision on this question, as well as on details on boundary questions, would be left, according to the Sub-Committee's recommendations, to a demarcation commission which would fix the exact boundary lines on the spot.229/

In its report to the ad hoc Committee, Sub-committee 1 reported that the most difficult problem which it had faced was that of the implementation of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union.

The Working Group on Implementation, taking into account the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom prior to the general debate in the ad hoc Committee (that the United Kingdom Government planned an early withdrawal of its troops and administration from Palestine) agreed on November 10, 1947, to the outlines of a plan for implementation. This plan provided for the termination of the Mandate and the withdrawal of the armed forces of the Mandatory Power by May 1, 1948, and the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States by July 1, 1948. The implementation of the proposed General Assembly resolution was to be entrusted to a commission of from three to five members appointed by the Assembly, but acting under the guidance of the Security Council.

This plan was reconsidered by the Working Group in the light of an additional statement, and replies to questions of Sub-Committee members, made by the representative of the United Kingdom on November 13, 1947, before the Sub-Committee. From the replies and the statement, the Sub-Committee learned that the United Kingdom Government planned to withdraw its troops from Palestine by August 1, 1948. Neither British troops nor the Mandatory Civil Administration in Palestine would be prepared to enforce a settlement against either Arabs or Jews. The United Kingdom Government reserved the right to lay down the Mandate at any time after it became evident that the Assembly's decision was not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. On the other hand, the United Kingdom Government would not take any action contrary to any resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. Subject to the general reservation that the Mandatory Power must retain sufficient control in areas still under military occupation to ensure the safety of British troops and their orderly withdrawal, the Mandatory Power would not obstruct the task of the Commission appointed to implement partition, nor, subject to that same reservation, would it obstruct the establishment of Provisional Councils of Government for the Jewish and Arab States, the work of the Boundary Demarcation Commission, and the recommendations in regard to immigration and land regulations for the territory of the future Jewish State.

In the light of these additional observations of the representative of the United Kingdom, the Working Group unanimously proposed, and the Sub-Committee, with minor modifications, approved, a new plan of implementation, which may be summarized as follows:

The Mandate was to be terminated and British troops were to be withdrawn at a date to be agreed on by the Commission, consisting of five members (Guatemala, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Uruguay), and the Mandatory Power, with the approval of the Security Council, but in any case not later than August 1, 1948.

The proposed Jewish and Arab States, and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, would come into existence two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the Mandatory Power, but in any case not later than October 1, 1948. During the transitional period, the Commission would administer Palestine under the guidance of the Security Council, and would take the necessary measures to implement the Plan of Partition with Economic Union. Until the termination of the Mandate, the Mandatory Power was to maintain order and direct the main public services to the extent that these had not yet been placed under the direction of the Commission, Provisional Councils of Government and the Joint Economic Board, respectively. The Commission and the Mandatory Power were to co-operate, and there was to be a progressive transfer from the Mandatory Power to the Provisional Councils of Government and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, of responsibility for all the functions of government. During the transitional period, the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, would have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation. Following the termination of the Mandate, the whole administration would be in charge of the Provisional Councils of Government and the Joint Economic Board, acting under the Commission. The Provisional Council of Government of each State was to recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State to maintain internal order. If by April 1, 1948, a Provisional Council of Government could not be selected, or could not carry out its functions in either of the States, the Security Council would take such action with respect to that State as it deemed proper.

Concerning the City of Jerusalem, the Sub-Committee adopted, with minor extensions, the boundaries proposed by UNSCOP.230/ The Sub-committee decided to recommend that the City of Jerusalem be placed under a Special International Regime in relation with the Trusteeship Council, rather than under an International Trusteeship, as recommended by UNSCOP.

The Sub-Committee also adopted a number of other amendments to various portions of the text of the recommendations of UNSCOP with a view to giving greater clarity and precision to details.

The Plan of Partition with Economic Union, as adopted by the Sub-Committee, was incorporated into a draft resolution and submitted to the ad hoc Committee for approval. All the recommendations and the draft resolution were adopted unanimously by the Sub-Committee, with the exception of a single paragraph relating to the composition of the special police force for the City of Jerusalem, the text of which was adopted by a vote of 6 to 1, with 2 abstentions.

(b) REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 2 (A/AC.14/32)

At its first meeting on October 23, 1947, Sub-committee 2 elected A. Gonzalez Fernandez (Colombia) as Chairman and Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) as Rapporteur. On a preliminary review of the task assigned to it the drafting of a detailed plan for the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the establishment of Palestine as an independent unitary state the Sub-Committee felt that it was somewhat unfortunate that both Sub-Committee 1 and Sub-Committee 2 were so constituted as to include in each of them representatives of only one school of thought, respectively, and that there was insufficient representation of neutral countries. Accordingly, it was proposed that the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee should be requested to reconstitute Sub-Committee 2 (irrespective of what might be done with regard to Sub-Committee 1) by replacing two of the Arab States in the Sub-Committee (which were prepared to withdraw) by neutrals or countries which had not definitely committed themselves to any particular solution of the Palestine question. The Chairman of the ad hoc Committee, being approached in this connection, explained to the Sub-Committee that he could not see his way to accepting this recommendation. In the circumstances, the representative of Colombia resigned from the Sub-Committee on October 28, and Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) was elected as Chairman in his stead, at the same time retaining his position as Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee.

From the outset, the Sub-Committee decided to concentrate on three broad issues:

(1) The legal questions connected with or arising from the Palestine problem, in particular the three proposals bearing on the subject submitted to the ad hoc Committee by the delegations of Iraq, Egypt and Syria (A/AC.14/21, A/AC.14/24, A/AC.14/25).231/

(2) The problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons and its connection with the Palestinian question.

(3) The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and constitutional proposals for the establishment of a unitary and independent state on the basis of the proposals submitted by Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the General Assembly.

Working groups were established to clear with each of these main issues and were constituted as follows:

Legal Problems: Pakistan, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Refugee Problem: Afghanistan, Colombia and Lebanon.

Constitutional Proposals: Egypt, Iraq and Yemen.

The reports of the three working groups were considered, amended and approved by the Sub-committee and constitute Chapters I, II and III, respectively, of its report to the ad hoc Committee. The conclusions of the Sub-Committee were embodied in three resolutions (Chapter IV) which were recommended to the ad hoc Committee for its recommendation, in turn, to the General Assembly.

A representative of the United Kingdom attended meetings of the Sub-Committee to provide assistance as required.

The three resolutions submitted by Sub-committee 2 to the ad hoc Committee for recommendation to the General Assembly read as follows:

Resolution No. I
DRAFT RESOLUTION REFERRING CERTAIN LEGAL QUESTIONS
TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

"Considering that the Palestine Question raises certain legal issues connected, inter alia, with the inherent right of the indigenous population of Palestine to their country and to determine its future, the pledges and assurances given to the Arabs in the first World War regarding the independence of Arab countries, including Palestine, the validity and scope of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the effect on the Mandate of the dissolution of the League of Nations and of the declaration by the Mandatory Power of its intentions to withdraw from Palestine;

"Considering that the Palestine question also raises other legal issues connected with the competence of the United Nations to recommend any solution contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Charter of the United Nations, or to the wishes of the majority of the people of Palestine;

"Considering that doubts have been expressed by several Member States concerning the legality under the Charter of any action by the United Nations, or by any Member State or group of Member States, to enforce any proposal which is contrary to the wishes, or is made without the consent, of the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine;

"Considering that these questions involve legal issues which so far have not been pronounced upon by any impartial or competent tribunal, and it is essential that such questions be authoritatively determined before the United Nations can recommend a solution of the Palestine question in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,

"The General Assembly of the United Nations Resolves to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter IV of the Statute of the Court on the following questions:

"(i) Whether the indigenous population of Palestine has not an inherent right to Palestine and to determine its future constitution and government;

"(ii) Whether the pledges and assurances given by Great Britain to the Arabs during the first World War (including the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918) concerning the independence and future of Arab countries at the end of the war did not include Palestine;

"(iii)Whether the Balfour Declaration, which was made without the knowledge or consent of the indigenous population of Palestine, was valid and binding on the people of Palestine, or consistent with the earlier and subsequent pledges and assurances given to the Arabs;

"(iv) Whether the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine are in conformity or consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations (in particular Article 22), or are compatible with the provisions of the Mandate relating to the development of self-government and the preservation of the rights and position of the Arabs of Palestine;

"(v) Whether the legal basis for the Mandate for Palestine has not disappeared with the dissolution of the League of Nations, and whether it is not the duty of the Mandatory Power to hand over power and administration to a Government of Palestine representing the rightful people of Palestine;

"(vi) Whether a plan to partition Palestine without the consent of the majority of its people is consistent with the objectives of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and with the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine;

"(vii)Whether the United Nations is competent to recommend either of the two plans and recommendations of the majority or minority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, or any other solution involving partition of the territory of Palestine, or a permanent trusteeship over any city or part of Palestine, without the consent of the majority of the people of Palestine

"(viii)Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and future Government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of, the inhabitants of Palestine.

"The General Assembly instructs the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the International Court of Justice, accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the questions under reference."

Resolution No. II
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON JEWISH REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

"The General Assembly, having regard to the unanimous recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, that the General Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews will be dealt with as a matter "of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem;

"Bearing in mind that genuine refugees and displaced persons constitute a problem which is international in scope and character,

"Considering that the question of refugees and displaced persons is indivisible in character as regards its possible solution;

"Considering that it is the duty of the Governments concerned to make provision for the return of refugees and displaced persons to the countries of which they are nationals;

"Being further of the opinion that where repatriation proves impossible, solution should be sought by way of resettlement in the territories of the Members of the United Nations which are willing and in a position to absorb these refugees and displaced persons;

"Considering that Palestine, despite its very small area and limited resources, has absorbed a disproportionately large number of Jewish immigrants and cannot take any more without serious injury to the economy of the country and the rights and position of the indigenous population;

"Considering that many other countries with much greater area and larger resources have not taken their due share of Jewish refugees and displaced persons;

"Having adopted a resolution (No. 62 (1)) on 15 December 1946 calling for the creation of an international refugee organization with a view to the solution of the refugee problem through the combined efforts of the United Nations; and

"Taking note of the assumption on 1 July 1947 by the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization of operational responsibility for displaced persons and refugees;

"Recommends:

"(i) That countries of origin should be requested to take back the Jewish refugees and displaced persons belonging to them, and to render them all possible assistance to resettle in life;

"(ii) That those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who cannot be repatriated should be absorbed in the territories of Members of the United Nations in proportion to their area, economic resources, per capita income, population and other relevant factors;

"(iii) That a Special Committee of the General Assembly should be set up to recommend for acceptance of the Members of the United Nations a scheme of quotas of Jewish refugees and displaced persons to be resettled in their respective territories, and that the Special Committee should, as far as possible, work in consultation with the International Refugee Organization or its Preparatory Commission."

Resolution No. III
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSTITUTION AND FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

"The General Assembly, taking note of the declaration by the Mandatory Power of its intention to withdraw from Palestine;

"Considering that Palestine is a mandated territory whose independence was provisionally recognized by virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

"Recognizing that the only solution in consonance with the objectives of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations is one that is acceptable to the majority of the people of Palestine;

"Being satisfied that the partition of Palestine is unjust, illegal and impracticable and that the only just and workable solution is the immediate establishment of a unitary, democratic, and independent state, with adequate safeguards for minorities;

"Believing that peaceful and orderly transfer of power from the Mandatory to the Government of the people of Palestine is necessary in the interest of all concerned;

"Recommends:

"1. That a Provisional Government, representative of all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength, should be set up as early as possible in Palestine;

"2. That the powers and functions of the present Administration of Palestine should be vested in the Provisional Government as soon as the latter is constituted;

"3. That the Mandatory Power should begin the withdrawal of its forces and services from Palestine as soon as the Provisional Government is installed, and should complete the withdrawal within one year;

"4. That the Provisional Government should, as soon as practicable, enact an electoral law for the setting up of a Constituent Assembly, prepare an electoral register, and hold elections for the Constituent Assembly;

"5. That the Constituent Assembly should also function as a Legislature and that the Provisional Government should be responsible to it until elections for a Legislature are held under the new constitution;

"6. That while the task of framing a constitution for Palestine must be left to the Constituent Assembly the following basic principles shall be strictly adhered to:
(c) REPORT OF CONCILIATION GROUP

At the twenty-third meeting of the ad hoc Committee on November 19, 1947, the Chairman, speaking on behalf of the conciliation group, reported that the efforts of the group had not been fruitful. Both parties seemed too confident as to the success of their case before the General Assembly and there appeared to be little hope of conciliation, at least at the present time.

g. Ad hoc COMMITTEE CONSIDERS SUB-COMMITTEE REPORTS

The reports of the two Sub-Committees (A/AC.14/34 and A/AC.14/32) and of the Conciliation Group were placed before the ad hoc Committee at the 23rd meeting on November 19, 1947, and their consideration began at the next meeting on November 20. On the latter date, in the course of the 25th meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom recalled the general principles contained in the statement made to the Committee on behalf of his Government at the second meeting.232/ He applied those principles to the specific proposals of Sub-Committees 1 and 2 with respect to the role assigned to the United Kingdom in the implementation of those proposals. In both cases the United Kingdom would have to perform certain functions which were not compatible with the declared intentions of its Government. In both cases, also since the Mandatory Power intended to withdraw from Palestine without assuming any responsibility for the establishment of a new regime which would not command general consent in Palestine there would be no regularly constituted authority in the evacuated areas unless the United Nations recommended a way in which the gap could be effectively filled.

The Committee adjourned to allow both Sub-committees to meet immediately to reconsider their respective recommendations in the light of this statement of the representative of the United Kingdom. Representatives of the United Kingdom attended the new meetings of the two Sub-Committees to answer questions and furnish information.

Sub-Committee 2 decided not to alter its proposals, while Sub-Committee 1 revised certain parts of the implementation of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union (A/AC.14/34/Add.2).

The revised draft of Sub-Committee 1 was submitted to the ad hoc Committee at its 27th meeting on November 22,1947.

The discussion of both reports (i.e., of Sub-committees 1 and 2) was pursued during four meetings (27th to 31st).

During the 28th meeting, the representative of the Jewish Agency renewed the offer he had made in Sub-Committee 1, to transfer to the future Arab State a part of the Beersheba area and a portion of the Negeb along the Egyptian frontier, if such an offer could satisfy certain delegations which were in favour of partition but had suggested an extension of territory for the Arab State in the South of Palestine. Following this statement, the representative of the United States proposed a revision of the boundaries of the two future States in conformity with the suggestion of the Jewish Agency (A/AC.14/38).

In the course of the discussion, no amendments were proposed to the recommendations of Sub-committee 2, while the representatives of Australia (A/AC.14/39), Canada (A/AC.14/45), Denmark (A/AC.14/43 and Rev.1), France (A/AC.14/37), the Netherlands (A/AC.14/36), Pakistan (A/AC.14/40),Sweden (A/AC.14/35) and the United States (A/AC.14/42 and A/AC.14/38) submitted amendments to the recommendations of Sub-Committee 1; a joint amendment to the latter was also submitted by the delegations of Norway and Pakistan (A/AC.14/46).

Most of these amendments were of a technical nature, designed to elaborate or clarify provisions of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, and most of them were adopted without opposition. A few amendments were not pressed by their sponsors. Only three amendments were rejected as a result of votes. One of these was proposed by Pakistan (A/AC.14/40) and would have laid down the principle that not more than ten per cent of the land, exclusive of state or waste lands, in the Arab and Jewish States could be owned by Jews or Arabs respectively. It was rejected by a vote of 22 to 8. The second amendment to be rejected was among those submitted by Sweden (A/AC.14/35). It would have deleted in the relevant paragraph of the draft resolution embodying the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, in connection with the administrative staff of the Governor of the City of Jerusalem, the phrase "and chosen whenever possible from the residents of the City on a non-discriminatory basis". The vote leading to the rejection of this amendment was 15 to 10. The third and final amendment to the recommendations of Sub-Committee 1 to be rejected by the ad hoc Committee (by a vote of 15 to 13) was among those submitted by France (A/AC.14/37). It would have inserted in the paragraph dealing with the official languages of the City of Jerusalem a passage explicitly naming English and French as being among languages which, in addition to Arabic and Hebrew, might be adopted as the official languages of the city.

Among the more important amendments adopted by the ad hoc Committee (in addition to the United States proposal to transfer to the proposed Arab State a part of the Beersheba area and a portion of the Negeb (see above)) was one, proposed by Denmark, calling upon the Security Council to consider whether the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the peace (if circumstances warranted this) and, if the answer was in the affirmative, to supplement the authorization of the Assembly by taking measures to empower the Commission to exercise its functions under the Partition Plan, and to determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged in the Partition Plan. Then, too, the Committee endorsed the joint proposal by Norway and Pakistan to leave the composition of the five-member Commission to the General Assembly rather than recommend specifically that it be composed of Guatemala, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Uruguay, as suggested by Sub-Committee 1.

During the general debate on the recommendations of Sub-Committees 1 and 2, opinion in the ad hoc Committee once again was sharply divided.

The representatives of Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia were of the opinion that the recommendations of Sub-committee 1 went beyond the Charter and were thus illegal. They favoured adoption of the proposals of Sub-Committee 2. Several of them addressed a series of questions both to the Chairman of Sub-Committee 1 and to the representative of the Mandatory Power, concerning the legality of the proposed Plan of Partition with Economic Union. The Plan was also opposed categorically by the representative of the Arab Higher Committee.

The representatives of the United Kingdom, El Salvador, Yugoslavia, Colombia, Belgium and Mexico announced that they would not vote for either the Partition Plan or the proposal to establish Palestine as an independent unitary state. The representative of Yugoslavia once again advocated the adoption of the UNSCOP minority plan for a federal state. The representative of Colombia stated that he would vote for the first of the three draft resolutions proposed by Sub-Committee 2, i.e., the one which would invite the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion on several legal aspects of the Palestine question. The representative of France announced that he would vote for the referral of one of the eight questions listed in draft Resolution I to the International Court of Justice (i.e., whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent, of the inhabitants of Palestine).

The representatives of Canada, Poland, Uruguay, Sweden, New Zealand, United States, Denmark, China, Chile, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, U.S.S.R. and Guatemala announced their support for the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, without necessarily subscribing to every detail thereof. Several representatives, notably those of New Zealand, Canada and Denmark, expressed doubts concerning the provisions for implementing the Partition Plan, emphasizing the crucial importance of implementation provisions. In general, however, these representatives held that the Partition Plan, although not a perfect solution of the Palestine question, represented the most equitable solution attainable under the circumstances. Support of the Partition Plan was also expressed by the representative of the Jewish Agency, who declared, however, that the Plan entailed heavy sacrifices for the Jewish people.

h. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ad hoc COMMITTEE

Voting on the recommendations occupied the ad hoc Committee during its 32nd meeting on November 24, its 33rd on November 25 and its 34th and final meeting on November 25, 1947.

First to be put to the vote were the three draft resolutions submitted by Sub-Committee 2.

Draft Resolution I, providing for the reference to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion concerning eight legal questions connected with or arising out of the Palestine problem, was voted on in two parts. The first, comprising questions 1 to 7 inclusive, was rejected by a vote of 25 to 18, with 11 abstentions. The second, comprising the last question,233/ was rejected by a vote of 21 to 20, with 13 abstentions.

Draft Resolution II dealing with Jewish refugees and displaced persons was put to the vote paragraph by paragraph. Paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 9 of the preamble, as well as the first two paragraphs of the operative part were adopted, the others rejected. The modified draft resolution as a whole received 16 votes in favour, 16 against, with 26 abstentions, and the Committee decided, in view of this result, to include the text of the modified draft resolution verbatim in its report to the General Assembly.

Draft Resolution III of Sub-Committee 2 (dealing with the establishment of an independent, unitary State of Palestine) was rejected by a vote of 29 to 12, with 14 abstentions.

The Committee then turned to the recommendations of Sub-Committee 1. After voting on the amendments, the Committee, during its 34th meeting, on November 25, 1947, voted on the amended draft resolution embodying the Plan of Partition with Economic Union. The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 25 to 13, with 17 abstentions.234/

Before this vote, the representative of New Zealand announced that he would abstain, without prejudice to the vote he might cast in the General Assembly, because he regarded the implementation provisions as inadequate. He urged, as a duty which the United Nations owed to itself as well as to Arabs and Jews, that all Members, particularly the big Powers, pledge at the current Assembly that, if bloodshed and upheaval broke out in Palestine, a united effort to suppress it would be made by means of an international force to which all would contribute in proportionate strength.

The delegations of Syria, Iraq and Egypt protested against the partition resolution as being unjust, impractical, against the Charter and a threat to peace. The representative of Egypt reserved the right of his Government to consider the resolution null and void.

The report of the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (A/516) was then forwarded to the General Assembly for its consideration.

i. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS RECOMMENDATIONS OF ad hoc COMMITTEE

The recommendations of the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (A/516) were considered by the General Assembly at the 124th to 128th plenary meetings, from November 26 to 29, 1947.

The Plan of Partition with Economic Union, in the form recommended by the ad hoc Committee, was supported, often with certain misgivings concerning particular aspects (e.g., the provisions for the Plan's implementation), by the representatives of Sweden, Canada, Brazil, United States, Poland, Uruguay, Netherlands, New Zealand, U.S.S.R., Belgium and Guatemala. The Plan was opposed, on the grounds that it violated the Charter and the principle of the right of self-determination of the Palestine population, by the representatives of the Philippines, Yemen, Greece, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Haiti, Pakistan, Cuba and Iraq.

Representatives of several other Members declared themselves equally dissatisfied with the Partition Plan and with the rival plan for a unitary Palestine. Those who under these circumstances announced that they would abstain from voting were the representatives of China and Ethiopia.

During the 127th meeting on November 28, the representative of Colombia submitted a draft resolution (A/518) which provided that a decision on the Palestine question be deferred and that the matter be referred back to the ad hoc Committee for further efforts at producing a solution acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. At the same meeting, the representative of France proposed a 24-hour adjournment to permit a last-minute effort at conciliating Arabs and Jews and at arriving at an agreed solution of the Palestine problem. The French motion was supported by the representatives of Denmark and Luxembourg, and opposed by those of Colombia and Poland. It was approved by the Assembly by a vote of 25 to 15, with 10 abstentions, and, consequently, the Assembly thereupon adjourned for 24 hours.

Following this 24-hour adjournment, the representative of Lebanon, at the 128th plenary meeting on November 29, 1947, deploring that since the beginning of the discussions "no démarche was attempted with the Arab delegations and no attempt was made to find any conciliation formula . . ." until the representatives of France and Colombia had intervened during the preceding plenary meeting, assured the Assembly that the Arab States had been and were always ready to listen to and study "any conciliatory formula susceptible of providing a reasonable and just solution of the Palestine question". They would have been happy to present a detailed plan embodying such a formula, but time had been lacking to do so between the present and the preceding plenary meeting. Nevertheless, the Arab States were in position to submit the "general principles which ought to serve as a basis for a compromise formula", namely:

"Principle number one: A federal independent state shall be set up in Palestine not later than 1 August 1948.

"Principle number two: The government of the independent state of Palestine shall be constituted on a federal basis and shall comprise a federal government and cantonal governments of Jewish and Arab cantons.

"Principle number three: The delimitation of the cantons shall be effected with a view to leaving as few Arab or Jewish minorities as possible in each Canton.

"Principle number four: The population of Palestine shall elect by direct universal suffrage a Constituent Assembly which shall draft the future constitution of the federal state of Palestine. The Constituent Assembly shall comprise all the elements of the population in proportion to the number of their respective citizens.

"Principle number five: The Constituent Assembly, in defining the powers of the federal stare of Palestine, as well as the powers of the judicial and legislative organs, in defining the functions of the cantonal governments, and in defining the relationships between the cantonal governments and the federal state, will be guided by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America, as well as the constitutions of the individual states of the United States of America.

"Principle number six: Among other necessary and essential provisions, the constitution shall provide for the protection of the Holy Places, freedom of access, visit and worship, in accordance with the status quo, as well as the safeguarding of the rights of religious establishments of all nationalities which are now found in Palestine."

In formulating these suggestions, the Arab States, the representative of Lebanon said, did not wish to exclude any suggestion or proposal which might be submitted by other delegations and which might be calculated to conciliate the points of view of Jews and Arabs.

The statement that no attempt at conciliation had been made was challenged by the representative of Iceland, who had been the Rapporteur of the ad hoc Committee. He recalled the efforts by the ad hoc Committee's Conciliation Group, adding that, as previously reported, these efforts had been doomed to failure in view of the vast gap between the contending parties.

The representative of the United States declared that the suggestions outlined by the representative of Lebanon coincided very largely with the plan recommended in the UNSCOP minority report, a plan which the ad hoc Committee had rejected. He moved that the recommendations of the ad hoc Committee be put to the vote immediately.

The representative of Iran submitted a draft resolution calling for a delay until January 15, 1948, in the deliberations of the Assembly on the Palestine question to enable the ad hoc Committee to reconvene and to study the matter further. The representative of Syria declared that the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee, in his capacity as Chairman of the Conciliation Group, had requested the chief of the Saudi Arabian delegation to make arrangements for consultations with the chief of the United States delegation to see if conciliation were possible. The representative of Syria further declared that the chief of the Saudi Arabian delegation had immediately notified the Chairman of the Conciliation Group of its readiness to accept this suggestion, but had never received an answer. Nor had another approach been made for such consultations to any of the delegations most directly concerned. Therefore, he maintained, the ad hoc Committee had not fulfilled its duties.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. opposed the proposal of the representative of Lebanon, and suggested that a vote be taken promptly on the recommendations of the ad hoc Committee.

The President ruled that the recommendations of the ad hoc Committee must be voted on before the Iranian proposal could be put to the vote.

The representative of Lebanon said he wished to call the Assembly's attention to the fact that the twelve general recommendations of UNSCOP235/ had not been voted on in the ad hoc Committee. He therefore suggested that this be done now, before a vote was taken on the Plan of Partition with Economic Union. The President ruled that these twelve recommendations had been a matter for the ad hoc Committee, and not for the General Assembly. He then submitted the report of the ad hoc Committee (A/516) to a roll-call vote.

The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of South Africa, U.S.S.R., United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen.

Abstained: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

The report, including the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, was therefore adopted by a vote of 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions (see below).

Following the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that a number of details connected with the application of the resolution just adopted would closely affect his Government. He expressed the hope that the United Nations Commission (envisaged in the resolution) would communicate with his Government in order that arrangements might be agreed upon for the arrival of the Commission in Palestine and for the co-ordination of its plans with those of the Mandatory Power for the withdrawal of British administration and British military forces. Earlier, the representative of the United Kingdom had reaffirmed the policy of his Government as outlined before the beginning of the general debate in the ad hoc Committee, and had reaffirmed that, subject to the limitations of that policy, the Government of the United Kingdom would not obstruct the implementation of the Partition Plan.

Also, following the adoption of the resolution on Partition, the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen denounced the Partition Plan as being anti-Charter, illegal and immoral, and declared that their respective Governments, regarding the resolution embodying the plan as a recommendation (rather than a binding decision), would not feel bound by it.

The President then proposed, and the Assembly endorsed, the following Members for membership on the United Nations Palestine Commission: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and the Philippines.

On the proposal of the representative of Sweden, acting for the Rapporteur of the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee, the Assembly completed work on the Palestine aspect of the agenda of the second session by adopting the following resolution (181 (II) B):

"The General Assembly

"Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed $2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine."

j. TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ON THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

The text of the resolution (181 (II) A) on the Future Government of Palestine, as adopted by the General Assembly at the 128th plenary meeting on November 29, 1947, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

"Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

"Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,
"Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

"Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

"Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

"Requests that
"Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

"Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

"Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly."
PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

PART I. FUTURE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be described in parts II and III below.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.

The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.

The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia provisions for:

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and nondiscriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall cooperate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.
C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:
General Provision

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

CHAPTER 1. HOLY PLACES, RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS AND SITES

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.

No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

CHAPTER 2. RELIGIOUS AND MINORITY RIGHTS

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.

3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.236/

8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)237/ shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.

CHAPTER 3. - CITIZENSHIP, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

1. Citizenship. Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jews residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. International conventions. (a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. Financial obligations. (a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.

(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.

CHAPTER 4. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

2. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.
The Economic Union of Palestine

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:

(a) A customs union;

(b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;

(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce

(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;

(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years, they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.

4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.

5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.

6. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to co-operate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.

7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.

8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.

9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.

10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.

11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.

12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

13. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:

(a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;

(b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;

(c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of:

(i) The service of the outstanding public debt;

(ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.

14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

15. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board.

16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.

17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.
Freedom of transit and visit

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.
Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking

19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.

20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.

21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
E. ASSETS

1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.

2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.
F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.
PART II. - BOUNDARIES238/

A. THE ARAB STATE

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad sub-district boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr I'nan village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr I'nan roads. From the south-west corner of Kafr I'nan village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, when it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection.

The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the northeastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the southeastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road to I'Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'Billin situated to the west of the I'Billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follow's the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin subdistrict boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point north-east of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first north-westwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs southwestwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh.Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydda and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its southwest corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand el 'Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the northeastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary line runs north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat el Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Esh Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-east corner of Ibdis village it runs to a point south-west of the built-up area of Beit 'Affa, crossing the Hebron-El Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to the Beersheba subdistrict boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab el Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns northeastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron-sub-district boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Jiya across the village lands of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the southeast corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. el Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. el Mushrifa. From there it joins Wadi El Zaiyatin just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the northeast and then to the south-east following this wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Yisrael lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.
B. THE JEWISH STATE

The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Transjordan. It includes the whole of the Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat et Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron subdistrict boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.
C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, Section B, below.)
PART III. CITY OF JERUSALEM

A. SPECIAL REGIME

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.
B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu-fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B [following p. 236 in the present Yearbook]).
C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain inter alia the substance of the following provisions:

1. Government machinery; special objectives. The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

(a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reigns in Jerusalem;

(b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.

2. Governor and administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a nondiscriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. Local autonomy. (a) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.

(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.

4. Security measures. (a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.

(b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration.

(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

5. Legislative organization. A Legislative Council elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6. Administration of justice. The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it.

7. Economic Union and economic regime. The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and nondiscrimination for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. Freedom of transit and visit, control of residents. Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion with the international administration of the City.

10. Official languages. Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.

11. Citizenship. All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part 1, section B, paragraph 9 of this plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

12. Freedoms of citizens. (a) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and Press, assembly and association, and petition.

(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

(c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

(d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

(f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

13. Holy Places. (a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

14. Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine. (a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

(b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.

In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.
D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a reexamination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City.
PART IV. CAPITULATIONS

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

k. UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION

One of the consequences of the General Assembly's resolution 181(II) of November 29, 1947, concerning the Plan of Partition with Economic Union of Palestine, was the establishment of a five member United Nations Palestine Commission, composed of the representatives of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and the Philippines, whose terms of reference were laid down in the resolution.

The Palestine Commission held its first meeting on January 9, 1948, and elected Karel Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) and Raul Diez de Medina (Bolivia) as its Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively.

Under the partition resolution, the Commission had been assigned a major part in the implementation of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, a task in which it was to avail itself of the guidance and assistance of the Security Council whenever necessary.

At the outset of its work, the Commission invited the United Kingdom as the Mandatory Power, the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine to designate representatives who might furnish the Commission such authoritative information and other assistance as it might require in the discharge of its duties. The United Kingdom and the Jewish Agency complied with this request, while the Arab Higher Committee declared itself unable to accept the invitation, stating that it was "determined to persist in rejection partition and in refusal recognize UNO resolution this respect and anything deriving therefrom".239/ Early in March, the Commission dispatched to Palestine an advance party of six Secretariat members for purposes of observation and exploratory discussions.

The Commission rendered to the Security Council two monthly progress reports (S/663 and S/695, dated respectively January 29 and March 12, 1948) as required by the Assembly's resolution, and, in addition, a Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine (S/676) on February 16, 1948. In the last-mentioned report, the Commission reported to the Security Council inter alia:

"It is the considered view of the Commission that the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the general direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of international concern for that territory.

"The Commission submits this report with a profound appreciation of its duty to the United Nations. The sole motivation of the Commission is to obtain from the Security Council that effective assistance without which it is firmly convinced, it cannot discharge the great responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly."

The Security Council's consideration of the reports of the Commission has been noted elsewhere in the present Yearbook.240/

The Palestine Commission, in a resolution adopted on April 2, 1948, recalled the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947; stated that it had "received no guidance or instructions from the Security Council concerning the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution", and noted the Council's decisions of April 1 calling for steps to be taken to arrange a truce in Palestine, and requesting the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine. In the same resolution, the Commission decided (A/532, p. 2):

"1. To continue its work, bearing in mind the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, in the understanding that all of its decisions will be subject to such final action on the future government of Palestine as may be taken by the special session of the General Assembly convening on 16 April;

"II. To undertake the preparation of a report to be presented to the special session of the General Assembly which will include an exposition of the reasons which have prevented the Commission from discharging all of the responsibilities assigned to it by the resolution of 29 November 1947."

The reasons which, in the Commission's opinion, prevented it from discharging all of the responsibilities assigned to it by the Assembly's resolution, were summed up by the Commission in its report to the General Assembly (A/532) in the following terms:

"The Commission . . . has the duty to report to the General Assembly that the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of co-operation from the Mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine, and the fact that the Security Council did not furnish the Commission with the necessary armed assistance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly's resolution."

In the same report, the Commission also outlined a number of "problems which require an urgent solution", regardless of the ultimate decision of the Assembly on the future government of Palestine, including questions concerned with security, administration, economics and finance. The report also registered the concern of the Commission concerning the food situation in the Holy Land, adding that "in view of the urgency of this matter, the Commission is presenting a special report241/ on the subject to the Security Council with a request for its guidance . . .".

In the concluding paragraph of its report to the General Assembly, the Commission warned once again ". . . in the absence of forces adequate to restore and maintain law and order in Palestine following the termination of the Mandate, there will be administrative chaos, starvation, widespread strife, violence and bloodshed in Palestine, including Jerusalem. These calamitous results for the people of Palestine will be intensified unless specific arrangements are made regarding the urgent matters outlined above well in advance of 15 May 1948."

The report to the General Assembly was adopted by the Palestine Commission on April 10, 1948.

Following the decision of the General Assembly to relieve the Commission of its duties,242/ the Commission held its 75th and last meeting on May 17, 1948, took cognizance of the Assembly's action and adjourned sine die.
E. SECOND SPECIAL SESSION243/

1. Calling of the Session

On April 1, 1948, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in pursuance of a request of the Security Council, summoned by telegram the second special session of the General Assembly to meet at Flushing Meadow, New York, on April 16 to "consider further the question of the future government of Palestine" (A/530).

This marked the first time that the Security Council, invoking Article 20 of the Charter, had taken the initiative in convening an Assembly session. (The first special session of the General Assembly had been convened at the request of an individual Member nation, the United Kingdom.244/) The Security Council made its request in a resolution adopted on the motion of the United States representative on April 1,1948.245/

2. Organization of the Session

The General Assembly convened at Flushing Meadow on April 16. The session was opened by the Chairman of the Brazilian delegation, Joaõ Carlos Muniz. It was the 129th meeting of the Assembly.

On the proposal of the temporary President, the Assembly, without discussion, agreed to the establishment of a Credentials Committee composed of the representatives of Belgium, Dominican Republic, Egypt, India, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Ukrainian S.S.R. and Uruguay.

José Arce of the Assembly by 31 out of 53 votes cast, the Chairman of the Chinese delegation receiving 18 votes.

The Assembly agreed with the suggestion of the President to follow the usual procedure of constituting a General Committee and referring to it the consideration of the agenda.

Accordingly, the Assembly, at its 130th meeting, proceeded to the election of the Chairmen of the six Main Committees and of its own seven Vice-Presidents. To elect the six Chairmen, the Assembly resolved itself successively into each of the six Main Committees. The following were elected:

First (Political and Security) Committee
T. F. Tsiang (China)

Second (Economic and Financial) Committee
Eduardo Anze Matienzo (Bolivia)

Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee
Carlos García Bauer (Guatemala)

Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee
Sir Carl August Berendsen (New Zealand)

Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee
Joza Vilfan (Yugoslavia)

Sixth (Legal) Committee
Nasrollah Entezam (Iran)

To complete the composition of the General Committee, the Assembly elected its seven Vice Presidents. Chief representatives of the following countries were chosen: France, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States.

The Assembly approved the report of the Credentials Committee which showed that the credentials of thirteen delegations fully satisfied the requirements and that provisional credentials had been received by 43 delegations, while one Member Government, Paraguay, had submitted no credentials.
3. Agenda of the Session

a. ITEMS PROPOSED

Apart from organizational and procedural matters, the only item on the provisional agenda (A/531) was one providing for the "further consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine". In addition, the delegations of China (A/535) and India (A/536) proposed that the application of the Union of Burma for membership in the United Nations be included in the agenda of the session. The item was placed on the supplementary list of additional agenda items which, together with the provisional agenda, was referred to the General Committee.

b. CONSIDERATION OF AGENDA

The General Committee met on April 16, 1948, and required only one meeting its 42nd to formulate its recommendations to the Assembly in connection with the agenda and the organization of the work thereon. The representatives of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and Guatemala declared that they failed to see the need for a special session of the General Assembly for the further consideration of the Palestine question. Substantially the same view had been expressed during the 130th meeting of the General Assembly by the representative of Uruguay.

There was no opposition in the General Committee to the proposal to place the Burmese application for membership in the United Nations on the agenda of the session.

The recommendation to approve the provisional agenda, i.e., the further consideration of the future government of Palestine, received 11 affirmative votes. No negative votes were cast but three members of the General Committee the representatives of Guatemala, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia abstained.

By an identical vote, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that the further consideration of the Palestine question be referred to the First Committee for consideration and report.

The General Committee was unanimous in recommending (A/537) that the General Assembly consider in plenary meeting, and without prior reference to committee, the application of Burma for membership in the United Nations.

The recommendations of the General Committee (A/537) were approved by the General Assembly at its 131st meeting on April 19, 1948, as follows:

(1) That the provisional agenda ("Question of the future government of Palestine") be approved; this was adopted without objection.

(2) That the supplementary list (Application of Burma) be approved; this was adopted unanimously.

(3) That the item on the future government of Palestine be referred to the First Committee; this was adopted by 44 votes in favour, with 10 abstentions.

(4) That the Assembly consider the application of Burma in plenary meeting; this was adopted without a vote.
4. Admission of the Union of Burma to the United Nations

The application of the Union of Burma for membership in the United Nations was considered at the 131st meeting of the General Assembly on April 19, 1948. Statements in support of the application were made by the representatives of India, Pakistan and Siam, who emphasized the close ties of friendship existing between Burma and their own countries, as well as their conviction that the membership of the Union of Burma would be an asset to the United Nations.

On the proposal of the President, the Assembly unanimously adopted the following resolution (188(S-2)):

"The General Assembly,

"Taking note of the application for membership submitted to the United Nations by the Union of Burma, and of the recommendation of the Security Council that the Assembly admit the Union of Burma to membership,

"Decides to admit the Union of Burma as a Member of the United Nations."

As a result of this vote, the Union of Burma, on April 19, 1948, became the 58th Member of the United Nations.
5. Further Consideration of the Question of the
Future Government of Palestine

a. ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

At its 118th meeting on April 20, the First Committee elected Juliusz Katz-Suchy (Poland) as its Vice-Chairman, T. F. Tsiang (China) having previously been chosen as Chairman. Finn Moe (Norway) was elected as Rapporteur.

In the course of its work, the Committee established two sub-committees to deal with particular aspects of the problem.

All in all, the First Committee met 25 times during the second special session.

Representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, as well as the Chairman of the Palestine Commission, participated in the Committee meetings without vote.

(No meetings were held by the other five Main Committees, aside from one meeting of each, held for the purpose of electing Committee Chairmen, as mentioned above.)

b. GENERAL DEBATE

Following the completion of its organization, the First Committee, during its 118th meeting, embarked upon an initial general debate on the question of the future government of Palestine.

(1) Viewpoint of the United States

The representative of the United States recalled that his Government had introduced the resolution requesting the calling of the special session of the General Assembly which the Security Council had adopted on April 1, 1948.

It seemed to the Government of the United States that the problem facing the Assembly was, in essence, that of establishing peace in Palestine and of creating conditions for a constructive political settlement in the Holy Land.

The representative of the United States held that it had been conclusively proved that resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly, which called for the partition of Palestine with economic union and which had been adopted on November 29, 1947, could not be implemented by peaceful means, contrary to the hopes of the United States. Moreover, the Security Council had failed to adopt a United States proposal to place the Council formally behind the Partition Plan.

The situation in the Holy Land was fast deteriorating; already there was bloodshed, and even greater disorders must be expected after the termination of the Mandate on May 15. Appeals for a truce, such as had been issued by the Security Council, were a step in the right direction, but could not ensure the continuance of governmental authority in Palestine.

Under the circumstances, the United States believed that the Assembly should consider the establishment of a Temporary Trusteeship for Palestine. Without submitting a draft Trusteeship Agreement worked out in every detail, the United States was putting forward a working paper (A/C.1/277) containing suggestions for such an Agreement. These suggestions were based upon the draft statute for Jerusalem prepared by the Trusteeship Council pursuant to the Assembly's resolution of November 29,246/ as well as upon ideas advanced informally by members of the Security Council; they thus represented, to a very considerable degree, a collective view.

In the view of the United States, such an agreement for a temporary period of Trusteeship should provide that major governmental functions be exercised by a Government of Palestine, headed by a Governor-General appointed by, and responsible to, the Trusteeship Council, whose own role would be supervisory. Pending the establishment of an elected, possibly bicameral, legislature, the Governor-General should be authorized to legislate by decree. He should also be empowered to call upon certain states, to be listed in the Trusteeship Agreement, for assistance in the maintenance of law and order, if need be.

The Trusteeship Agreement should also contain provisions for immigration into Palestine on some agreed basis, for a policy concerning land purchase, and for the protection of, and access to, the Holy Places.

The United States would be willing to provide police forces for the implementation of such a plan, provided other governments were willing to do the same.

The Temporary Trusteeship should not be regarded as a substitute for the Partition Plan, or for any solution agreeable to Arabs and Jews. It was an emergency measure to safeguard human lives and to create an atmosphere in which negotiations for a permanent solution could proceed more smoothly, and the Trusteeship should be terminated promptly as soon as a general solution of the Palestine problem had been found.

The representative of the United States suggested that the First Committee call upon the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee to study without delay all aspects of the Trusteeship suggestions.247/

(2) Viewpoint of the United Kingdom

The representative of the United Kingdom declared that it had now been proved that the partition resolution could only be enforced by the use of arms. It might be advisable for the Assembly to give second thoughts to the Palestine problem.

It was clear that there was danger of anarchy in the Holy Land following termination of the Mandate on May 15.

Those who proposed to adhere to the resolution of November 29 should consider squarely whether their governments were prepared to assist in its enforcement, whether any enforcement action could secure the essential co-operation of the local population, and whether the necessary forces could be provided by May 15.

The representative of the United Kingdom took issue with those who criticized the role of his Government in connection with the implementation of the November resolution. He stated that his Government's warnings that its authority as Mandatory Power in Palestine could not be divided until the end of the Mandate, had gone unheeded.

Parts of the Partition Plan had not been conceived impartially and little attention had been paid to the difficulties of implementation, to assured opposition, to the certainty of deteriorating conditions, or to the problems facing the Mandatory Power. Under these circumstances there could not have been full co-operation on the part of the Mandatory Power with the Palestine Commission. Yet, short of complete implementation, there had been co-operation over a wide field; a great volume of information had been placed at the disposal of the Palestine Commission by the Mandatory Power, many arrangements had been agreed to, and on several points the United Kingdom had taken the initiative.

The Mandatory Power could not agree to the transfer to the Palestine Commission of a port for the admission of Jewish arms and immigrants without inflaming the entire situation and delaying the scheduled withdrawal of British forces from Palestine.

The United Kingdom has been accused of being pro-Arab. Yet its actions had been just as severely criticized by Arabs as by Jews. In reality it had never been anything but impartial in fulfilling its thankless task, and all its actions had been aimed at securing a settlement agreed to by Jews and Arabs.

Less than a month now remained to devise a new plan to avoid large-scale conflict in Palestine. The United Nations had the right to ask both Arabs and Jews to contribute to stability by making the necessary mutual concessions.

It was clear that partition could only be put through by force of arms and that the forces could not be supplied by May 15.

A truce was therefore of the first importance, and the Security Council's actions in this respect were to be welcomed and supported.

Regarding Trusteeship, the United Kingdom had previously made, without success, a proposal similar to the plan put forward by the United States. The plan offered an interim authority. A Trusteeship plan involved many difficulties, but it, as well as any other alternative, including partition, should be studied against the background of the present situation.

Since both sides were convinced of the justice of their cause, and since any final settlement without their agreement could not be effected without force, the Assembly was, perhaps, obliged to aim at a more modest objective than Trusteeship, in order to prevent danger to world peace. In any attempt to find a solution, the United Kingdom would co-operate, subject only to the limitations involved in its decision to withdraw from Palestine.

The Palestine problem could be eased if other states, following the example set by the United Kingdom, took positive action regarding displaced persons in Europe and opened their gates more widely so that the pressure of refugees upon Palestine would be reduced.

(3) Viewpoint of the Arab Higher Committee

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee, reviewing developments leading up to the present situation in Palestine, said the Mandate had been ratified in 1922 in disregard to peoples' right to self-determination. The Arabs, having no alternative, had resorted to their sacred right of self-defence; and since then Palestine, the Land of Peace, had known instability, hatred and disorder.

During the second regular session of the General Assembly, Members had heard the people of Palestine proclaim their intention of defending their national patrimony to the last man. Nevertheless, two thirds of the Members, ill-advised, misled or acting under compulsion, had accepted an illegal scheme which could not be carried out and which was contrary to the rights and interests of the Arabs.

Confronted with what was a scheme to carve up the living body of Palestine, the Arabs had done what any self-respecting people would have done under the circumstancesthey had fought in self-defence.

Arabs had been living in Palestine for at least thirteen centuries. When the British occupied Palestine, the Arabs had formed 93 per cent of the population, the Jews seven per cent. This basic fact had been totally ignored in the Mandate, which had rested on the principle of a Jewish National Home, to be created at the expense of the existing Arab National Home.

British bayonets had opened the country to Jews whose number in Palestine had risen from 50,000 to 700,000 in a quarter of a century. Arabs, traditionally farmers in Palestine, had been deprived of their land. This process had led to the formation of a proletariat of landless Arab peasants who had settled around the towns. The resources of the country had become a Jewish monopoly to the detriment of the Arabsa development which had elicited expressions of concern even in the British Parliament.

Acting in self defence, the Arabs had resorted to uprisings.

Some of the worst abuses, including large-scale Jewish immigration, were to have been ended by the Mandatory Power, according to the White Paper issued in 1939. But, yielding to Zionist pressure, the United Kingdom had not enforced the policy stated in its own White Paper.

Once it had decided to relinquish the Mandate, the only course the United Kingdom could have taken, morally speaking, was to turn over Palestine as a unit to one Palestinian Government representing all the lawful citizens of the Holy Land. Instead of doing this, the Mandatory Power had requested the assistance of the United Nations.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) had been given objectionable terms of reference and its composition had likewise been not above suspicion since it numbered among its members three persons known for their connections with the Zionists. For these reasons the Arabs of Palestine had not assisted UNSCOP's investigation. UNSCOP had thus heard only the views of the Jewish Agency and of the British, the views of Arab States having been given a hurried hearing in the course of a two day visit to Lebanon.

UNSCOP had ignored Arab opposition to the partition scheme, which could never be carried out peaceably without the consent of the majority of the population of Palestine. And yet the Assembly had endorsed this plan under circumstances unworthy of the United Nations.

As for the United States suggestions, if they aimed at the establishment of an interim government, destined to remain in being for a short, explicitly stated, period of time, pending final settlement of the question, they were worthy of consideration, provided it was clearly understood that they were intended to lead to the independence of Palestine as a single democratic state in which the legitimate rights of the different sections of the citizens would be safeguarded.

Failing agreement on some such plan, the overwhelming majority of the people of Palestine would establish an independent Palestinian Government in conformity with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 28 of the Mandate, these being the Articles which provided for the establishment of such a government on the termination of the Mandate.

(4) Viewpoint of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

The representative of the Jewish Agency said that explanations for the convocation of the present session of the Assembly had an air of unreality. The argument, advanced by some representatives, that a new solution should be sought for the Palestine problem because the Partition Plan could not be implemented without recourse to force, was fallacious.

Assembly expectations that the Security Council would carry out its basic task and that the mandatory Power would maintain law and order in Palestine while the Mandate remained in force had proved incorrect. The report of the Palestine Commission revealed the extent to which the Mandatory Power had created obstructions and difficulties.

In the face of these developments it could not be said that the Partition Plan could not be implemented peacefully or that it was unworkable.

It was not correct to assert that the Security Council had decided not to assume the task entrusted to it by the Assembly. The Council had merely decided to postpone a decision on this matter until the five permanent Members had had an opportunity to confer among themselves concerning the best means of implementing the Assembly resolution of November 29 and of drawing up the recommendations to be given by the Council to the Palestine Commission. This demonstrated clearly that, far from refusing to support the Assembly, the Security Council had every intention of devising a concrete program for implementing the resolution of November 29.

During one of their meetings, the five permanent members of the Security Council had been presented with a nine-point implementation program by the Jewish Agency. Not only had there been no action on that program, but it seemed that it had not even been discussed. The Jewish Agency had been forced to conclude that the decision to thrust aside the Assembly resolution had been arrived at by certain members of the Security Council even before the Council met to consider the matter.

The facts of the situation were simple: confronted with Arab threats and acts of violence, the Security Council had faltered, retreated and, confronted with defiance, capitulated. The proposal to abandon the Partition Plan was, in effect, an invitation to the United Nations as a whole to emulate the example of the Security Council, i.e., to capitulate likewise. Violence was to be appeased, aggression to be rewarded, and law was to yield to terrorism. There was a very real danger that the United Nations might repeat the mistakes of the League of Nations when the latter failed to act in the face of Japanese aggression in China, Fascist Italy's attack upon Ethiopia, and Nazi Germany's subjugation of Czechoslovakia.

Arab reaction to the Assembly's resolution of November 29 was no mere non-compliance, but a violation of the Charter with its ban on recourse to the threat or use of force in international relations, save in the common interest.

The report of the Palestine Commission had clearly established the facts in the situation. Partition had become a reality in Palestine.

The United States suggestion was untenable. It was too late to impose Trusteeship on the peoples of Palestine, and the receptiveness of the Arabs to a Trusteeship regime should be discounted as a manoeuvre designed to defeat partition. There were two distinct peoples in Palestine. A common Palestinian citizenship had no moral meaning, for neither Jew nor Arab had any sense of service to a single state.

The force neededand force would be needed to impose even a Temporary Trusteeship regime would better be used to enforce partition as a final solution.

May 15 would mark the end of the Mandate. On the following day, a provisional Jewish Government would begin to function in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations resolution. The Jewish State would thus become a reality. The only threat to its existence would come from the Arab States. The problem before the Assembly was not how to implement the resolution of November 29, 1947, but rather how to prevent the Arab States from violating their Charter obligations and from thwarting the will of the United Nations.

(5) Other Viewpoints

These, in brief, were the views of the representatives of the two parties directly involved, of the Mandatory Power and of the nation at whose suggestion the Security Council had issued its request for a special session.

As regards the other members of the First Committee, the views expressed during the general debate may be summed up as follows:

The resolution which the General Assembly adopted by a two-thirds majority on November 29, 1947, was not perfect but it was the fairest and most equitable solution of the Palestine problem.

Among those who expressed this view were the representatives of Australia, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, New Zealand, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of South Africa, Uruguay and U.S.S.R.

It was regrettable that the resolution of November 29, 1947, did not provide for its own effective implementation, all the more so, since this lack of implementation machinery had been noted at the time and had now become primarily responsible for the fact that the Partition Plan was behind schedule.

Among the representatives making this point were those of Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the Union of South Africa. The representatives of Australia and New Zealand further warned that yielding to terrorism, of whatever origin, would seriously jeopardize the prestige and authority of the United Nations.

The United States and the Mandatory Power were seeking to wreck the decision taken by the General Assembly last November, placing selfish national interests in both countries ahead of the interests of the population of Palestine and of the United Nations.

This view was expressed by the representatives of Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

In spite of the obstacles to its realization, the Partition Plan of November 29 should remain in full force, and the United Nations should concentrate on devising ways and means of implementing it vigorously.

Representatives who shared this point of view included those of Australia, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, New Zealand, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of South Africa, Uruguay, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. The representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa further stated that, while adhering to the November resolution, they were prepared to examine any proposal which could achieve a just and reasonable peace.

No greater force would be needed to implement the Partition Plan than would be required for the implementation of the Trusteeship proposal, and if the latter was to be implemented by force why, then, not the former?

This point of view was shared by the representatives of Australia, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand and Poland.

Thus ran the arguments in favour of retaining the resolution adopted on November 29, 1947. Arguments advanced by those who favoured reconsideration of that resolution may be summarized as follows:

The resolution of November 29, 1947, was not based on the Charter and did not accord with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the population of Palestine. It was, therefore, unjust and illegal.

Among those who shared this view were the representatives of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen.

Active Arab intervention in opposition to the Partition Plan was nothing more than completely justified self-defence such as any self-respecting people would be compelled to adopt.

This view was expressed by the representatives of Egypt, Syria and Yemen.

The Charter does not justify the use of force to implement a resolution such as that of November 29, 1947, which was a recommendation, not an enforceable decision.

Among those who agreed on this point of view were the representatives of China, Egypt, Pakistan and Syria.

Far from undermining the prestige of the United Nations, reconsideration and rectification of the error committed on November 29, 1947, could not but enhance the authority of the organization, and the attempt should be made to substitute a new and fair solution for the Palestine problem.

That was the view of the representatives of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

The United States proposal for a Temporary Trusteeship for Palestine was worthy of consideration, provided it was not meant as an attempt at implementing the Partition Plan under the guise of Trusteeship, but was intended as a means of gaining time to allow peaceful negotiations during which a just solution could be worked out.

That was the view of the representatives of the Arab States participating in the general debate. In addition, a willingness to study the Trusteeship proposal was also voiced by the representatives of Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Greece, India, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Siam and Sweden, many of whom emphasized the importance, to any plan, of the question of implementation.

The representatives of Egypt, Pakistan and Syria declared that immigration was one of the most vital aspects of the Palestine problem, and that Jewish pressure on Palestine would relax if more countries opened their doors to Jewish displaced persons.

The representatives of Bolivia, Norway and Panama suggested that it might be advisable to suspend, without prejudice, the resolution of November 29, 1947, in order to deal with the emergency situation in the Holy Land.

The representatives of several Arab States, notably the representative of Lebanon, appealed to the Jews to abandon their efforts to set up a Jewish State which would have to live, assuming that it proved viable at all, in an atmosphere of constant hostility emanating from its own immediate neighbours, the Arab nations. Instead, the representative of Lebanon declared, the Jews should join in living in a unitary, democratic Palestine which would surely flourish as a result of Arab-Jewish co-operation, and which would thus act as a catalyst for the economic and cultural development of the entire Middle East.

Finally, several representatives, particularly those of Sweden and France, urged that action be taken promptly to protect the City of Jerusalem, without, of course, delaying consideration of the larger issue, i.e., the future government of Palestine.

Those, in brief, were the differing views expressed by members of the First Committee during the initial general debate.248/

c. PROTECTION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

(1) Assembly Asked to Refer Jerusalem Problem to
Trusteeship Council

During the 118th meeting of the First Committee, on April 20, the Swedish representative said that the emergency problem of maintaining order in Jerusalem and the protection of the Holy Places should be regarded as urgent, without prejudice to the larger issue. He proposed that the Committee undertake a special and speedy investigation of the problem of maintaining order in Jerusalem, perhaps through the medium of a small special committee which would report back in about a week. Such a procedure would avoid hampering or delaying consideration of the main question.

The representative of France, expressing similar concern for the possible fate of the Holy City, introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/280) at the 121st meeting of the First Committee on April 22. The resolution was a recommendation by the First Committee to the General Assembly, suggesting that the Assembly ask the Trusteeship Council to "study and, in consultation with the Mandatory Power and the interested parties, take suitable measures for the protection of the City [i.e., of Jerusalem] and its inhabitants", considering that the maintenance of order and security in the Holy City "is an urgent question which concerns the United Nations as a whole".

The French representative said the Trusteeship Council had already prepared a draft statute for Jerusalem and was therefore familiar with the problem. The draft statute contained a clause authorizing the Governor to organize and direct a special police corps, as large as he might deem necessary, to help in the maintenance of public order and in the protection of the Holy Places.

In the draft statute, the Trusteeship Council had provided for the appointment of a Chief of Police and Security for Jerusalem. The French representative believed that it should immediately select that person. Once appointed, the Chief of Police and Security would work under the authority of the Security Council and would enjoy the status of an international civil servant. He should proceed at once to recruit a police force, calling for volunteers, as provided in Article XIV of the draft statute.

The French representative pointed out that his resolution contained no specific statement concerning measures to be taken by the Trusteeship Council, leaving that body free to give consideration to all proposals submitted by the Arabs and Jews,

He did not think that the Committee would wish to wait until the termination of the Mandate before taking steps to assure the safety of Jerusalem. Moreover, he stressed that the French proposal did not in any way prejudge the final decision concerning the future of Palestine as a whole.

The authority of the United Nations was at stake. The hesitations and reversals of the preceding weeks had only weakened that authority. If the Committee were to begin its discussion by taking a practical decision, that, the French representative declared, would make it clear that it intended to strengthen the authority of the United Nations.

The French representative accepted a Swedish amendment (A/C.1/281) which, aside from introducing certain drafting changes, explicitly stressed the need for haste on the part of the Trusteeship Council in submitting recommendations to the General Assembly. There was general agreement with the aim of the French proposal, i.e., to devise ways and means of protecting Jerusalem.

Opinion was divided, however, concerning the procedure to be adopted to achieve this aim. The representatives of Poland said the Trusteeship Council was not the appropriate body to deal with security measures, such as were clearly implicit in any method of protecting Jerusalem. The Polish delegation preferred the proposal informally advanced at a previous meeting by the Swedish representative, who had suggested the creation of a special sub-committee of the First Committee to deal with the Jerusalem question. The Polish delegation was not primarily interested in the exact composition of such a special sub-committee but did think it should be given a time limit of approximately ten days within which to submit its proposals.

The Polish view was shared by the representatives of the U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Czechoslovakia and Australia, the last-mentioned formally introducing an amendment (A/C.1/282) which would have referred the problem of devising suitable measures for the protection of Jerusalem to a sub-committee of the First Committee "comprising representatives of the members of the Trusteeship Council together with three other representatives to be nominated by the Chairman [of the First Committee]".

On the other hand, the representatives of France, the United States, Brazil, South Africa and New Zealand favoured referring the problem to the Trusteeship Council.

One further verbal amendment was introduced in the course of the consideration of the French proposal when the representative of Czechoslovakia proposed to preface the resolution, as amended by Sweden and Australia, with these words: "Pursuant to the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 . . .".

The amendment was opposed by the representative of Pakistan who felt that a mischievous effect was being created by seeking to inject into an otherwise non-controversial matter an implementation, at least in part, of the Assembly's Partition Plan. In the light of the remarks of the representative of Pakistan, the representative of France announced that he could not support the Czechoslovak amendment. The representative of Uruguay regarded the amendment as unnecessary, since the Trusteeship Council or a sub-committee would be well aware anyway of the existence of the Assembly's resolution of November 29.

Upon being submitted to the vote, the Czechoslovak amendment was rejected by a margin of 38 to 5, with 9 abstentions.

The Australian amendment was rejected by a vote of 26 to 20, with 7 abstentions.

The French proposal, as amended by Sweden, was then adopted by a vote of 44 to 3, with 6 abstentions.

Following the vote, the representative of Poland explained that he had abstained because in his opinion a study of the Jerusalem problem by the Trusteeship Council would not lead to a solution. Moreover, he added, it was contrary to Article 85 of the Charter to present security and political questions to the Trusteeship Council, whose competence extended merely to Trusteeship matters.

At the suggestion of several representatives, the Chairman contacted the President of the General Assembly, who agreed to convene a plenary meeting of the Assembly immediately.

(2) Assembly Endorses Committee Recommendation

The plenary meeting the 132nd was held at Lake Success on April 26. The representative of Guatemala said he had originally voted for the Australian amendment, which he regarded as the most adequate. But since there was now no other proposal before the General Assembly, he would vote for the resolution submitted by France, as amended by Sweden.

The resolution (185(S-2)) was then put to the vote and was adopted by 46 affirmative votes, with 7 abstentions. It read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Considering that the maintenance of order and security in Jerusalem is an urgent question which concerns the United Nations as a whole,

"Resolves to ask the Trusteeship Council to study, with the Mandatory Power and the interested parties, suitable measures for the protection of the city and its inhabitants, and to submit within the shortest possible time proposals to the General Assembly to that effect."

(3) Assembly supports Trusteeship Council's Conclusions

Acting on the Assembly's request, the Trusteeship Council studied the problem of the protection of the City of Jerusalem and its inhabitants and submitted its conclusions to the Assembly on May 5 (A/544).

The Trusteeship Council's report showed that it had considered a French suggestion to send immediately to Jerusalem a United Nations official with powers to recruit, organize and maintain an international force of 1,000 police. The Council had also considered a United States proposal for placing Jerusalem under temporary Trusteeship with provisions for the maintenance of law and order. The Council reported that it had found it impossible to secure the mutual agreement of the interested parties Mandatory Power, Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee to either the French or the United States proposal.

The representatives of Australia and of the Jewish Agency had informed the Council that they considered the proper course to be the adoption of the draft statute for Jerusalem and the immediate bringing into force of such portions thereof as were applicable in the circumstances. This was not acceptable to the representative of the Arab Higher Committee since, in his view, it would be tantamount to a total or partial implementation of the partition scheme. The Council therefore did not pursue this matter.

The report of the Trusteeship Council (A/544) lists these conclusions and recommendations:

"1. Following consultations with the Trusteeship Council, the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine ordered on 2 May 1948 within the Walled City of Jerusalem a cease-fire which is now in effect. The two parties have further agreed that the specific terms of a truce in respect of the Walled City will be elaborated in Jerusalem in consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine.

"2. The Trusteeship Council also brings to the notice of the General Assembly the undertakings given by the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine that their communities will respect and safeguard all Holy Places.

"3. The Trusteeship Council has been informed that the Mandatory Power would be willing, if the General Assembly agrees, to appoint under Palestine legislation before 15 May 1948, a neutral acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, as Special Municipal Commissioner, who shall, with the co-operation of the community committees already existing in Jerusalem, carry out the functions hitherto performed by the Municipal Commission. The Trusteeship Council, therefore, recommends to the General Assembly that it inform the Mandatory Power of its full agreement with such measure.

"4. The Council recognizes that the measure hereabove recommended does not provide adequately for the protection of the City and of its inhabitants. It considers also that urgent attention should be given by the General Assembly to the necessity of providing for the custody of the assets of the Government of Palestine in Jerusalem and for an effective maintenance of law and order in the municipal area pending a final settlement."

The report of the Trusteeship Council was discussed by the General Assembly on May 6, at its 133rd and 134th plenary meetings. The representatives of Poland, the U.S.S.R. and France said the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council were totally inadequate and that they could not support them in their present form.

Other representatives likewise expressed the view that the recommendations were inadequate but, suggesting that further action be taken by the Assembly, announced their willingness to support the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council as the only ones immediately available.

A draft resolution (A/545) embodying the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council was presented by the President of the General Assembly. It consisted of four paragraphs. The first of these would recall the Assembly's request to the Trusteeship Council to study the Jerusalem problem and to submit recommendations. The second paragraph would have the General Assembly take note of and approve the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council. The third paragraph would recommend to the Mandatory Power the appointment of a Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem, as recommended in the third of the four conclusions and recommendations contained in the Trusteeship Council's report (see above). The fourth paragraph would have the Assembly decide that urgent attention be given to the necessity of providing for the custody of the assets of the Government of Palestine in Jerusalem and for effective maintenance of law and order in the municipal area, pending a final settlement as recommended in the last of the four conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council.

The representative of France held that it would be factitious reasoning to assert that ineffective measures were better than no measures at all. The authority of the General Assembly must inevitably be jeopardized if it were to adopt a measure so meagre in the face of a danger so great and urgent. He offered an amendment (A/546) to the draft resolution proposed by the President. The amendment would substitute a new text for paragraph four of the draft resolution.

In substance, the French proposal declared that the Special Municipal Commissioner to be appointed pursuant to paragraph three would "no longer be empowered by any regular authority" once the Mandate expired and that consequently it was "urgently necessary that the United Nations appoint a special delegate to proceed immediately to Jerusalem with the following instructions and powers:

"(a) To secure compliance with the cease-fire order already issued for the old city;

"(b) To co-operate with the Truce Commission established by the Security Council to secure a truce that shall cover the whole city of Jerusalem within the present municipal boundaries;

"(c) To exercise in the name of the United Nations temporarily and until the future of the Holy City shall be determined, power of control over the whole of the municipal government and particularly to ensure that all expedient steps are taken to safeguard and conserve the assets of the municipality;

"(d) To observe the preservation and maintenance in good condition of the Holy Places;

"(e) Generally to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of man;

"(f) To ensure the maintenance of order and security in the Holy City, and for that purpose to organize the necessary municipal police forces;

"(g) Guided by humane considerations, and with the co-operation of the Jewish and Arab communities of the Holy City, to explore all suitable means of ensuring the supply to the City of food, water, and the like."

The representative of Australia proposed to amend the fourth paragraph to the draft resolution suggested by the President by substituting the following text (A/547):

"Decides that continuing urgent attention should be given by the First Committee to the question of further measures for the protection of the City of Jerusalem and its inhabitants."

He proposed that if the Australian amendment were adopted, the French amendment should be referred to the First Committee for consideration.

The representative of Belgium said he would support the French amendment if explicit provisions were incorporated therein for its implementation. Without such implementation provisions nothing could be accomplished and the prestige of the United Nations must inevitably suffer. The representative of the United States shared the views of the Belgian representative and favoured the Australian amendment.

The first paragraph of the President's draft resolution was carried by a vote of 45 to 0, with 5 abstentions. The second paragraph was adopted by a vote of 36 to 0, with 16 abstentions.

The representative of France suggested that both the third paragraph of the draft resolution and the French amendment be referred to the First Committee and that voting on the third paragraph be postponed until the First Committee reported back to the Assembly. This proposal was opposed by the representatives of Belgium, the United States, Iraq and Syria, the last-mentioned expressing the view that the Trusteeship Council's recommendations were adequate, the others warning that to delay a vote on the third paragraph might make its implementation by the Mandatory Power impossible in view of the imminent expiration of the Mandate.

The motion to postpone consideration of the third paragraph of the President's draft resolution as suggested by France was defeated by a vote of 28 to 11, with 10 abstentions. The unamended paragraph itself was then adopted by a vote of 35 to 2, with 14 abstentions.

The Australian amendment, with a drafting change proposed by the representative of Greece, was adopted by a vote of 28 to 0, with 21 abstentions.

In the absence of objections, the President declared that the French amendment to the President's draft resolution would be referred to the First Committee.

The representative of Poland stated that no vote could be taken on the draft resolution as a whole since the French amendment had not been voted on. The President ruled that with the adoption of the Australian amendment, the resolution constituted a whole and could therefore be voted on.

The amended resolution, in its entirety, was then put to the vote and was adopted by 35 affirmative votes, with 17 abstentions. It read as follows (resolution 187 (S-2)):

"The General Assembly,

"Having asked the Trusteeship Council to study, with the Mandatory Power and the interested parties, suitable measures for the protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants and to submit within the shortest possible time proposals to the General Assembly to that effect,

"Takes note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, as set forth in its report to the General Assembly on the protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants;

"Approves these conclusions and recommendations;

"Recommends that the Mandatory Power appoint under Palestine legislation, before 15 May 1948, a neutral acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, as Special Municipal Commissioner, who shall, with the co-operation of the community committees already existing in Jerusalem, carry out the functions hitherto performed by the Municipal Commission;

"Decides that continuing urgent attention should be given by the First Committee or its subsidiary bodies to the question of further measures for the protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants."

(4) First Committee Establishes Sub-Committee on Jerusalem

At the 138th meeting of the First Committee, the representative of the United States introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/294) the operative part of which read:

"The First Committee

...

"Decides to establish a sub-committee composed of representatives of States members of the Trusteeship Council, and

"Instructs the sub-committee to examine further measures for the protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants and to bring before the First Committee as promptly as possible appropriate recommendations."

The representative of Poland held that there should first be a full discussion in the First Committee in which specific lines should be decided on for the guidance of any possible future sub-committee. He was opposed to the immediate establishment of a sub-committee.

The United States proposal was supported by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Syria, while the representatives of Uruguay and the U.S.S.R. shared the view of the Polish representative.

The representative of France said he shared many of the doubts expressed by the representative of Poland. Nevertheless, in the interest of swift action, he could support the United States proposal, provided it were amended. In view of the fact that the Trusteeship Council had already dealt with the matter, he did not expect great advances from a sub-committee having the same composition as the Trusteeship Council. He therefore proposed adding the representatives of Sweden, Brazil and Iran to the sub-committee suggested by the United States representative. The representative of the United States accepted the French amendment.

The representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee implied that their organizations should be consulted during any sub-committee consideration of the Jerusalem question.

The representative of Guatemala presented an amendment (A/C.1/296) to the United States draft resolution providing for consultation with the two parties. He also presented an amendment (A/C.1/295) providing that the sub-committee be composed of representatives of Australia, France, Haiti, Mexico, Sweden, U.S.S.R. and United States. Such a composition, he said, would guarantee neutrality while utilizing the experience of the Trusteeship Council; it would also provide for speedier action since the sub-committee would not be as large a body as that proposed in the original United States draft resolution.

The representatives of Uruguay and Haiti suggested that a vote be taken first upon the principle of whether the Committee favoured the establishment of any sub-committee on Jerusalem at this time.

The Chairman pointed out that this could be accomplished by voting separately on the first five words of the second paragraph of the United States proposal, i.e., upon the words "Decides to establish a sub-committee...".

The first paragraph of the United States draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 38 to 0, with 5 abstentions.

The first five words of the second paragraph were adopted by a vote of 31 to 9, with 3 abstentions.

The Guatemalan amendment concerning composition was rejected by a vote of 24 to 9, with 13 abstentions.

The remainder of the second paragraph, as amended by France, was adopted by a vote of 25 to 1, with 11 abstentions.

The second Guatemalan amendment (providing for consultations with the Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee) was adopted by a vote of 22 to 0, with 22 abstentions. The final paragraph of the United States draft resolution, as amended by Guatemala, was adopted by a vote of 39 to 0, with 9 abstentions.

In accordance with this resolution (A/C.1/297) the Sub-Committee (Sub-Committee 10), set up on May 11 for the purpose of considering further the question of protecting the City of Jerusalem, was composed of representatives of the following countries:

Australia
Belgium
Brazil
China
Costa Rica
France
Iran
Iraq
Mexico
New Zealand
Philippines
Sweden
U.S.S.R.
United Kingdom
United States

(5) Sub-Committee Recommendations Referred to Assembly

The Sub-Committee, which held six meetings, reported back to the First Committee on May 13. The report (A/C.1/298) stated that the group had elected the representative of Sweden as Chairman, the representative of Iran as Vice-Chairman, and the representative of France as Rapporteur.

Two important documents were placed before Sub-Committee 10. In the first of these (A/C.1/SC.10/2), the United Kingdom representative informed the Sub-Committee of an order of the municipal government of Jerusalem, dated May 11, by which the Jerusalem Municipal Commissioner, to be nominated by the High Commissioner or by the United Nations, might take any action and give any directions which in his discretion he deemed appropriate for the administration of Jerusalem.

The other document was presented jointly by the representatives of France and the United States (A/C.1/SC.10/1). It contained a proposal for a temporary international regime for Jerusalem based upon Chapter III of the Charter ("International Trusteeship System"). The central idea of this joint proposal was to entrust the protection of Jerusalem and its inhabitants temporarily to the responsibility of a United Nations Commissioner nominated by the United Nations and placed under the supreme authority of the Trusteeship Council.

The Sub-Committee discussed this document at length and heard the views of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee. During an article- by-article examination, a number of amendments were proposed and in general accepted by the authors of the proposal. The two most important ones were the following: The representative of Mexico proposed that express mention be made of the fundamental human freedoms necessary under the special regime; wording to this effect was incorporated in Article 7 of the revised text (A/C.1/SC.10/1/Rev.1) . In addition, to accommodate both the point of view of the United Kingdom and that embodied in the Trusteeship Council's report previously adopted by the Assembly, a paragraph (2) was inserted in Article 4, specifying that "the Jerusalem Municipal Commissioner, appointed in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly of 6 May 1948, should continue to exercise his functions under the authority of the United Nations Commissioner".

The revised text of the France-United States proposal was submitted to the Sub-Committee on May 13 and discussed at length, for a second time, article by article.

To meet a view expressed by the United Kingdom representative, the representative of the United States added an article on the financial implications of the proposal. A number of other amendments having been introduced at the request of other representatives, a vote was taken on the revised document, which was adopted by a vote of 8 to 2, with 4 abstentions.

The Sub-Committee recommendation was as follows (A/C.1/298):
THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION OF JERUSALEM

"Whereas the territory known as Palestine has been administered by the Government of the United Kingdom under a Mandate assigned by the Principal Allied Powers and confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations; and

"Whereas Jerusalem as hereinafter defined contains many Holy Places sacred to Christians, Jews and Moslems alike, and

"Whereas the Mandate will be terminated on 15 May 1948; and

"Whereas it is imperative that pending a final settlement of the Palestine problem Jerusalem be protected; and

"Whereas the maintenance and furtherance of international peace and security requires that the United Nations should exercise temporary administrative authority in Jerusalem; and

"Whereas Chapter XII of the Charter authorizes and empowers the United Nations to exercise such temporary authority;

"Now Therefore the General Assembly of the United Nations hereby decides that temporary authority in Jerusalem shall from 15 May 1948 be exercised in accordance with the terms of the following Articles:
Article 1

"The `town planning area' of Jerusalem as defined under the Town Planning Ordinance No. 28 of 1936, and hereinafter referred to as Jerusalem, is hereby placed temporarily under the authority of the United Nations.
Article 2

"The United Nations is hereby designated as the administering authority for Jerusalem. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall exercise the functions of the administering authority.
Article 3

"The administering authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over Jerusalem which shall be exercised through the agency of the Government of Jerusalem as hereinafter provided.
Article 4

"1. The Government of Jerusalem shall consist of a United Nations Commissioner and such officers as may be appointed by him or by the United Nations assisted to the fullest extent possible by such organs of self-government as in the opinion of the United Nations Commissioner will meet with co-operation from the various communities of Jerusalem.

"2. The Jerusalem Municipal Commissioner, appointed in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly of 6 May 1948, shall continue to exercise his functions under the authority of the United Nations Commissioner.

"3. The United Nations Commissioner shall be appointed by and may be removed by the Trusteeship Council.

"4. The United Nations Commissioner shall be subject to the instructions of the Trusteeship Council. He is hereby invested with full powers to administer Jerusalem in accordance with the provisions of these articles and the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 5

"1. The United Nations Commissioner shall be responsible for the organization and direction of a police force necessary for the maintenance of internal law and order, which may be recruited from within or from outside Jerusalem.

"2. Pending the organization of the force provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Trusteeship Council shall take such steps as may be appropriate for the maintenance of internal law and order.
Article 6

"1. The territorial integrity of Jerusalem and its status as defined in these articles shall be assured by the United Nations.

"2. The United Nations Commissioner may organize volunteer forces from among the inhabitants of Jerusalem to provide for local defense and to assist in the maintenance of internal law and order.

"3. In the event that the United Nations Commissioner is unable, through the use of the force provided in Article 5 or the force provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, to maintain the territorial integrity of Jerusalem against an act or threat of aggression, he shall request the Secretary-General to bring the matter to the immediate attention of the Security Council.

"4. The United Nations Commissioner shall make the necessary arrangements to ensure free access to Jerusalem for persons, foodstuffs and other essential supplies, and the maintenance of the water supply and other essential services.
Article 7

"1. All persons within Jerusalem shall enjoy freedom of conscience and shall, subject only to the requirements of public order, public morals and public health, enjoy all other human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition (including petition to the Trusteeship Council).

"2. No discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, religion, language or sex shall be made against any person within Jerusalem.
Article 8

"1. The United Nations Commissioner shall, under the authority of the Trusteeship Council, assure the protection of and free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within Jerusalem, as well as of educational and cultural establishments and charitable institutions and hospitals, the rights of which will be maintained as they were before the termination of the Mandate.

"2. Subject only to the requirements of public order and security and of public morals and public health, the United Nations Commissioner shall ensure freedom of entry into and of temporary residence in, Jerusalem to all pilgrims without any distinction as to nationality or faith.
Article 9

"The temporary authority of the United Nations in Jerusalem shall be exercised in accordance with Article 76 of the Charter and be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned in Jerusalem or to the final settlement of the Palestine problem.
Article 10
"1. The Trusteeship Council shall immediately make plans for the raising of revenues for Jerusalem.

"2. Expenditures for Jerusalem shall be covered as far as possible by local revenues, provided that the salary and emoluments of the United Nations Commissioner, and such other officers as may be appointed by the Trusteeship Council, shall be paid from a special United Nations operational budget. In addition, the cost of maintaining the police who may be required from outside Jerusalem, if not covered by local revenues shall be provided for by means to be determined by the Trusteeship Council. Such funds as are deemed by the United Nations Commissioner and the Trusteeship Council essential to accomplish the provisions of this arrangement and which cannot be raised by the Government of Jerusalem, shall be provided by the United Nations, either through subsidies or through loans repayable from future revenues of Jerusalem.
Article 11

"In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter, all Members shall give the administering authority every assistance in making these Articles effective.
Article 12

"This special arrangement shall terminate upon 31 December 1949 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly."

Sub-Committee 10 adjourned its sixth and last meeting at 4:15 P.M., May 13. A short time thereafter, Sub-Committee 9 also adjourned its last meeting. Within a matter of minutes, the First Committee met (139th meeting) to receive and consider the reports of both Sub-Committees.

This short period of time between the adjournments of the respective Sub-Committee meetings and the convening of the First Committee immediately led to a procedural debate. The Chairman of the First Committee proposed that the Committee take up the report of Sub-Committee 10 at once.

The representatives of Poland, the U.S.S.R., Uruguay and the Ukrainian S.S.R. objected to such a course of procedure on the grounds that they had not had sufficient time to study either the report of Sub-Committee 10 or that of Sub-Committee 9. The reason given by those who favoured immediate consideration namely, that the Assembly should attempt to finish its work by 6:00 P.M. (Eastern Daylight Time) the following day (May 14) because the Mandate expired at that time did not appear to carry sufficient weight.

It was agreed eventually to permit the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee 10 to introduce the report of his group and to hear, at an evening meeting, the views of those representatives who were ready to discuss the report, while those who were not would be given an opportunity to present their views at a meeting the next morning.

During the meeting (139th) the representative of Syria communicated to Committee members the contents of a cable which he had just received. He had been informed, he said, that the High Commissioner for Palestine had communicated, through the Syrian Government, to the Arab Higher Committee the conditions of a truce which had been agreed upon by the High Commissioner and the (Security Council's) Truce Commission.249/ The conditions were: first, that there should be a cease-fire in Jerusalem and the area and on all routes leading thereto; secondly, that there should be no impediments to providing the city with the necessities of life, the arrangements to be supervised by a commission of the two parties; thirdly, that there should be free access to the Wailing Wall for unarmed Jews under the supervision of the same commission. These terms had been accepted by the Arab Higher Committee. He believed the Committee would welcome the news that there would be peace in Jerusalem and no danger of fighting in the Holy Places.

The report of Sub-Committee 10 was not discussed during the following (140th) meeting, held later that evening (May 13), priority being given to the report of Sub-Committee 9. The recommendations of Sub-Committee 10 were discussed during the last (140th) meeting of the First Committee, on May 14.

The representative of Poland termed Sub-Committee 10's proposal a violation of the resolution of November 29, and, as such, completely unacceptable. Opposition to the proposal was also expressed by the representatives of the Arab States. The representative of Iraq said that the proposal, although termed officially a temporary administration, did, in fact, involve a Trusteeship regime. The United Nations, by itself, had no right to present such an agreement. This must be done by the states directly concerned, including the Mandatory Power.

Besides, the representative of Iraq stated, agreement on a truce for Jerusalem had been reached. Furthermore, it had just (May 14) been learned that Jews and Arabs had agreed to the appointment of Harold Evans, of the United States, as Special Municipal Commissioner, and Mr. Evans had agreed to accept the post. This was an adequate agreed basis. On the other hand, anything that did not command the support of the two communities would not prove workable in practice, whatever phraseology might be used, and would be but detrimental to the truce. The representative of the Arab Higher Committee expressed himself in similar terms.

The representative of the United Kingdom also expressed apprehension lest adoption of the temporary administration plan jeopardize a truce in Jerusalem, given the strong opposition of the Arabs. He further criticized the proposal of Sub-committee 10 for not containing more concrete enforcement provisions and for containing inadequate financial clauses. The United Kingdom could not therefore vote for the proposal. But if the General Assembly, in spite of these objections, insisted on the proposal, the United Kingdom delegation would not exercise its vote in such a way as to preclude a solution on these lines.

Welcoming the appointment of Mr. Evans, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed the belief that mediation, rather than a new and untried scheme for the administration of Jerusalem, which had been rejected by both parties in its present form, was the solution to the problem.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. held that the United States, as the real author of the proposal submitted by Sub-Committee 10 was trying to further its plan for a Trusteeship regime for all Palestine by gaining acceptance of a Trusteeship regime for Jerusalem, the latter being merely an entering wedge. The delegation of the U.S.S.R. could not accept the proposal and would stand by the resolution of November 29.

The representatives of Australia, Yugoslavia and Argentina also announced that they could not support the proposal submitted by Sub-Committee 10. The representative of Yugoslavia declared that no action should be taken by the Assembly on the proposal of Sub-Committee 10 until the Fifth Committee had reported on the budgetary implications of the proposal. The Secretary-General stated that a previous resolution of the General Assembly covered this matter, since it delegated sufficient authority to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Secretary-General with regard to expenses relating to peace and security that might arise between regular sessions of the Assembly.

Support of the proposal of Sub-Committee 10 was expressed by the representatives of France and the United States, who declared that the appointment of the Special Municipal Commissioner, desirable as it was, did not constitute adequate assurance for the protection of Jerusalem, particularly in view of the uncertain legal status of the Commissioner's authority following the expiration of the Mandate and, even more important, the precarious legal situation that might arise with respect to the appointment of a successor to Mr. Evans should the latter be obliged to give up his post for any reason whatever.

The representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine said he had no confirmation of reports that Arabs and Jews had reached agreement on the terms of a truce for Jerusalem. He hoped such a truce had been consummated but, if it had been, he could not see how that could be used as an argument against the proposal for a temporary administration of Jerusalem.

At the same time the representative of the Jewish Agency officially notified the First Committee that a Jewish State had been proclaimed at ten o'clock that morning (May 14), and read part of the statement proclaiming the establishment of a Jewish State. He explained that the hour of the proclamation had been advanced out of respect for the Jewish Sabbath.

The representative of Guatemala said that the proposal for a special regime for Jerusalem would have to be adopted before the expiration of the Mandate, i.e., by 6:00 P.M. New York time that day, since otherwise there would exist no possibility in international law of making any special arrangement for Jerusalem.

Following a suggestion by the representative of Argentina, the representative of the United States formally moved that the First Committee forward the proposal of Sub-Committee 10 directly to the General Assembly without a recommendation. The motion was adopted by 15 affirmative votes, with 26 abstentions.

(6) Assembly Rejects Special Jerusalem Regime

In accordance with the decision of the First Committee, the recommendations of Sub-Committee 10 (A/C.1/298) were therefore referred directly to the General Assembly in plenary meeting. The Assembly considered the matter at its 135th plenary meeting the last of the second special session on May 14.

Opening that meeting, the President ruled that speakers would be limited to five minutes. Upon being challenged by the representative of the U.S.S.R., the presidential ruling was upheld by a vote of 35 to 11, with 3 abstentions.

The representative of the United States declared that if the Assembly were to institute a "Trusteeship Agreement" for Jerusalem, it must do so before the termination of the Mandate, namely, within one hour. He therefore moved that the recommendations of Sub-Committee 10 be considered before those of Sub-Committee 9. This motion was adopted by a vote of 27 to 1, with 16 abstentions .

In the ensuing discussion, the proposal regarding Jerusalem was opposed by the representatives of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Poland, Afghanistan and Yemen. It was supported by the representatives of France and the United States. Before the voting began, the representative of Iraq called attention to the fact that the time was now one minute past six o'clock. He recalled the statement of the representative of the United States that if any action were to be taken on the Jerusalem regime, it would have to be completed before 6:00 P.M. It being past six o'clock now, "the whole game was up". There being no comment on the remarks of the representative of Iraq, the Assembly proceeded to vote on the resolution (A/C.1/298).

The first vote was on a Mexican amendment (A/C.1/302) to replace the fifth paragraph of the preamble (reading "Whereas the maintenance and furtherance of international peace and security requires that the United Nations should exercise temporary authority in Jerusalem") by the following:

"Whereas the maintenance of order and security in Jerusalem is an urgent question which concerns the United Nations as a whole;"

The amendment was adopted by a roll-call vote of 15 to 11, with 28 abstentions.

A second Mexican amendment (A/C.1/302), to delete, in paragraph 6 of the preamble, the word "such" and to insert the word "administrative" after the word "temporary", making the amended paragraph read "Whereas Chapter XII of the Charter authorizes and empowers the United Nations to exercise temporary administrative authority", was adopted by a roll-call vote of 14 to 11, with 28 abstentions.

The Assembly next voted on a United States amendment (A/C.1/304) to substitute "Trusteeship Council" for "United Nations" in the third line of paragraph 1, Article 4, making the relevant passage read "The Government of Jerusalem shall consist of a United Nations Commissioner and such officers as may be appointed by him or by the Trusteeship Council . . .".

The amendment was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to 11, with 26 abstentions.

A second United States amendment (A/C.1/304) proposed that the ". . . salary and emoluments of the United Nations Commissioner, and such other officers as may be appointed by the Trusteeship Council, shall be paid from the regular United Nations budget" (rather than "from a special United Nations operational budget", as stated in paragraph 2, Article 10, of the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 10).

The amendment was approved by a roll-call vote of 19 to 12, with 23 abstentions.

A third United States amendment (A/C.1/304) to the draft resolution proposed the addition of the following to the end of the same paragraph 2, Article 10:

". . . provided that, if United Nations funds are contemplated, the Secretary-General shall be guided by the procedures which were established by the Second Session of the General Assembly for defraying unforeseen and extraordinary expenses.

This amendment was carried by a roll-call vote of 17 to 12, with 25 abstentions.

A roll-call vote was then taken on the entire resolution, as amended, resulting in a vote of 20 in favour, 15 against, with 19 abstentions. The President announced that since the resolution had not received the requisite two-thirds majority, it was rejected.

Two further efforts were made during this concluding plenary meeting of the special session with regard to Jerusalem. Australia proposed verbally that the following paragraph be inserted in the draft resolution (A/552) proposed by the First Committee on the recommendation of Sub-Committee 9:250/

"The General Assembly,

* * * * *

"Calls on the Jerusalem Municipal Commissioner to consult and co-operate with the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, especially to ensure the protection of the inhabitants of Jerusalem and the preservation of the Holy Places pending the establishment of an international regime for the city of Jerusalem under United Nations administration."

In introducing this amendment, the representative of Australia said it represented the barest minimum which could possibly be attained and should therefore be at least secured.

A first vote on the Australian amendment was inconclusive, resulting in a tie of 10 votes in favour, 10 against, with 28 abstentions. Upon being resubmitted, the amendment was rejected by a vote of 14 to 10, with 24 abstentions.

The final effort to deal further with the question of the City of Jerusalem was a verbal proposal of the representative of Guatemala that the Trusteeship Council be requested to adopt the draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem so that it could be put into effect. The representative of Guatemala said he realized that this question was not on the agenda, but thought the urgency of the case the fate of Jerusalem warranted its consideration. He also announced that his Government had recognized the Jewish State. The President stated that it was not possible for him to accede to the Guatemalan request since the point raised was not on the agenda.251/

d. FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(1) First Committee Abandons Proposal to Refer
Trusteeship Working Paper to Fourth Committee

While the general debate was still in progress,252/ the representative of the United States, during the 120th meeting of the First Committee on April 21, 1948, introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/278) calling for the referral of the United States working paper on a draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine (A/C.1/277) to the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee for study and report, with recommendations to the General Assembly in plenary meeting.

In the ensuing debate on this proposal, two points of view emerged. On the one hand it was argued that a matter of substance would, in fact be decided under the guise of taking a procedural decision. The question was not whether the United States Trusteeship proposal should be examined by the Fourth Committee, the First Committee or a joint First and Fourth Committee, but rather whether the United States Trusteeship proposal should be considered at all as long as the resolution of November 29 remained fully in force. Among those who shared this view were the representatives of Poland, Yugoslavia, the Ukrainian S.S.R., the U.S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R. Others who opposed referring the Trusteeship proposal to the Fourth Committee argued that the proposal ought to be explored in the First Committee with a view to deciding political questionS of principle before referring it to any other body. Among those expressing this view were the representatives of Sweden, New Zealand, Iran, Belgium, Uruguay and France.

On the other hand it was argued for example, by the representatives of Lebanon and the United States that no decision on principle could be taken in vacuo, that a study of the details by the Fourth Committee in no way entailed a commitment on the principle of Trusteeship and that the issue would therefore not be prejudged in the manner feared by opponents of the procedural motion of the United States.

In the end, it was decided (at the 128th meeting) to vote on the following question: Should the First Committee begin the discussion of the working paper (A/C.1/277) submitted by the United States (i.e., on the Trusteeship proposal)? The Committee decided by a vote of 38 to 7, with 7 abstentions, to begin the examination of the Trusteeship proposal. The suggestion to refer the proposal to the Fourth Committee was abandoned.

(2) Sub-Committee on Palestine Trusteeship Established

Following this decision, the representative of Guatemala submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/284) which, declaring that "it is not possible to discuss the question of trusteeship for Palestine without previously having the necessary information as to whether trusteeship is desired or will be accepted by the population of Palestine; and whether it is possible to implement trusteeship and make it workable", called for the appointment of a sub-committee to report on its findings with respect to these questions after hearing the United Nations Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, the Arab Higher Committee, the Jewish Agency and the legal, economic and military experts on Palestine of the Secretariat.

The representative of Guatemala subsequently accepted a United States amendment (A/C.1/285) to his draft resolution. This amendment proposed to add to the instructions to the sub-committee a specific statement that the terms of the United States Trusteeship proposal (A/C.1/277) be regarded by the sub-committee as a basis of work. The amendment further provided that the sub-committee be composed of representatives of States members of the Trusteeship and Security Councils and of the representative of Guatemala. (The original Guatemalan proposal did not touch upon the question of the sub-committee's composition, leaving this point to be decided later.)

Peru suggested (A/C.1/286) adding a third question to those to be addressed to the sub-committee, namely that of the approximate cost of the proposed Trusteeship plan or of any other United Nations provisional government in Palestine.

Drafting changes to the Guatemalan proposal as amended by the United States were proposed by several representatives.

A comprehensive amendment was submitted by Cuba (A/C.1/290). Instead of the composition recommended by the United States, the representative of Cuba proposed that the sub-committee be composed of the officers of the First Committee (i.e., the representatives of China, Poland and Norway), and the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, Guatemala, India, U.S.S.R. and United States.

Where the Guatemalan proposal limited itself to calling upon the sub-committee for "report with recommendations concerning the Trusteeship proposal or any other United Nations provisional government for Palestine, the Cuban amendment instructed the sub-committee to "formulate and report to the Committee a proposal for a provisional regime for Palestine", taking into account the views expressed during the debate and the views of the interested parties.

In a sub-amendment (A/C.1/291) to the Cuban amendment, the representative of Guatemala proposed that the mandatory provision quoted in the preceding paragraph be replaced by a provision calling upon the sub-committee to "study the possibilities of establishing a provisional regime for Palestine and report its findings to the Committee". The representative of Guatemala, in another sub-amendment (A/C.1/291) to the Cuban amendment, also proposed enlarging the composition of the sub-committee's membership by adding the following to the list of representatives proposed for sub-committee membership by the representative of Cuba: the representatives of Australia, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Haiti, New Zealand, Sweden and Uruguay.

The Guatemalan sub-amendments were rejected by the Committee, the proposal to alter the sub-committee's terms of reference being rejected by a vote of 28 to 3, with 22 abstentions, and the proposal to enlarge the composition of the sub-committee being rejected by a vote of 33 to 7, with 13 abstentions.

A proposal made orally by the representative of Argentina, to add the representative of Cuba to the sub-committee membership, was adopted by a vote of 33 to 0, with 19 abstentions.

Finally, the Committee, at its 137th meeting, on May 5, by a vote of 33 to 7, with 13 abstentions, adopted the Cuban modification (A/C.1/290) of the Guatemalan draft resolution, together with the oral amendment proposed by Argentina.

In its final form the resolution (A/C.1/292) consisted of four paragraphs. The first of these set forth the composition of the Sub-Committee, as follows:
Officers of the First Committee (i.e., China, Poland, Norway) and the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Guatemala, France, India, U.S.S.R. and United States.

The second paragraph laid down that the Sub-Committee "in the light of the situation in Palestine and of the work of the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council, and taking into account all suggestions made in the course of the Committee's debate, shall formulate and report to the Committee a proposal for a provisional regime for Palestine".

The third paragraph instructed the Sub-Committee to take into account "(a) whether it is likely that such proposal will commend itself to the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, (b) whether it is possible to implement this proposal and make it workable, and (c) the approximate cost of such proposal".

The final paragraph provided that the Sub-committee "may consult representatives of the United Nations Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, the Arab Higher Committee, and the Jewish Agency and may avail itself of the services of other experts on Palestine".

During the consideration of the Guatemalan proposal, the Committee also embarked upon a discussion of the substance of the United States Trusteeship working paper (A/C.1/277). Questions raised by various representatives dealt with such matters as the duration of the Trusteeship regime, the functions of the proposed Palestine administration, the powers of the Governor-General, protection of and access to the Holy Places, immigration, land purchase and budgetary implications. There was no discussion during the preliminary article-by-article examination of the working paper on the subject of contribution of police forces by Member States to enforce the Trusteeship proposal.

On the basic issue of the proposal i.e., on Trusteeship as such for Palestine no new views emerged. Those who had argued in favour of retaining the resolution of November 29 expressed themselves against the Trusteeship idea. The Arab States declared that the Trusteeship proposals were worth exploring further, but only if it were clearly understood that Trusteeship would not be a veiled attempt at partial or total implementation of the Partition Plan. Although the Palestine Arabs were ready for self-government, they would nevertheless be willing to consider a Trusteeship proposal, provided the period of Trusteeship were of limited duration and gave rise to a reasonable hope that a just and equitable solution could be found while it lasted.

Representatives of the Jewish Agency opposed the Trusteeship proposal as an unwarranted retrogression from the resolution of November 29, which the Jews in Palestine had implemented to so large an extent that a return now was impossible.

That, in brief, was the background against which the Committee decided on May 5 to set up a sub-committee Sub-Committee 9 to "formulate and report to the Committee a proposal for a provisional regime for Palestine".

(3) Sub-Committee Proposal Endorsed by First Committee

Sub-Committee 9 held eleven meetings. Its officers were the same as those of the First Committee, i.e., the representative of China as Chairman, the representative of Poland as Vice-Chairman and the representative of Norway as Rapporteur. The Sub-Committee had decided by a vote of 8 to 3 (Guatemala Poland and U.S.S.R.), with 1 abstention (China), that the meetings should be held in private and that at the end of each meeting, a Press Officer of the United Nations would issue a full press communiqué approved by the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur.

In its report (A/C.1/299) to the First Committee, which was submitted on May 13, the Sub-committee stated that it had examined a number of working papers and proposals, the major suggestions or proposals having been submitted by the representative of France, the Rapporteur, the representative of the United States, and the representative of Poland. The report further stated that the Sub-Committee had sought the assistance of the Chairman of the Palestine Commission, the representative of the Mandatory Power and of Pablo Azcarate of the United Nations Secretariat. (Mr. Azcarate had returned to Lake Success from Palestine a short time before).

The Sub-Committee, at its final meeting on May 13, adopted with certain modifications a United States proposal (A/C.1/SC.9/1) after rejecting by varying margins several Polish amendments (A/C.1/SC.9/2) hereto.

The main differences between the Polish and the United States versions of the proposal were as follows: Whereas the United States draft proposed that the General Assembly call upon all persons, organizations and Governments to "cooperate in making effective" a truce such as the Security Council was seeking to secure in Palestine, the Polish version suggested that the Assembly call upon all Governments "to refrain from any threat or use of force to change the situation, to restrain their nationals from such threats or use of force, and to co-operate in making effective such a truce".

Instead of providing for a United Nations Commissioner for Palestine to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council, as the United States proposed, Poland suggested the creation of a United Nations Temporary Mediation and Conciliation Commission in Palestine. The functions assigned to the Commissioner in the United States proposal were, with certain changes, assigned to the Mediation Commission in the Polish amendment.

Finally, the Polish amendment proposed the deletion of the final clause of the United States draft resolution (which provided for the discharge of the Palestine Commission by the General Assembly) and the substitution therefor of a clause in which the Assembly would declare that "the present resolution does in no way prejudice the rights and legal position of the parties concerned".

The draft resolution adopted by the Sub-Committee differed from the United States draft proposal in several respects. Thus, the reference in the preamble to "the resolutions adopted by the Security Council with reference to Palestine on March 5, April 1, April 17 and April 23, 1948, was omitted, being replaced by a reference to "the present situation in regard to Palestine". Furthermore, it was decided to replace the designation "United Nations Commissioner for Palestine" by the designation "United Nations Mediator in Palestine". With one exception, the functions assigned to the United Nations representative in Palestine were identical, the exception being that the draft resolution adopted by the Sub-Committee made it one of the functions of the Mediator to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine", while the original United States proposal had defined the corresponding function as the promotion of "agreement on the future government of Palestine". Finally, while the United States draft resolution had provided for the discharge of the Palestine Commission, the corresponding clause of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution provided for the suspension of the Palestine Commission.

The draft resolution adopted by Sub-Committee 10 (A/C.1/299) consisted of three parts, preceded by a preamble.

In the preamble, the General Assembly would be "taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestine".

In the first of the three operative parts of the draft resolution, the General Assembly "strongly supports" the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon all concerned to co-operate to make such a truce effective.

In the second part, the Assembly "empowers" United Nations Mediator in Palestine, chosen by a committee composed of representatives of China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R., to exercise, inter alia, the following functions:

(a) Use his good offices with the "local and community authorities" in Palestine to

(1) arrange for the operation of essential common services;

(2) assure the protection of the Holy Places;

(3) promote a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine.

(b) Co-operate with the Truce Commission appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of April 23, 1948.

(c) Invite "as seems to him advisable" the assistance and co-operation of appropriate specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, and other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character, such as the International Red Cross, with a view to promoting the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine.

This part of the draft resolution also would instruct the Mediator to render progress reports monthly or more frequently to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General for transmission to Member nations, and would direct the Mediator to conform to the provisions of the present draft resolution and to instructions of the Security Council. It also would authorize the Secretary-General to pay the Mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the International Court of Justice and to provide him with an adequate staff.

The third and final part of the draft resolution adopted by the Sub-Committee "suspends, as of 1 June 1948, the Palestine Commission from further exercise of responsibilities under its Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947".

The report of Sub-Committee 9 reached the First Committee at its 139th meeting on May 13.

After an initial procedural debate concerning the short interval between the concluding meetings of Sub-Committees 9 and 10253/ the Committee discussed the report of Sub-Committee 9 during its 140th meeting on May 13.

The representative of the United States supported the proposal of the Sub-Committee. When the discussions in the Sub-Committee appeared to be leading to a common conclusion, he said, the United States had drafted a proposal embodying the views expressed by a majority of the Sub-committee members. The proposal thus was not a United States invention but was, rather, the product of the deliberative processes of the General Assembly.

Outlining the provisions of the draft resolution,254/ the representative of the United States said the proposal was based on the need to satisfy two conditions: first, that any proposal should be based on the authority of the Charter, and, second, that it should be practical and take into account the existing situation and the importance of bringing an end to the conflict in the Holy Land.

The deliberations had clearly shown that it was impossible in the available time to find a peaceful solution acceptable to both parties. No proposal had been made which would either enable the United Nations to bring about a peaceful implementation of the resolution of November 29 or provide for the implementation of that resolution by use of United Nations forces.

It had further become clear that, although many Members favoured the idea, neither Jews nor Arabs would be willing to sacrifice their interests to permit a temporary Trusteeship to operate effectively. Hence, the representative of the United States declared, armed forces would have to be provided for the implementation of a Trusteeship regime; yet no other governments had declared their willingness to join the United States in its declared willingness to supply such forces. A final cardinal fact in the situation was the decision of the Mandatory Power to lay down its Mandate at midnight the following day, i.e., on Friday, May 14 at 6:00 P.M. (New York time).

He reviewed the steps taken by the United States Government to secure a truce in the Holy Land. As a member of the Security Council's Truce Commission, he announced, the United States, following discussions with Arab and Jewish representatives both in New York and in Palestine had drawn up Articles of Truce which it considered fair and equitable. He wished to call attention to two of these proposed Articles of Truce in particular, namely Articles 5 and 11. Article 5 had stated:

"During the period of the truce, and without prejudice to the future governmental structure of Palestine, existing Arab and Jewish authorities shall function as Temporary Truce Regimes in the areas in which such authorities are now exercising control and shall accord full and equal rights to all inhabitants in such areas."

And Article 11 had stated:

"During the period of the truce, and without prejudice to future decisions on the question of immigration, the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine accept, as a matter of emergency, the authority of the Security Council Truce Commission to deal with the question of immigration into Palestine."

The representative of the United States, reviewing the recent history of United Nations efforts to secure a truce in Palestine, regretted that the proposed Articles of Truce had not been accepted by the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, the Arab States or the Mandatory Power. He noted that revised truce terms had been submitted since then but had not yet been accepted by either party.

Against this background, the representative of the United States strongly recommended adoption of the draft resolution submitted by Sub- Committee 9, pointing out that, pending further action by the General Assembly, the resolution of November 29, 1947, remained as a recommendation although it could not be implemented. Although the current special session had not succeeded in finding a solution for the problem, Members were in a position to use the power of the United Nations in continuing efforts to ease the situation in Palestine. The proposal before the Committee was based upon the conviction that peace depended, not upon force, but upon the processes of reconciliation.

The representative of Canada supported the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 9. This resolution, he pointed out, provided for measures to supplement the efforts of the Security Council since it proposed to add the good offices of a mediator to lend his moderating influence.

The representative of Greece also supported the draft resolution but presented an amendment to Part III. He suggested (A/C.1/300) that the Palestine Commission be "relieved" rather than "suspended", as proposed in the Sub-Committee's draft resolution. Mere suspension, he thought, would confuse the situation.

The representative of Poland, observing that the representative of Greece had brought up once again an amendment which had been discussed extensively in the Sub-Committee, announced that his delegation likewise would resubmit its amendments to the draft resolution (A/C.1/SC.9/2).255/

The representative of the United Kingdom said it was now evident that there was no longer any question of imposing any settlement in Palestine. His Government had suggested an approach to the problem by truce and mediation and the draft resolution of the Sub-Committee appeared to give effect to that suggestion. The United Kingdom delegation would support this draft resolution since it believed that it opened the road to an ultimate solution for peace in Palestine.

The representative of New Zealand termed the proposal of Sub-Committee 9 pitifully inadequate and said it was indeed the very least that the Assembly could do. The statements of many delegations appeared to make it clear, however, that nothing better could be achieved. The entire situation confronting the Assembly was the result of departure from the principles agreed upon at the previous session. As for the draft resolution presented by Sub-Committee 9, the representative of New Zealand offered two amendments (A/C.1/301). The draft resolution instructed the Mediator to conform in his activities with such instructions as the Security Council might issue. The representative of New Zealand proposed to insert the words "the General Assembly or", so that the Mediator would be instructed to comply with the instructions of the General Assembly as well. [Furthermore, the representative of New Zealand proposed the deletion of Part III of the draft resolution (A/C.1/299), which "suspends, as of 1 June 1948, the Palestine Commission ...". He proposed to substitute for this clause a paragraph in which the Assembly "thanks the Palestine Commission for . . . [its] efforts, and, pending a further decision by the General Assembly or the Security Council, resolves, in the light of the present situation and without prejudice to the General Assembly's resolution . . . of the 29th November 1947, to suspend the responsibility of the Palestine Commission under that resolution as from a date to be fixed by the Secretary-General".

The representative of Czechoslovakia protested against the manner in which the Assembly had been going about its work. A Sub-Committee had been set up on May 4 to make proposals on questions of substance although there had been no prior decision on the fundamental principles. The first Committee, in his opinion, had never seriously discussed the United States contention that the resolution of November 29 could not be implemented by peaceful means and that implementation by the use of force had proved impossible. Yet the fact was that partition was actually being implemented and that the special session of the Assembly had proved powerless to alter the situation in Palestine or even to ensure a peaceful change-over. As for the draft resolution, he reserved the position of his delegation pending the receipt of instructions from the Czechoslovak Government.

The representative of Poland held that there was no relationship between the actual situation in Palestine, on the one hand, and the draft resolutions prepared by Sub-Committees 9 and 10, on the other hand. They were both unrealistic and could have no effect upon the real situation in Palestine.

Both proposals were part of a manoeuvre of long standing to prevent implementation of the Partition Plan, a manoeuvre in which the United States had played, and was playing, the predominant part. Both draft resolutions were merely parts of the Trusteeship plan, whose acceptance in toto the United States had found it impossible to secure.

The Polish representative said it had appeared possible that unanimous agreement might be reached in Sub-Committee 9 on a draft resolution based upon a working paper submitted by the Sub-Committee's Rapporteur. In spite of that agreement, the Sub-Committee had "suddenly" been faced with a new draft resolution by the United States. Nevertheless, he, as a member of the Sub-Committee, had endeavoured to make the United States draft resolution acceptable by the introduction of amendments. This attempt was rebuffed, with the result that the Polish delegation was obliged to oppose the resolution in its present form.

The representative of Poland then reintroduced most of the amendments he had previously presented in the Sub-Committee (A/C.1/SC.9/2), deploring in particular the Sub-Committee's failure to include in its draft resolution an appeal to all governments to refrain from any threat or use of force to change the situation, and its failure to insert a provision stating that the draft resolution did not in any way prejudice the rights and legal position of the parties. He also objected to the draft resolution's reference to "community authorities" in Palestine when, in his view, the reference should be to "the respective authorities," i.e., Arab and Jewish authorities on a level higher than that of individual local communities.

As for Section III of the draft resolution, the Polish representative supported the New Zealand amendment (A/C.1/301), saying that if it were accepted he would not insist upon his own amendment to this part of the draft resolution.

The representative of the Dominican Republic held that while the proposal of Sub-Committee 9 was not fully satisfactory it was generally acceptable. The powers laid down for the Mediator were very limited, making him a mandatory without a mandate. The delegation of the Dominican Republic preferred the text of the draft resolution to the alternative versions proposed in the various amendments and would vote for the unamended text in the hope that on this basis further progress would be made toward re-establishing peace in Palestine.

Opposition to the draft resolution was voiced by the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R., who expressed substantial agreement with the views outlined by the representative of Poland.

At this stage of the discussion, the representative of Cuba moved closure of the debate on the report of Sub-Committee 9.

This motion was opposed by the representatives of Siam and Iran, but was adopted by the Committee by a vote of 23 to 15, with 10 abstentions.

On a point of order, the representative of Yugoslavia held that under Rule 142 of the rules of procedure, the Assembly could not proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 9 until it had heard a statement by the Secretary-General and a report from the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee on budgetary implications.

The Secretary-General said no precise figure could be given since neither the contemplated size of the Mediator's staff nor the duration of the Mediator's activities could be clearly known. A tentative figure for the expenses might be $100,000. Commenting upon a further statement of the Yugoslav representative, the Secretary-General declared that he was satisfied as to his authority to provide funds for the proposed Mediator without prior references to the Fifth Committee.

The draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 9, together with the amendments presented thereto, was then put to the vote. The Committee adopted the first of the two New Zealand amendments (A/C.1/301), i.e., the one providing for the Mediator's acting in compliance, not only with instructions of the Security Council, but also with instructions from the Assembly. The vote on this amendment was 26 to 6, with 16 abstentions.

The Committee also adopted the Greek amendment (A/C.1/300) to "relieve" rather than "suspend" the Palestine Commission, the vote being 24 to 15, with 11 abstentions.

Finally, the Committee, by a vote of 13 to 7, with 25 abstentions, adopted a French amendment (A/C.1/303) to insert the word "future" before the word "situation" in the phrase "to promote a peaceful adjustment of the situation of Palestine", an amendment that had not been discussed during the preceding debate in the Committee.

All other amendments were rejected by varying votes.

The amended resolution as a whole was then adopted by a vote of 35 to 6, with 10 abstentions, and was forwarded to the General Assembly for its decision.

(4) Australia Withdraws Draft Resolution on
Implementation of Partition

The representative of Australia said he had abstained from the final vote on the resolution of Sub-Committee 9 for two reasons: (i) the failure of the Committee to accept the second New Zealand amendment (A/C.1/301), which would have brought the resolution into relation with the resolution of November 29; and (ii) the Australian draft resolution which had been before the Committee for some time, although it had never been generally discussed.

The Australian draft resolution (A/C.1/279) would have: recalled the resolution of November 29; taken note of the report submitted by the Palestine Commission; recognized that "circumstances beyond [the First Committee's] control have prevented the Palestine Commission from adhering to the prescribed schedules of stages of implementation of the . . . resolution of 29 November 1947"; and recommended that the General Assembly

"1. Request the Palestine Commission

"(a) To proceed immediately with the creation of Provisional Councils of Government and Local Militia Forces, in co-operation with the respective communities concerned, in the prescribed areas of Palestine,

"(b) To assume as from 15 May, in co-operation with one or both of the Provisional Councils of Government, Civil Administration in the relevant area or areas of Palestine,

"(c) To carry through, in co-operation with one or both of the Provisional Councils of Government, the remaining stages after 15 May prescribed in the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947."

The Australian draft resolution would further have recommended that the Assembly

"2. Call on the states of the Arab League to prohibit their Nationals from engaging in activities in Palestine designed to obstruct the carrying out of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947,"

and

"3. Call on States Members of the United Nations to refrain from furnishing aid or encouragement to either community in Palestine which is acting without the sanction of the Palestine Commission and in obstruction of the terms of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947."

That resolution, which had been before the First Committee since April 21, was motivated, like the rejected New Zealand amendment, by the desire and resolve to see that the authority and credit of the United Nations and its decisions were upheld, the representative of Australia declared. He ventured to think that both the Australian and New Zealand proposals expressed the real conscience of many representatives around the Committee table. However, the Committee had adopted a resolution (i.e., the one proposed by Sub-Committee 9, as amended) which, though sketchy, did admit a certain amount of responsibility on its part for what was happening in Palestine, and gave some recognition to the momentum of events. For these reasons he now withdrew the Australian draft resolution.

With the withdrawal of the Australian proposal, the adoption of the amended draft resolution of Sub-Committee 9, and the decision256/ to refer the proposal of Sub-Committee 10 concerning Jerusalem directly to the General Assembly without a vote in Committee, the First Committee had completed its task (141st meeting, May 14, 1948) and it was not convened again during the special session.

(5) Assembly Adopts Mediation Proposal

The resolution proposed by the First Committee (A/552) was considered at the 135th (concluding) plenary meeting of the second special session of the General Assembly.257/

Just before the Assembly opened the discussion on the resolution, the representative of Colombia asked whether the representative of the United States could confirm the information given to the press regarding recognition of the Government of the Jewish State by the United States. The representative of the United States said he had no official information on this matter at the present time.

The representative of Guatemala supported the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee, although he deplored the acceptance of the Greek amendment, which "relieved" rather than "suspended" the Palestine Commission. The Guatemalan delegation had consistently opposed any measures tending to abrogate the resolution of November 29. It interpreted the draft resolution now under consideration as limiting the role of the United Nations representative in Palestine to mediation between the parties. The resolution of November 29 thus remained in force.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. said that in view of the situation in Palestine at the present time there was no reason to appoint a mediator. A feature of that situation was the existence of one of the two States provided for in the Assembly's November resolution: the Jewish State. Even if the draft resolution were accepted, its acceptance could in no way affect the partition decision, which remained fully valid. The U.S.S.R. delegation would vote against the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee because it feared that opponents of the Partition Plan might take advantage of the provisions of the proposed resolution to complicate the existing situation.

The resolution of November 29 had been adopted by the Assembly to protect the interests of the Palestine population. Ever since, the United Kingdom, and particularly the United States, had tried to prevent the implementation of the November resolution. The policy of the United States was full of contradictions, while the policy of the U.S.S.R. had been entirely consistent, according first consideration to the interests of the people of Palestine.

The representative of Poland said the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine was in conformity with the resolution of November 29. He was sure that the leaders of the New Jewish State realized the wisdom of close co-operation with the other peoples of the Middle East and that the Arab population of Palestine would follow their example, thus strengthening the Arab States in their struggle for complete independence in that part of the world. Creation of the Jewish State had already rendered obsolete many of the provisions of the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee, a fact which, the representative of Poland thought, the United States itself had seemed to realize when it decided to grant de facto recognition to the Jewish State. The draft resolution amounted to a veiled attempt to invalidate the partition resolution. The Polish delegation would vote against it.

The representative of Peru said he would abstain from voting on the draft resolution since, in his opinion, it was too feeble to ensure real and lasting harmony among the peoples of Palestine.

The representative of Uruguay declared that the Mediator should be given adequate powers, since he would be incurring heavy responsibilities. He requested a roll-call vote on separate paragraphs of the draft resolution on which some delegations might wish to abstain.

The representative of Australia proposed an amendment258/ to the draft resolution to link the Mediator's activities explicitly with the legal and de facto situation in Jerusalem.

Referring to the recognition of the Jewish State by the United States, the representative of Cuba said he could not see why a vote should now be taken on the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee. That draft resolution, he held, now seemed pointless in view of the action of its sponsor, the United States Government.

The representative of Syria said he understood at last why the United States delegation had urged that priority should be given to the report of Sub-Committee 10.259/ The real intention of the United States had been to await the termination of the Mandate, secure acceptance of a Trusteeship regime for Jerusalem, advocating a political stand-still, and then present the Assembly with the fait accompli of United States recognition of the so-called Jewish State. By acting as it did, the United States had acted against the resolution of the Security Council.

The representative of the United States read two statements to the Assembly. The first one was from the President of the United States and read:

"This Government has been informed that a Jewish State has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the Provisional Government hereof. The United States recognizes the Provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel."

The second statement was issued by the White House in Washington and read:

"The desire of the United States to obtain a truce in Palestine will in no way be lessened by the proclamation of a Jewish State. We hope that the new Jewish State will join with the Security Council Truce Commission in redoubled efforts to bring an end to the fighting, which has been, throughout the United Nations consideration of Palestine, a principal objective of this Government."

The objective of bringing peace to Palestine, the representative of the United States declared, remained the policy and hope of his Government. The draft resolution before the Assembly promoted the realization of that objective. Consequently the United States delegation would continue to give the draft resolution its full support.

The representative of Egypt said that in view of the latest developments it would be a worthless mockery if the Assembly continued to discuss the draft resolution before it. The entire procedure had been a "mere fake" and the nations gathered in the Assembly had been victims, unaware of what was going on behind the scenes. What had happened was a blow not only to the United Nations but to international relations as a whole. The hopes and ideals of mankind had been betrayed.

The representative of Lebanon said the United States had been responsible for the convening of the present Assembly session. For four weeks the United States delegation had been assuring the parties that its only aim was to bring about peace and reconciliation. The Arabs, it now appeared, had been duped. The action taken by the United States would lead to the gravest repercussions in the Middle East, and the intellectual, cultural and spiritual interests of the United States in the Middle East would be deeply affected by the decision just taken by the United States.

This concluded the discussion of the resolution proposed by the First Committee. Following the rejection of the Australian amendment,260/ the draft resolution (A/552) was put to the vote, paragraph by paragraph.

The result of the voting was as follows:

Part of Resolution Vote

Preamble Adopted, 27 to 5, with 13 abstentions
Section I " 32 to 0, 20
Section II, Para. 1 " 31 to 7, 11
Section II, Para. 2 " 31 to 4, 13
Section II, Para. 3 " 32 to 5, 12
Section II, Para. 4 " 29 to 6, 13
Section III " 29 to 11 8

A vote was then taken on the resolution as a whole, at the request of the representative of Colombia, by roll-call, and it was adopted by a vote of 31 to 7, with 16 abstentions. The resolution (186 (S-2)) was as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestine,
I

"Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine261/ and calls upon all Governments, organizations and persons to co-operate in making effective such a truce;
II

1. Empowers a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, to exercise the following functions:

"(a) To use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine to:
"(b) To co-operate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 April 1948 [S/727];

"(c) To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and co-operation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character;

"2. Instructs the United Nations Mediator to render progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General for transmission to the members of the United Nations;

"3. Directs the United Nations Mediator to conform in his activities with the provisions of this resolution, and with such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue;

"4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the United Nations Mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the International Court of Justice, and to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Mediator by the General Assembly;
III
"Relieves the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of responsibilities under resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947."

Following the adoption of this resolution, the Assembly, without discussion or objection, adopted a resolution (189 (S-2)) submitted by the Dominican Republic. The resolution expressed the "full appreciation" of the General Assembly for the "work performed by the Palestine Commission in pursuance of its mandate from the General Assembly".

The second special session then adjourned after an address by the President. (In pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of May 14, 1948 (186(S-2)), a committee of the Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States met on May 20, 1948, and appointed Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross, as United Nations Mediator on Palestine.)262/

ENDNOTES


211/See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, pp. 276-78.

212/For this section see doc. A/364: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly.

213/The representative of Australia on the Special Committee abstained from voting on either the Majority or the Minority Plan.

214/See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, pp. 301-3.

215/See A/364, Vol. II, Annex 5.

216/Ibid., Annex 6.

217/Ibid., Annex 8.

218/Ibid., Annex 9.

219/See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, p. 303.

220/As the majority plan was, with certain modifications ultimately adopted by the General Assembly, it is not dealt with here in any detail. For resolution adopted by the General Assembly, see pp. 247-56. For details of the plan proposed by the Committee, see doc. A/364, Chapter V.

221/For details of the minority proposal, see doc. A/364 Chapter VII.

222/See Section b (2) (b), pp. 229-30.

223/See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, pp. 74-75.

224/Ibid., pp. 168-69.

225/See Section b (3), p. 231.

226/See summary of UNSCOP report, pp. 229-31.

227/See ibid., p. 230.

228/See Section e, pp. 235-37.

229/See insert following p. 236 for map showing boundaries established by the Assembly.

230/See Annex II of the Sub-Committee's report (A/AC.14/34).

231/See section e, pp. 235-37.

232/See Section c (1), pp. 231-32.

233/See p. 241.

234/For text, see pp. 247-56.

235/See Section b (2) (b), pp. 229-30.

236/The following stipulation shall be added to the declaration concerning the Jewish State: In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration." [Footnote in original document]

237/In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words "by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State". [Footnote in original document]

238/The boundary lines described in part II are indicated in Annex A [following p. 236 in the present Yearbook. The base map used in marking and describing this boundary is "Palestine 1:250,000" published by the Survey of Palestine, 1946. [Footnote in original document]

239/Telegram sent to Secretary-General by Arab Higher Committee on January 19,1948, quoted on page 6 of the Commission's Report (A/532) to the General Assembly.

240/See pp. 403-7.

241/The special report was issued on April 13 (S/720 and Add. 1, dated April 14 and May 5,1948, respectively).

242/See p. 281.

243/A more detailed account of the debates at the second special session of the General Assembly is given in the United Nations Bulletin, Vol. IV, Nos. 9-11.

244/See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, pp. 276-77.

245/See pp. 410-11.

246/See pp. 254-56.

247/For subsequent consideration of Trusteeship proposal, see pp. 273-75.

248/A fuller account of the statements made by individual representatives is given in the summary records of the First Committee meetings (A/C.1/118-131).

249/For establishment of the Truce Commission by the Security Council, see Security Council, pp. 415-16.

250/See p. 280.

251/For action taken at the 135th plenary meeting on mediation proposal, see pp. 279-81.

252/See pp. 259-60.

253/See p. 270.

254/See p. 281 for resolution as adopted by the Assembly; see pp. 278-79 for amendments adopted to the draft proposed by the Sub-Committee.

255/See p. 275.

256/See p. 271.

257/For discussion on Jerusalem at the 135th plenary meeting, see pp. 271-73.

258/See p. 272.

259/See pp. 270-71.

260/See p. 272.

261/See pp. 412-16.

262/Security Council, Official Records, Third Year. No. 71, p. 4. For reports of the Mediator see Security Council, pp. 429-48, and his progress report to the General Assembly, pp. 304-13.


*****



4. Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine

On September 16, 1948, 24 hours before his assassination, the United Nations Mediator on Pal-estine, Count Folke Bernadotte, had prepared a progress report for submission to the General As-sembly.281/

a. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report (A/648) states the Mediator's con-viction that prompt Assembly action would greatly enhance the prospects of a peaceful settlement in the Holy Land, and would, in fact, be indispensable for such a settlement.

It covers the Mediator's activities during the Palestine truce from June 11 to July 9, 1948, and the one which, beginning on July 18, 1948, was still in force when the report was submitted to the Assembly.

The report is divided into three parts, each of which is devoted to a broad aspect of the Palestine situation. Thus Part I deals with the mediation effort per se, Part II with the supervision of the two truces and Part III with the question of assist-ance to refugees, particularly some 360,000 Arab refugees who left, or were expelled from, Israel-ruled parts of Palestine during the fighting in the Holy Land.

Annexes to the report reproduce textually important communications exchanged between the Mediator and the two contesting parties (Annexes I and II to Part I) and tabulate the replies and aid furnished in response to requests for specific com-modities to alleviate the plight of refugees (An-nexes I and II to Part III). A further annex con-tains the flight log of the Mediator from May 27 to September 9, 1948 (Annex III to Part I). The flight log is reproduced below.282/

b. THE MEDIATOR'S CONCLUSIONS
(1) Conclusions on the Mediation Effort

The operative part of the report consists of the conclusions reached by the Mediator on each of the three major aspects of the Palestine problem. These conclusions are stated in his report in the following terms:

"1. Since I presented my written suggestions to the Arab and Jewish authorities on 27 June283/ I have made no formal submission to either party of further sugges-tions or proposals for a definitive settlement. Since that date, however, I have held many oral discussions in the Arab capitals and Tel Aviv, in the course of which vari-ous ideas on settlement have been freely exchanged. As regards my original suggestions, I hold to the opinion that they offered a general framework within which a reasonable and workable settlement might have been reached, had the two parties concerned been willing to discuss them. They were flatly rejected, however, by both parties. Since they were put forth on the explicit condition that they were purely tentative, were designed primarily to elicit views and counter-suggestions from each party, and, in any event, could be implemented only if agreed upon by both parties, I have never since pressed them. With respect to one basic concept in my sugges-tions, it has become increasingly clear to me that, how-ever desirable a political and economic union might be in Palestine, the time is certainly not now propitious for the effectuation of any such scheme.

"2. I do not consider it to be within my province to recommend to the Members of the United Nations a pro-posed course of action on the Palestine question. That is a responsibility of the Members acting through the appro-priate organs. In my role as United Nations Mediator, however, it was inevitable that I should accumulate in-formation and draw conclusions from my experience which might well be of assistance to Members of the United Nations in charting the future course of United Nations action on Palestine. I consider it my duty, there-fore, to acquaint the Members of the United Nations, through the medium of this report, with certain of the conclusions on means of peaceful adjustment which have evolved from my frequent consultations with Arab and Jewish authorities over the past three and one-half months and from my personal appraisal of the present Palestinian scene. I do not suggest that these conclusions would provide the basis for a proposal which would readily win the willing approval of both parties. I have not, in the course of my intensive efforts to achieve agree-ment between Arabs and Jews, been able to devise any such formula. I am convinced, however, that it is possible at this stage to formulate a proposal which, if firmly approved and strongly backed by the General Assembly, would not be forcibly resisted by either side, confident as I am, of course, that the Security Council stands firm in its resolution of 15 July that military action shall not be employed by either party in the Palestine dispute. It cannot be ignored that the vast difference between now and last November is that a war has been started and stopped and that in the intervening months decisive events have occurred.
SEVEN BASIC PREMISES

"3. The following seven basic premises form the basis for my conclusions:

Return to peace

"(a) Peace must return to Palestine and every feasible measure should be taken to ensure that hostilities will not be resumed and that harmonious relations between Arab and Jew will ultimately be restored.

The Jewish State

"(b) A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so.

Boundary determination

"(c) The boundaries of this new State must finally be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties concerned or failing that, by the United Nations.

Continuous frontiers

"(d) Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration, which should be the major objective of the boundary arrangements, should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories, whose frontiers should not, therefore, be rigidly controlled by the terri-torial arrangements envisaged in the resolution of 29 November.

Right of repatriation

"(e) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effec-tive, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.

Jerusalem

"(f) The City of Jerusalem, because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of in-terests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment.

International responsibility

"(g) International responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form of inter-national guarantees, as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights.
SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

"4. The following conclusions broadly outlined, would, in my view, considering all the circumstances, provide a reasonable, equitable and workable basis for settlement:

"(a) Since the Security Council, under pain of Chap-ter VIII sanctions, has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine as a means of settling the dis-pute, hostilities should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties or, failing that, by the United Nations. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the mini-mum, an armistice which would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under United Nations supervision.

"(b) The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations and delimited by a technical boundaries commission ap-pointed by and responsible to the United Nations, with the following revisions in the boundaries broadly defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 No-vember in order to make them more equitable, workable and consistent with existing realities in Palestine.
"(c) The disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in full con-sultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connexion and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, there would be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, subject to such frontier rectifications regard-ing other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable.

"(d) The United Nations, by declaration or other ap-propriate means, should undertake to provide special assurance that the boundaries between the Arab and Jew-ish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned.

"(e) The port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, and without prejudice to their inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State or the ad-ministration of the city of Haifa, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking on their part to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refineries, whose distribution would continue on the basis of the historical pattern.

"(f) The airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport with assurance of access to it and employment of its facilities for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.

"(g) The City of Jerusalem, which should be under-stood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom.

"(h) The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem, by road, rail or air, should be fully respected by all parties.

"(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest pos-sible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations con-ciliation commission described in paragraph (k) below.

"(j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine and of all Jews in the Arab territory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The conciliation commission provided for in the follow-ing paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices, on the in-vitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations with a view to eliminating troublesome mi-nority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensa-tion for property owned.

"(k) In view of the special nature of the Palestine problem and the dangerous complexities of Arab-Jewish relationships, the United Nations should establish a Pal-estine conciliation commission. This commission, which should be appointed for a limited period, should be re-sponsible to the United Nations and act under its author-ity. The commission, assisted by such United Nations personnel as may prove necessary, should undertake:
(2) Conclusions regarding the Truce Operation

"1. The supervision of the truce is a continuing re-sponsibility and it is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage to formulate any definitive views concerning the operation. The experience thus far gained in the supervision of two truces extending over a total period of more than three months has been very valuable, how-ever, and on the basis of this experience certain analyses and conclusions may even now be usefully set forth.

"2. In assessing in general terms the entire period of truce, my dual role of Mediator and of supervisor of truce observation is an important factor. Conditions of truce, even though subject to frequent minor and occasional major infractions by both parties, provide a peaceful basis indispensable to the task of mediation. At the same time, organizing and supervising truce observance make imperative demands on time and staff. I am inevitably drawn into the settlement of disputes arising solely out of the truce, and it may be readily appreciated that my position and decisions as truce supervisor cannot, in the minds of the disputants, be easily dissociated from my role in the more fundamental task of mediation.

"3. The situation in Jerusalem has been considerably more tense and difficult during the second truce than during the first. This fact is due to a complex of reasons among which are the change in military dispositions be-tween truces, and the increased concentration of man-power which appears to have taken place there in the interval between the truces. The special importance which each side attaches to the status of Jerusalem in a general settlement of the Palestine problem is, in the cir-cumstances, a constant influence tending to heighten the tension there.

"4. However, the situation in Jerusalem has shown recent improvement. The decision of the Security Coun-cil on 19 August fixing the responsibility of the parties under the cease-fire order, a considerable increase in the number of United Nations Observers stationed there, and intensive efforts to achieve localized demilitarization agreements, have produced beneficial results. Neverthe-less, the conditions in Jerusalem are such that not even the increased number of Observers now there could for long maintain the truce in the City if it should appear likely that a settlement would be indefinitely deferred.

"5. United Nations supervision of the regular food convoys for Jerusalem has been an important feature of both truces. The movement of these convoys involved difficult negotiation and constant supervision and escort. Apart from some sniping activity during the early days of each truce, the convoy system has worked remarkably well. On the other hand, persistent efforts to ensure the flow of water to Jerusalem through the main pipe-lines have met with failure during both truces, the destruction of the Latrun pumping station having so far nullified all efforts to solve the problem during the second truce.

"6. The period of the first truce coincided with the ripening of cereal crops in Palestine. Since the front lines ran almost entirely through land belonging to Arab cultivators, a great number of fields bearing crops was in no-man's land or behind Jewish positions. Attempts by Arabs to harvest crops in no-man's land and in the vi-cinity of and sometimes behind Jewish positions often led the Jews to react by firing on the harvesters. This was a major complication during the first truce, both before and after my ruling of 16 June, and explains many of the breaches of truce and the difficulties of truce observation over a wide area. During the second truce, incidents of this nature have been relatively few, since the harvest season for cereal crops is over. The efforts of Observers in securing local agreements regarding harvest-ing of crops undoubtedly saved many crops that would otherwise have been lost.

"7. The fact that in the Negeb there is no continuous front line has been, during both truces, a special cause of difficulty as a result of the need for each side to by-pass the other's positions in order to supply some of its own positions. Convoys under United Nations supervision largely solved the problem, though not without friction, during the first truce. During the second truce a similar system was proposed, but agreement on conditions could not be reached with the parties. Consequently, on 14 September I laid down the terms governing future con-voys in the Negeb.

"8. In considering the effectiveness of the truce super-vision, attention must be paid to two distinct, though re-lated, aspects of the problem. On the one hand, there is the problem of observing the actual fighting fronts, of dealing with incidents which may arise there and prevent-ing, if possible, any further outbreak of hostilities. On the other hand, there is the observation which is neces-sary over a vast area to check whether or not materials and men are being moved in a manner to confer a mili-tary advantage contrary to the terms of the truce. As regards the second aspect of this problem, an important consideration is that the area under observation covers a very large part of the Middle East and that the necessity to concentrate a majority of the limited number of Observers at my disposal near the fighting fronts restricts the number available for duties elsewhere. The avail-ability of an increased number of Observers has enabled me to ensure a more extensive supervision, especially in territories outside Palestine.

"9. Experience has shown that the more quickly ac-tion can be taken to deal with a local violation, the more easily incidents are controlled or prevented. It must be admitted that, on occasion, slowness to act, often because of circumstances beyond control, has hampered the opera-tion of the truce supervision. Although the Secretary--General of the United Nations has given me the fullest co-operation and every assistance available to him, it is apparent that the United Nations was not in position as regards Observer personnel, armed guards, communica-tions and transportation equipment or budgetary pro-vision to set up rapidly the elaborate machinery of truce observation required.

"10. The second truce differed from the first princi-pally in the fact that it was ordered by the Security Council under threat of further action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and that no time limit was set. This in-troduced a new element into the situation as compared with the first truce, in that the second truce involved compliance with a Security Council order. There is a tendency on each side to regard alleged breaches by the other side of a truce which has been ordered by the Security Council as calling for prompt action by that Council. Both sides now evidence a sense of grievance and complain that the compulsory prolongation of the truce is contrary to their interests. This feeling is inevi-tably reflected in their attitudes toward the Observers and truce obligations in general. The truce undoubtedly imposes a heavy burden on both sides, but even so, the burden of war would be heavier.

"11. The truce is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to prepare the way for a peaceful settlement. There is a period during which the potentiality for constructive ac-tion, which flows from the fact that a truce has been achieved by international intervention, is at a maximum. If, however, there appears no prospect of relieving the existing tension by some arrangement which holds concrete promise of peace, the machinery of truce supervision will in time lose its effectiveness and become an object of cynicism. If this period of maximum tendency to forego military action as a means of achieving a desired settlement is not seized, the advantage gained by inter-national intervention may well be lost."
(3) Conclusions regarding Assistance to Refugees

"1. Conclusions which may be derived from the ex-perience to date are summarized as follows:

"(a) As a result of the conflict in Palestine there are approximately 360,000 Arab refugees and 7,000 Jewish refugees requiring aid in that country and adjacent States.

"(b) Large numbers of these are infants, children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. Their condition is one of destitution and they are 'vulnerable groups' in the medical and social sense.

"(c) The destruction of their property and the loss of their assets will render most of them a charge upon the communities in which they have sought refuge for a minimum period of one year (through this winter and until the end of the 1949 harvest).

"(d) The Arab inhabitants of Palestine are not citi-zens or subjects of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, the States which are at present providing them with a refuge and the basic necessities of life. As residents of Palestine, a former mandated territory for which the international community has a continuing re-sponsibility until a final settlement is achieved, these Arab refugees understandably look to the United Nations for effective assistance.

"(e) The temporary alleviation of their condition which is all that my disaster relief programme can prom-ise them now, is quite inadequate to meet any continuing need, unless the resources in supplies and personnel avail-able are greatly increased. Such increased resources might indirectly be of permanent value in establishing social services in the countries concerned, or greatly improving existing services. This applies particularly to general so-cial administrative organizations, maternal and child care services, the training of social workers, and the improve-ment of food economics.

"(f) The refugees, on return to their homes, are en-titled to adequate safeguards for their personal security, normal facilities for employment, and adequate oppor-tunities to develop within the community without racial, religious or social discrimination.

"(g) So long as large numbers of the refugees remain in distress, I believe that responsibility for their relief should be assumed by the United Nations in conjunction with the neighbouring Arab States, the Provisional Gov-ernment of Israel, the specialized agencies, and also all the voluntary bodies or organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

"2. In concluding this part of my report, I must em-phasize again the desperate urgency of this problem. The choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die. The situation of the majority of these hapless refugees is already tragic, and to prevent them from being overwhelmed by further disaster and to make possible their ultimate rehabilita-tion, it is my earnest hope that the international com-munity will give all necessary support to make the meas-ures I have outlined fully effective. I believe that for the international community to accept its share of responsibility for the refugees of Palestine is one of the minimum conditions for the success of its efforts to bring peace to that land."

c. SUMMARY OF OTHER PARTS OF THE REPORT

The conclusions stated above were preceded, in the Mediator's report to the General Assembly, by an account of his actual work. A brief résumé of these parts of the report follows.
(1) The Mediation Effort

The Mediator's activities up to July 15, 1948 the date on which the Security Council, in the pres-ence of Count Bernadotte, ordered the second Palestine truce are covered in another part of the present Yearbook284/ and are not reviewed here, although an account thereof is contained in the Mediator's report to the Assembly. Of the period following July 15, the Mediator reported:

"14. Following my return to Rhodes on 19 July, after my short visit to Lake Success to attend the meetings of the Security Council, I consulted with Arab leaders on different occasions at Beirut, Amman and Alexandria. These conversations persuaded me that while the Arab States would maintain the truce, they would reject any suggestion of acceptance or recognition of the Jewish State, and would not meet with Jewish representatives. The Arab leaders had become greatly concerned and in-censed about the mounting distress among the huge num-ber of Arab refugees. They considered the solution of this problem fundamental to a settlement of the Palestine question. I recognized that in the Arab States public opinion on the Palestine question was considerably agi-tated and that each of my visits to Arab capitals projected the question into prominence in the Arab Press. I de-cided, therefore, in addition to the truce supervision, to concentrate my efforts in the immediate future on the problem of refugees and the demilitarization of Jerusa-lem, since no useful purpose could be served by taking precipitate action in forcing matters to a head. I con-cluded that a short cooling-off period as regards the basic political problems might best serve the cause of later mediation. I decided, therefore, in the circumstances, that I could fulfil my previous commitment to attend the International Red Cross Conference in Stockholm. While there I would use the opportunity afforded by this Con-ference to further United Nations action in favour of immediate relief for Arab refugees.

"15. The two visits which I paid to Tel Aviv, at the end of July and early in August, made it apparent that the Jewish attitude had stiffened in the interval between the two truces, that Jewish demands in the settlement would probably be more ambitious, and that Jewish opin-ion was less receptive to mediation. A feeling of greater confidence and independence had grown out of Jewish military efforts during the interval between the two truces. Less reliance was placed in the United Nations and there was a growing tendency to criticize its short-comings with regard to Palestine.

"16. Following my return to Rhodes from Stockholm on 3 September, I undertook further talks with Arab and Jewish leaders in Alexandria, Amman and Tel Aviv in the period 6 to 9 September. These talks revealed that there was, at least for the time being, no prospect of vol-untary agreement between the disputants, nor any will-ingness on the part of Arabs to negotiate with the Jews either directly or through the Mediator. But I did sense a more moderate and reasonable atmosphere in all quar-ters and a tendency to discuss more realistically the basic problems.

"17. As a result of these talks, I became convinced: (a) that it would be of utmost urgency that the General Assembly consider and reach decisions upon the Palestine question at its forthcoming session; (b) that if the Gen-eral Assembly should reach firm and equitable decisions on the principal political issues there would be a reason-able prospect that settlement could be achieved if not by formal at least by tacit acceptance; and (c) that the truce could be maintained with reasonable fidelity throughout the General Assembly session but that it might be gravely doubted that it could be indefinitely prolonged beyond then in the absence of tangible progress toward a settlement."

The Mediator also recalled the offer of direct negotiations which the Provisional Government of Israel, through him, extended to the Arab States on August 6, 1948, an offer which the Arab States declined. In this connection, the Mediator declared in his report:

"For my part ... I would welcome direct negotiations at any time the parties could agree to hold them, though I was well aware that at this particular time such an offer was probably premature, since I had just discussed the question of settlement with the Arabs. I am convinced, however, that the offer was sincerely made. It had re-cently been brought to my attention by both. Arab and Jewish officials that other offers for direct negotiations have been transmitted by Jewish representatives directly to Arab authorities. I have reaffirmed to both Arab and Jewish authorities that I would be very pleased should they find it possible to enter into direct negotiations and that I am prepared to offer every possible assistance toward that end."

The Mediator also reviewed his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of Jerusalem, efforts which at the writing of the report had not yet borne fruit.

In a section dealing with the problem of Arab refugees in so far as that problem entered into his mediatory efforts, Count Bernadotte recalled that his proposal to permit such refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-occupied parts was rejected by the Provisional Government of Israel on secu-rity grounds. The Mediator added:

"... notwithstanding the views expressed by the Pro-visional Government of Israel, it was my firm view that the right of the refugees to return to their homes at the earliest practicable date should be affirmed.

"* * * * *

"It must not be supposed, however, that the establishment of the right of refugees to return to their former homes provides a solution of the problem. The vast ma-jority of the refugees may no longer have homes to return to and their re-settlement in the State of Israel presents an economic and social problem of special complexity. Whether the refugees are re-settled in the State of Israel or in one or other of the Arab States, a major question to be faced is that of placing them in an environment in which they can find employment and the means of livelihood. But in any case their unconditional right to make a free choice should be fully respected."

As regards the Assembly's resolution of Novem-ber 29, 1947, the Mediator's observations on the spot led him to the view that "the ... question ... is not whether it may be advisable to review and revise the resolution.... It has already been out-run and irrevocably revised by the actual facts of recent Palestine history.". Among these facts he cited the non-internationalization of Jerusalem, the lack of implementation of the clauses providing for economic union, the non-creation of the pro-posed Arab State, as well as the attitude of both parties. On the last point, the Mediator stated that the only implementation of the partition reso-lution although admittedly not in accordance with the procedure envisaged therein had been the creation of the State of Israel, a "vigorous reality" which would continue to exist. On the other hand, the Jews, as a result of recent events, had apparently modified their attitude towards some of the territorial provisions of the partition scheme, notably as regards the internationalization of Jerusalem and the disposition of some other ter-ritories not intended for inclusion in the Jewish State in the resolution of November 29.

On the Arab side, the Mediator declared in his report, the dilemma was that the Arab States knew and felt that the State of Israel could only be de-stroyed by force, although they had been unable to do this. Besides, there was the fact that the Security Council had decreed that force should in no case be employed. The Arabs, the Mediator further reported, feared that Israel might not be satisfied to stay within its borders as of that time. In this connection, as well as in connection with the problem of immigration, the Mediator sug-gested that it would be helpful if the Jews as well as others were somewhat more understanding with respect to the general Arab attitude.

Any proposal for a unitary state, comprising Arabs and Jews in Palestine, as envisaged by the Arabs, was in the Mediator's opinion, unrealistic in the circumstances at the time he was reporting, and while economic union remained desirable, it was not at that time attainable.

Although officially the attitude of the two parties had not, at the time of the report, undergone any marked change, the Mediator nevertheless was able to report:

"There are recent indications of more moderate and sober counsel in at least some important quarters."

He added:

"Although it cannot be said that neither side will fight again under any circumstances, I am strongly of the view that the time is ripe for a settlement. I am reasonably confident that given the permanent injunction against military action issued by the Security Council, and firm political decisions by the General Assembly, both sides will acquiesce, however reluctantly, in any reasonable settlement on which is placed the stamp of approval of the United Nations."
(2) The Supervision of the Two Truces

Under this heading, the Mediator reviewed the operation of the first and second truces, the first lasting from June 11 to July 9, 1948, the second having begun on July 18 and continuing to be in force at the time the report was written.

Both truces, the Mediator stated, had worked well on the whole. In both there were initial difficulties because of the fact that no United Na-tions Observers were on hand at the respective times fixed for cessation of hostilities, a fact which made it difficult for the Mediator's staff to judge the validity of rival claims of positions won or lost after the two truces were to become effective. In most such cases, therefore, the report stated, the Observers took as their point of departure the position of the front lines as they found them upon arriving on the scene.

Charges of truce violations were registered with the Mediator by both sides. The overwhelming majority of these charges were found to be either grossly exaggerated or without valid evidence. There were, however, three serious breaches of the truce between June 11 and July 9, and four serious violations between July 18 and the date of the writing of the report. In each of these cases, the Security Council was formally notified by the Mediator.

(a) SERIOUS TRUCE VIOLATIONS
(i) The Altalena Incident

Sponsored by the Irgun Zvai Leumi, the ship Altalena attempted to bring war materials and men of military age to Palestine in circumvention of the truce terms. The Provisional Government of Israel took strong police action to prevent the landing, and the ship was set on fire, but some of the men and arms had already been successfully landed in Israel. The Provisional Government of Israel was informed by the Mediator that its ex-planation regarding the disposition of the men and arms was not satisfactory. The incident occurred toward the end of the first truce.
(ii) Firing on Negeb-bound Convoys

Egyptian forces refused to permit convoys carry-ing relief supplies under United Nations control to pass through their territory to isolated Jewish settlements in the Negeb, and fired on them. The in-cident was settled temporarily, but re-occurred toward the end of the first truce.
(iii) Blocking Jerusalem Water Supply

Transjordan and Iraqi forces refused to permit the flow of water to Jerusalem through the pipe-line and pumping stations controlled by them. De-spite repeated representations by the Mediator to the Arab authorities and despite the decision of the Security Council of July 7, no water flowed to Jerusalem during the first truce.
(iv) Destruction of Latrun Pumping Station

The Latrun pumping station, located in no-man's land and controlled by the Mediator's staff, was blown up on August 12, 1948. This violation of the truce was found to have been the responsibility of Arab forces, possibly irregulars.
(v) Violation of Jerusalem Red Cross Zone

Egyptian, Transjordan and Israeli forces were located in close proximity in the vicinity of Jeru-salem's Red Cross Zone, which included Govern-ment House, the Jewish Agricultural School and the Government Arab College. Following the occurrence of a number of minor incidents, Israeli forces, during the night of August 16-17, launched an attack on Egyptian positions south of the Zone. Although the attack was repulsed, Israeli forces remained in occupation of part of the Zone, and refused to withdraw unless the Arab Legion com-plied with a previous order of the Observers to withdraw from positions occupied by them in no -man's land at Nabi Dawid and Deir Abu Tor, and unless the Egyptian and Transjordan forces agreed to the establishment of, and withdrawal from, an enlarged neutral zone in the area surrounding the Red Cross Zone. The Central Truce Supervision Board decided on August 27 that the Israeli forces had committed two flagrant violations of the terms of the truce in (a) launching the attack and in (b) retaining troops in the Red Cross Zone, and ordered them to withdraw by August 29. At the same time, the Board decided to create a Neutral Zone, supervised by United Nations Observers, around the Red Cross Zone, and ordered all troops to be withdrawn from the Neutral Zone. After initial delays, this order was complied with by all concerned, and on September 4, all troops were withdrawn from both the Red Cross Zone and the newly created Neutral Zone.

Commenting upon the matter, the Mediator stated in his report: "I am convinced that the set-tlement arrived at in this case and the establish-ment of the enlarged Neutral Zone will help to ameliorate the generally tense situation in Jeru-salem." He added that Israeli authorities "are pro-testing against the failure of the Arab Legion to comply with Board's order that they withdraw from the positions occupied by them at Nabi Dawid and Deir Abu Tor. The Observers are exert-ing strong efforts to induce the Arab forces to withdraw from those positions."
(vi) Murder of Two French Observers at Gaza

The third serious violation of the second truce occurred on August 28, when two French Observ-ers, Lt.-Col. Joseph Queru and Captain Pierre Jean-nel, were killed at Gaza by Saudi Arabian irregular troops under Egyptian military command. Although there was an element of United Nations responsi-bility in that the Egyptian forces did not receive advance notice of the arrival of the plane carrying the two Observers, and the pilot was not properly briefed, "nevertheless" the Mediator reported "Egyptian anti-aircraft guns fired at the plane in violation of the truce, and the two unarmed Ob-servers were murdered and robbed by troops under Egyptian command after the officers had landed and left their plane. The Egyptian Government was notified of its responsibility and appropriate redress was requested."
(vii) Attack on Three Arab Villages

The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, in the latter part of July, complained to the Mediator against the attack on three Arab villages Ein Gazal, Jaba and Ijzim located south of Haifa, in Israeli territory, claiming that Jewish attacks had led to the capture or massacre of tens of thousands and that there were four thousand refugees from these localities. A preliminary investigation by the Mediator's staff disclosed that the villages were deserted and had been damaged, but uncovered no evidence of massacre or capture. Israeli authorities admitted that some of the in-habitants had been killed or made prisoners during what they called a "police raid" undertaken to stamp out sniping and the activities of irregulars who were blocking the Tel Aviv-Haifa road. After a thorough investigation, the Observers located more than 8,000 of the villagers and established that less than 130 were killed or missing. The Central Truce Supervision Board found that the villages were attacked by the Jews between July 18 and 25 by air and land, and that the inhabitants had been forced to evacuate. Following this evacu-ation, the villages of Ein Gazal and Jaba were de-stroyed by the Israeli forces. The attack could not be excused as a police action since there had been fighting prior to the truce, and at the commence-ment of the truce, the villagers had offered to negotiate with the Jews, who had apparently failed to explore the offer. The Mediator, on September 9, informed the Provisional Government of Israel that the action at the three villages constituted a violation of both the spirit and letter of the truce terms, that the evacuated villagers should be per-mitted forthwith to return, and that the Provisional Government must do everything possible to re-habilitate them, including the restoration at its expense of all houses damaged or destroyed.

All in all, there had been some five hundred complaints and incidents reported to the Mediator during the first truce, as compared to some three hundred between July 15 and September 4, 1948. All but the seven incidents described above were of a less serious nature, and no special reports were submitted to the Security Council in connection with them.

Concerning the machinery of dealing with al-leged violations of the truce, the Mediator stated:

"All complaints are submitted to investigation by Observers in the field and, where necessary, by a special investigation team. In cases where they cannot be settled by Observers on the spot, they are referred, together with the Observer's report, to Haifa Headquarters for disposal. The less serious cases are referred to the Chief of Staff, and the more serious ones to the Central Truce Super-vision Board. Decisions by both the Chief of Staff and the Central Truce Supervision Board are transmitted to me for review and are then dispatched to the Govern-ments concerned. Major violations, if not immediately rectified by the parties, are reported to the Security Council."

The allocation of Observers was flexible. As of September 8,1948, the distribution and location of Observers were as follows:

Israel: Haifa, 76; Aqir, 2; Natanya, 4; Rama David, 4; Tel Aviv, 28; Tiberias, 13.

Jerusalem: 79.

Arab areas of Palestine: Hebron, 4; Gaza, 14; Nablus, 15; Ramallah, 7.

Egypt: Alexandria, 5; Cairo, 5; El Arish, 3; Port Said, 1.

Iraq: Baghdad, 3; Basra, 3.

Lebanon: Beirut, 17.

Syria: Damascus, 14.

Transjordan: Aqaba, 2; Amman, 16.

In both truces, the Mediator reported, the most sensitive spot was the City of Jerusalem, which, particularly during the second truce, was gripped by an atmosphere of tenseness, punctuated by many instances of sniping and other forms of dangerous, if limited, military action, chiefly by irregulars on both sides. The situation was somewhat eased through the creation of neutral zones, but the only real solution of the problem was, the Mediator re-ported, to be found in the eventual total demilitari-zation of the City, as yet unachieved.

(b) PERSONNEL OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION

The first truce was supervised by 93 military Observers, i.e., 31 each from Belgium, France and the United States, five Swedish officers, 51 United Nations guards and 70 additional men serving as auxiliary personnel.

Three hundred officers from Belgium, France and the United States came to Palestine and the surrounding countries as military Observers for the second truce 125 each from the United States and France, 50 from Belgium. In addition, there were ten Swedish officers, including Major-General Aage Lundstrom, Chief of the Mediator's Military Staff and his personal representative. During the middle of August, it became clear to the Mediator that his staff, although larger than during the first truce, was still too small and he therefore requested the services of an additional 300 enlisted men 50 from Belgium, and 125 each from France and the United States to act as Observers and to assist the officer Observers in their work. At the time the report was written (September 16), 84 United States enlisted men had arrived, and the Mediator had also secured four French and 78 United States enlisted men to serve the Observers as auxiliary technical personnel. The latter included air crew-men, clerks, communications and motor transport personnel and medical assistants.

Equipment needed by the Mediator's staff was made available by the United Nations, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In both truces, Haifa was chosen as headquarters of the observation organization, while the Medi-ator's headquarters as such remained throughout on the island of Rhodes.

(c) observer CASUALTIES

In his report to the General Assembly, the Mediator stated:

"I can speak only with praise of the loyalty of the Observer personnel to the cause of international peace, and of their courage and impartiality in the performance of their duty. They are unarmed and have no power to prevent truce violations or to enforce their rights or deci-sions. They are engaged in a difficult and hazardous task. It is with deep regret that I must record the following casualties among Observers... ."

Those killed were:

Commandant RENÉ DE LABARRIÈRE, of the French Army, killed while on duty near Afula on July 3, 1948.

OLE H. BAKKE, of Norway, a United Nations guard, killed while on duty at Jerusalem on July 13, 1948.

Lieutenant-Colonel JOSEPH QUERU, of the French Army, killed while on duty near Gaza on August 28, 1948.

Captain PIERRE JEANNEL, of the French Army, killed while on duty near Gaza on August 28, 1948.

The wounded men were:

Commandant DU MOUSTIER DE CANCHY, of the French Army, wounded while on duty near Afula on July 3, 1948.

Captain ROBERT DENS, of the Belgian Army, wounded while on duty near Gaza on July 3, 1948.

Private First-Class EDWARD BRODEUR, of the United States Marine Corps, wounded while on duty at Jeru-salem on July 3, 1948.

Captain PAUL J. J. LEYDER, of the Belgian Army, wounded while on duty at Latrun on August 1, 1948.

Captain MICHEL TAYMANS, of the Belgian Army, wounded while on duty at Jerusalem on August 13, 1948.

Captain HENRI TORS, of the French Army, wounded while on duty at Jerusalem on August 28, 1948.

ERIC GORMSEN, of the United States, a United Nations guard, wounded while on duty at Jerusalem on Sep-tember 8, 1948.

"All these men" the Mediator declared in his report "were casualties in the service of the inter-national community. I commend their gallantry and devotion to duty, and express my sincerest sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives."
(3) Assistance to Refugees

The Mediator estimated that some 360,000 Arabs and some 7,000 Jews became refugees as a result of hostilities in Palestine. The 7,000 Jews were women and children from Jerusalem and various Arab-occupied areas who sought refuge in Jewish -controlled territory. As for the Arabs, the Medi-ator's report provided these "confirmed estimates":

3,000 sought refuge in Iraq,
50,000 in Lebanon,
70,000 in Syria,
50,000 in Transjordan,
145,000 in various parts of Arab Palestine,
12,000 in Egypt.
_______
330,000


(The remainder were scattered along access roads or distributed in tiny isolated communities or hiding places over a wide area.)

Approximately 50,000 Arabs remained in Jew-ish-controlled territory.

By the middle of July 1948, the refugee prob-lem had become grave, and the Mediator considered that urgent measures had to be taken for humani-tarian reasons. An appeal for assistance to the Preparatory Commission for the International Refu-gee Organization, elicited the response that PC-IRO doubted the eligibility of the Arab refugees under the IRO's constitution, adding that even if these doubts should prove to be unfounded, "... prior claim on its [PC-IRO's] limited resources would still be had by a large number of persons [which] the Organization had not yet been able to assist, but which have long had urgent refugee status".

The Mediator, on July 21, 1948, requested the Secretary-General to dispatch to his headquarters on Rhodes a senior official from the United Na-tions' Department of Social Affairs for the purpose of surveying the grave refugee problem. The re-quest was met, and the basic emergency relief needs of the refugees were determined. Subsequently, the Mediator addressed appeals to 53 nations for voluntary contributions to assist these refugees and enlisted the services of such bodies as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Or-ganization, the United Nations International Chil-dren's Emergency Fund and the International Refugee Organization (in an advisory capacity). UNICEF agreed to provide up to $411,000 plus shipping costs to cover an initial two months' program. The Mediator had requested $796,000.

Further aid came from the International Red Cross and the World Council of Churches, as well as from many of the nations to which an appeal had been made.

In his report, the Mediator differentiated among three phases of the problem of assistance to refu-gees: immediate relief of basic needs, short-term planned program and a long-range program.

As regards a short-term program, this would consist of integrating into a single coordinated whole the aid and assistance which individual na-tions and organizations might be willing to furnish. Such an attempt was in progress at the time of the report. A senior member of the United Nations Secretariat was serving as the Mediator's Director of Disaster Relief, with headquarters in BeiruT, established with the assistance of the Government of Lebanon and the League of Arab States. Assist-ance in the work, the Mediator reported, "will be provided by a Chief Medical Officer (WHO); a Chief Supply Officer (IRO, with subsequent re-placement by UNICEF); and a Director of Field Operations (IRC); two Supervisory Field Medical Officers (IRC and UN); a Field Supervisory Sup-ply Officer will support the programme in the field and will be assisted by Liaison and Supply Officers established, besides Beirut, at Damascus, Amman, Ramallah, Tel Aviv or Haifa, Gaza and Jerusalem."

Concerning the long-range program, the report declared that "even if the refugees were able to return to their homes at once, it would nevertheless be necessary, owing to their present circumstances, to maintain them during the winter and until Au-gust/September 1949, when harvesting will have been completed. It is obvious that action must be taken to determine the necessary measures and to provide for their implementation. It is my hope that the General Assembly of the United Nations will assume this responsibility."

d. FLIGHT LOG OF THE MEDIATOR

Date Itinerary of Flight

May 27 .. Paris-Rome-Athens
" 28 .. Athens-Cairo
" 31 .. Cairo-Haifa

Jun 1 .. Haifa-Mafrak-Amman-Mafrak-Cairo
" 3 .. Cairo-Mafrak-Amman-Haifa
" 4 .. Haifa-Cairo
" 5 .. Cairo-Beirut
" 6 .. Beirut-Haifa-Mafrak-Amman-Mafrak-Haifa
" 7 .. Haifa-Cairo
" 12 .. Cairo-Jerusalem-Damascus
" 13 .. Damascus-Tel Aviv-Haifa-Rhodes
" 15 .. Rhodes-Cairo
" 17 .. Cairo-Tel Aviv
" 18 .. Tel Aviv-Haifa-Rhodes

Jul 1 .. Rhodes-Jerusalem
" 2 .. Jerusalem-Rhodes
" 3 .. Rhodes-Cairo
" 4 .. Cairo-Rhodes
" 5-6.. Rhodes-Tel Aviv-Cairo
" 7 .. Cairo-Tel Aviv-Haifa
" 8 .. Haifa-Rhodes
" 9 .. Rhodes-Amman-Haifa-Beirut-Rhodes
" 10 .. Rhodes-Rome-Geneva
" 11 .. Geneva-Amsterdam
" 11-12 . Amsterdam-Prestwick-Gander-New York
" 17 .. New York-Gander-Prestwick
" 18 .. Prestwick-Amsterdam
" 18 .. Amsterdam-Geneva-Rome
" 19 .. Rome-Rhodes
" 24 .. Rhodes-Beirut
" 25 .. Beirut-Haifa
" 26 .. Haifa-Tel Aviv-Rhodes

Aug 1 .. Rhodes-Amman
" 3 .. Amman-Jerusalem-Alexandria
" 5-6 Alexandria-Tel Aviv-Haifa-Rhodes
" 9 .. Rhodes-Haifa-Jerusalem
" 11 .. Jerusalem-Haifa-Rhodes
" 12 .. Rhodes-Rome-Geneva
" 13 .. Geneva-Stockholm

Sep 1 .. Stockholm-Copenhagen-Paris
" 2 .. Paris-Geneva-Rome
" 3 .. Rome-Rhodes
" 6 .. Rhodes-Alexandria
" 8 .. Alexandria-Mafrak-Amman-Mafrak-Haifa
" 9 .. Haifa-Tel Aviv-Rhodes

ANNEX I

DELEGATIONS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY285/

A. Second Regular Session of the General Assembly


AFGHANISTAN:

Representatives Abdul Hosayn Aziz
Abdul Hamid Aziz
Abdul Kayoum
Sultan Ahmed

ARGENTINA:

Representatives José Arce
Enrique V. Corominas
Brig.-General Franklin Lucero
Luis Arean
Rodolfo Muñoz
Alternates Coronel Eduardo Lonardi
Carlos Quiros
Guillermo Roque Spangenberg
José Moneta
Ruben Dussaut

AUSTRALIA:

Representatives Herbert V. Evatt
N. J. O. Makin
Lt.-Colonel W. R. Hodgson
A. S. Watt
J. D. L. Hood
Alternates W. D. Forsyth
C V. Kellway
J. E. Oldham
J. Plimsoll
A. H. Tange

BELGIUM:

Representatives Paul-Henri Spaak
Fernand van Langenhove
Herman Vos
Pierre de Smet
Pierre Ryckmans
Alternates R. Scheyven
Victor Larock
Georges Kaeckenbeeck
Fernand Dehousse
Joseph Nisot

BOLIVIA:

Representatives Adolfo Costa du Rels
Eduardo Anze Matienzo
Ernesto Sanjinés
Humberto Palza
Luis Romero Saenz
Alternate Antonio Mogro Moreno

BRAZIL:

Representatives Oswaldo Aranha BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.:
CANADA:

Representatives Louis S. St. Laurent
J. L. Ilsley
Norman P. Lambert
Walter A. Tucker
Joseph Bradette
Alternates L. B. Pearson
George F. Davidson
L. R. Beaudoin
Sidney D. Pierce
Escott Reid

CHILE:

Representatives José Maza
Humberto Alvarez Suarez
Manuel Trucco Gaete
Hernan Santa Cruz
Rodrigo Aburto Orostegui
Alternate Joaquin Larrain

CHINA:

Representatives Wang Shih-chieh
V. K. Wellington Koo
T. F. Tsiang

END NOTES


281/For the Mediator's appointment, see p. 281; for noti-fication of his death, see Security Council, p. 450.

282/See pp. 312-13.

283/Doc. S/863; see Security Council, p. 432.

284/See Security Council, pp. 429-41.

285/The Charter of the United Nations provides that no Member may have more than five representatives in the General Assembly. Replacements for those representa-tives who served only a short time account for the fact that in some instances more than five representatives for a Member State are listed.

*****



6. The Palestine Question

a. CONSIDERATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 29, 1947

The Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council, by letter dated December 2, 1947 (S/614), the text of the resolution (181(II)) concerning the "future government of Palestine" which was adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947.17/ In this resolution the General Assembly requested that:

"(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the [partition] plan for its implementation;

"(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

"(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution ..."

At the 222nd meeting on December 9, the Council took note of the letter of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly's resolution and decided to postpone discussion of the matter.

The President drew attention also to requests from Egypt (S/617) and Lebanon (S/618) to take part in the discussion of this question, and the Council agreed that these two countries should be admitted to the debate without prejudice to the participation of other interested parties.

At the 243rd meeting on February 10, 1948, the Council considered the first monthly report of the Palestine Commission (S/663). The President of the Council stated that this report was purely factual and for the information of the Council. However, the Commission was preparing a special report which would be available shortly and which would involve questionS requiring determination by the Council. He suggested that the Council at this stage only take note of the first monthly progress report and postpone consideration of it until the Council would also have the special report before it. No objection was raised to this procedure and it was so decided.

b. CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORTS OF THE PALESTINE COMMISSION;
RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF MARCH 5, 1948

At the 253rd meeting on February 24, when the Council began to discuss the first monthly progress report and the first special report of the Palestine Commission,18/ the Chairman of the Commission and the representatives of Egypt and Lebanon were invited to take part in the discussions. The Jewish Agency for Palestine was invited to have its representative sit during the deliberations for the purpose of supplying such information and rendering such assistance as the Council might require. At the suggestion of the President, it was agreed to grant the same privilege to the Arab Higher Committee if it so requested.

The Chairman of the Palestine Commission stated that the Commission, as an executive organ of the General Assembly, was bound to act strictly in conformity with the Assembly's resolution, and that any political guidance that might be needed by the Commission had to come from the Security Council.

In its special report, the Commission had selected the problem of security as the most important one to be solved in order to implement the partition plan. The Commission was of the opinion that in the circumstances prevailing in Palestine, and under the conditions likely to exist in the near future, the only way of implementing the plan of partition as envisaged by the General Assembly required the assistance of an effective non-Palestinian military force. An efficient pacification of the areas would be necessary in order to execute the numerous and intricate provisions of the plan. The Chairman of the Commission stressed that unless either a peaceful arrangement could be effected, or effective control could be imposed by sufficient outside forces, far-reaching consequences might arise from the situation which existed at the moment.

The representative of the United States said that it was of first importance that the precedent which would be established should be in full accord with the Charter. The Assembly's resolution of November 29 contained three requests directed to the Security Council. Request (a) he considered could clearly be fulfilled. Requests (b) and (c), however, raised the question of the Council's constitutional powers. If the Council found that there was a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression against Palestine from the outside, then it was required to make recommendations or to take measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter; and Member States were obliged to assist the Council. But the Charter did not empower the Council to enforce a political settlement whether it was in pursuance of a recommendation made by the General Assembly or of one made by the Council itself. Concerning the current situation in Palestine he stated that the Council did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that a threat to the peace existed within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter. The representative of the United States then proposed certain specific steps which the Council should take. At the 255th meeting on February 25, he submitted his proposals in the form of a draft resolution (S/685), as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having received the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its first monthly report, and its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine,

"Resolves:

"1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947;

"2. To establish a committee of the Security Council comprising the five permanent members of the Council whose functions will be:
"Appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

The representative of the United Kingdom said that the British withdrawal would be completed by August 1. While the United Kingdom would not oppose the Assembly's decision, it was not prepared to take part in enforcing a settlement which was not acceptable to both parties. The United Kingdom's repeated warnings about the necessity of providing means of implementation for the solution of the problem had been ignored by the Assembly, and British public opinion would not approve further involvement which required enforcement. The United Kingdom would abstain from voting on the question of enforcement.

At the 254th meeting on February 24, the representative of Syria said that the Council must carefully scrutinize the recommendations of the Assembly, which, after hurriedly adopting the partition plan under pressure, had endeavoured to shift the burden of implementation to the Council. He thought it regrettable that the Assembly had not considered the proposal to seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The Assembly, he emphasized, was not a world government empowered to create states and to violate the integrity of countries, to impose government regimes under specified constitutional forms, to dictate economic union between states or to detach territories and cities and put them under permanent Trusteeship. The partition plan, he considered, was not in conformity with international law or with the Charter and was, in any case, a mere recommendation to Members.

For its part, the Council, under the Charter, could only use force under Chapter VII to maintain international peace and security, and was not allowed to use force to maintain internal order in a country. No measures of enforcement could be taken against a state by the Council before it was seized of a formal accusation by a competent party.

The representative of Colombia submitted a draft resolution (S/684) which provided that, on the basis of the situation which had occurred subsequent to the General Assembly resolution, the Security Council should invite; in accordance with Article 106 of the Charter, the permanent members of the Council to consult with one another with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as might be necessary in order to deal with the situation arising from the implementation of the Assembly's resolution. Pending the outcome of such consultations, the Council should appoint a sub-committee composed of two permanent members and three non-permanent members of the Council to ascertain the possibility of an agreement between the parties concerned, and the feasibility of calling a special session of the General Assembly for reconsideration of the resolution of November 29. The Council should also request the Government of the United Kingdom to postpone the date fixed for the termination of the Mandate and the evacuation of its troops from Palestine.

At the 255th meeting on February 25, the representative of Egypt appealed to the Council to scrutinize the legal basis for the partition resolution and to consider whether this resolution served the interests of peace. Egypt considered that the Assembly was not competent to decree partition or to make a recommendation of that nature. He regretted that the Egyptian proposal to seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice had not been followed and that the legal issue had been evaded.

In not complying with the Assembly's recommendation, Egypt was exercising its privilege under the Charter. To persist in enforcing partition would be injurious to the United Nations, since there was ample evidence that such a course would result in greatly increased strife, and would lead to disaster. The Palestinian Arabs and the neighbouring Arab States would never accept the partition of Palestine. The arrival of the Commission would further inflame feelings, as would any attempt to send a non-Palestinian armed force into the country in order to enforce partition.

If the Security Council assisted in the implementation of the partition plan, as requested by the General Assembly, it would deal a fatal blow to world peace, the representative of Egypt concluded.

At a subsequent meeting, the 267th meeting of the Council on March 16, the representative of Lebanon expressed a similar point of view.

At the 258th meeting on February 27, the representative of the Jewish Agency said that the compromise resolution of the Assembly had entailed far-reaching sacrifices for the Jews. It had been accepted by them, nevertheless, because it satisfied their claim to statehood and a place among the family of nations. The Council was now faced with an open attempt by the Arabs to change by force the settlement decreed by the Assembly, while the Mandatory Power thwarted the plan by a policy of non-co-operation.

In trying to justify its present attitude, the United Kingdom had developed a policy of neutrality based on the spurious argument of equal guilt. But the Jews had acted solely in self-defence against Arab aggression. Although hampered by the administration, the Jews were hopeful of being able to defend the Jewish State. An international force was not essential, but it was important that the Jews be provided with arms. The Palestine Commission had therefore been asked to revise the indiscriminate arms embargoes in favour of those who were prepared to implement the partition plan, denying arms to those who opposed it. He stressed that the Jews regarded partition as the irreducible minimum which they could accept, and beyond which they could not go.

The representative of Belgium approved the United States proposal for the appointment of a committee of the permanent members. However, he could not approve those clauses providing for acceptance of the requests made in the Assembly's resolution, since such action should only be taken in the light of information to be submitted by the proposed committee. He submitted a revised text (S/688) as an amendment to the United States draft resolution. The Belgian text was identical with that of the United States draft resolution except for the deletion of paragraph 1 of the United States text and the addition of a clause to paragraph (c) to the effect that the Committee should report to the Security Council concerning the consultations envisaged in that paragraph together with any recommendations as to the action to be taken by the Council in the matter.

The representative of Colombia said that it was evident that the Security Council was not authorized to use force to partition Palestine. He asked that the Council should explore the possibility of obtaining an agreement between Arabs and Jews which would enable the Commission to discharge its functions without the use of armed force, even at the expense of some revision of the partition plan. If it was not possible for the Palestine Commission to carry out its task without delay, then the Assembly might have to provide for the administration of Palestine at the termination of the Mandate, or discuss other arrangements.

Turning to the Colombian draft (S/684), he explained that the consultation of the permanent members and the work of the proposed committee would proceed simultaneously. He hoped that the United Kingdom would be willing to revise its decision to leave Palestine on May 15; the Council should make a request to that effect. He was prepared to withdraw the Colombian draft resolution in favour of any proposals from the United States or the U.S.S.R., since these countries were mainly responsible for the partition plan.

The representative of Syria supported the Belgian amendment (S/688), since the Council should not decide its actions in advance. He thought that the United States proposal was intended to secure indirectly the implementation of partition.

He could not approve the United States proposal to establish a sub-committee of the permanent members, because the existence of a threat to international peace had to be determined by the Council as a whole. Likewise paragraph 2(c) was unacceptable,, since the Council could not impose a political settlement.

At the 260th meeting on March 2, 1948, the representative of the United States stated that he considered the acceptance of paragraph 1 of his draft resolution to be an act of support for the implementation of the partition plan, and therefore he could not accept the Belgian amendment, since the representative of Belgium opposed paragraph 1 because he did not believe that the Assembly's requests should be accepted until after the proposed Committee had made its report.

He considered that the three requests were subject to the implied reservation that the Council should not exceed its authority under the Charter, and while it was true that armed force could not be used to implement partition, the Council would at any rate be obliged to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter if a threat to international peace or a breach of the peace were found to exist.

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council should examine whether a threat to the peace existed. However, this was not a task only for the permanent members. The United Kingdom could not support the United States proposal to accept the requests of the Assembly, since it was opposed to participation in implementing a plan which involved coercion of one of the communities. It could not, therefore, be a member of the proposed committee, but would assist it with all the information at its disposal.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. agreed to the principle of consultation among the permanent members of the Council, but proposed that such consultation should be carried on directly and not within a committee since the latter course would only cause delay. The results of these consultations should be submitted to the Council within ten or fifteen days. It was useless for the committee to consult with the Palestine Commission and with the Arabs and Jews, since such consultations were being carried on by the Commission and the latter had already submitted a report. He had no objections to paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution.

At the 261st meeting on March 3, the representative of Canada supported the Belgian amendment to the United States resolution because he considered that acceptance of the Assembly's requests should be postponed until after the permanent members had had an opportunity to consult one another and the parties concerned, and until after the Council had been satisfied that this situation could not be resolved through conciliation.

The representative of Egypt welcomed the spirit of the Belgian amendment to the United States draft resolution, but suggested that the question of consultation with the Palestine Commission should also be omitted, since the Commission was intimately connected with the question of implementing the partition plan.

The President, speaking as the representative of China, supported the Belgian amendment. China was willing to participate in the proposed committee, although he would prefer a rather different composition. He believed that the distinction between the enforcement of partition and the maintenance of peace by force was, although legally important, rather unreal in the existing situation.

At the 262nd meeting on March 5, the representative of the Jewish Agency questioned the value of the proposal for new consultations with the interested parties concerning the implementation of partition. The Palestine problem had been under discussion for years, and to raise the prospect of new negotiations might endanger the very object of the Assembly's decision.

He strongly urged immediate acceptance of the Assembly's requests. The role of the Security Council was an integral part in the implementation of the partition plan and failure of the Security Council to co-operate would, by permitting Arab aggression to frustrate partition, create a dangerous precedent for the United Nations.

The representative of France supported the Belgian amendment because it stressed the necessity of making a further attempt at conciliation. However, if the amendment was not accepted, he would support the United States draft resolution.

The representative of Colombia proposed that the Council adjourn for a week with the understanding that in the meantime the permanent members should consult as to what action could be taken under Article 106 of the Charter and report to the Council.

The representative of the United States opposed the motion for adjournment and asked for a vote on his draft resolution (S/685) and the amendments thereto.

The Council rejected the Colombian motion for an adjournment by a vote of 5 to 2, with 4 abstentions.

To meet the point of view of the representative of the U.S.S.R., who objected to the establishment of a committee of the Security Council, but who had expressed his willingness to accept a resolution calling for direct consultations among the permanent members of the Council, the representative of the United States revised paragraph 2(a) of his draft resolution to read: "To invite the five permanent members of the Security Council to consult and ...", and made the requisite drafting changes in the other paragraphs of the resolution.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. said that he would not oppose the United States draft resolution thus revised, though he thought it unnecessary to call upon the permanent members to consult with the Arabs, the Jews and the Mandatory Power, since that was the function of the Palestine Commission. He therefore would prefer if paragraphs 2(b) and (c) of the United States resolution were deleted. He would, however, abstain from voting rather than vote against the paragraphs in question. He proposed an amendment to the United States draft resolution providing that the permanent members should report on the results of their consultations within ten or fifteen days.

The representative of the United States accepted that amendment, and accordingly added a clause to paragraph 2(a) of his resolution setting a ten day time limit.

The representative of Belgium agreed to remove from his amendment (S/688) the provision for a committee of the permanent members and to substitute a recommendation for direct consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council.

At the 263rd meeting on March 5, the representative of the United States reported on some further drafting changes he had introduced in paragraph 2 (a) of his resolution in consultation with the representative of the U.S.S.R.

The revised Belgian amendment was then voted on, paragraph by paragraph, and was rejected.

The revised United States draft resolution was also voted on paragraph by paragraph and paragraphs 1, 2(b) and 2(c) were rejected.

The resolution [42 (1948)] resulting from this vote was adopted by 8 votes in favour, with 3 abstentions (Argentina, Syria, United Kingdom), and reads as follows (S/691):

"The Security Council,

"Having received the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947 on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its first monthly report and its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine,
"Resolves to call on the permanent members of the Council to consult and to inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make, as a result of such consultations, recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view to implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days; and

"Appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

c. REPORT ON THE CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS

At the 270th meeting on March 19, the representative of the United States reported on the consultations which had taken place among the permanent members of the Council pursuant to the Council's resolution of March 5. The report he submitted had the agreement of three of the permanent members: China, France and the United States. The United Kingdom did not participate in the consultations, but attended two of the meetings in its official capacity of Administering Authority and furnished information. Following is the text (see S/P.V. 270 [ S/P.V.270 , S/PV.270 ]) of the report submitted by the representative of the United States:
"PART I.

"The consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and informal communications with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee, held since March 5, 1948, have developed the following facts regarding the situation with respect to Palestine:

"1. The Jewish Agency accepts the partition plan, considers it to be the irreducible minimum acceptable to the Jews, and insists upon the implementation of the plan without modification.

"2. The Arab Higher Committee rejects any solution based on partition in any form and considers that the only acceptable solution is the formation of one independent State for the whole of Palestine, whose constitution would be based on democratic principles and which would include adequate safeguards for minorities and the safety of the Holy Places.

"3. No modifications in the essentials of the partition plan are acceptable to the Jewish Agency, and no modifications would make the plan acceptable to the Arab Higher Committee.

"4. The Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee have indicated that the partition plan cannot be implemented by peaceful means under present conditions.

"5. The Mandatory Power has confirmed that a considerable number of incursions of illegal arms and armed elements into Palestine have occurred by land and sea.

"6. The gradual withdrawal of the military forces of the Mandatory Power will, in the absence of agreement, result in increasing violence and disorder in Palestine. Warfare of a guerrilla type grows more violent constantly.

"7. If the mandate is terminated prior to a peaceful solution of the problem, large-scale fighting between the two communities can be expected.
"PART II.

"1. As a result of the consultations of the permanent members regarding the situation with respect to Palestine, they find and report that a continuation of the infiltration into Palestine, by land and by sea, of groups and persons with the purpose of taking part in violence would aggravate still further the situation, and recommend:
The representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that the consultations between the permanent members of the Council had produced some positive results inasmuch as some basic principles had been laid down which must underlie a decision of the Security Council on this question. The U.S.S.R. delegation considered, however, that these consultations would have proved more fruitful if from the beginning those questions had been dealt with which really needed consideration. At the first meeting, however, the representative of the United States had suggested that the permanent members hold further negotiations with the Arabs, the Jews and the Mandatory Power, such negotiations to include the question as to whether the partition plan should be implemented or modified. The U.S.S.R. delegation had opposed such negotiations and had insisted that the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, must be implemented and that consultations among the permanent members should be directed to that end.

As to the report submitted by the representative of the United States, he was of the opinion that Part I merely noted the facts of the situation, which had been known already, and therefore was of no special interest. He questioned whether paragraph 4 of Part I really stated the position of the parties mentioned therein, particularly as regards the point of view of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

As regards Part II, he stated that sub-paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) had been agreed to by all the members participating in the consultations. Though they were too general and vague he considered that these two paragraphs covered important points. He objected to paragraph 1 of Part II because it spoke of "infiltration into Palestine by land and by sea". He considered it clear that the danger arose from infiltration by land and not by sea. Therefore to speak of infiltration by land and by sea, placing them on an equal footing, deprived that part of the text of all meaning.

In conclusion the representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that the recommendations of the permanent members contained only general principles, on the basis of which the Council must take more concrete decisions to implement the resolution of the General Assembly.

The representative of Syria, speaking on behalf of the Arab States, said that (1) the Arabs were prepared to do their utmost to see peace with justice established in Palestine; (2) they were convinced that the partition plan and attempts to implement it were the only cause of violence in that country; (3) the Jews were receiving 1,500 "legal" immigrants monthly in addition to large numbers of illegal immigrants, most of whom were militarily trained and equipped; (4) the Jews were receiving large amounts of war material from outside while the Arabs were deprived of military supplies.

He regretted that the permanent members in their report had not recognized that the three requests of the Assembly were designed to make the Council enforce partition. Since the Council did not have the power to do this, they would have been correct in asking for reference back to the Assembly.

The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that it was at his suggestion that the phrase "by land and by sea" had been introduced into paragraph 1 of Part II of the report. He believed that the introduction of arms and fighters into Palestine had to be stopped by both parties.

The representative of the Jewish Agency believed that paragraph 4 of Part I of the report was open to some misunderstanding, since the fact "that partition could not be implemented by peaceful means under present conditions" was due solely to the attempt of the Arab States to frustrate it by force, in contravention of their obligations under the Charter. Similarly, paragraph 5 of Part I was open to serious misunderstanding. While the Mandatory Power had reported on incursions of illegal arms and armed elements into Palestine by land it had not reported such incursions by sea. Consequently, paragraph l of Part II did not contain an accurate statement of fact. In this connection the representative of the Jewish Agency also expressed the view that armed bands entering Palestine for the sole purpose of trying to undo by violence a decision of the United Nations should not be placed on the same moral level and equated with unarmed men, women and children coming into Palestine to settle that country, as was their right under the Mandate.

At the 271st meeting on March 19, the representative of the United Kingdom stressed that his delegation had taken part in the consultations of the permanent members solely for the purpose of giving information, and was not a party to the report.

The representative of Egypt endorsed the remarks of the representative of Syria. He stated that he had no particular quarrel with the statement of the representative of the United States concerning the consultations between the permanent members of the Council, although he expressed regret that the report omitted to recognize that the Zionists were the aggressors. Criticizing the representative of the U.S.S.R. for insisting on the prompt implementation of the partition plan he urged that the Council should not carry out the Assembly's request without full debate.

The representative of the United States stated that in view of the fact that the Mandatory Power planned to give up its Mandate on May 15, there was an urgent need for clarification of United Nations responsibility towards Palestine. In the opinion of the United States delegation the United Nations did not automatically fall heir to the responsibilities either of the League of Nations or of the Mandatory Power in respect of the Palestine Mandate. No steps had been taken by the Mandatory Power to place Palestine under United Nations Trusteeship in accordance with Article 81 of the Charter. A unilateral decision by the United Kingdom to terminate the Palestine Mandate could not automatically commit the United Nations to the responsibility for governing that country, nor did the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 constitute an acceptance by the United Nations of governmental responsibility for Palestine. The limited functions which the General Assembly in this resolution offered to undertake were an integral part of the partition plan. If it proved impossible to give effect to that plan, the United Nations would have, on May 15, no administrative and governmental responsibilities for Palestine unless further action was taken by the General Assembly. Referring, inter alia, to the report on the consultations between the permanent members of the Council, he concluded that there seemed to be general agreement that the partition plan could not be implemented by peaceful means. In the light of evidence now available the termination of the Mandate on May 15 would result in chaos, fighting and much loss of life. The United Nations could not permit such a result. He therefore urged that the Security Council should take further action by all means available to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine. He then went on to explain that the United States Government believed that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of Palestine. To this end the Council should call for an immediate special session of the General Assembly to consider the establishment of a temporary Trusteeship which would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned and without prejudice to the character of the eventual political settlement.

Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the Assembly, the Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement partition.

The representative of the Jewish Agency said that the United States proposal to suspend efforts to implement partition and to establish a temporary Trusteeship for Palestine represented a shocking reversal of the United States position which would incalculably hurt the prestige of the United Nations. It was clear that the proposal was a capitulation before a threat of violence on the part of some Members; but it should also be clear that the establishment of a Trusteeship would not ensure peace and would have to be maintained by force.

The President, speaking as the representative of China, supported the United States proposals as an attempt to seek a peaceful solution. The Palestine Commission had stated that the partition plan could not be implemented without force, and he was convinced that the Security Council should not furnish force for this purpose.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. did not agree that there was general agreement that partition could not be implemented by peaceful means. Moreover, he stated, the United States representative had referred to the report on the consultations of the permanent members of the Council, as though it confirmed and corroborated the proposals just submitted by the representative of the United States. The U.S.S.R. representative considered, however, that the United States proposals had nothing in common with those portions of the report which were agreed to by all four of the permanent members which took part in the consultations namely sub-paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of Part II of the Report. These paragraphs on the contrary, he stated, provided a basis upon which the Council should proceed to take more concrete decisions to implement the partition plan.

At the 274th meeting on March 24, the representative of Canada stated that although the United States proposal for establishing a temporary Trusteeship in Palestine presented certain difficulties, the proposed cooling-off period would provide an opportunity to work out a settlement in a less unfavourable atmosphere. This period could be of short duration. The Canadian delegation was not prepared, however, to declare itself in favour of any course of action until there was some evidence that there was a meeting of minds on the part of the countries most directly concerned.

The representative of France favoured the United States proposal to the extent that it contained the possibility of providing time in which agreement could be reached between the parties, and because it constituted an effort to set up a regime which could take the place of the Mandatory Power. The French delegation, however, was not then able to pronounce itself either for or against the United States proposal, which needed to be more precisely formulated and elaborated.

The representative of Lebanon felt that a detailed study of the plan submitted by the United States delegation was premature. The General Assembly, when called into special session, would have to make its own examination of the question.

The representative of Colombia thought it would be best to adjourn, with the understanding that the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council would go on with their conversations until they were ready to report to the Security Council.

The President thought that nothing could be gained by a renewal of the consultations.

The representative of Egypt reiterated Arab opposition to partition. With regard to the United States suggestion, he stated that any decision which meant suspending the implementation of a resolution which had brought only trouble would be a decision in the proper direction.

d. DISCUSSION OF THE UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

At the 275th meeting of the Council on March 30, the representative of the United States submitted the following draft resolutions (S/704 and S/705):
I

"The Security Council,

In the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Notes with grave concern the increasing violence and disorder in Palestine and believes that it is of the utmost urgency that an immediate truce be effected in Palestine;

"Calls upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee to make representatives available to the Security Council for the purpose of arranging a truce between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine; and emphasizes the heavy responsibility which would fall upon any party failing to observe such a truce;

"Calls upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence immediately."
II

"The Security Council,

"Having, on 9 December 1947, received the resolution of the General Assembly concerning Palestine dated 29 November 1947 and

"Having taken note of the United Nations Palestine Commission's First and Second Monthly Progress Reports and First Special Report on the problem of security, and

"Having, on 5 March 1948, called on the permanent members of the Council to consult, and

"Having taken note of the reports made concerning these consultations,

"Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 20 of the United Nations Charter, to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine."

Concerning the first resolution (S/704) the representative of the United States explained that it was his Government's view that the immediate cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a truce in Palestine were the most urgent objectives. Both the Arabs and the Jews must be prepared, he stated, to accept truce arrangements which would not prejudice the claims of either group. The truce should include suspension of political as well as military activity.

Concerning the second resolution (S/705) he stated that although the Government of the United States believed that a Trusteeship was essential to establish order, it felt that there should be no delay by debate over details of the temporary Trusteeship. To this end, the draft resolution omitted any mention of Trusteeship.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that his Government still considered that the General Assembly's decision in favour of the partition of Palestine into two independent states Jewish and Arab was an equitable one. In the General Assembly, the United States delegation had actively supported the proposal for partition and had secured its acceptance by the necessary majority of states. But now the United States had not only refused to support that decision, but had raised the question of rescinding it, and for that purpose had submitted entirely new proposals.

Full responsibility for wrecking the decision on the partition of Palestine therefore lay with the United States, which in the opinion of most people was not so much interested in a just settlement of the question of the future of Palestine and the relations between Arabs and Jews as in its own oil interests and strategic position in the Near East.

The adoption of the proposal for Trusteeship would leave both the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine without a state of their own and would serve only the interests of the influential circles of some of the Great Powers, who placed their own economic and strategic interests above the common interests of the United Nations.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. opposed the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to review the decision previously adopted, and also considered that it would be wrong for the Security Council to instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its work, which was directed towards implementing the decision on partition. The Commission had no right to stop working as long as the decision taken by the General Assembly remained in force.

At the 277th meeting on April 1, 1948, the representative of Argentina stated that he supported the United States proposals and appealed to the Arabs and Jews to reach an agreement.

The representative of Belgium considered that the Council had rejected the Assembly's requests and therefore had a duty to call a special session of the Assembly to cope with the situation.

The representative of the Jewish Agency urged that the first United States draft resolution (S/704) be amended to conform with the reality of the situation namely, Arab aggression. The Jews were anxious to terminate hostilities, but insisted that the truce had to be accompanied by the evacuation of foreign forces from Palestine and the cessation of preparations for future aggressions. The truce had also to be carried out within the framework of the partition plan and in conformity with its time-table.

The second United States draft resolution (S/705), he stated, proposed an unwarranted reversal of the Assembly's decision. The United States had given no assurance as to how Trusteeship was to be established and enforced. The Jews, for their part, would not accept any postponement of independence. He also drew attention to the situation in Jerusalem, which threatened to develop into a battle on the termination of the Mandate.

The representative of Egypt denied that the Arab States were interfering in the Palestine strife. He was prepared to support the United States proposal (S/704) for a truce.

The representative of the United Kingdom supported the United States proposal for a truce (S/704) and stated that he would vote in favour of the second draft resolution (S/705), if only to give the Assembly an opportunity to review its decision in the light of events.

The representative of Syria supported the second proposal (S/705). He reserved his attitude on the proposal for a truce (S/704) until the attitudes of both parties concerned had been ascertained.
The representative of the United States agreed to a proposal of the Ukrainian S.S.R. to the effect that the words "with grave concern" be deleted from the second paragraph of the truce resolution (S/704).

Subject to this amendment, the resolution (S/704) was then adopted unanimously.

The second draft resolution (S/705), requesting the Secretary-General to convoke a special session of the General Assembly, was adopted by 9 votes, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

The Council then agreed that the President should discuss the possible terms of the truce in Palestine with the accredited representatives of the two parties. It was also agreed to hold informal meetings to discuss the proposals the United States delegation had in mind for Trusteeship in Palestine, with a view to enabling the Security Council to make recommendations to the special session of the General Assembly.

e. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TRUCE AND
CONSIDERATION OF THE COLOMBIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION

At the 282nd meeting on April 15, the President reported that he had met twice with representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee to discuss the possible terms of a truce. The second meeting, he stated, led him to believe that it was fruitless to continue further conversations. He had therefore decided to consult informally with the other members of the Security Council with a view to formulating recommendations which the Council should direct to the parties. As a result of the informal consultations he submitted the following draft resolution (S/722) on behalf of the Colombian delegation:

"Considering the Council's resolution of 1 April 1948 and the conversations held by its President with the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee with a view to arranging a truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine;

"Considering that, as stated in that resolution, it is of the utmost urgency to bring about the immediate cessation of acts of violence in Palestine, and to establish conditions of peace and order in that country;

"Considering that the United Kingdom Government, so long as it remains the Mandatory Power, is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and should continue to take all steps necessary to that end; and that in so doing it should receive the co-operation and support of the Security Council in particular, as well as of all the Members of the United Nations;

"The Security Council

"1. Calls upon all persons and organizations in Palestine, and especially upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, to take immediately, without prejudice to their rights, claims, or positions, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interests of Palestine, the following measures:
"2. Requests the United Kingdom Government for so long as it remains the Mandatory Power to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth under paragraph 1 above and subject to retaining the freedom of action of its own forces to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned and to keep the Security Council and the General Assembly currently informed on the situation in Palestine.

"3. Calls upon all Governments, and particularly those of the countries neighbouring Palestine, to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above, and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands, individuals armed or capable of bearing arms and weapons and war materials.

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint three members of the Secretariat who will proceed to Palestine and who will act in co-operation with the Mandatory Power as observers in the execution of the truce and report to him thereon."

The representatives of the United States and Canada supported the Colombian draft resolution.

The representative of the Jewish Agency stated that in the course of the consultations with the President of the Council the Agency had put forward as one of the essential conditions of the truce that the armed units which had been brought into Palestine from outside should be withdrawn and that no further incursions should be tolerated. The Jewish Agency still adhered to that position. He then suggested the following modifications in the Colombian draft resolution.

He proposed the deletion in the third paragraph of the preamble of all except the first phrase to the effect that the Mandatory Power was responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine, on the ground that the word "continue" in the following phrase implied that the Mandatory Power had hitherto discharged its responsibilities in maintaining peace and order, which was not the case. Moreover, in view of its recent record the Mandatory Power should not be formally assured of full international support for whatever it might do or leave undone in the future.

In paragraph 1 (a) the representative of the Jewish Agency proposed the deletion of the requirement that "all activities of a military or paramilitary nature" should cease as being far too wide to be practicable, since such a requirement might be interpreted as applying to all normal defence arrangements.

In paragraph 1 (b) the representative of the Jewish Agency objected to the provision against the introduction into Palestine of "individuals ... capable of bearing arms", as this would affect Jewish immigration.

As regards paragraph 1 (c) he stated that it might be interpreted as imposing, during the truce period, a world embargo on the acquisition of arms for future defence, while leaving the Arab States free to accumulate arms for future fighting in Palestine. He therefore suggested that paragraph 1(c) should read: "... refrain from importing weapons and war materials" and that all reference to acquisition should be deleted.

Concerning sub-paragraph 1(d) the representative of the Jewish Agency stated that the introduction of a political subject into the question of a military truce was liable to vitiate the issue and he therefore proposed deletion of this paragraph.

In connection with paragraph 1 (f) he suggested that not only the safety of the Holy Places but free access to them should be ensured.

Turning to paragraph 2 of the resolution, the representative of the Jewish Agency stated that the Agency could not possibly agree that the Mandatory administration was impartial and could properly be entrusted with the task of supervising the execution of the truce provisions. If no authoritative United Nations organ was set up to supervise and ensure the observance of the truce, the Jewish Agency would consider that no adequate provision at all had been made in this regard.

As regards paragraph 3 the representative of the Jewish Agency urged that the governments of states neighbouring on Palestine should be called upon to prohibit in their territories the recruitment and preparation of forces for eventual incursions into Palestine. Also, provision should be made to evacuate or at least to immobilize the foreign armed units already in Palestine.

The representative of Syria stated that paragraphs 1(b), (c) and (d) contained the points which were essential, and if these were not accepted by the Jewish Agency, all discussion would be futile. He interpreted these paragraphs to mean that any implementation of the partition plan should definitely be stopped and that there would be no Jewish immigration into Palestine at all during the truce period. He was prepared to support the draft resolution without modifications subject to the above interpretation.

The representative of Egypt had certain objections to the draft resolution, but felt that it was well intended and conceived for the re-establishment of peace. If the resolution were to mean real peace, and not a camouflage for something else, then his delegation was for it.

At the 283rd meeting on April 16, the representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that paragraph 1(a) of the Colombian draft resolution was open to different interpretations and would not provide the necessary conditions for the practical establishment of a truce. Paragraph 1(b), as well as paragraph 3, did not take account of the lawful rights of the Jews, in particular in connection with the question of immigration. Paragraph 1(c) was unacceptable to the U.S.S.R. delegation unless the Council adopted an additional provision calling for the immediate withdrawal of all armed bands which had invaded Palestine and for the prevention in the future of the invasion of Palestine by such groups. He submitted an amendment which provided for the insertion after paragraph 1 (c) of a paragraph along the lines indicated. Paragraph 2 also was not clear, particularly as regards the "freedom of action" which was to be left to the United Kingdom Government. The representative of the U.S.S.R. concluded that the resolution as a whole was unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it placed the military aspect of the truce in the background and introduced political considerations which would complicate the task of bringing about a truce in the true sense, i.e., stopping the bloodshed.

The representative of France explained that paragraph 1(a) did not mean that armed organizations would be dissolved, and that paragraph 1(d) would not put a stop to all political meetings. Paragraph 1(b) should be accepted, since the restriction on immigration would be limited in time and would be compensated for by the cessation of armed Arab infiltration. Paragraph 1 (c) might be more acceptable if the phrase referring to the acquisition of war materials was deleted.

The representative of the United States stressed that the truce was only a temporary measure. He believed that its terms were fair and reasonable. In the light of the comments of the representative of the Jewish Agency he proposed the following amendments:

1. To replace paragraph l(b) by the following:
2. To add to paragraph 1 (f) the following:
3. Paragraph 3 to be amended to correspond to the revised wording of paragraph l(b) as regards "armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals".

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee insisted that any truce must be such as would lead to an assured and lasting settlement.

The required settlement, he insisted, must be based on a strict implementation of the principles of democracy and the right of self-determination. There could be no truce on the basis of the partition scheme and the Arabs could not agree to cease fighting unless they were assured that the truce and the ensuing discussions were not a preliminary to the partition scheme. He also insisted that, as a prerequisite for a truce, all Jewish immigration must stop. It would be impossible for the Arabs to stop their people from attacking newcomers. Asserting that the disorders in Palestine were due to the activities of Jewish terrorist gangs, he further demanded that these gangs should be arrested and expelled from Palestine. Finally, he declared that the recent establishment of a Jewish Administration in the Jewish area under the partition scheme had undermined paragraph l(d) of the Council's truce proposals. This step, he stated, obviously precluded the realization of a truce under any conditions.

The Colombian draft resolution was then voted paragraph by paragraph. The preamble, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 1 (a) and the United States amendment to sub-paragraph 1(b) were adopted unanimously. The Council next voted on the U.S.S.R. amendment submitted in connection with paragraph l(c), which was rejected by a vote of 6 to 2 (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), with 3 abstentions (Argentina, China, Colombia). Paragraph 1(c) and also paragraph 1(d) were then adopted by 9 votes in favour, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), and paragraph 1 (f), as amended by the representative of the United States, was adopted unanimously. The vote on paragraph 2 and paragraph 3, amended by the representative of the United States, was again 9 in favour, with 2 abstentions. The Council failed however, to adopt paragraph 4 of the resolution, which requested the Secretary-General to appoint three members of the Secretariat to act in co-operation with the Mandatory Power as observers in the execution of the truce. The vote was in favour, with 5 abstentions (Argentina, Belgium, Syria, United Kingdom, United States). In this connection the representatives of Argentina and of Belgium had expressed the view that the Mandatory Power alone should be responsible for the supervision of the truce until the termination of the Mandate. The representative of Syria had suggested that a truce commission composed of the career consular officials of those members of the Security Council who had representatives in Jerusalem would be preferable to the appointment of observers by the Secretary-General, as the consular officers were already on the spot and knew the country. However, he did not submit a formal amendment to this effect. The representative of the Jewish Agency reiterated his view that if the supervision of the truce were to be left entirely co the Mandatory Power, the Jewish Agency would consider that no arrangement for supervision had been made at all.

The amended Colombian resolution (S/723) as a whole was adopted by a vote of 9 in favour, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.). Its operative part reads as follows:19/

"The Security Council

"1. Calls upon all persons and organizations in Palestine, and especially upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, to take immediately, without prejudice to their rights, claims, or positions, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interests of Palestine, the following measures:
"2. Requests the United Kingdom Government, for so long as it remains the Mandatory Power, to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth under paragraph 1 above and, subject to retaining the freedom of action of its own forces, to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned, and to keep the Security Council and the General Assembly currently informed on the situation in Palestine.

"3. Calls upon all Governments, and particularly those of the countries neighbouring Palestine, to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above, and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals and weapons and war materials."

f. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRUCE COMMISSION

At the 287th meeting on April 23, the representative of the United States asked the representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee and the Mandatory Power what steps had been taken to implement the truce resolution of April 17, 1948 (S/723).20/

The representative of the United Kingdom reported that the Palestine High Commissioner had publicized the Council's resolution. His attempts at bringing about negotiations between Arab and Jewish authorities in Palestine, however, had not met with success because of difficulties of communications, particularly as regards the establishment of contact with responsible Arab leaders.

The representative of the Jewish Agency stated that the Agency had informed the High Commissioner that the Jews would cease firing as soon as the Arabs did the same.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee said that if the Jews observed the terms of the truce and the situation was frozen both politically and militarily, then the Arabs would cease-fire. The Jews, however, he maintained, had shown no inclination to cease fighting and were proceeding with the establishment of an independent Jewish administration in Palestine. In these circumstances the Arabs could not in justice be asked to cease-fire.

The representative of the United States then proposed a draft resolution which provided for the establishment of a truce commission for Palestine composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council, except Syria, which had career consular officers in Jerusalem, whose function would be to assist the Security Council in bringing about the implementation of the Council's resolution of April 17, 1948.

The Commission was to report to the President of the Security Council within 48 hours regarding its activities and the development of the situation, and subsequently to keep the Council informed with respect thereto.

The representative of France, supported by the representative of Syria, proposed that the resolution be amended so as to specify the members of the truce commission. He also considered that the time limit of 48 hours should be extended.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. said that the terms of the truce resolution had made its implementation impossible and that the present United States proposal was not conducive to achieving a truce.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. said that the resolution of April 17 was not realistic, since it did not include the minimum requirements of a truce namely, the withdrawal of armed groups which had entered Palestine in order to oppose partition and the prevention of further entries. He regarded the new United States proposal as part of a policy designed to force the United Nations to adopt Trusteeship.

The representatives of Canada and Syria both supported the draft resolution.

Certain drafting changes proposed by the representatives of Belgium, Lebanon, Syria, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee were acceptable to the representative of the United States, who submitted a draft resolution revised accordingly. In response to the suggestion of the representatives of France and Syria, the time limit was extended from 48 hours to four days.

The amended text of the United States draft resolution (S/727) was adopted by the Council by 8 votes, with 3 abstentions (Colombia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), as follows:

"Referring to its resolution of 17 April 1948, calling upon all parties concerned to comply with specific terms for a truce in Palestine,

"The Security Council

"Establishes a truce commission for Palestine composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council which have career consular officers in Jerusalem, noting, however, that the representative of Syria has indicated that his Government is not prepared to serve on the Commission. The function of the Commission shall be to assist the Security Council in supervising the implementation by the parties of the resolution of the Security Council of 17 April 1948;

"Requests the Commission to report to the President of the Security Council within four days regarding its activities and the development of the situation, and subsequently to keep the Security Council currently informed with respect thereto.

"The Commission, its members, their assistants and its personnel shall be entitled to travel, separately or together, wherever the Commission deems necessary to carry out its tasks.

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall furnish the Commission with such personnel and assistance as it may require, taking into account the special urgency of the situation with respect to Palestine."

After discussion, at the 291st meeting on May 12, of two messages from the Truce Commission (S/741, S/742), dated May 9 and 10 respectively, asking whether it would be possible for the United Nations to send the officers necessary to effect the control of a truce for Jerusalem, or whether the latter should be ensured by the representative of the International Red Cross, it was decided that the President should draft a reply on the basis of the fact that the Truce Commission would be given broad discretionary powers to determine the various means of assistance it might require according to the degree of usefulness of these means of assistance.21/

g. INTERVENTION OF THE ARAB STATES IN PALESTINE

On April 30 the Palestine Truce Commission informed the Security Council by cablegram (S/732) that the situation in Palestine was deteriorating rapidly, that government departments were closing daily and normal activities coming to a standstill and that the intensity of fighting was increasing steadily.

By a telegram addressed to the President of the Security Council dated May 1, 1948 (S/730), the Jewish Agency for Palestine drew the attention of the Security Council to reports of the invasion of Palestine by regular forces of Syria and Lebanon in the north and by Egyptian forces in the south. It was also reliably informed, the Agency stated, that a strong column of Iraqi troops was en route towards Palestine.

By a telegram of May 15 (S/743) the Government of Egypt informed the Security Council that Egyptian armed forces had started to enter Palestine "to establish security and order in place of chaos and disorder which prevailed and which rendered the country at the mercy of the Zionist terrorist gangs who persisted in attacking peaceful Arab inhabitants".

By a telegram dated May 16 (S/748) the King of Transjordan likewise informed the United Nations that Transjordanian forces had been "compelled to enter Palestine to protect unarmed Arabs against massacres".

The Secretary-General of the Arab League, in a cablegram dated May 15 (S/745), set forth at length the reasons which had prompted the Arab States to intervene in Palestine and expressed confidence that their action would receive the support of the United Nations.

At the 292nd meeting of the Security Council on May 15, the representative of the Jewish Agency drew the Council's attention to the Agency's telegram of May 1 (S/730), cited above, and to other warnings of Arab preparations for aggression presented to the Council (S/736, S/738).

As to the Egyptian telegram of May 15 (S/743), he stated that the very idea that the armed intervention of Egyptian forces in Palestine would lead to restoration of order was grotesque. The State of Israel, which had now been established within Palestine,22/ would defend itself against this wanton and unprovoked aggression but at the same time it had a right to expect immediate action by the organs of the United Nations. He urged that the Council determine the situation in Palestine to be a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace and an act of aggression and call upon the Arab States to refrain from aggression on penalty of action under Chapter VII.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee questioned the right of the Jewish Agency to term as aggression the entry of Arab forces which had been invited by the Arab Higher Committee to maintain law and order. With the termination of the Mandate, he asserted, Palestine had become an independent nation and the Jews constituted a rebellious minority.

The representative of Syria asked that the Council examine the international status of Palestine. He considered that in the absence of a Trusteeship Agreement, Palestine had achieved its independence upon the termination of the Mandate.

The representative of Egypt reiterated that his country was intervening in Palestine solely to preserve law and order. With the termination of the Mandate, Palestine had regained complete independence and sovereignty.

h. UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION AND QUESTIONNAIRE

At the 293rd meeting on May 17, the representative of the United States said that the actual information on hand about the situation in Palestine indicated to the United States Government that there was a threat to, and a breach of, the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. Accordingly, he submitted the following draft resolution (S/749):

"The Security Council,

"Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine,

"Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

"Orders all Governments and authorities to cease and desist from any hostile military action and to that end issue a cease-fire and stand-fast order to their military and para-military forces, to become effective within thirty-six hours after the adoption of this resolution;

"Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with these orders."

At the same time the United States delegation, considering that additional information on Palestine was desirable, submitted a list of questions to be put to the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, a second list of questions to be put to the Arab Higher Committee and a third list of questions to be put to the Provisional Government of Israel.

At the 294th and 295th meetings, on May 18, the Council examined the questionnaire submitted by the United States delegation, and a number of amendments were adopted as a result of the discussion.

It was agreed that the replies to the questions should be received within a time-limit of 48 hours, counting from noon, May 19, New York standard time. Following is the text of the amended questionnaire (S/753) adopted by the Council:

"I. Questions to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon:

"(a) Are armed elements of your armed forces or irregular forces sponsored by your Government now operating (1) in Palestine; (2) in areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where the Jews are in the majority ?

"(b) If so, where are such forces now located and under what command are they operating, and what are their military objectives?

"(c) On what basis is it claimed that such forces are enticed to enter (1) Palestine; (2) areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where the Jews are in the majority, and conduct operations there?

"(d) Who is now responsible for the exercise of political functions in the areas of Palestine where the Arabs are in the majority?

"(e) Is such authority now negotiating with Jewish authorities on a political settlement in Palestine?

"(f) Have the Jewish forces violated your frontiers and penetrated your territory?

"II. Questions to the Arab Higher Committee:

"(a) Is the Arab Higher Committee exercising political authority in Palestine?

"(b) What governmental arrangements have been made to maintain public order and to carry on public services in sections of Palestine where Arabs are in the majority?

"(c) Have the Arabs of Palestine requested assistance from governments outside of Palestine?

"(d) If so, what governments, and for what purpose?

"(e) Have you named representatives to deal with the Security Council Truce Commission for the purpose of effecting the truce called for by the Security Council?

"(f) Have Jewish forces penetrated into the territory over which you claim to have authority?

"III. Questions to the Jewish Authorities in Palestine:

"(a) Over which areas of Palestine do you actually exercise control at the present time?

"(b) Do you have armed forces operating in areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where the Arabs are in the majority, or outside Palestine?

"(c) If so, on what basis do you attempt to justify such operations?

"(d) Have you arranged for the entry into Palestine in the near future of men of military age from outside Palestine? If so, what are the numbers and where are they coming from?

"(e) Are you negotiating with Arab authorities regarding either the truce or a political settlement in Palestine?

"(f) Have you named representatives to deal with the Security Council Truce Commission for the purpose of effecting the truce called for by the Security Council?

"(g) Will you agree to an immediate and unconditional truce for the City of Jerusalem and the Holy Places?

"(h) Have Arab forces penetrated into the territory over which you claim to have authority?"

The representative of the U.S.S.R. expressed regret that a great deal of time had been spent in discussing the questionnaire when it was clear that the Council had sufficient information to determine the existence of a breach of the peace.

Of the Arab States, Transjordan stated in its reply (S/760) that the United States, the author of the proposition of addressing questions to the Arab States, had not yet recognized the Government of Transjordan, although Transjordan for the past two years had met all the required conditions for such recognition. At the same time, the United States had recognized the so-called Jewish State within a few hours of its proclamation, although the factors for this recognition were lacking. The reply from the Government of Transjordan also pointed out that the Security Council had failed on several occasions to recommend Transjordan for membership in the United Nations. For these reasons the Government of Transjordan did not feel that there was room for a reply to the Council's questionnaire.

The replies of the other Arab States, i.e., Egypt (S/767), Saudi Arabia (S/772), Iraq (S/769), Yemen (S/774, Add.1), Syria (S/768) and Lebanon (S/770), indicated that armed forces of each of them, with the exception of Yemen were operating inside Palestine; and Yemen replied that it likewise had decided to dispatch a detachment of its regular forces to Palestine. While Lebanon and Saudi Arabia merely indicated that at present their forces were not operating in areas where the Jews were in the majority, Syria, Iraq and Egypt expressed the view that Palestine must be considered as a unit and that any distinction as between different areas, towns or districts was not valid (see question (a)).

The replies to questions (b) and (c) generally agreed in stating that the armed forces of the Arab States had entered Palestine to prevent the annihilation of the Arab majority of Palestine by Zionist terrorists and to restore peace and order. The neighbouring Arab Governments who were members of the Arab League, it was stated further, considered themselves responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their area as a regional organization in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. The Arab armies, moreover, had entered Palestine in response to a request for assistance from the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine. It was their aim to assist that majority in the establishment of a united democratic state in Palestine.

The replies to question (d) indicated that the Arab armies were exercising political authority in the areas under their control.

As regards question (e) the replies were unanimous that the activities of the Zionists and the proclamation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine precluded any understanding between Arabs and Jews.

In answer to the last question, (f), the Governments of Syria and Lebanon reported some incursions into their territories by Jewish forces. The governments of the other states concerned, although stating that their respective territories had not been violated by Jewish forces, expressed the view that the activities of the Zionists and the proclamation of a Jewish State in Palestine nevertheless constituted a threat to the whole region. They also emphasized that in view of the historic, cultural and religious ties between the Palestinian Arabs and those of the neighbouring countries the latter could not remain indifferent to the course of events in Palestine.

In its reply dated May 24 (S/775) the Arab Higher Committee stated in answer to question (a) that it exercised political authority over the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Palestine. Being composed of representatives of the different Arab political parties, it formed a coalition which expressed Arab public opinion in Palestine. The Arab Higher Committee concluded further that it therefore spoke in the name of the majority of all of Palestine, inasmuch as the Arabs were in the majority in all districts and sub-districts except that of Jaffa, in which Tel Aviv is located.

In answer to question (b) the Arab Higher Committee stated that at its request all Arab Government officials had continued to carry out their duties after the withdrawal of the Mandatory. When the regular Arab armies entered Palestine, however, they assumed responsibility for public security and related governmental responsibilities in the areas under their control.

Replying to questions (c) and (d) the Arab Higher Committee indicated that it had asked for assistance from the states members of the Arab League, i.e., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, in order to resist the "Jewish aggressive invasion" of Palestine. Contact with the Security Council Truce Commission, the answer to question (e) indicated further, was maintained by the Arab Higher Committee through the Arab League.

Finally, in answer to the last question, (f) the Arab Higher Committee stated that the Arabs claimed authority over all of Palestine. All forces opposing the Arab majority, therefore, should be regarded as unlawful.

The reply of the Provisional Government of Israel (S/766) to the questions addressed to the "Jewish authorities in Palestine" was transmitted by the acting representative of Israel at the United Nations on May 22.

In reply to questions (a) and (b) it was stated that the Provisional Government of Israel was actually exercising control of the entire area of the Jewish State as defined in the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947. In addition, the Provisional Government of Israel was exercising control over certain parts of Palestine outside the territory of the State of Israel, parts which, with the notable exception of Jerusalem, formerly, for the most part, contained Arab majorities, but which had been mostly abandoned by their Arab population. No area outside of Palestine, the reply from the Provisional Government of Israel stated further, was under Jewish occupation, but sallies beyond the frontiers of the State had occasionally been carried out by Jewish forces for imperative military reasons.

In answer to question (c) the Provisional Government of Israel stated that its operations in areas outside the State of Israel were justified on the following grounds: (1) to repel aggression and to prevent these areas from being used as bases for attacks against the State of Israel; (2) to protect Jewish population, traffic and economic life, including Jewish settlements outside the area of the State where, owing to the absence of any duly constituted authority, life and property were in imminent danger.

In answer to question (d) the Provisional Government of Israel stated that it had made arrangements for the entry of immigrants of all ages and both sexes in accordance with its avowed policy of large-scale immigration, which policy, the Provisional Government of Israel considered, was a matter within its domestic jurisdiction.

The answer to question (e) indicated that no negotiations between Arabs and Jews were taking place, past Jewish offers to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, having been rejected by the Arab League and by King Abdullah of Transjordan.

The Provisional Government of Israel was continuing to maintain the liaison with the Security Council's Truce Commission formerly maintained by the Jewish Agency, and would be willing to agree to an immediate and unconditional truce for the City of Jerusalem, the answers to questions (f) and (g) stated.

In answer to the last question the Provisional Government of Israel stated that Arab forces had penetrated into certain parts of the Negeb and that in addition Arab planes and Arab artillery had repeatedly attacked Jewish settlements.

At the 296th meeting on May 19, the Council began its consideration of the draft resolution presented by the United States delegation (S/749).

The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government supported the objectives of the United States draft resolution, though not its form. He had grave doubts about the wisdom and expediency of invoking Article 39, which was applicable solely with regard to international peace. Other difficulties connected with the present case concerned the actual judicial status of Palestine, the degree of binding force of the Assembly's recommendations and the definition of an act of aggression and of the aggressor. For these reasons, he submitted the following amendment (S/755) as a redraft of the United States draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Bearing in mind the change in the juridical status of Palestine consequent upon the termination of the mandate, and the necessity for further clarification of this status;

"Taking into consideration that previous resolutions Of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine,

"Calls upon all parties concerned in Palestine to abstain from acts of armed force against each other, and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after the adoption Of this resolution;

"Calls upon the Truce Commission and upon all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the city of Jerusalem;

"Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with the two preceding paragraphs of this resolution;

"Requests the Committee appointed by the General Assembly on 14 May to proceed as expeditiously as possible with the appointment of a United Nations Mediator for Palestine, and calls upon all parties concerned to avail themselves of his good offices in order to seek a solution by mediation"

The representative of the United States stated that the United States could not assent to the proposed amendment since it would take the problem out of Chapter VII into Chapter VI of the Charter, and would obviate the finding of a threat to the peace.

The representative of Belgium considered that the Council must remain within the framework of Chapter VI and use all means for the pacific settlement of the dispute. He asked what measures the Council could take in respect to a state which did not obey its orders, under the existing circumstances, i.e., without armed forces at the Council's disposal, and without the probability of being able to apply Article 106.

The representative of the Jewish Agency said that the fact that armed force was being used in Palestine by the Governments of Arab States was not disputed and was openly admitted by the aggressors in their communications to the Council. Since this use of armed force constituted a violation of the Charter, it was irrelevant to examine the justifications invoked in its behalf. An unconditional cease-fire was the only possible starting point in the quest for peace. The Security Council would not have gone too far if, on the basis of available evidence, it had determined not merely a breach of peace, but also an act of aggression. He considered that it was necessary for the cease-fire to become effective immediately rather than after an interval of thirty-six hours.

The representative of China said that he could not find anything in the Charter which justified the United Nations in ordering the partition of any country or territory. He supported the representatives of the United Kingdom and Belgium in feeling that the resolution should proceed under Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII.

At the 297th meeting on May 19, the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. said that the existence of a threat to or breach of the peace in Palestine should be established on the basis of the available evidence. Documents submitted to the Council by Egypt and Transjordan clearly stated that their troops had entered Palestine.23/ These troops had a very definite military and political objective. The existence of the new Government of Israel was also an established fact; it had been recognized by eight different states, and was determined to defend its territory. He stated that the United Kingdom was responsible for the entry into Palestine of Transjordanian troops.

The representative of Syria stated that it was necessary to study the international status of Palestine to ascertain whether or not international peace was being disturbed. He failed to see how action could be taken under Article 39 of the Charter. Hence he could not accept the United States draft resolution.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee stated that the principle of self-determination, upheld by both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter, granted to the Arab majority of the people of Palestine the unquestionable right of complete sovereignty over the whole country. Under the circumstances that had prevailed in Palestine during the last six months, the Arab majority had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to have recourse to the assistance of the neighbouring States members of the Arab League in order to restore peace and stability in their country.

At the 298th meeting on May 20, the representative of Canada expressed himself in favour of the United Kingdom proposal as a continuation of the efforts of the Council to achieve a just and lasting settlement in Palestine by means of negotiation, and because it did not involve measures of coercion.

The President, speaking as the representative of France, stated that it was perfectly clear that a threat to the peace existed in Palestine. By following the course outlined in the United States draft resolution, the Security Council would be giving the Truce Commission and the Mediator24/ the authority and powers which they required for the accomplishment of their task. He would, therefore, vote for the United States draft resolution.

The representative of Colombia stated that the amendment submitted by the United Kingdom delegation would lead the Council to repeat measures already tried unsuccessfully. The Colombian delegation, therefore, could not support it.

The representative of Argentina said he would not vote in favour of any measure of a coercive character, but would vote for any measure of a pacificatory character, since that would be in the interest of the whole population of Palestine.

At the 299th meeting on May 21, the President drew the Council's attention to a cable (S/762) from the Truce Commission to the effect that it had been concentrating its efforts on bringing about a truce in Jerusalem. The Commission felt, the telegram stated, that, taking a realistic view of the situation in Jerusalem, the only effective measure which could be taken to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities in the Holy City was the employment of a neutral force sufficiently large and powerful to enforce its will on either or both of the parties. Failing the presence of such a neutral force in Jerusalem, the only alternatives were victory by one of the two sides to a stalemate. Both the Arabs and the Jews had expressed a desire for a cease-fire and a truce in Jerusalem on their own terms, which were unacceptable to the other side. In view of the extreme gravity of the situation the Commission recommended that the Security Council should explore all those remedies provided for in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter which were capable of immediate and effective application.

The President also announced that the permanent members of the Security Council had decided upon the appointment of Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden as Mediator in Palestine.25/

Continuing the discussion on the United States draft resolution, the representative of the U.S.S.R. said that, despite the assertions of some representatives, partition of Palestine into two independent states was valid and in force, and had to be implemented through the joint efforts of all Members of the United Nations. He criticized the attitude of the United Kingdom Government, which was openly supporting the action of Transjordan and at the same time was preventing the Council from taking effective action to suppress the existing threat to and breach of the peace in Palestine. The attitude of the Belgian and Chinese representatives in the Council was also difficult to understand. It was the view of the U.S.S.R. delegation that it would be illusory for the Security Council to place all its hopes in a Mediator who had no more rights and powers than the Truce Commission, which had proved itself utterly powerless to induce the Governments to abstain from warlike activities in Palestine. What was needed in the present situation was an effective decision with a view to putting an end to military operations in Palestine.

He considered that the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation could be taken as a basis for the adoption of appropriate decisions by the Security Council.

The text submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom, he considered, was inadequate and would not serve to improve the situation in Palestine, although some of its paragraphs were not objectionable.

The representative of Syria said that it had been previously decided that the Security Council was not enticed to participate in, or to take any action for, the implementation of the plan of partition. Even the General Assembly had abandoned tacitly, if not openly and clearly, the resolution of November 29 last.

With regard to the United States resolution he stated that a truce was not an end in itself and that any order such as that contained in the resolution, if it was issued in that blunt fashion and without giving any satisfaction or assurance of what was to be done afterwards, would not be complied with. He insisted that the cause of the dispute must be removed before a truce could become effective. The cause of all the fighting was the partition plan, which the Arabs would never accept.

At the 301st meeting on May 21, the representative of Egypt stressed the importance of a decision to apply Chapter VII of the Charter. Before accepting the United States draft resolution, which was, in effect, a confirmation of partition, the Council had to consider the legal situation. That Palestine had emerged as an independent sovereign state on May 15, he stated, was clear from Article 22 of the Mandate which had recognized Palestine as an independent state, subject only to the "administrative advice and assistance" of the Mandatory Power. The forces of the Arab States were in Palestine, with the consent of the great majority of the population, solely to maintain law and order in the face of terroristic activities of the Jewish minority and in the light of the inability of the United Nations to find a solution. He considered that the action of the United States Government in recognizing the State of Israel, which was a rebellious minority, had no legal force or meaning.

At the 302nd meeting on May 22, the representative of the Jewish Agency appealed to the Council to adopt the United States draft resolution (S/749). Failure to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter simply because the machinery of enforcement was not yet complete would be a disastrous blow to the prestige of the United Nations. He assured the Council that the Jews would accept a cease-fire, which, he said, should be followed by the removal of armed Arab forces from Palestine.

The President ruled that the United States draft resolution and the United Kingdom amendment to it would be voted on paragraph by paragraph.

The first paragraph of the United Kingdom amendment was therefore put to the vote first and was not adopted, receiving 6 votes in favour, with 5 abstentions (Colombia, France, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United States).

The second paragraph of the United Kingdom amendment was identical with the first paragraph of the United States resolution. This was adopted unanimously.

The next paragraph to be voted on was the second paragraph of the United States resolution, containing a finding of a threat to and breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. Before a vote on the paragraph was taken the representative of the United States expressed the view that the statements of the Arab States, their replies to the Council's questionnaire and the declaration by Syria of its intention to establish a blockade of foreign shipping off the coast of Palestine constituted indisputable evidence that the Arabs were guilty of a breach of international peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. The claim that their action qualified under the Charter as that of a regional organization could not be justified, especially in the light of Article 53.

The representative of the United Kingdom opposed such a determination under Article 39 of the Charter, on the ground that it should not be invoked unless the Council was prepared eventually to use armed force in Palestine. He also considered that the Council should persist in its attempts by various means to arrange for truce and mediation.

The Council failed to adopt the paragraph, there being 5 votes in favour (Colombia, France, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United States), with 6 abstentions.

The third paragraph of the United Kingdom amendment, with some further changes proposed by the representatives of the United States and China, was then adopted by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 abstention.

The last three paragraphs of the United Kingdom amendment were adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), the last paragraph having been revised at the suggestion of the representative of France so as to render the wording stronger.

Before a vote was taken on the resolution as a whole the representative of the United States expressed the view that the resolution before the Council as a result of the above voting was unsatisfactory. He would vote for the amended resolution solely because of the call upon the parties to issue a cease-fire order within 36 hours after the stated time. If the parties did not obey the cease-fire request, the Security Council must consider further action.

The representative of Colombia was also dissatisfied with the Council's action but hoped that it might result in a frank discussion of the situation in which the Council was placed.

The resolution as a whole (S/773) was then adopted by 8 votes in favour, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.). Following is the text of the resolution as adopted by the Council:

"The Security Council,

"Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine,

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned, to abstain from any hostile military action in Palestine and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after midnight, New York standard time, 22 May 1948;

"Calls upon the Truce Commission and upon all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the City of Jerusalem;

"Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with the two preceding paragraphs of this resolution;

"Calls upon all parties concerned to facilitate by all means in their power the task of the United Nations Mediator appointed in execution of the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948."

By a letter dated May 24 (S/779), the representative of the Jewish Agency informed the Security Council that the Provisional Government of Israel had issued orders to all commanders to cease-fire on May 24, at noon, New York time and not to resume firing unless the other side continued to fire.

By telegrams addressed to the Secretary-General the Governments of Lebanon, Iraq and Syria informed the Security Council that the time limit set in the Council's resolution of May 22 (S/773) was not sufficient for consultations among the Arab Governments with a view to arriving at a decision with regard to the Council's cease-fire order. At the 303rd meeting of the Council on May 24, the representative of Syria further informed the Council of a telegram he had received from the Secretary-General of the Arab League requesting the Security Council to grant to the Arab States a delay sufficient for them to exchange views at a meeting which would be held the following day at Amman, Transjordan.

The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and France supported the request for an extension of the time limit and, at the suggestion of the representative of France, the Council agreed to an extension of 48 hours to expire on May 26 at noon, New York standard time.

The Provisional Government of Israel protested against the extension of the time limit granted the Arab States and informed the Council (S/788) that it must review its position in the light of the Council's decision. It subsequently informed the Council (S/789) that as a result of a new decision by the Provisional Government ceasefire orders had been reissued to all commanders effective May 26 at 1 P.M., New York time.

At the 305th meeting on May 26, the representative of Egypt stated that his Government could not abide by a cease-fire recommendation unless it provided for a cessation of the immigration of recruits for the Jewish forces and to the importation of military equipment by the Jews, and unless it paved the way for an equitable solution of the Palestine question in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the population.

The representative of Iraq on behalf of all the Arab States then presented the reply of the Arab League to the Council's cease-fire order (S/792). The Arab League considered the ceasefire order unacceptable, since it gave no guarantee against Zionist attack. The League believed that the resolution of April 17 should be observed, and was prepared to consider any further proposals of the Council.

The representative of the Jewish Agency said that the Provisional Government of Israel accepted and was willing to carry out the unconditional cease-fire requested by the Council, but would not accept the terms laid down by the Arab aggressors. He said these terms would amount to surrender.

The representative of Syria pointed out that the Jews had everything to gain from a cease-fire, while the Arabs had everything to lose.

At the 306th meeting on May 26, the President read a letter from the Jewish Agency to the effect that the Jewish authorities were maintaining close liaison with the Truce Commission. He asked for clarification of the statements made by the Arab States at the previous meeting.

The representative of Iraq said that the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States were at Amman, awaiting any suggestions which the Council might make.

The representative of Syria stated that the Arabs rejected an unconditional cease-fire but they had accepted a truce on the basis of the Council's resolution of April 17, confirmed by the Assembly's resolution of May 14, which, he asserted, had been violated by the Jews.

The representative of the Jewish Agency pointed out that the resolution of April 17 had referred only to the period when the Assembly had the Palestine question under discussion.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. urged that the Council take more decisive measures to put an end to the fighting in Palestine. He considered that the cessation of hostilities was being delayed in accordance with the imperialistic interests of the United Kingdom, which was in fact participating in the hostilities by supplying arms and personnel to the Arab forces.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee insisted that nationals of the Arab States could not be regarded as invaders in Palestine. It was only natural that the Palestinians had appealed to their neighbours for assistance in the face of mounting Jewish aggression.

The representative of the United States said that the cease-fire resolution taken under Chapter VI had proved ineffective and that the fighting was growing in intensity. He asked that other members should now make suggestions for a solution.

i. U.S.S.R. AND UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

The representative of the U.S.S.R. considered that the Council had to take steps designed to restore peace, in Palestine. To that end he proposed a draft resolution, a revised text of which was submitted at the 309th meeting and read as follows (S/794/Rev.2):

"Considering that the Security Council's resolution of 22 May on the cessation of military operations in Palestine has not been carried out, in view of the refusal of the Arab States to comply with this decision;

"Considering that military operations in Palestine, in view of this, are increasing in intensity and that the number of casualties is growing; and

"Considering that as a result of these events the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations;

"The Security Council

"Orders the Governments of the States involved in the present conflict in Palestine to secure the cessation of military operations within thirty-six hours after the adoption by the Security Council of this resolution."

The representative of Egypt reiterated that his Government would welcome a cease-fire on the basis of the Council's resolution of April 17, which he considered to be still operative since it had been affirmed by the Assembly's resolution of May 14. That cease-fire resolution had correctly provided for a cessation of all acts, political and military, which might jeopardize the rights, claims or position of either party, and paved the way for an equitable settlement.

The representative of the United Kingdom considered that the basis of the resolution of April 17, which aimed at political and military truce, had been removed by the proclamation of the Jewish State, and that the reaction of the Arab States to the present proposals had to be assessed in the light of past events. The Council, however, had to bring the fighting to an end in order to create conditions in which proposals for a settlement of the dispute could be considered. To that end, he proposed a draft resolution (S/795), the text of which, as revised at the 310th meeting, read as follows (S/795/Rev.2):

"The Security Council,

"Desiring to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews,

"Calls upon both parties to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks,

"Calls upon both parties to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine during the cease-fire,

"Calls upon both parties and upon all Governments to refrain from importing war material into Palestine during the cease-fire,

"Urges both parties to take every possible precaution for the protection of the Holy Places and of the city of Jerusalem,

"Instructs the United Nations Mediator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers,

"Instructs the United Nations Mediator to make contact with both parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to making recommendations to the Security Council about an eventual settlement for Palestine,

"Calls upon all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator,

"Instructs the United Nations Mediator to make a weekly report to the Security Council during the cease-fire,

"Invites the States Members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security Council not later than 6 p.m. New York standard time on 1 June 1948,

"Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the present situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter."

At the 307th meeting on May 28, the representative of China stated his opposition to the Soviet Union draft resolution and supported in principle the draft resolution of the United Kingdom.

The representative of the Jewish Agency criticized the United Kingdom draft resolution as upholding the interests of the Arabs. It was intended to bring reward to the aggressors and impose sanctions upon their victims. The proposed cease-fire, conditioned upon restrictions on immigration and the cessation of the importation of men and military equipment by the Jews, would be prejudicial to them while it would not affect the Arab position. It was also contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Neither the Council nor the Mediator had any power to affect the sovereignty and integrity of Israel, which had been established with the sanction of the Assembly. It was significant that the United Kingdom was prepared to invoke Chapter VII in the event of the rejection of this draft resolution, while it opposed most vigorously any such action when confronted with the defiant rejection by the Arabs of the previous Council resolutions calling for a truce.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. said that, whereas the U.S.S.R. draft resolution presented a constructive approach to the problem, the draft resolution of the United Kingdom was designed to stifle the State of Israel. At the end of the four-week period, the Jews would find their resources depleted while the Arabs would be prepared for a renewed onslaught. The invaders would be permitted to retain their forces in Palestine and use it as a base for larger operations. All the large arsenals of the United Kingdom would be at the disposal of the Arabs, and a virtual blockade would be established around Israel. Jewish immigration was an internal matter for the State of Israel. The provision for enforcement action by the Security Council against any party which rejected the resolution was clearly designed to obtain sanctions against the Jews. The whole draft resolution was biased and unacceptable.

The representative of Canada opposed the draft resolution of the U.S.S.R. for the same reason as he had opposed that of the United States. The Council should not leave the methods of pacific settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter and embark upon measures under Chapter VII until the Council had been informed as a result of consultations among the permanent members "what consecutive steps in the way of diplomatic, economic or military pressure or coercion might follow should the order of the Council to cease military action fail". He supported in general the United Kingdom draft resolution as a fresh attempt to obtain a cease-fire by agreement and because that resolution, in his view, relied upon the machinery of mediation, negotiation and conciliation, which had not yet been fully tried.

The representative of the United States supported the U.S.S.R. draft resolution. He referred to several statements by Arab representatives as conclusive evidence of a breach of international peace.

At the 309th meeting on May 28, the representative of France stated that he supported the U.S.S.R. draft resolution for the same reason that he had supported the United States proposal, especially since the situation was deteriorating rapidly.

The representative of Colombia supported the U.S.S.R. draft resolution in principle. He was gratified that the U.S.S.R. and the United States were now in agreement, and he shared the Canadian view that some accord between the permanent members, in respect of enforcement action under Article 106 of the Charter, was advisable before the Council decided to act under Chapter VII.

The Council, he stated further, had spent weeks in discussions without achieving anything. He believed that negotiations should be reopened with the parties in order to find a peaceful solution. In this spirit, he suggested that the Council might wish to adopt a draft resolution inviting the permanent members of the Council to consult with one another with a view to such joint action on behalf of the United Nations as might be necessary to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the resolutions adopted by the Council on April 17 (S/723) and May 22 (S/773), 1948, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

The Council should further establish a commission of five members, three to be designated by the Council itself, one by the Arab Higher Committee and another by the Jewish Agency. If the membership of the commission should not be completed within three days from the date of the resolution, the President of the Council should designate such other member or members as might be required to complete the membership of five.

The primary task of this commission would be to discuss with the representatives of the Governments and the authorities concerned the possibility of negotiating a peaceful settlement of the question of the future government of Palestine. The Governments and communities directly interested in this question were to make representatives available to the commission of the Council for the purpose of discussing such peaceful settlement and the commission itself should co-operate with the Truce Commission and the United Nations Mediator to the best of their ability in the performance of their duties.

The President, as the representative of France, referring to a communication from the Truce Commission (S/997/Corr.1) concerning the situation in Jerusalem, proposed the following draft resolution (S/798/Rev.2) concerning a truce in Jerusalem, which, he stated, need not prejudice the position of either party:

"The Security Council,

"Considering that the appeal issued by the Security Council on 22 May 1948 with a view to terminating hostilities in Palestine has not been complied with;

"That that appeal called upon the Truce Commission and all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiations and maintenance of a truce in the city of Jerusalem;

"That the attack on and bombardment of Jerusalem have been going on since 15 May; that they have already caused terrible destruction, which is increasing every day; that places of priceless value for three of the greatest religions of the world, representing an important part of the spiritual and cultural heritage of humanity, are thereby endangered, if they have not already been stricken,

"Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to cease hostilities in the city of Jerusalem within a time-limit expiring at noon 29 May (New York standard time);

"Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party, or both, or if, after having been accepted, it is not implemented the present situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to taking measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter."

At the 309th meeting on May 29, the representative of the U.S.S.R. said that the proposals in the United Kingdom draft resolution were illegal and were contrary to the interests of both Jews and Arabs and to the Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947. Adoption of the United Kingdom draft would be equivalent to imposing sanctions on the Jewish State, the victim of aggression. He considered that the draft resolution was an expression of the imperialistic policy of the United Kingdom, designed to prolong the conflict in Palestine by inciting Arabs to fight Jews, to make it impossible for the Jewish State to maintain its independence, or for a new and independent Arab State to emerge in the Arab part of Palestine. The existence of a state of war was indisputable. He therefore urged adoption of the U.S.S.R. draft resolution as the measure which could restore peace in Palestine.

The representative of the United Kingdom believed that the Council should not enter upon action under Chapter VII of the Charter unless it was prepared to proceed if necessary to the most drastic enforcement measures, and unless it was satisfied as to what would be the results of such action. The United Kingdom draft resolution was designed to bring pressure for peace without the use of Chapter VII. He contested the statement of the representative of the Jewish Agency that the United Kingdom draft resolution was discriminatory, and pointed out that some of the provisions which were objected to had figured in the resolution of April 17.

The representative of Belgium supported the United Kingdom draft resolution in principle. He believed that, in the long run, only mediation was capable of bringing about peace in Palestine, and that the Council should not make a determination under Article 39 of the Charter unless it, or rather the permanent members, were prepared to proceed to all the coercive measures provided for in Chapter VII.

At the 310th meeting on May 29, the representative of Syria stated that he opposed the demand of the representative of the U.S.S.R. for measures under Chapter VII on the grounds that such action would only aggravate the situation and make a solution more difficult. He did not consider that Chapter VII of the Charter was applicable since (a) Palestine was an Arab country and hence international peace was not threatened, (b) he did not recognize the existence of a sovereign Jewish State, (c) the resolution of November 29, 1947, which had never been more than a recommendation, could not create any state and (d) that resolution had been abandoned by the Assembly in its resolution of May 14, 1948.

The representative of the Jewish Agency reiterated his view that the third and fourth paragraphs of the United Kingdom draft resolution discriminated against the interests of the Jewish State. Moreover, Israel was now a sovereign state, and those paragraphs constituted a violation of its domestic jurisdiction. The French draft resolution was acceptable in principle, subject to a guarantee being given for access to the Holy Places and to the city itself.

The representative of Colombia deplored the disunity among the permanent members which, in the absence of an international force, made it difficult for the Council to apply enforcement measures in the face of a recognized threat to the peace.

The President, speaking as the representative of France, stated that he believed that Article 39 of the Charter made it imperative for the Council, under the existing conditions, to determine the existence of a threat to international peace irrespective of what measures it might be able to take.

At its 310th meeting on May 29, the Council proceeded to vote on the resolutions before it. The U.S.S.R. resolution was put to the vote first, the first paragraph being voted on in two parts at the request of the representative of Colombia. The first part of the first paragraph received 5 votes in favour (Belgium, France, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United States), with 6 abstentions and was not adopted. The reference to the refusal of the Arab States to comply with the Council's previous decision of May 22 was rejected by a vote of 2 in favour (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), with 9 abstentions. The vote on the remaining four paragraphs of the resolution again was 5 in favour, with 6 abstentions. The U.S.S.R. resolution therefore was not adopted.

The Council then considered the United Kingdom resolution, paragraph by paragraph, and amendments were proposed by the representatives of the United States, France, Colombia, Canada and Syria and suggestions by the Jewish Agency.

The first paragraph of the resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 in favour, with 3 abstentions.

In the second as well as in subsequent paragraphs the representative of the United States proposed the use of the phrase "all governments and authorities concerned" instead of "both parties". This was accepted by the representative of the United Kingdom. The representative of Colombia proposed that the provision of a time limit of four weeks for the truce should be deleted as in his view fighting should be stopped once and for all and not only for a brief interval. This amendment was rejected by a vote of 3 in favour (Colombia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), with 8 abstentions. The second paragraph of the resolution was then adopted by 10 votes, with Colombia abstaining.

As regards the third paragraph the representative of the United States proposed that the prohibition of the introduction of fighting personnel and men of military age should be applied not only to Palestine but to all the Arab States as well which should be listed by name. This change was accepted by the representative of the United Kingdom. The representative of France then proposed that the reference to "men of military age" in this paragraph be deleted and that instead an additional paragraph should be inserted calling upon all governments and authorities concerned, should immigrants of military age be introduced into countries or territories under their control, to undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training, and in order to ensure the fulfilment of this obligation to intern them during that period in camps placed under the control of the Mediator, who would have the authority to make any exceptions which he might deem appropriate.

In support of his amendment the representative of France stated that it was designed to keep a fair balance between a ban on the entry of all persons of military age and the possibility that immigrants of military age would be trained and mobilized for use after the expiration of the truce, thus not giving any undue advantage to either of the parties.

The representative of the Jewish Agency welcomed the spirit of the French amendment, although he did not favour the provision that immigrants of military age should be interned in camps. The representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and of Egypt, on the other hand, reiterated their opposition to any immigration whatever.

At the suggestion of the representative of the United States the reference to internment camps was deleted from the French amendment and the phrase "men of military age" was substituted for the phrase "immigrants of military age". In this form the representative of the United Kingdom accepted the French amendment. The two paragraphs as amended (paragraph 3 of the original United Kingdom draft resolution and the additional paragraph to be inserted) were then adopted by a vote of 7 in favour, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

The fourth paragraph of the original United Kingdom resolution was adopted by a vote of 9 in favour, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), after the representative of the United Kingdom had accepted a United States amendment referring to the export of war material to Palestine as well as its import into Palestine, and extending the prohibition on the import and export of war materials to the Arab States.

In connection with the fifth paragraph the representative of the United Kingdom accepted a suggestion of the representative of the Jewish Agency to include a reference to the necessity of safeguarding access to the Holy Places. The paragraph was then adopted unanimously.

Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the original United Kingdom resolution were adopted by 9 votes in favour, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.). The wording of paragraph 7 was changed at the suggestion of the representative of Canada so as to include mention of the General Assembly's resolution as regards the Mediator's functions.

The last two paragraphs of the original United Kingdom resolution were adopted by 8 votes and 7 votes in favour respectively, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R, U.S.S.R.) in the first vote and 4 abstentions (those three and Argentina) in the second vote.

An additional paragraph proposed by the representative of the United States calling upon all governments to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 in favour, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

Following is the text of the resolution (S/801) as adopted by the Council:

"The Security Council,

"Desiring to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews,

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks,

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel into Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease-fire, and

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned, should men of military age be introduced into countries or territories under their control, to undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training during the cease-fire,

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to refrain from importing or exporting war material into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease-fire,

"Urges all Governments and authorities concerned to take every possible precaution for the protection of the Holy Places and of the City of Jerusalem, including access to all shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them,

"Instructs the United Nations Mediator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers,

"Instructs the United Nations Mediator to make contact with all parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to carrying out his functions as determined by the General Assembly,

"Calls upon all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator,

"Instructs the United Nations Mediator to make a weekly report to the Security Council during the cease-fire,

"Invites the States Members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security Council not later than 6:00 p.m. New York standard time on 1 June 1948,

"Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter,

"Calls upon all Governments to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution."

After the United Kingdom resolution had been adopted, the President, speaking as the representative of France, withdrew his own draft resolution (S/798/Rev.2) regarding a truce in Jerusalem. The Colombian proposal for the establishment of a commission of five had not been formally submitted as a resolution and was therefore not put to a vote.

j. ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED OF THE RESOLUTION OF MAY 29, 1948

By letter dated June 1, 1948 (S/804), the representative of the Jewish Agency transmitted the reply of the Provisional Government of Israel to the Council's resolution of May 29. The Provisional Government of Israel, the Council was informed, had decided to respond to the Council's call and had instructed the High Command of its Defence Army to issue cease-fire orders to all its forces effective on June 2, at 7 P.M., New York daylight time, on condition that the other side acted likewise. The Provisional Government of Israel would also comply with all the injunctions and obligations imposed by the resolution, provided that a similar undertaking was entered into by the other governments and authorities concerned. The Provisional Government of Israel stated further that its acceptance of the cease-fire was subject to the following assumptions, which in its opinion were implied in the terms of the resolution, but which it wished placed on record:

"1. That the ban on the import of arms into the territory of the Arab States enumerated in the resolution should apply also to the deliveries of arms from stocks owned or controlled by foreign powers within those territories.

"2. That during the cease-fire, the armed forces of neither side will seek to advance beyond the areas controlled by them at the announcement of the cease-fire and that each side will be entitled to maintain the positions in its military occupation at that time.

"3. That freedom of access to Jerusalem will be ensured for the supply of food and other essentials, as well as for normal civilian entry and exit.

"4. That any attempt by the parties concerned to stop or impede the normal transport of goods assigned to Israel and other States concerned will be regarded as an act of armed force.

"5. That while the provisional Government of Israel is ready to comply with the injunction that persons of military age admitted during the cease-fire period should not be mobilized or submitted to military training, its freedom to admit immigrants, regardless of age, will not be impaired."

By telegram dated June 1, 1948, and addressed to the Secretary-General (S/810) the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt communicated to the Security Council the reply of all the States members of the Arab League. This reply stressed that the suspension of hostilities must serve as a means of finding a just solution of the Palestine problem and expressed the confidence of the States members of the Arab League that the Truce Commission and the United Nations Mediator would realize that any solution which did not ensure political unity for Palestine nor respect the will of the majority of the population of that country would not have the least chance of success.

Referring to the question of Jewish immigration the telegram stated that it was inconceivable that the Security Council could have intended to place the Zionists in a position to profit by the period of cessation of hostilities in order to receive a reinforcement of men, who although they came to Palestine as immigrants were in reality nothing but trained fighters.

Finally, the telegram stated, the Governments of the Arab States considered it necessary that a body be set up under the necessary safeguards, charged with the most careful supervision of the provisions and conditions of the Security Council's resolution, as the Arab States did not consider that the resolution gave them full assurance that the other party would observe these provisions and conditions.

In the light of these explanations, the telegram concluded, the Arab States accepted the Security Council's invitation to cease-fire for a period of four weeks from a date to be determined for this purpose.

The Security Council considered these replies at its 311th meeting on June 2. It had before it also a telegram from the United Nations Mediator (S/814) dated June 2, concerning the date to be set for the truce to come into effect. The Mediator stated that talks with the parties and his own preliminary study of the problem of controls had convinced him that a limited time must be allowed between the date of acceptance of the resolution and the date of its application. If the effective date were set so early that the controls would not be operative there would be immediate charges of violations by both sides. The Mediator therefore suggested that he be authorized to fix the effective date in consultation with the two parties and the Truce Commission. The four-week period he assumed, would be computed from this effective date.

The representative of the Jewish Agency asked that the Council fix an early deadline for the operation of the cease-fire. He thought that the message dealing with this subject from the Mediator (S/814) showed too much regard for technical details.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee said that, as a member of the Arab League his Committee upheld the statement communicated by the Egyptian Government (S/810).

The representative of Iraq stressed the importance of taking measures to ensure that the ceasefire was not broken.

The President stated that it was the Council's understanding that the comments contained in the replies of the cease-fire resolution did not constitute conditions, and that the resolution had been accepted unconditionally. He asked for the members' views on the Mediator's suggestion (S/814) that he be authorized to fix a date for the cease-fire in consultation with the parties.

The representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom supported this suggestion.

In reply to the representative of the United Kingdom, the President said that the four-week period would be computed from the beginning of the cease-fire.

The representative of France thought that everything possible should be done to increase the Mediator's authority.

The representative of the United States considered that the Mediator should be urged not to delay the cease-fire until controls covering all aspects of the Assembly and the Council resolutions had been established. In addition, he asked that the Mediator stress the humanitarian and non. political aspect of his task.

The representative of Canada agreed that the Mediator should be asked to put the cease-fire into effect as soon as possible.

The representative of Colombia suggested that the Council inform the Mediator that it would meet within two or three days to receive his report on the situation.

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government would not permit the transfer of war materials to the parties from stocks in the Middle East during the period of the cease-fire. He suggested that the Mediator be authorized to reconcile differences of interpretation regarding the resolution. He should also be asked to report on measures of supervision.

With the representatives of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. abstaining, the Council then approved the suggestion of the Mediator regarding the procedure for arranging the effective date for the cease-fire and the truce (S/814) and agreed that this time-limit should be as short as possible.

At the 313th meeting on June 3, the President drew attention to Part II, paragraph 3, of the Assembly's resolution of May 14 (A/554), which directed the Mediator to conform with such instructions as the General Assembly or the Council might issue. He asked if members wished instructions to be issued.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee stated that the maintenance of the truce depended upon the establishment of effective controls. The Jews had, in the past, found many ways of smuggling arms and men into Palestine. Control of immigration was of the greatest importance; he appealed to all governments to restrict the movement of Jewish immigrants and sales of war materials to the Jews. He contested the assumption of the Provisional Government of Israel that there should be freedom of access for the Jews into Jerusalem. The abandonment of the siege was contrary to the standstill order, and would benefit the Jews. He reiterated that the Arabs could not enter into negotiations on the basis of recognition of the existence of a Jewish state.

The representative of the Jewish Agency said that the Council's resolution clearly ruled out any general ban on the immigration of Jews of military age. Referring to the arbitrary and unilateral United Kingdom decision not to release such men from the camps on Cyprus, he pointed out that it was for the Mediator to decide what regulation should be imposed. He stated that the Provisional Government of Israel would not take part in any negotiations concerning the existence of the Jewish State.

The representative of France stated that he was disturbed by the two preceding statements and said that the parties must co-operate in the Council's attempt at conciliation. He drew attention to the penultimate paragraph of the truce resolution, which provided for measures under Chapter VII of the Charter if the truce did not lead to results. It was up to the Mediator, he considered, to interpret the terms of the resolution. If his interpretation was challenged, it could be referred to the Council.

The President shared the views of the preceding speaker, and it was agreed that the Council should not issue any instructions to the Mediator pending examination of his first report, and that the Mediator should have full authority to act within the terms of the resolution and interpret it in any way he deemed correct. Only if that interpretation were challenged should the matter be submitted to the Council for further consideration.

k. TRUCE IN PALESTINE EFFECTIVE FROM JUNE 11, 1948

By cablegram dated June 4, 1948 (S/823), the United Nations Mediator informed the President of the Security Council that he had been negotiating with the parties concerning the effective date of the truce and that the only question obstructing agreement was that of Jewish immigration into Palestine during the truce. The difficulty had arisen with regard to the interpretation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution of May 29, 1948, referring to "fighting personnel" and "men of military age". The Mediator therefore inquired whether the Security Council had intended the resolution to permit Jewish immigration of men of military age during the truce provided that they were not mobilized or submitted to military training, or whether its purpose was to exclude during that period all men of military age. In reply the President informed the Mediator that the basic intent of the resolution could be interpreted as meaning that no military advantage should accrue to either side as a result of the truce.

The President informed the Security Council of these developments at its 314th meeting on June 7.

The representative of France though that it should be made clear to the Mediator that the truce resolution had been accepted unconditionally, and that his task was to devise means of implementing it and bring together the divergent interpretations.

The President stressed that it was for the Mediator and not the parties to interpret the truce resolution. If those interpretations were rejected, then the matter would be considered by the Council.

The representative of the Jewish Agency expressed surprise that the cease-fire order issued by the Provisional Government of Israel had met with no response either from the Arabs or the Council. The immediate task of the Mediator should be to obtain a cease-fire rather than to discuss technical details pertaining to the provisions of the resolution.

Following further negotiations with the representatives of both parties the Mediator concluded that there was no practical possibility of negotiating a detailed agreement within any reasonable period of time. He therefore decided, on June 7, to submit to the parties his own draft of the terms of the truce, requesting the parties to accept the proposal (S/829) without conditions by June 11, 1948, 6 A.M., G.M.T. As to the disputed clauses of the Security Council's resolution of May 29, the Mediator interpreted this to mean that no fighting personnel (i.e., men belonging to a military unit or bearing arms) could be introduced into Palestine or any Arab country during the period of the truce.

Regarding the entry of men of military age, his interpretation was that the resolution did not prohibit immigration nor did it appear to place any complete and positive ban on the inclusion of men of military age in such immigration. The Mediator therefore decided that free immigration of women and children and men under and above the age group of 18 to 45 should be permitted. In addition, a limited number of men of military age were to be permitted to enter, the number to be at the discretion of the Mediator and these men to be kept in non-military camps under the surveillance of United Nations observers during the period of the truce.

By a letter dated June 9 (S/833) the Government of Egypt, on behalf of the Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Syria, accepted the Mediator's proposal (S/829) as a proof of these States' "sincere desire for co-operation with the United Nations to achieve a peaceful and equitable solution of the problem of Palestine". Similar replies were received by the Mediator from the Governments of Iraq, Transjordan and Yemen.26/

The Provisional Government of Israel accepted the truce proposals by a letter dated June 10 (S/834), although it expressed dissatisfaction with certain of the clauses affecting Jewish immigration.

The Mediator informed the Security Council of the acceptance by all parties of the truce proposals by a cablegram dated June 10 (S/830).

At the 317th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of the United States expressed gratification at the announcement of the acceptance of the truce and expressed hope that it would be extended into an enduring settlement.

The President said that the Council would now await the result of the Mediator's negotiations for a peaceful settlement. He suggested that an acknowledgement by the Council of the successful conclusion of his efforts for a truce be sent to the Mediator. He did not, however, think it necessary, as proposed by the representative of France, that the Council confirm the Mediator's interpretations of the truce resolution, since they had not been challenged by the parties.

At the 320th meeting, on June 15, the President drew attention to three messages received from the Mediator (S/837, S/839, S/840). The first (S/837) was a request that all communications from interested parties relating to the truce agreement should be submitted to the Mediator, and that the latter should exercise his discretion in reporting them to the Council. The second was a cablegram from the Mediator dated June 15 (S/839) informing the Council that in his view the truce had worked well during the first few days, taking into account all circumstances, including difficulties encountered regarding communications and getting observers to strategic points and fronts in time. The last message (S/840) contained a request that the Council call on all Member States, and on some non-member states, to report on the steps taken to implement the resolution of May 29, and urge all states to assist the Mediator in the implementation of the truce proposals. The President proposed to accept these requests. After brief discussion the Council agreed to the Mediator's requests.

Replies (S/855, Adds.1-4) to the Council's inquiry, which was brought to the attention of States Members and non-members of the United Nations by the Secretary General, were received from:

Austria Haiti
Belgium Hungary
Brazil India
Canada Italy
China New Zealand
Colombia Switzerland
Czechoslovakia United Kingdom
Dominican Republic Union of South Africa
Ecuador United States
France
Greece

l. QUESTION OF TRUCE OBSERVERS

At the 314th meeting of the Council on June 7, the representative of the U.S.S.R. asked for clarification of the procedure to be adopted for providing the Mediator with military observers in accordance with paragraph 7 of the resolution of May 29. The U.S.S.R. was prepared to send observers to Palestine together with other Powers directly concerned.

The representative of the United States said that the Mediator had approached his Government, as a member of the Truce Commission, to ascertain whether it would be prepared to furnish military observers. His Government had replied in the affirmative.

The representatives of France and Belgium said that their Governments had likewise been approached.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. then expressed the view that the question was not one of interpretation to be left to the Mediator. The decision as to which countries should send observers and as to how the latter would be made available had to be made by the Council. Membership in the Truce Commission had no connection with the problem of assigning these observers to the Mediator.

At the 317th meeting of the Council on June 10, the representative of the United States stated that in his opinion it was the intent of the resolution of May 29 that the Mediator should be left free to make his own arrangements in respect of the truce and its supervision. He would, however, accept any decision which the Council might make.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. stated he did not see how the seventh paragraph of the resolution of May 29 could be interpreted to mean that only States members of the Truce Commission should send military observers.

The representative of Canada pointed out that the resolution of May 29 called upon the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce in concert with the Truce Commission. He believed that the latter was under an obligation to provide the assistance and facilities for observation, and he could not see that any state possessed a right to participate.

At the 320th meeting of the Council on June 15, the representative of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following draft resolution (S/841):

"Considering the necessity of providing the United Nations Mediator in Palestine with an appropriate number of military observers in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 29 May 1948,

"The Security Council resolves:

"1. To attach to the United Nations Mediator military observers numbering from thirty to fifty persons.

"2. The military observers should be appointed by Member States of the Security Council wishing to participate in the designation of such observers, excluding Syria."

The representative of the U.S.S.R. did not consider that the question could be settled otherwise than by a decision of the Security Council. The Mediator was not entitled to settle the question irrespective of the Council or to request some states to supply him with observers. He saw no reason why the United States representative should object to the participation of a small group of U.S.S.R. observers, numbering not more than five. The U.S.S.R. had the same right as any other country to send observers to Palestine.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. supported the U.S.S.R. draft resolution and considered it essential that U.S.S.R. observers participate in supervising the truce. He could not understand why the United States and other members should object to such a procedure, which was necessary if the group of observers was to be fully representative of the Council, and if effective and successful implementation of the May 29 resolution was to be ensured.

The representative of Argentina said he would not have opposed the U.S.S.R. resolution had it been presented in connection with the resolution of May 29. However, he believed that the decision should now be left to the Mediator, who was acting in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly.

The Council rejected the U.S.S.R. draft resolution by 2 votes in favour (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), with 9 abstentions.

m. TRUCE OBSERVANCE AND MEDIATOR'S PROPOSALS FOR A PEACEFUL
ADJUSTMENT OF THE FUTURE SITUATION IN PALESTINE

By cablegram dated June 21, 1948 (S/849), the Mediator informed the Security Council that the truce was holding up well on the whole. Headquarters for truce supervision were now being established at Haifa, while the Mediator had established his own headquarters at Rhodes. This arrangement, the Mediator reported, was proving satisfactory and permitted him to concentrate on the mediation aspect of his work.

On June 30, 1948, the Mediator informed the Security Council by cablegram (S/860) that as a result of consultations with representatives of the parties he had, on June 28 and 29, presented to the Arab and Jewish authorities in Cairo and Tel Aviv, respectively, brief papers setting forth in outline his views and suggestions for a possible approach to a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine. The Mediator stressed that these suggestions had been presented quite tentatively with the objective of discovering if there might be found at this stage of the mediation a common ground on which further discussion and mediation might proceed.

Following are the suggestions which the Mediator presented to the parties (S/863):

"1. That, subject to the willingness of the directly interested parties to consider such an arrangement, Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate entrusted to the United Kingdom in 1922, that is including Transjordan, might form a Union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish.

"2. That the boundaries of the two members be determined in the first instance by negotiation with the assistance of the Mediator and on the basis of suggestions to be made by him. When agreement is reached on the main outlines of the boundaries they will be definitively fixed by a Boundaries Commission.

"3. That the purposes and function of the Union should be to promote common economic interests, to operate and maintain common services, including customs and excise, to undertake development projects and to coordinate foreign policy and measures for common defence.

"4. That the functions and authority of the Union might be exercised through a central council and such other organs as the members of the Union may determine.

"5. That, subject to the provisions of the Instrument of Union, each member of the Union may exercise full control over its own affairs including its foreign relations.

"6. Immigration within its own borders should be within the competence of each member, provided that, following a period of two years from the establishment of the Union, either member would be entitled to request the Council of the Union to review the immigration policy of the other member and to render a ruling thereon in terms of the common interests of the Union. In the event of the inability of the Council to reach a decision on the matter, the issue could be referred by either member to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations whose decision, taking into account the principle of economic absorptive capacity, would be binding on the member whose policy is at issue.

"7. That religious and minority rights be fully protected by each member of the Union and guaranteed by the United Nations.

"8. That Holy Places, religious buildings and sites be preserved and that existing rights in respect of the same be fully guaranteed by each member of the Union.

"9. That recognition be accorded to the right of residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left their normal places of abode to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property."

As regards territorial matters, the Mediator proposed the following:

"1. Inclusion of the whole or part of the Negeb in Arab territory.

"2. Inclusion of the whole or part of Western Galilee in Jewish territory.

"3. Inclusion of the City of Jerusalem in Arab territory, with municipal autonomy for the Jewish community and special arrangements for the protection of the Holy Places.

"4. Consideration of the status of Jaffa.

"5. Establishment of a free port at Haifa, the area of the free port to include the refineries and terminals.

"6. Establishment of a free airport at Lydda."

Both parties rejected the Mediator's proposals (S/863) as a basis of discussion. In its reply (S/370) the Provisional Government of Israel stated that the proposals ignored the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, as well as the outstanding fact of the situation, namely the effective establishment of the sovereignty of the State of Israel within the area assigned to it by the General Assembly's resolution.

Inclusion of the Arab portion of Palestine in the territory of Transjordan, the Provisional Government of Israel considered, would fundamentally change the context of the boundary problem. Referring to the questions of economic union and immigration, the Provisional Government of Israel asserted that it could not agree to any encroachment upon or limitation of the free sovereignty of the people of Israel in its independent State. Finally, the Provisional Government objected to the suggestion that Jerusalem be included in Arab territory, which it termed disastrous. The Jewish people would never acquiesce in the imposition of Arab domination over Jerusalem, no matter what formal municipal autonomy and what right of access to Holy Places the Jews of Jerusalem might be allowed to enjoy. The Provisional Government expressed hope that in the light of its present observations, the Mediator would reconsider his whole approach to the problem.

The Arabs, in rejecting the Mediator's proposals (see S/888, p. 14), offered counter-suggestions providing for a unitary state in the whole of Palestine, and offering, in the Mediator's opinion, little or no compromise.

n. APPEALS FOR PROLONGATION OF THE TRUCE

The four-week truce which had come into effect on June 10 in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of May 29, was due to expire on July 9. By a cablegram, dated July 9 (S/865), the Mediator informed the Security Council that in his opinion the truce had, on the whole, worked well. There had been complaints from both sides as to the alleged violations of the terms of the truce agreement, the cablegram stated, but despite instances of violation all fighting on a major scale had been stopped and by July 9, 1948, neither side had gained any significant military advantage from the application of the truce.

At the same time the Mediator informed the Council that on July 3 and 5 he had submitted proposals to the parties (see below) for a prolongation of the truce (S/865). Not having received any answers to these proposals as yet, and with the expiration of the truce period imminent, the Mediator asked the United Nations to appeal urgently to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as might be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator.

The Security Council considered the Mediator's request at its 330th and 331st meetings on July 7.

At the 330th meeting on July 7, the President, in his invitation to representatives of the interested parties to take their seats at the Council table, included, among others, the "representative of the State of Israel".

As several representatives questioned the correctness of the President's statement, the President stated his ruling to this effect and submitted it to a vote.

Only five members were in favour of overruling the President's ruling (Belgium, Canada, China, Syria, United Kingdom). The President therefore declared his ruling sustained.

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee withdrew after stating that, as long as the terminology used by the President was applied in the Council, he could not assist in its deliberations.

Turning to the substance of the question before the Security Council, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council could not ignore the Mediator's request. He urged immediate action by the Council in view of the early expiration of the truce. He submitted a draft resolution (S/867), according to which the Council, taking into consideration the Mediator's telegram of July 5, would address an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept a prolongation of the truce.

The representative of the United States stated that the Council, when faced with the alternatives of peace and war, must support the truce. He therefore urged the Council to place itself behind the effort for prolongation of the truce.

The representative of Syria brought to the attention of the Council his Government's note referring to the exchange of diplomatic representatives between the United States and Israel during the period of the truce. The representative of Syria stated that if such actions, which he considered to be a violation of the truce agreement and the resolution of May 29, were to continue, then the prolongation of the truce period would not be of great use.

The representative of France considered that the Council should support the Mediator's request without delay.

At the 331st meeting on July 7, the representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that, in considering the possibility of prolongation of the truce, the Council must examine the suggestions which the Mediator had presented to the parties on June 28 (S/863) and which he considered violated the General Assembly's decision of November 29, 1947. In making these suggestions, he said, the Mediator, instead of contributing to a peaceful settlement, was encouraging the prolongation of the fighting and was interfering with the establishment of two independent states in Palestine. The proposed arrangements for the enlargement of Transjordan, through annexation of a part of Palestine to its territory, the infringement of the sovereignty of the Jewish State in the fields of foreign policy and defence, together with various other suggestions for territorial and constitutional changes with regard to Jerusalem, Western Galilee and the Negeb, violated the Assembly's decision and undermined the authority of the United Nations. The U.S.S.R. delegation supported prolongation of the truce, but could not accede to the conditions attached to it.

The representative of Belgium considered that the Council must unreservedly support the Mediator's request for prolongation of the truce, irrespective of such matters as violations which might have occurred or the proposals submitted by the Mediator. These could be discussed at a later stage.

The representative of Syria said that it was up to the parties on the spot to express their attitude regarding the Mediator's proposals. He considered that the Mediator had the full right to submit his proposals. The Mediator had not been sent to Palestine to enforce the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, which, in any case, had been abandoned by the General Assembly when it adopted the resolution of May 14, 1948.27/ Only a just solution would have a prospect of success and permanence.

The representatives of China, Argentina and Canada supported the United Kingdom draft resolution.

The President, speaking as the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R., said that in considering the United Kingdom proposal, one had to ask oneself to what end the present truce was being contemplated. A study of the proposals submitted by the Mediator provided ample answer to that question. Those proposals were aimed at the establishment of one federal state instead of two independent and sovereign states. Jerusalem, which should have been given an international status, was to be handed to the Arabs, and Transjordan was to be a component part of Palestine. All such schemes presented by the Mediator were harmful to the interests of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, as well as to the interests of other Arab States of the Middle East, and were designed to safeguard the strategic, political and economic interests of certain Powers, particularly the United Kingdom. For these reasons, the delegation of the Ukrainian S.S.R., although favouring a truce, was unable to vote for the draft resolution and would abstain.

The United Kingdom draft resolution (S/867) was then adopted by 8 votes in favour, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Taking into consideration the telegram from the United Nations Mediator dated 5 July 1948,

"Addresses an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator."

At the 331st meeting on July 7, the President also brought to the attention of the Council a telegram from the United Nations Mediator (S/869) stating that the truce should be prolonged with the definite understanding that food, water and other essential non-military supplies would be assured for Jerusalem.

After a brief exchange of views, it was decided that the President would inform the Mediator that the Council had approved the principle contained in his statement regarding supplies for Jerusalem.

The proposals (S/865) which the Mediator had presented to the parties on July 3 and 5 (see above) provided for an indefinite prolongation of the truce, or failing that, for a three-day extension in order to facilitate the evacuation of the United Nations Observers and their equipment. In addition, the Mediator had advanced certain proposals to be put into effect, if his appeal for a prolongation of the truce should be rejected by either or both sides. These provided for: (1) the demilitarization of Jerusalem; (2) immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem to permit a final decision to be reached on the question of demilitarization; and (3) the demilitarization of the Haifa dock and port area and of the Haifa oil refineries.

The Provisional Government of Israel replied on July 7 (S/872) that it agreed to a thirty-day prolongation of the truce on the understanding that the conditions to be observed by all parties concerned should be substantially the same as those which governed the previous truce. The Provisional Government of Israel was likewise willing to accept the proposal for a three-day extension of the truce. Moreover, it was ready to discuss the demilitarization of Jerusalem and to accept an immediate cease-fire for Jerusalem. It did not favour, however, the demilitarization of the Haifa refineries, terminals and port areas.

By a telegram dated July 9 (S/876) the Mediator transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of the reply of the Political Committee of the League of Arab States to the Mediator's proposal (S/865) for a prolongation of the truce. In this reply it was stated that Arab apprehensions that the Zionists were sure to violate the truce conditions had proved well founded. The Zionists, it was charged, had continued aggression against Arabs in areas under their occupation and had steadily persisted throughout the truce in pursuing their policy of smuggling immigrants, arms and ammunition into the country; they had also occupied a number of villages and positions not in their possession at the time of the cease-fire. Despite these flagrant violations of the truce, the Arabs had refrained from resuming the fight immediately in order to permit the United Nations Mediator ample scope to carry out his endeavours to find a peaceful solution. Unfortunately the solution proposed by the Mediator, the Arab reply stated, based as it was on the continuation of the status quo and aiming at the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish State, had been most disappointing to the Arabs. Further, the Zionists were steadily carrying on with the establishment and consolidation of their State and there was no hope of their co-operation in arriving at the desired peaceful settlement which was the aim of the truce. A prolongation of the truce in this manner would be detrimental to the Arab majority of Palestine. The communication from the Political Committee of the Arab League concluded that all these factors made it imperative for the Arab States not to agree to a prolongation of the truce under present conditions and to take all measures necessary to bring these conditions to an end.

Through the Secretary-General of the Arab League the Arab States informed the Mediator (see S/888, p. 16; S/P.V.333 [ S/PV.333 ], p. 38) that the proposal for the demilitarization of Jerusalem as a whole was unacceptable and therefore also the proposal for an immediate cease-fire in the city for the purpose of deciding upon the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The Arabs, however, were ready to institute an immediate cease-fire in the Old City. The Arabs were also willing to consider the complete demilitarization of the entire city of Haifa, with Arab participation in the supervision of the city.

At its 332nd meeting, on July 8, the Council had before it the reply of the Provisional Government of Israel (S/872) to the Mediator's proposals cited above and a preliminary report from the Mediator (S/873) concerning the replies of both parties. The Council further had before it a cable (S/871) from the Provisional Government of Israel concerning its acceptance of the prolongation of the truce and its rejection by the Arabs. In this same cable the Provisional Government of Israel informed the Council that on July 8 at 1 A.M., G.M.T., an Egyptian force consisting of two armoured columns and infantry had launched an attack against Israeli positions in southern Palestine and that a battle was currently in progress. The Provisional Government of Israel stated that it would be most interested to learn what the Security Council would decide in this emergency.

The representative of the United States welcomed Israel's acceptance of the proposal for a prolongation of the truce and remarked that, after one of the contesting parties had freely indicated its willingness to prolong the truce, the other party could not allege that a resort to force was an act of self-defence. Rejection of the truce appeal by the Arab States would leave the Security Council no other choice than to find that there was a threat to the peace under Article 39 of the Charter.

The representative of Syria stated that it was not difficult to understand Arab hesitation now to accept a prolongation of the truce, which was working against their interests and was permitting the Jews to strengthen their position and retain their spoils. Faced with such a situation and with the hostility of certain Powers, the Arabs had no other choice than to defend themselves. If, on the other hand, the Jews abandoned their present plans for the establishment of a separate Jewish State in Palestine, they would be assured of all rights on an equal footing with the rest of the population of Palestine.

The representative of Israel stated that Israel's decision to accept the Mediator's proposal was based on the Charter; its decision to defend itself was likewise based on the same premise. The case of aggression by the Arab States was beyond any doubt. When confronted with such a situation, the Council must discharge its responsibilities.

On July 9 the Mediator sent a further appeal (S/878) to all parties for a ten-day extension of the truce. He stated that he found it imperative to proceed to Lake Success for the purpose of presenting to the Security Council a full report on his negotiations and the Arab and Jewish replies to his several proposals. He planned, however, to return to the Near East within a matter of days for the purpose of resuming his efforts at mediation. In the interests of peace, therefore, he appealed to both parties with the utmost urgency to accept an unconditional cease-fire in Palestine for a period of ten days extending from 12 noon, G.M.T., July 10, 1948.

The Provisional Government of Israel accepted the new cease-fire proposal and informed the Mediator (S/884) that it was ready to issue the necessary orders as soon as it was notified by the Mediator that the proposal had been accepted by the Arab Governments and authorities concerned.

No reply to the Mediator's appeal for a ten-day cease-fire was received from the Arab States.28/

o. RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF JULY 15, 1948

At the 333rd meeting on July 13, the United Nations Mediator made an oral statement explaining and amplifying a written report (S/888) which he had on July 12 submitted to the Council, concerning his activities in connection with the truce and his negotiations for the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine. He concluded by stating that, for the time being, he had exhausted all the powers at his disposal, and that it was up to the Council to adopt measures to put an end to the renewal of hostilities in Palestine.

Without recommending or suggesting any course of action to the Council, the Mediator expressed the following thoughts which might be useful in the solution of the Palestinian problem. The parties must be persuaded that use of force in settling the dispute would not be tolerated; that an order for an immediate cease-fire in Palestine was indispensable; that an order for the demilitarization of Jerusalem should be issued immediately; that the Council must make clear its determination to apply the provisions of Articles 41 and 42 in case these orders were not complied with; that the cease-fire in Palestine and the demilitarization of Jerusalem might lead eventually to an armistice, at which time mediation could be effectively employed, and if found feasible, a plebiscite of the two peoples could be held; and that the Arab refugees who had fled from the Jewish-occupied areas should be ensured of the possibility of returning to their homes.

At the 334th meeting on July 13, the representative of Israel stated that he considered that the Arab States, in resuming their attack upon Israel, had committed an act of aggression within the meaning of Chapter VII. The Arabs, having rejected all the appeals made by the Council and the Mediator for prolongation of the truce, must assume responsibility for their action. On the other hand, the responsibility of the Security Council in the light of the provisions of the Charter and of its previous resolutions was quite clear. Since all previous efforts for pacific settlement under Chapter VI had failed, the Council must proceed now to take action to end the fighting by other means.

The representative of Iraq, who had asked to take part in the discussion at the 334th meeting and who was accordingly invited to the Council table, stated that in defending Palestine the Arabs were defending their honour, their national existence and their future security. The Arab States had no selfish designs in Palestine but had intervened in the highest interests of safeguarding the foundations of the peace of the Middle East. The Arab States welcomed the continuation of the efforts of the Mediator in seeking an equitable solution.

The representative of the United States said that the report submitted by the Mediator and the renewal of the hostilities made it imperative for the Council to take immediate action to stop the fighting. To that end he submitted the following draft resolution (S/890):

"The Security Council,

"Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated his acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution of 7 July 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine,

"Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter,
"Orders the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military and paramilitary forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution,

"Declares that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council;

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned [pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter]29/ to continue to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948;

"Orders as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the City of Jerusalem to take effect twenty-four hours from the time of the adoption of this resolution and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective;

"Instructs the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem and to assure the protection of and access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine;

"Instructs the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce and to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce [since 11 June 1948];30/ authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within his capacity to do so by appropriate local action; and requests him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action;

"Decides that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached."31/

The representative of Syria criticized the first paragraph of the United States draft resolution for putting the blame for the renewal of fighting on the Arabs, thereby disregarding the reasons which had compelled them to reject an extension of the truce. The language used in that paragraph, accusing one party and justifying the other, did not help to secure peace for Palestine. The second paragraph, concerning the finding of the existence of a threat to international peace, was erroneous since it had never been proved that the present situation really constituted an international problem. The international status of Palestine must be clarified and to that end he submitted a draft resolution (S/894), which as slightly revised at the 340th meeting of the Council on July 27 (for discussion at the 340th meeting, see below) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Noting that the United Kingdom terminated its mandate on 15 May 1948, without having established any governmental organization to assume power of administration,

"Requests:

"The International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 96 of the Charter, to give an advisory legal opinion as to the international status of Palestine arising from the termination of the mandate,
"The Secretariat and the parties concerned to supply the Court with the available documents and information on the subject.

"This request should be made provided it will not delay or impair the normal process of mediation."

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation accepted in general the United States draft resolution, which had become necessary in view of the recent developments. The first paragraph of the United States draft resolution contained a simple statement of fact that the Arab States had failed to consent to the prolongation of the truce. Circumstances compelled the Council to proceed to take action along the lines proposed by the United States delegation, and this proposal should not surprise anyone. He submitted two amendments (S/895). The first of these provided that reference should be made in the first paragraph of the resolution to "the other party" rather than to the "Provisional Government of Israel". The second amendment relating to the penultimate paragraph of the resolution was intended to authorize the Mediator to investigate breaches of the truce "since July 11, 1948," as the representative of the United Kingdom considered that it was important to investigate the responsibility for irregularities in the past.

At the 335th meeting on July 14 the representative of Belgium stated that his delegation had endorsed all previous appeals for prolongation of the truce in Palestine because it was convinced of the advantages of a peaceful settlement. He pointed out the difficulties inherent in carrying out any enforcement action pursuant to Chapter VII. Article 42 could not be applied under present circumstances except through the machinery provided for in Article 106, the application of which was extremely doubtful in the light of other events. Despite these and other reservations the Belgian delegation would support the United States draft resolution. He expressed support also for the Syrian draft resolution, considering that if the Arab States believed that a peaceful adjustment as contemplated in the General Assembly's resolution of May 14 could be more easily reached if certain legal aspects of the question were clarified, then the Security Council should endorse such a request.

The representative of Canada said that the Canadian delegation supported the United States draft resolution because it contained elements which were essential to bringing the fighting in Palestine to an end. In the present situation, the Council had no other alternative than to employ Chapter VII. He supported this resolution also in order to provide further opportunity for the Mediator to proceed with the task assigned to him by the General Assembly on May 14.

The representative of China stated that the juridical question pertaining to the status of Palestine was of considerable importance, and an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice would be extremely helpful. As regards the United States draft resolution, he considered that it offered the Arabs no alternative to war, nor a substitute for it. As the resolution was drafted, the truce was to be permanent and what remained was peaceful negotiation. Under the terms of the resolution one party would retain all its gains and would not be urged to start negotiations looking towards a compromise. The Chinese delegation therefore was not ready to accept the United States resolution as it stood.

The United Nations Mediator stated that any action on the part of the Security Council should make it absolutely clear that the United Nations would not permit the Palestine issue to be settled by force. The Council's action, moreover, should be so strong and so firm that neither party could afford to run the risk of ignoring or defying it. He stressed that if the truce were to be prolonged under conditions similar to those which governed the truce which expired on July 9, it would be necessary to have at the disposal of the Mediator within a matter of days a substantial number (i.e., about three hundred) observers, together with a considerable amount of equipment, especially for transport and communications. Referring to the United States draft resolution, he stated that he assumed that the truce called for would be on the same basis as the terms agreed upon for the truce which ended July 9, except for the provision relating to the internment in camps of men of military age who might enter Palestine during the truce. He did not think it would be fair to keep these men in camps for an indefinite period of time. He assured the Council, however, that other arrangements could be devised to ensure that these men would not be trained or mobilized to take part in the fighting, should the truce be broken.

As soon as a new truce went into effect the Mediator would proceed to Palestine to renew his efforts at mediation.

The representative of Egypt recalled that the Mediator's report recognized that the truce was working in favour of the Jewish side. He concurred with the statement made by the representative of China that the United States draft resolution offered the Arabs no alternative or substitute for war. All Arab States were in favour of peace, but they must be reasonably assured that such a peace would not amount to the surrender of their vital interests.

He also objected to the first paragraph of the United States draft resolution as inaccurate and unjust towards the Arabs, and also because of the terms used with regard to the Jewish side. The term "Provisional Government of Israel" had been insisted upon despite the contrary opinion of the majority of the Council. He urged the Council to support the Syrian draft resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal status of Palestine. In conclusion he said that instead of condemning the Arabs as aggressors the Council should concentrate with the help of the Mediator upon modifying and completing truce conditions that would be acceptable to all parties.

At the 336th meeting on July 14, the representative of Israel stated that the use of force by the Arab States should certainly be described as aggression, now after the Arab refusal and the Jewish acceptance of various proposals for ceasing hostilities had been certified by the Mediator, so that no difficulty remained in determining the responsibility or initiative. The first paragraph of the United States draft resolution, however, while containing an accurate record of communications received by the Security Council, did not draw any conclusions from this record. The representative of Israel therefore considered that the paragraph in question did not constitute an adequate response to Arab aggression.

Moreover, he stated, the resolution in its succeeding paragraphs defined as a neutral "threat to the peace" what actually was an act of aggression of one side. And, from this defect of principle, he stated, there ensued in the latter part of the resolution a false equilibrium between attack and defence and an implication that preparation for attack and defence should be equally controlled and impeded.

In particular the representative of Israel objected to the reference to the resolution of May 29, which he considered was obsolete and confusing because it took the Council back to the terms of Chapter VI of the Charter and thus established a barrier against the accurate differentiation between defence and attack, inasmuch as Chapter VI was relevant in case of a dispute between two parties and in terms of a situation for which guilt and responsibility could not be determined.

The Provisional Government of Israel, therefore, while it welcomed the fact that the cease-fire orders contained in the United States resolution were firm and unconditional, regretted that they should be obscured by accompanying appeals to renew arrangements which had been outstripped by events and especially outstripped by the fact of Arab aggression.

The representative of Israel announced that the Provisional Government of Israel had decided that if an order to cease-fire were issued by the Security Council and were complied with by the Arab armies, the forces of Israel would be ordered to cease-fire. The same would be the case if the Council ordered an unconditional cease-fire for Jerusalem.

The representative of France supported the United States draft resolution. He considered that it was based on the true facts of the situation and contained conclusions arising from the determination that a threat to the peace existed in Palestine. He disagreed with the Chinese representative that this resolution would offer nothing to the Arabs. He believed that if a truce were to be established in Palestine, the Mediator would be able to resume his efforts to secure an equitable settlement of the problem. He hesitated, at this stage, to support the Syrian draft resolution, although the French delegation had, in the past, supported similar proposals during the second regular session of the General Assembly. If such a proposal should be adopted, he stressed that it should be clearly understood that the mediation efforts would continue simultaneously with any procedure undertaken before the International Court of Justice.

The representative of Colombia considered that since all previous efforts of the Mediator and the Council had failed, it was the Council's obligation to take another step to restore peace in Palestine. The United States draft resolution was adequate to meet this objective and would be supported by the Colombian delegation. It would support also the United Kingdom amendment to the first paragraph, since the question of recognition of new states was not one to be dealt with by the Council. The Colombian delegation would be prepared to support also, at the appropriate time, the Syrian draft resolution, as another procedure in the search for a peaceful solution to the problem.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. considered it essential to study how successful the last truce had been and what events had taken place while it lasted. In the course of the truce those who had started the hostilities in Palestine had in fact been preparing for the renewal of the fighting. The Mediator had advanced some suggestions which ignored previous decisions of the General Assembly regarding the future of Palestine and which, by reopening the question, had helped to aggravate the situation.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that his delegation would support any proposal which was designed to put an end to military action in Palestine and he therefore supported the appropriate paragraphs of the United States resolution, i.e., paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. The United States resolution as a whole, however, was not fully satisfactory.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. objected to paragraph 5 of the United States resolution on the ground that it placed further responsibility for the settlement of the Palestine problem on the United Nations Mediator, although experience had shown that he was not in a position to solve it. The Council itself should take the responsibility for settling the problem.

Paragraph 7, which must be taken together with the explanations given by the Mediator, would be contrary to the decision adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, to place Jerusalem under a special regime. The representative of the U.S.S.R. submitted an amendment (S/896) to replace paragraph 7 by the following text:

"Proposes to both parties that they immediately withdraw their armed forces from Jerusalem, for which city the special Statute decided upon by the General Assembly should be put into effect."

Paragraph 8 was not acceptable to the U.S.S.R. representative because it again placed responsibility for the question of military observers on the Mediator. Past practice in this respect had led to the result that truce observation had been placed almost exclusively in the hands of United States citizens. The U.S.S.R. delegation considered this practice incorrect.

Finally the representative of the U.S.S.R. objected to paragraph 9 because it hinted at the possibility of the General Assembly's adopting another resolution regarding Palestine. This might be interpreted by some persons as paving the way for the reconsideration of the whole Palestine question at the next regular session of the General Assembly. It was the Security Council's task at the present time, however, to implement the decisions which had been adopted in the past.

The representative of China, amplifying his previous remarks, stated that both parties should be urged to make concessions, and, to that end, he proposed the following amendment (S/897) as an addition to the draft resolution:

"Calls on both parties to seek, in co-operation with the Mediator, a solution through mutual concessions both in regard to the political organization of Palestine and in regard to immigration."

The representative of Egypt considered that the first United Kingdom amendment to the United States draft resolution was inadequate as it failed to mention Jewish violations of the truce and only mentioned what was purported to be successive rejections by the Arabs of all the appeals of the Security Council and of the Mediator for a renewal of the cease-fire. There was but a single case, he stated, in which the Arabs had declined to renew or accept a cease-fire. The Arabs were still considering their answer to the Mediator's appeal for an unconditional cease-fire for ten days. The whole first paragraph of the United States draft resolution lacked equilibrium and disregarded Arab difficulties in renewing the truce. The Arabs should not be asked to accept the impossible without being given some assurance as to how this truce would be used. Past experience had shown, he said, that the Jews had profited substantially from the ceasefire. He criticized the U.S.S.R. representative's amendment and his statement, which appeared to disregard everything that had happened since November 29, 1947, and ignored completely the decisions taken by the Security Council and by the General Assembly on April 17, May 14 and May 29.

The Chinese amendment on the other hand, was, in the opinion of the Egyptian representative, a constructive step aimed at re-establishing an equilibrium in the United States resolution.

The representative of Argentina said that his delegation for the time being was opposed to the application of Chapter VII and to measures of coercion, but would vote for such measures as might lead to the suspension of hostilities. He supported unreservedly proposals concerning the safety of the city of Jerusalem.

The representative of Syria stated that so far all sacrifices were demanded from the Arabs, and the Jews were left free to act as they wished. The Jews should be put on the same level as the other side and pressed to make concessions in order to reach a settlement. In this spirit, he supported the Chinese amendment, which offered some opportunity for finding a just political settlement for Palestine.

At the 338th meeting on July 15, the representative of the United States, referring to the observations of the representative of the U.S.S.R. on the fifth and eighth paragraphs of the United States draft resolution, explained that his Government had complete confidence in the abilities of the Mediator to fulfil his task with the maximum possibility of success. With regard to the seventh paragraph he considered that the withdrawal of the forces of both parties from Jerusalem was implicit in the provisions for demilitarization. His delegation was prepared to re-phrase this paragraph if such an adjustment would satisfy the U.S.S.R. representative. With regard to the ninth paragraph he stated that it was clear that the Security Council and the General Assembly might, if circumstances required it, adopt some new resolutions on the Palestine question. The main objective of that paragraph, however, was to assure that the truce would remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine had been reached.

The representative of Israel criticized the Chinese amendment, which implied that the Arabs should receive a reward for refraining from hostilities. Referring to certain questions of detail which had been raised in the course of the discussion concerning the contemplated truce, he stated that there was no point in considering the nature and the scope of the co-operation to be sought from all governments and authorities concerned under paragraph 5 of the United States draft resolution until the preliminary and fundamental question raised by this draft resolution had been determined, i.e., the question of the readiness of the Arab Governments to order a cease-fire. He had previously announced, he stated, the readiness of the Provisional Government of Israel to order a cease-fire and the world was now awaiting the Arab answer to that primary question.

The President, speaking as the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R., considered that the Mediator's actions and suggestions submitted to the parties were responsible to a large extent for the renewal of hostilities. They were in contradiction to the Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, and jeopardized the legitimate interests of one party. His latest suggestion regarding a plebiscite would be tantamount to the liquidation of Israel and, of course, could never be accepted.

He criticized United Kingdom and United States policy in Palestine, and stated that the Ukrainian S.S.R. delegation, which firmly supported the immediate cessation of military action in Palestine, could not accede to those paragraphs of the United States draft resolution which openly undermined the authority of the United Nations and its decisions. Nor could his delegation support the Syrian draft resolution, which would remove the Palestine question from the competence of the United Nations.

The Council then proceeded to vote on the United States draft resolution paragraph by paragraph.

The representative of Syria submitted an amendment (S/901) to replace the first paragraph of the United States resolution by the following text:

"Taking into consideration the report of the United Nations Mediator dated 12 July 1948 (S/888)."

This amendment was rejected by 4 votes in favour (Argentina, Belgium, China, Syria), with 7 abstentions. The United Kingdom amendment to the first paragraph of the United States resolution providing for the deletion of the reference to the "Provisional Government of Israel" was then rejected by a vote of 3 (Belgium, Colombia, United Kingdom) to 1 (Syria), with 7 abstentions. The first paragraph of the United States resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 to 1 (Syria), with 2 abstentions (Argentina, China).

The second paragraph was adopted by the same vote.

Concerning the third paragraph of the United States resolution, the Mediator expressed doubt as to whether it would be possible to have an adequate organization to supervise the truce set up within three days, the time limit which was fixed in the United States resolution for the coming into effect of the truce. The representative of Canada therefore submitted an amendment stating that the truce should "take effect at such early date as the Mediator, taking into account his responsibilities for supervising the observation of the truce, may determine and notify to the respective parties". This amendment was rejected by 5 votes in favour (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia) with 6 abstentions. The third paragraph of the United States resolution was then adopted by a vote of 9 to 1 (Syria), with 1 abstention (Argentina). The phrase "pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations" was first put to the vote separately at the request of the representative of Argentina and was adopted by a vote of 8 to 1 (Syria), with 2 abstentions (Argentina, China).

The fourth paragraph was adopted also by a vote of 8 to 1, with 2 abstentions.

The phrase "pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter" in the fifth paragraph of the resolution was again voted separately and was rejected by a vote of 6 to 1 (Syria), with 4 abstentions (Argentina, China, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.). Subject to this amendment paragraph 5 was adopted by 9 votes in favour, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

Paragraph 6 was adopted unanimously.

The U.S.S.R. amendment to paragraph 7 (S/896) was rejected by a vote of 2 in favour (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.) to 1 (Syria), with 8 abstentions. The original text of the United states resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 in favour, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

Paragraph 8 of the United States resolution was adopted by a vote of 9 in favour, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), after the representative of the United States had accepted the United Kingdom amendment to insert a reference to breaches of the truce "since 11 June 1948".

The last paragraph of the United States draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 to 1, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

The Council then discussed the Chinese amendment to add an appeal to the parties to seek in co-operation with the Mediator a solution through mutual concessions both in regard to the political organization of Palestine and in regard to immigration (S/897). After some discussion the representative of China accepted an alternative text proposed by the representative of the United States, as follows:

"Reiterates the appeal to the parties contained in the last paragraph of its resolution of 22 May32/ and urges upon the parties that they continue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully."

The Council adopted this text by a vote of 9 in favour, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).

By 8 votes in favour, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), the Council finally adopted two additional paragraphs proposed by the Secretariat, which read as follows:

"Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 May and under this resolution; and

"Requests that the Secretary-General make appropriate arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the obligations arising from this resolution."

The amended United States resolution (S/902) as a whole was then adopted on July 15, 1948, by a vote of 7 to 1 (Syria), with 3 abstentions (Argentina, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.).33/

p. ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES OF THE TRUCE RENEWAL

By a cablegram dated July 16 (S/903) the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel informed the United Nations that the Provisional Government had decided to comply with the Security Council's request for a resumption of the truce in Palestine and for an immediate unconditional cease-fire in Jerusalem contained in the Council's resolution of July 15 (S/902). The Provisional Government of Israel would issue the necessary orders as soon as it was notified that all Arab Governments and authorities concerned had likewise accepted the truce in Palestine and the immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem and had issued orders for these arrangements to take effect.

In a cablegram dated July 17, 1948 (S/906), the Secretary-General of the Arab League informed the United Nations that as evidence of their great concern for the safety of the Holy Places the Arab States had decided to accept that part of the Security Council's resolution of July 15 concerning the cease-fire in Jerusalem.

A further telegram dated July 18 (S/908) from the Secretary-General of the Arab League, in reply to the Security Council's resolution of July 15, stated that the Arab Governments were surprised at the attitude the Security Council had adopted in regarding the situation in Palestine as a threat to the peace subject to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and entailing the application of sanctions against the Arab States if they refused to cease-fire in Palestine. The telegram went on to state that, had it not been for the military intervention of the Arab States in response to the appeal of the Palestinian Arabs to put an end to the anarchy caused by the Zionist terrorist bands, security throughout the Middle East would have been seriously jeopardized. To call the deliverers of Palestine, therefore, the aggressors and to describe the gradual restoration of order in Palestine by the Arab States as a breach of the peace and violation of the Charter would, in the opinion of the Arab States, be a complete reversal of the true position.

Repeating Arab charges that the Zionists had violated the previous truce and that they had benefitted by it at the expense of the Arabs, the Secretary-General of the Arab League informed the Security Council that the Arab States felt that a renewed truce must be subject to conditions which would remedy the situation which obtained during the four-week truce. These conditions included the following: that all Jewish immigration should be stopped during the truce and that Arab refugees be enabled to return home and that their lives and property be guaranteed; also that the duration of the truce should be limited with a view to making a last effort to reach the peaceful solution desired.

The telegram then stated that in view of the fact that the Security Council persisted in considering the continuation of hostilities in Palestine to be a breach of the peace and because it expressly threatened to apply sanctions to the Arab States if they refused to cease-fire, the Arab States had no other alternative than to accept the Security Council's resolution of July 15. The cessation of hostilities, however, would not bring true peace to that part of the world, the Arab States declared.

Finally the Arab States through the Secretary-General of the Arab League protested against the fact that the Security Council's resolution had "recognized the Zionist bands as a provisional government" and asserted that such recognition went beyond the limits of neutrality which the Security Council should observe in regard to the conflict in Palestine.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of the resolution of July 15, the Mediator informed the parties by a cablegram dated July 16 (S/907) that the cease-fire would take effect at 3 P.M., G.M.T., on July 18. In response, the Arab States and the Provisional Government of Israel informed the Mediator that they had issued the requisite cease-fire orders to their forces (S/907).

The Syrian proposal, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion regarding the post-Mandate status of Palestine (S/894),34/ was considered further by the Security Council at its 339th and 340th meetings on July 27, 1948.

The representative of Syria declared that while there were undoubtedly political aspects to the Palestine question there was an even more fundamental legal issue regarding the exact status of Palestine in international law. The Court itself could refuse to consider the request for an advisory opinion if it agreed with those who thought the Palestine problem was first and foremost a political issue. Referring the question to the Court, moreover, need not at all delay the conciliatory efforts of the United Nations Mediator. As things now stood the Arabs felt that the United Nations had passed an illegal resolution on the partition of Palestine and they were defending what they regarded as an eminently just cause. But if, the representative of Syria concluded, the International Court of Justice should, contrary to expectations, hold that the Arabs were wrong, then, no doubt, "all the opposing and conflicting parties would submit and yield to that resolution".

The representative of Colombia proposed to add a new paragraph to the Syrian proposal to the effect that the request for an advisory opinion from the Court should be made provided it would not "delay or impair the normal process of mediation". With such a formula, he observed, the actual decision to approach the Court and the timing of that decision could, if desired, be delegated to the Mediator himself.

The Syrian representative accepted the Colombian amendment, and the amended draft resolution was supported by the representatives of Argentina, United Kingdom, China and Egypt.

Opposition to the proposal was expressed by the representatives of Canada, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Israel. The representatives of Canada and the United States felt that the draft resolution could not but hinder and delay the process of mediation, thus serving no useful purpose. The representative of the U.S.S.R. saw in the Syrian proposal a "belated and ill-masked attempt to turn back the clock" on Palestine.

The representative of Israel held that the question of the existence of a State of Israel was not a question of law but rather of fact; besides, he stated, the question of statehood was irrelevant to the issue of aggression, since the Charter did not specify that an act of international aggression, to constitute aggression, need be directed against a state. Recalling that Syria had opposed an approach to the International Court of Justice in the disputes involving the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Indonesia and the treatment of Indians in South Africa, and further that all Arab States had withheld their support from the Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, recommending more frequent recourse in general to the Court, the representative of Israel stated that the proposal to refer the Palestine question to the Court took on the aspect of a political manoeuvre which must inevitably further becloud the whole problem.

The Syrian resolution as amended by the representative of Colombia was then put to a vote. It failed of adoption, receiving 6 votes in favour, 1 against (Ukrainian S.S.R.), and 4 abstentions (Canada, France, U.S.S.R., United States).

q. QUESTIONS OF TRUCE VIOLATIONS

Dispersed throughout the Council's consideration of the Palestine question were discussions arising out of truce violations reported by the Mediator and allegations of such violations by the two parties concerned.

In a dispatch to the Council (S/955) on August 7, the Mediator reported that he had instructed his Observers to be guided by a number of considerations, the most important of which was that no party might unilaterally put an end to the truce, or take retaliatory measures for alleged or real local breaches of the truce, the Security Council alone being competent to decide what measures should be taken against truce violators. Should one party find itself under unprovoked attack, it should limit its self-defence to operations necessary to repulse such attack, pending action by the Observers. Whatever the result of operations undertaken in self-defence, the status quo ante must be restored.

The Mediator also reported that the situation in Jerusalem was "particularly tense", with sniping continuing. He stated that he had urged both parties to begin negotiations aimed at demilitarizing Jerusalem, under the auspices of United Nations representatives. Such negotiations would soon start.

In a subsequent communication (S/961) dated August 12, the Mediator informed the Council that he had requested both Arab and Jewish commanders in Jerusalem to issue the following order:

"Firing of any kind even in answer to firing by the other party shall be forbidden as from Friday, 13 August, at 4:00 A.M. Arab time (6 A.M. Jewish time).

The Arabs had accepted this request, and the Mediator expected a Jewish answer the following day (August 13). The Mediator added:

"Should the request not be complied with by one party after it has been accepted, responsibilities will be easier to assess. It results from impartial reports that the Jews have generally speaking though not on all occasions been the more aggressive party since the renewal of the truce. Reports received from United Nations observers concerning last night's [August 11/12] firing support this appreciation, since firing began from the Jewish side."

As regards the water supply of Jerusalem, the Mediator, in the same report, declared that repairs to the Latrun water pumping station, then "in United Nations hands", were to start at once and were expected to be completed in two days.

The Mediator declared that he had informed the Provisional Government of Israel of his decision that the Arab inhabitants of the villages of Ajanjul and Buweiriya must be permitted to return to their homes unarmed, following the immediate evacuation of both places, which, investigation had shown, had been occupied by Jewish forces following the commencement of the second truce. He expected strongly that the Provisional Government of Israel would accept this decision.

Shortly afterwards, i.e., on the same date of August 12, the Mediator cabled (S/963) that the Latrun pumping station had been completely destroyed during the night of August 11/12, by Arab irregulars, according to first reports. Pending an investigation now in progress, he had authorized the Provisional Government of Israel to postpone compliance with his decision regarding the Israeli evacuation of Ajanjul and Buweiriya villages in the Latrun sector.

The Council was also notified of the wrecking of the Latrun pumping station in a cablegram, dated August 12, by Moshe Shertok, Israeli Foreign Minister.

The subject matters dealt with in these communications were discussed by the Council at its 349th meeting on August 13. Eventually the Council decided, by a vote of 8 to 1, with 2 abstentions, to authorize the President to dispatch a message to the Mediator informing him that the Security Council had taken note of the telegram of August 12, concerning the destruction of the water pumping station at Latrun, and asking him to make all efforts and take steps to ensure water supply to the population of Jerusalem.35/

The negative vote was cast by the representative of Syria, who explained that he disagreed with the practice of singling out from the Mediator's communications the one topic of the Jerusalem water supply, rather than offer the Council's comments on all the important matters raised in the Mediator's dispatches, as, for example, the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The representatives of China and Argentina abstained, the former explaining that he regarded the dispatch of the message to the Mediator as superfluous.

The question of the truce, as such, was broached at the 352nd meeting on August 18, by the representative of the United States. Noting rumours that one or the other of the two parties to the Palestine dispute was considering an abrogation of the truce, he stated that, in the view of his Government, the truce could be terminated only by the Security Council and not by one of the states or a group of the states concerned. He was not aware, the United States representative continued, of any circumstances which would incline the Security Council to revoke or modify its resolution of July 15 unless it should be necessary to order measures under Chapter VII against any party which repudiated the truce and resorted to war.

He also emphasized that both parties were under obligation to co-operate with the Mediator regarding the demilitarization of Jerusalem. Finally, he stated his belief that the Security Council would also wish to remind all governments in the world that they were called upon by the resolution of July 15, which included a reference to the resolution of May 29, to co-operate in preventing breaches of the truce which might occur through shipments of war material to Palestine.

The representative of Canada said the Council could not let pass unnoticed a statement released to the press by the representative of Israel as coming from the Israeli Foreign Minister on August 13 which contained the suggestion that the truce in Palestine might not be continued. In this connection the Canadian representative associated himself with the remarks of the representative of the United States, as did also the representative of Belgium.

Commenting upon these statements, the representative of Israel declared, inter alia, that the Provisional Government of Israel had advocated the early replacement of the truce by peace negotiations. So long as the truce was in force, however, the Provisional Government of Israel would observe it in strict accordance with the resolution of July 15. At the same time, the Provisional Government of Israel would urge the Council to investigate the merit of fixing an early time limit, at the end of which the whole situation of the truce might be reconsidered. Before the expiration of this time limit every influence should be brought to bear upon the parties concerned to open direct and peaceful negotiations. His Government, the representative of Israel said, was most anxious and willing to begin peace negotiations at any time.

At the 354th meeting on August 19, the Council examined a cable dated August 18 from the Mediator (S/977), which stated, inter alia, that not only had firing practically never ceased in Jerusalem, but the situation there was gradually getting out of hand. Under prevailing conditions it was difficult to assess responsibilities because both parties had come deliberately to ignore the authority of the United Nations. Further deterioration of the situation in Jerusalem might lead to a general resumption of hostilities. The Mediator therefore requested that the Security Council take prompt action with a view to giving effect to its resolution of July 15. Should the action of the Security Council take the form of warning, he suggested that it should clearly be pointed out to the parties

(1) that responsibility would be assessed whether violations were due to members of opposing armies or to dissident elements or irregulars;

(2) that each party had a duty to bring to justice its own dissident elements and irregulars when they violated the truce;

(3) that reprisals and retaliations were not permitted;

(4) that no party would be allowed to gain by any violation of truce.

In connection with this cable from the Mediator, the representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States jointly introduced a draft resolution (S/981) embodying the Mediator's suggestions. The resolution read:

"The Security Council,

"Taking into account communications from the Mediator concerning the situation in Jerusalem,

"Directs the attention of the governments and authorities concerned to the Resolution of the Security Council of 15 July 1948, and
"Decides pursuant to its Resolution of 15 July 1948, and so informs the governments and authorities concerned, that:

"(a) Each party is responsible for the actions of both regular and irregular forces operating under its authority or in territory under its control;

"(b) Each party has the obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating the Truce by individuals or groups who are subject to its authority or who are in territory under its control;

"(c) Each party has the obligation to bring to speedy trial and in case of conviction to punishment any and all persons within their jurisdiction who are involved in a breach of the Truce;

"(d) No party is permitted to violate the Truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party;

"(e) No party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the Truce."

Referring to sub-paragraph (d) of the joint draft resolution, the representative of Israel stated his belief that if this provision was to be interpreted as not being in conflict with an earlier ruling of the Mediator, i.e., that a party finding itself under unprovoked attack should limit its self-defence to operations necessary to repulse such attack pending action by United Nations Observers, he shared the belief of the sponsors of the proposal that the substance of the joint draft resolution was not controversial. In passing he welcomed the shift of the Mediator's opinion regarding the responsibility for the hostilities in Jerusalem, noting that whereas the Mediator had previously (see above) inclined to the view that the Jews had proved to be more aggressive, he now held both parties equally responsible.

The representative of the United States confirmed the correctness of the Israeli representative's understanding of the sub-paragraph (d) of the draft resolution:

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. stated that he could not see much point in adopting the draft resolution. The Mediator's cable, he declared, showed the failure of that United Nations official. The present draft resolution would not change matters greatly.

The representative of the U.S.S.R., indicating similar scepticism, declared that he could accept the resolution through sub-paragraph (b), but could not support sub-paragraphs (d) and (e), which were needlessly repetitious of earlier resolutions, while sub-paragraph (c) might be thought to be in conflict with the "domestic jurisdiction" clause of the Charter (Article 2, paragraph 7).

The representative of Egypt held that the draft resolution erred mostly by omission inasmuch as the Zionists had received huge amounts of armaments and other military assets, in violation of the truce; yet the ban on such contraband material was not singled out for emphasis in the proposal; also it contained nothing about Arab refugees, despite the urgency of their plight.

Upon being submitted to the vote, the draft resolution up to and including sub-paragraph (b) was adopted by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 abstention (Syria). Sub-paragraphs (c) and (e) were approved by separate but identical votes of 8 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), while sub-paragraph (d) was approved by a vote of 7 to 0, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.). The draft resolution as a whole was declared approved, without being submitted to a vote as such.

The representative of Syria declared that he had abstained from voting because he had opposed the resolution of July 15, to which the present resolution referred, and also because it made no mention of refugees nor of the demilitarization of Jerusalem, although the Mediator had indicated the importance of those two points, which the Syrian representative himself considered to be essential to the preservation of the truce and to any final peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the representative of China, referring to a communication from the Mediator (S/979) dated August 19, dealing with the demilitarization of Jerusalem, asked whether the Council was content to accept without comment the statement of the Mediator that he entertained serious doubts whether demilitarization could be obtained in the near future.

The Mediator's doubts were due to his belief that the difficulties of reaching agreement on the demilitarization resulted more from political reasons relating to the future status of Jerusalem than from mere military considerations regarding the present conflict.

The representative of China suggested that the Council might wish to request the Mediator to redouble his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of Jerusalem in spite of all the difficulties. He was supported by the representative of France, and there was no opposition to the Chinese suggestion.

The Council resolved not to meet again, except in an emergency, until its members reconvened in Paris, in September.

A further meeting the 356th was, however, convened on August 30 by the President to consider a communication (S/985) from the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel, requesting an interpretation of sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of the resolution adopted on August 19 (see above).36/ After an exchange of views, the Council failed to adopt the agenda, only two members (U.S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R.) voting in favour, the remaining nine members abstaining on the ground that the agenda did not warrant emergency consideration. Before the meeting was adjourned, the Council was informed that two French observers in Palestine Captain Jennel of the French Air Force and Lieutenant-Colonel Queru of the French Army had been killed at Gaza (Palestine) on August 28. The Council expressed its sympathy and condolences to the families of the two officers and to the French Government.

r. QUESTION OF REFUGEES

At the 343rd meeting of the Security Council on August 2, 1948, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government felt strongly that there were two aspects of the Palestine problem that directly affected the chances of finding a solution for it: the fate of the large number of displaced persons in Europe for whom no home had yet been found; and the existence of a large body of Arab refugees in Palestine itself and in adjacent countries.

While there remained in European displaced persons camps some 200,000 Jews, the number of Arab refugees was estimated to be at least 250,000, with other estimates ranging as high as 550,000. Of the Arab refugees about four fifths had sought shelter in Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, the remainder in Arab-held parts of Palestine.

The representative of the United Kingdom hoped the Security Council would impress upon the Mediator the gravity and importance of the Arab refugee problem. Although the Mediator was aware of the matter and had begun to give it his consideration, it might strengthen his hand if the Council were to lay special emphasis upon it.

The question of short-term relief for the Arab refugees, the representative of the United Kingdom considered, was particularly urgent. As a first step, he therefore suggested that the Council ask the International Red Cross to send a small party at once to Palestine and the neighbouring Arab States to examine the scope of the problem and formulate recommendations. Should these recommendations, as might be anticipated, include a request for additional relief funds, the United Kingdom would be willing to provide its due share, on the assumption that other countries would also make appropriate contributions. In fact, the Government of the United Kingdom would be ready to advance up to £100,000 immediately in order to enable the investigation to start without delay or to provide urgently needed tents and medical supplies.

The President thought the Council would wish to obtain information from the Mediator in connection with the questions raised by the representative of the United Kingdom, adding that he deemed it appropriate to transmit the text of the latter's statement to the Mediator. It might then prove possible for the Mediator to solve the question with the participation of Israeli and Arab authorities, obviating the need for further Council consideration.

The United Kingdom representative indicated that this suggestion was acceptable to him, but hoped that in forwarding his own statement to the Mediator, the Council might wish to endorse what he had said about the grave importance of the question of Arab refugees.

The representative of Syria agreed that the problem of Arab refugees stood in "very intimate connection and relation with the peace and security in Palestine". The majority of the refugees, he stated, had been expelled from their homes before May 15, i.e., before the termination of the Mandate and before the Arab States had "interfered militarily in Palestine". Indeed the Arab States had expressly stated that one of the reasons for their interference had been their desire to bring about the repatriation of those refugees. He agreed with the suggestion of the President to call the Mediator's attention to the statement and suggestions made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R., while agreeing to the President's suggestion, further suggested that requests for information, both as regards Arab and Jewish displaced persons, including Jews in camps on the island of Cyprus, be addressed to the governments and authorities concerned.

The representative of Israel stated that he intended to raise the question of the Cyprus internees before the Council. As for the Arab refugees, he said the matter was being discussed between the Mediator and the Provisional Government of Israel. The latter had already explained why, in its view, a full settlement of that problem was not feasible during the truce when a renewal of hostilities might still be expected.

The representative of France said he had no objection to the course suggested by the President and the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. He considered, however, that in communicating with the Mediator about the United Kingdom statement the impression should not be created that he would be expected to deal with the question of refugees as a matter of priority. The question was part and parcel of the whole settlement which the Mediator was supposed to seek.

The representative of Egypt recalled that the Mediator in reply to a question had stated on July 14 in the Security Council that, in his opinion, "there should not be any conditions whatsoever for the Arab refugees to return to their homes, if they wish to do so". Apparently this view was being challenged by the "Zionist spokesman" and the representative of France, who had referred to the Arab refugee problem as being related to other aspects of the Palestine truce. The representative of Egypt held that the Mediator had been right on this point and that there could be no question of attaching any conditions to the return of the Arab refugees who had been driven from their homes.

The Egyptian representative also referred to the "driving away from the table of the Security Council the representative of the Arabs of Palestine". This, he held, was no mere point of procedure, but one of substance: to justify the continued practice37/ which had led to the absence of the representative of the Arab Higher Committee on the grounds that it had become "established" appeared to be untenable. The representative of Egypt regarded this question as still open, saying he would welcome an opportunity of discussing it.

The President denied that the representative of the Arab Higher Committee had ever been driven from the Council table; on the contrary, he had been, and was being, invited to attend every meeting on the Palestine question, and if he chose not to do so, the fault was not the Council's.

At the conclusion of the 343rd meeting the President, summing up the questions which had been raised, stated that "information should be requested from the Governments and authorities concerned and of the Mediator regarding all four items which were raised today; these being the displaced persons of Jewish nationality in Europe, Arab refugees, and the matter of the Jews detained by the United Kingdom authorities in a camp in Cyprus".

Replies to letters sent by the Acting Secretary-General on August 3, 1948, requesting information regarding (i) Jewish displaced persons in Europe, (ii) Arab displaced persons in Palestine and adjacent countries, (iii) assistance to such Arab displaced persons and (iv) the Cyprus internees, were received from the United Nations Mediator (S/948, S/964), the Arab Higher Committee (S/957) and the Provisional Government of Israel (S/946, S/949, S/965). The Council also received a communication (S/962) from the representative of the United Kingdom stating that his Government had notified the Mediator of its readiness to provide for the relief of Arab refugees tentage and medical supplies from British military stocks in the Middle East up to £100,000.

The positions of those who replied to the four questions may be summed up briefly as follows:

(i) Jewish Displaced Persons.

In the opinion of the Arab Higher Committee the problem of the refugees in Europe had no relation to the Palestine problem.

In the opinion of the Provisional Government of Israel, Jewish refugees in Europe, estimated to number 250,000, should be permitted to immigrate into Palestine.

The Mediator did not comment upon the question of Jewish displaced persons in Europe in his reply to the Security Council.

(ii) and (iii) Arab Displaced Persons and Assistance to Them.

According to the Arab Higher Committee, some 550,000 Palestinian Arabs had been forced to leave their homes as a result of Jewish attacks. About 300,000 Arabs from Palestine had sought refuge in neighbouring Arab countries; the remaining 250,000 were still living in Palestine. The great majority of these refugees were penniless and not in a position to earn their livelihood.

According to the Provisional Government of Israel, the number of Arab refugees was about 300,000. Most of these, it was stated, had left Palestine during recent months in the wake of the war launched against Israel by neighbouring Arab States, partly in obedience to direct orders by local Arab military commanders, and partly as a result of the panic campaign spread among Palestinian Arabs by the leaders of the invading Arab States. Before a peace settlement was reached, Israel would be unable to readmit Arab refugees apart from exceptional cases on compassionate grounds, as their return would create a most acute security and economic problem. The refugee question could come up for a permanent constructive solution only as part of the general peace settlement and with due regard to Jewish counter-claims for the destruction of life and property caused by Arab aggression as well as to the position of Jewish communities in Arab countries and other relevant considerations.

The United Nations Mediator expressed the view that the right of the refugees to return to their homes at the earliest practicable date should be affirmed. At the same time he stated that he was taking active steps to give prompt aid to "the refugee victims of this conflict", and would call upon all appropriate international organizations and agencies for assistance.

(iv) The Cyprus Internees.

The Arab Higher Committee stated that the refugees in Cyprus were illegal Jewish immigrants who had tried to land in Palestine during the period of the Mandate. They should be returned to their country of origin or place of embarkation. Moreover, during the past year all women and children previously held in Cyprus had been admitted to Palestine. Those who remained were able-bodied young men who were purposely picked from militarily trained groups. It would be a violation of the letter and spirit of the Security Council's truce resolution to allow them to proceed to Palestine in order to increase Jewish manpower and fighting personnel.

According to the Provisional Government of Israel, the refusal to permit the 7,500 men between the ages of 18 and 45 years held in Cyprus to proceed to Palestine was contrary to the terms of the Security Council's resolution of May 29, which allowed men of military age to enter the country provided that they were not conscripted nor trained for military service. The Mediator had not requested detention of these refugees as essential for the maintenance of the truce. The Provisional Government of Israel therefore protested against this "lawless procedure" and breach of the truce agreement.

The Mediator expressed the opinion that the admission to Palestine of Jewish refugees detained in Cyprus must be governed by general rules in force concerning the observation of the truce, particularly regarding non-admission of fighting personnel and conditions for the admission of men of military age.

At the 349th meeting of the Security Council on August 13, the representative of Egypt and Syria supported the views contained in the reply of the Arab Higher Committee, and urged the Council to devote greater and more urgent attention to these matters. The representative of Israel elaborated upon the views expressed in the reply of the Provisional Government with regard to Cyprus. He challenged the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom that British policy concerning Cyprus was entirely consonant with the relevant terms of the successive truce resolutions of the Council.

The question of the Arab refugees was again discussed in the course of the Council's 352nd meeting On August 18. The representative of the U.S.S.R. declared that the responsibility for the plight of the Arab refugees must be shared in varying degrees by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Arab States, because of their overt or covert attempts to undermine the General Assembly's partition resolution of November 29, 1947. The refugee problem, he considered, could only be solved by implementing this resolution.

The representative of Egypt expressed the hope that the Security Council would do something about the refugee problem very soon so as not to allow "the seeds of trouble to take root and grow".

The representative of Belgium considered that the Security Council would fail in its duty if it did not try to settle this question in the very near future.

In the course of the 354th meeting on August 19, the Security Council agreed to a suggestion of the representative of the United Kingdom that the records of the Council's discussion on the displaced persons aspect of the Palestine problem be transmitted at once to the Economic and Social Council and the International Refugee Organization. The United Kingdom representative stated that his Government would shortly submit to the Council in writing certain details and figures showing what the United Kingdom had done to shoulder its share of the common burden. He urged the Council to take prompt action to furnish relief to both Arab and Jewish displaced persons lest the difficulties of the Council's task in Palestine be aggravated.

s. ABDUCTION OF FIVE BRITISH NATIONALS

In a message dated July 14, 1948 (S/898), the Palestine Truce Commission informed the Security Council that the Acting Manager and four other members of the staff of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation, all of them British nationals, had been arrested on July 6 by members of the dissident Irgun Zvai Leumi who had posed as Jewish Army personnel and that these five men had been held ever since, despite protests by the Chairman of the Truce Commission.

The Irgun Zvai Leumi was said to be collecting evidence of spying against the five British members of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation, while Jewish authorities were reported to be negotiating to have them handed over to the government at Tel Aviv.

If the Jews would not release the five staff members within a reasonable time, then the Commission would, it had informed the Jews, ask the Security Council to take such action as it deemed appropriate.

(In May 1948 the members of the Truce Commission had agreed to afford the protection of their respective flags to the Jerusalem Electric Corporation's local power station. The five officials were said to have been arrested on the premises of that power station, thus involving the question of United Nations authority.)

In a subsequent message (S/905), dated July 16, the Truce Commission informed the Security Council that no satisfactory reply had been received from the Jews and the Commission therefore was now handing the problem over to the Security Council for appropriate action.

In a further communication (S/915, p. 3 (VI)), the Chairman of the Truce Commission, under date of July 17, informed the Council that the five abducted men had been turned over to the Commandant of the Jewish forces at Jerusalem the previous day, presumably to be taken immediately to Tel Aviv for trial by a military court.

The question of the abduction of the five British nationals was raised at the 340th meeting of the Security Council, on July 27, by the representative of the United Kingdom. He declared that his Government regarded the incident as being of urgent importance and one which constituted an affront to the prestige of the Truce Commission, and, through it, of the United Nations. Among the issues raised by the matter, he said, was the question of whether the Jewish authorities in Tel Aviv claimed to exercise, or did in fact exercise, any control at all over organizations such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi. If so, then the Council would surely be entitled to ask the Jewish representative whether his authorities could give any promise that the security of individuals of whatever nationality, and the inviolability of premises protected by the special authority of the United Nations, would be respected in the future. He also wished to know if the Jewish authorities in Tel Aviv had authorized the abductions, before or after they occurred, and whether they were now condoning them in any way.

The representative of the United Kingdom then presented a draft resolution (S/923) which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the messages sent by the Palestine Truce Commission on 14, 15 and 17 July on the subject of the five employees of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation abducted by the Irgun Zvai Leumi,

"Supports the demand of the Truce Commission for the release of the five men and calls for their surrender to the Truce Commission in Jerusalem."

The representative of Israel stated that the main concern of the Provisional Government of Israel following the taking into custody of the five men "by certain forces in Jerusalem", had been to bring these men under "authorized control". The sole point at issue, it appeared to him, was whether jurisdiction to investigate the conduct of the five detained men belonged to the Provisional Government of Israel or to the Truce Commission. He doubted that the Security Council could, at this stage, pronounce itself on this conflict of jurisdiction.

While the Provisional Government of Israel had not been in any way associated with the arrest of the five men, nevertheless, once they had come within its custody and jurisdiction, it appeared that the charges against them could not be entirely and immediately ignored, and constituted a prima facie case for further investigation.

As to the Truce Commission, the Provisional Government of Israel was of the opinion that it had no judicial rights or functions in any part of Palestinian territory, that it could not confer immunity on anybody not in its direct employ and that it was not competent to exercise functions of custody or investigation.

The wisest course under the circumstances would be, the representative of Israel stated, to allow the judicial processes now under way to take their course, the more so since they were proceeding in public. In this connection he informed the Council that when the five men had appeared before a civil court in Tel Aviv on July 27, the court had ruled that unless more specific charges could be adduced within a brief period of time, the case of the prosecution would be deemed insufficient and the men would be released forthwith.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. held that the matter was one within the domestic jurisdiction of Israel and was therefore not within the Council's competence.

The representative of the United States, noting that the safety of the five men now seemed assured, since they were in the custody of the Provisional Government of Israel and could rely on fair judicial processes, stated that the Security Council might feel that it was not necessary to adopt the resolution suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom either for the purpose of assuring the safety of these individuals or for the purposes of maintaining the authority and prestige of the Truce Commission.

The representative of Syria expressed his full support of the United Kingdom draft resolution, which he considered very moderate and which, he stated, he had never thought would meet with any opposition from any Council member. A similar view was expressed by the representative of Belgium.

The representative of the U.S.S.R., sharing the views of the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R., held that the matter was outside the Council's competence, being entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State of Israel. Therefore, he said, he could not support the United Kingdom proposal.

The representative of France, declaring that he was not in a position to vote on the United Kingdom draft resolution, asked that a decision thereon be postponed. He stated that the matter offered some grave difficulties from a legal point of view, one of these being that it did not seem to be the role of the Truce Commission to grant protection to British subjects any more than, for instance, to French subjects, or Ukrainian subjects or any other citizens.

The representative of the United Kingdom declared that he had no objection to a postponement of a vote on his proposal, as suggested by the representative of France.

At the 343rd meeting of the Council on August 2, two communications bearing on the question were read. The first (S/936/Corr.1) was a letter from the representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, stating that the law governing the trial of the five men was that in force during the British Mandate, since no new enactments had been made "relevant to this branch of legislation" and enumerating in detail the measures which the courts of Israel were applying.

The letter also stated that the Provisional Government of Israel regarded this case as being sub judice, and accordingly considered that it would be contrary to legal principle to comment on the merits of the case itself.

The second communication (S/937) likewise from the representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, informed the Council that, contrary to what had been stated in the previous discussion, it had now been established that the five men had not been taken from the power station of the Jerusalem Electric Corporation itself, i.e., from the building under the protection of the Truce Commission, but from their nearby private dwellings. This, the representative of Israel declared, made it clear that no issue affecting the status of the Truce Commission or of United Nations premises arose at all.

Both the representatives of the United Kingdom and of the Provisional Government of Israel declared that they had no further information on the question of the five British nationals, and the Council decided to defer consideration until a later date, after the representative of the United Kingdom, in reply to a question asked by the President and arising out of a statement by the Ukrainian representative that the latter would like to see the question dropped from the agenda, declared that he was not prepared to withdraw either his draft resolution or the matter to which it referred.

t. TRIBUTES TO COUNT BERNADOTTE AND COLONEL SEROT

On September 17, 1948, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, and United Nations Observer Colonel André Serot (France) were assassinated in a part of the City of Jerusalem which was under Jewish control.

The following day, at the 358th meeting of the Security Council, the President stated that he felt sure that the Council as a whole would wish to express its horror at this senseless and disastrous crime. He added that it was a tragedy for the world as a whole that death had cut short the work which Count Bernadotte had so devotedly begun. The task of the United Nations in Palestine, he continued, remained to be done, and there could be no question of relinquishing it. It must rather be the Council's duty to redouble its efforts to bring peace to that distracted and desecrated land and to build on the foundation which Count Bernadotte had already laid.

In the name of the Security Council, the President said, he would send a message of condolence to Countess Bernadotte and members of the Count's family, as well as to the King and Government of Sweden. He also proposed to arrange, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the proper representation of the Security Council at the funeral of Count Bernadotte in Stockholm.

The President also extended the sympathy of the Security Council in the loss of Colonel Serot to the French representative and, through him, to Colonel Serot's family and to the French Government.

The President informed the Council that with his approval the Secretary-General had sent two telegrams (S/1003). The first of these empowered Ralph Bunche, of the Secretariat, to assume full authority over the Palestine Mission until further notice. The second requested General Aage Lundstrom, Chief of Staff of Truce Supervision, to make the fullest investigation of the circumstances of the shooting of Count Bernadotte, and also to cable immediately all details in his possession and to continue sending by urgent cable every additional detail as soon as received. The President further proposed, and the Council agreed, that copies of these two telegrams be sent to the Chairman of the Security Council's Truce Commission in Jerusalem together with a request that he give his fullest cooperation to Mr. Bunche and to General Lundstrom.

The Secretary-General stated that the murder of Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot could only be interpreted as a direct act of attempted interference with the effort of the United Nations to settle the Palestine question. Praising the work of both men, the Secretary-General said their murder demanded an answer to the question of what should be done in future to protect those who served the United Nations as its representatives in such operations as the one which it had been required to undertake in connection with Palestine. No steps must be left untaken to prevent future recurrences of such tragedies. Sentiments similar to those expressed by the President and Secretary-General were also voiced by all the members of the Council.

The representative of Argentina proposed the following draft resolution (see S/P.V.358 [ S/PV.358 ]), which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council:

"The Security Council,

"Deeply shocked by the tragic death of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, as the result of a cowardly act which appears to have been committed by a criminal group of terrorists in Jerusalem while the United Nations representative was fulfilling his peace-seeking mission in the Holy Land,

"Resolves

"First, to request the Secretary-General to keep the flag of the United Nations at half-mast for a period of three days;

"Second, to authorize the Secretary-General to meet from the working capital fund all expenses connected with the death and burial of the United Nations Mediator;

"Third, to be represented at the interment by the President or a person whom he may appoint for the occasion."

Following the adoption of that resolution, the Security Council members, prior to adjourning the meeting, stood for a moment in silent tribute to the memory of Count Bernadotte.

END NOTES


17/For the text of this resolution, see General Assembly, pp. 247-56.

18/For discussion of the work of the Palestine Commission and its reports, see pp. 256-57.

19/As indicated above, the 283rd meeting of the Council at which this resolution was adopted, was held on April 16. As the meeting, however, convened at 9 P.M. and did not adjourn until after midnight, the resolution is generally referred to as the Council's resolution of April 17.

20/See footnote 19.

21/For subsequent messages from the Truce Commission to the Security Council see S/757, S/758, S/817, S/900 on the general situation; S/759, S/761, S/762, S/763 S/764, S/765, S/776, S/777, S/785, S/793, S/797/Corr.1, S/800, S/802, S/808, S/816, S/824, S/891, S/915, S/938 on the situation in Jerusalem; S/771/Add.1 reporting shooting of Thomas Wasson, American member of Truce Commission; S/778 requesting appointment of military advisers to furnish reports on situation in Jerusalem; S/898, S/905, S/915, S/920 on arrest of five British members of Jerusalem Electric Corporation; S/877 and Add.1 on occupancy of King David's Hotel headquarters of Truce Commission, by Haganah.

22/By a cablegram dated May 15 (S/747) the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel had informed the Security Council of the Proclamation of an independent State of Israel in Palestine.

23/See p. 418.

24/For the appointment of the Mediator, see General Assembly, p. 281.

25/For General Assembly's resolution, see p. 281.

26/See S/833, Note by the Secretary-General.

27/See General Assembly, p. 281.

28/Speaking before the Security Council on July 15 (see S/P.V.337 [ S/PV.337 ]), the representative of Egypt stated that the Arab Governments were still considering their reply to this appeal. In the meantime, however, the Arab forces had resumed hostilities.

29/This phrase was deleted in the resolution as finally adopted by the Council. See below, p. 441.

30/This amendment proposed by the United Kingdom was adopted by the Council. See below, p. 441.

31/Three additional paragraphs were adopted by the Council. See below, p. 441.

32/See p. 422.

33/The text of the original United States resolution indicating the two minor amendments adopted as a result of the Council's deliberations is given above on p. 436. The three additional paragraphs adopted by the Council are quoted on this page.

34/For text of the proposal, see p. 437.

35/Concerning the question of the Jerusalem water supply, see also p. 309.

36/The Council convened at this meeting also to consider a communication (S/987) from the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, requesting the appointment of military observers in Kashmir.

37/I.e., the designation "representative of the State of Israel" which had been used for the first time by the President of the Security Council in July rather than the previously-employed "representative of the Jewish Agency". (See p. 433.)

ANNEX IX
REPRESENTATIVES ON THE PALESTINE TRUCE COMMISSION


BELGIUM:

Representative Jean Nieuwenhuys


FRANCE:

Representative Rene Neuville


UNITED STATES:

Representative Thomas C. Wasson (assassinated in May 1948)

Acting Representative William C. Burdett (from May to June 1948)

Representative John J. MacDonald (appointed on June 25, 1948)

*****



10. Joint Economic Board for Palestine

In accordance with the General Assembly's res-olution 181 (II),46/ the Economic and Social Council, at its 174th meeting on March 11, con-sidered the question of the election of the three non-Palestinian members of the Joint Economic Board for Palestine. The U.S.S.R. representative, supported by the Byelorussian and Polish represent-atives, proposed that the Council should proceed to elect the three members at its sixth session; the proposal was rejected by the Council by 9 votes to 3, with 6 abstentions. Other representatives, in-cluding the United States representative, thought that the question should be deferred to the next session, since procedural questions had not been solved and the Council had not yet received the necessary information; moreover, the Palestine Commission had recommended that the question should be dealt with at the seventh session of the Council. The Chilean, Netherlands and New Zea-land representatives considered that the question of the election itself was not on the agenda, but merely the necessary preliminary measures. The Council adopted by 14 votes, with 4 abstentions, a compromise proposal (E/773) jointly put for-ward by Poland and Venezuela with amendments proposed by Canada, U.S.S.R., Denmark and the United States. In this resolution (112 (VI)) it requested Member States to submit to the Secre-tary-General, not later than June 15, 1948, the names of suitable candidates for nomination as non--Palestinian members of the Joint Economic Board, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council's seventh session the list of nominees for election after consulting the Palestine Commis-sion on the terms and conditions of service.


___________________

46/See p. 251.
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3. Communication from the World Jewish Congress

The Council at its sixth session (174th plenary meeting on March 11) on a point of order raised by the Polish representative discussed the question of a report of the Council NGO Committee (E/710) on the memoranda of the World Jewish Congress in regard to the situation of the Jewish populations in Arab countries. This report had been placed before the Council at the same time as the report of the Council NGO Committee (E/706) and the Polish representative alleged that an informal agreement had been reached among the five Great Powers not to discuss docu-ment E/710 on the ground that it would unduly prolong the Council's deliberations. The U.S.S.R. and French representatives denied that there had been any such agreement. The French representa-tive explained that different members of the Council had suggested various ways of handling the question. He thought that a number of mem-bers had not realized that the document was before the Council for discussion and that it might appear that the Council had refused to examine the ques-tion. The United States representative stated that the matter had been referred to the Council with-out recommendation by the Council NGO Com-mittee and would only be discussed by the Council on the specific request of a member of the Council. The Polish representative, however, felt that the item on the agenda was "Reports of the Council NGO Committee", and one of these reports was document E/710; the Council had simply overlooked the document in question. He asked for a review of the whole question from the procedural point of view.

The Council adopted a resolution (133 (VI) H) proposed by the representative of France transmit-ting the record of its discussion to the Council NGO Committee and requesting that Committee to submit to the Council at its next session "what-ever recommendations it may deem useful".

The Council NGO Committee which had originally heard a representative of the World Jewish Congress on February 16, 1948 held meetings on June 21 and 22, 1948, at which repre-sentatives of Egypt, Pakistan, Syria and Turkey were heard on the question, as well as the repre-sentative of the World Jewish Congress. The Committee reported to the Council at the seventh session (E/940).

The report by the NGO Committee was de-ferred with other items until the eighth session. In connection with the above question, the NGO Committee concluded that, with regard to con-sultation with non-governmental organizations in categories B and C, it should not make specific recommendations regarding the substance of the consultation unless specifically requested by the Council. At the same time the Committee agreed that its reports should be sufficiently detailed and explicit to permit the members of the Council to form their own judgments regarding the importance of the subject under consideration and any action to be taken thereon.

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J. QUESTIONS SPECIALLY REFERRED TO THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL
BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
1. City of Jerusalem

a. THE DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM
AND QUESTIONS ARISING OUT OF IT

Part III of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, annexed to the resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly, dated November 29, 1947, on the future Government of Palestine, established the City of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under a Special International Regime to be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council was designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations, and was assigned the task of elaborating and approving within a period of five months a detailed Statute for the City on lines set forth in the Plan.38/

In a letter (T/77) dated December 1, 1947, the Secretary-General drew the attention of the President of the Trusteeship Council to the responsibil-ities envisaged for it in the Plan. At the sixth meeting of its second session (T/P.V.33), the Council decided to appoint a working committee of five or six members to prepare for its considera-tion a draft Statute for the City. The composition of the Working Committee was entrusted to the President, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Trusteeship. At the seventh meeting (T/P.V.34) the President an-nounced that he had appointed Australia, China, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States as members of the Working Com-mittee on Jerusalem.

The Working Committee held 25 meetings. At its first meeting, it elected Benjamin Gerig (United States) as Chairman, and Sir Alan Burns (United Kingdom) as Vice-Chairman; and at its second meeting it elected Henri Laurentie (France) as Rapporteur. In the course of its first eight meet-ings it completed a general examination of the Plan, hearing explanations of it from Karel Lisicky (subsequently Chairman of the United Nations Palestine Commission), and heard evidence on the situation in Palestine from certain officers of the Palestine Government. It adjourned on December 12, 1947, after having set up two drafting groups of experts to prepare a preliminary draft Statute.

The Working Committee reassembled on January 7, 1948, and during its next sixteen meetings examined the preliminary draft Statute submitted by the Drafting Groups. During that period, and in pursuance of a resolution (T/117) adopted by the Council at the fourteenth meeting of the second session (T/P.V.41), it heard representa-tives of the Jewish Agency, of the Agudas Israel World Organization and of the Patriarch of Jeru-salem (Greek Orthodox Church); the Arab Higher Committee was afforded a similar opportunity to be heard but did not avail itself of it.

At its 24th meeting on January 23, 1948, the Working Committee adopted a draft Statute (T/118) for submission to the Trusteeship Coun-cil.

During the second part of its second session, the Council examined the draft Statute prepared by the Working Committee, and gave several hearings to representatives of the Jewish Agency on various matters provided for in the draft. Before the Coun-cil entered upon a detailed examination of the draft Statute, the representative of Iraq declared at the nineteenth meeting of the Council's second session (T/SR.46) that the Trusteeship Plan for the City of Jerusalem was illegal and contrary to the Charter, basing his assertion on the following four arguments:

(1) The City of Jerusalem was an integral part of Palestine, deserving independence in the same degree as did the people of the rest of Palestine. The fact that the City was sacred to three religions provided no legal basis for separation.

(2) According to the Charter, Trusteeship was to be an intermediary step leading towards self-government or independence. Permanent Trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem was therefore illegal.

(3) According to the Charter, a Trusteeship Agree-ment had to be presented to the General Assembly by the party or parties concerned. The Charter did not acknowledge the authority of the General Assembly as the sole originator of such an Agreement as the United Kingdom, the Mandatory Power, had not presented a Trusteeship Agreement, the General Assembly had no right to draft a constitution of Trusteeship.

(4) Under the Charter, the Trusteeship Council it-self could not act as a trustee. Only a state could per-form that function; the true function of the Trusteeship Council was that of supervision.

Finally, the representative of Iraq maintained that if the Plan for Jerusalem was to be regarded as a special arrangement not intended to fit within the Trusteeship System then the Council was not acting under Chapter XII of the Charter and could not act legally at all in the matter. The representa-tive of Iraq would therefore not participate in the discussion of the draft Statute for the City of Jeru-salem.

At the 20th meeting of the Council's second session the representative of the Philippines asked for some clarification of the guiding principles which the Working Committee had followed in drafting the Statute. Referring to a statement in the Working Committee's report (T/122) that Jerusalem was not a Trust Territory and that Chap-ters XII and XIII of the United Nations Charter were not, therefore, generally applicable, the repre-sentative of the Philippines expressed the view that the provisions of these Chapters for the politi-cal advancement of non-self-governing peoples should be applied in so far as they were not inconsistent with the special conditions of the General Assembly's resolution. The Trusteeship Council, he thought, could not deny autonomy to the in-habitants of Jerusalem. The Council could do no less in its administration of the City than observe the same principles it required the Administering Authorities to adhere to.

The representatives of the United States and France, who had both served on the Working Com-mittee, explained that the Plan for Jerusalem was a juridical innovation subject to revision within ten years. The Committee had taken the position that, while the Charter as a whole was applicable, Chapters XI, XII and XIII did not apply specifical-ly, and had worked on the basis that the Statute for Jerusalem was not a Trusteeship Agreement. The General Assembly had at one time considered that the administration of the City should be handled by the Security Council or a special com-mittee of the General Assembly itself. The fact that the Trusteeship Council had finally been en-trusted with the task did not mean that Jerusalem fell within the Trusteeship System. The Committee had, however, made every attempt to give the maximum liberty possible to the inhabitants of the City under the special conditions laid down by the General Assembly's resolution and to ensure that the Statute was not in conflict with any funda-mental rights described in the Charter of the United Nations.

The representatives of Belgium and New Zea-land stated that the General Assembly's primary concern was not the political advancement of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, but rather the protection of the unique religious interests located in Jeru-salem. It had been intended that Jerusalem should be self-governing within certain specific limits which would ensure the preservation of the religious and historical interests of the City.

The representative of China thought that the task of administering Jerusalem rightly belonged to the Trusteeship Council. As a Mandated Ter-ritory Palestine fell within the purview of the Council. The Council, moreover, would be carry-ing out the fundamental idea of Trusteeship, which was that the responsible authority should be the guardian of the interests of the people. Article 81 of the Charter explicitly mentioned the possibility that the United Nations might act as an Adminis-tering Authority.

As a result of the Council's detailed examination, the draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem under-went considerable amendment. At the 35th meet-ing on March 10, 1948 (T/SR.62), the Council adopted a resolution (32(II)) to the effect that the draft Statute (T/118/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1) was then in satisfactory form, but that the question of its formal approval should be deferred until the third part of the second session.

On a number of matters the draft Statute re-quired the Council to issue instructions to the Governor of the City. At the 33rd meeting on March 8, 1948 (T/SR.60), the Council adopted provisional instructions to the Governor of the City of Jerusalem (T/144).

The Council considered also the financial im-plications of the Statute and at the 35th meeting (T/SR.62) adopted a resolution (T/151) re-questing the Secretary-General to provide funds during 1948 for such activities as it might author-ize, and to lay before the Council, at its next reg-ular session, estimates for the year 1949 to enable the Council to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly.

The Trusteeship Council concluded the second part of its second session with the 35th meeting on March 10, 1948. The Council's 36th meeting (T/SR.63) was held on April 21, 1948, to con-sider further the question of the approval of the Statute for the City of Jerusalem. In view of the fact that since the Council's previous meeting the second special session of the General Assembly had been convened to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine, the repre-sentative of the United States proposed that the Trusteeship Council should inform the General Assembly that it had formulated a Statute for the City of Jerusalem and was now in a position to approve it by April 29. He proposed that the Council should refer the Statute in its latest form (T/118/Rev.2) to the General Assembly for such further instructions as the Assembly might see fit to give.

Supporting the United States proposal, the rep-resentatives of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Mexico and China expressed the view that the General Assembly's resolution 181 (II) of Novem-ber 29 which had formed the basis of the Trustee-ship Council's work might be modified during the General Assembly's special session. It would there-fore be best to leave the General Assembly itself to come to a decision with regard to the Statute for the City of Jerusalem and the appointment of a Governor. The Trusteeship Council, they con-sidered, had fulfilled its duty by framing the Statute.

The representative of Belgium proposed that unless the Council received new instructions from the General Assembly it should not reconvene on or before April 29 to approve the Statute. He therefore moved the deletion of that part of the United States draft resolution stating that the Coun-cil was in a position to approve the Statute by April 29.

The representatives of Australia, New Zealand and France considered that adoption of the draft Statute by the Trusteeship Council could be deferred only within the terms of the General As-sembly's resolution of November 29. As that resolution had not been rescinded, it was the Council's duty to adopt the Statute within the prescribed period of five months. If the Council re-ceived no further instructions from the General Assembly, failure to approve the Statute for the city of Jerusalem would be a failure to carry out the General Assembly's mandate.

The Trusteeship Council adopted the Belgian amendment to the United States draft resolution by a vote of 6 to 3, with 2 abstentions. The resolution as amended was adopted by a vote of 8 to 0, with 3 abstentions. An Australian motion that the Council should meet again on April 28 to take action with regard to the Statute for Jerusalem was rejected by a vote of 3 to 3, with 4 abstentions.

No further instructions to the Trusteeship Council were issued by the General Assembly at its second special session.

At the first meeting of its third session (T/-SR.74) the Council included in its agenda the item "Present state of the question of the Statute for the City of Jerusalem". The item was taken up by the Council at the 34th and 35th meetings of its third session on July 28 and 29, 1948 (T/SR.107, 108). The representative of Belgium stated that consideration of the question of Jerusalem at this time might prove dangerous. The resolution of the problem of Jerusalem, he stated, no longer depended on the Trusteeship Council. The Security Council had been seized of the Palestine question and a Mediator had been appointed.39/ The Trusteeship Council therefore would be making a griev-ous mistake if it embarked upon a discussion which was certain to hamper the task of the Mediator.

The majority of the Council's members support-ed the Belgian proposal, although the representa-tive of France, in particular, stressed that he did so purely on grounds of expediency. In the opinion of the representative of France the Council had not completed its task under the terms of the Gen-eral Assembly's resolution 181(II) of November 29 and was still seized of the question of the draft Statute for Jerusalem. The representative of China, on the other hand, expressed the view that the Council had fulfilled its duty and that in the absence of further instructions from the General Assembly no action by the Council was called for.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that the Trusteeship Council had failed to complete its work on the Statute and had, without any legal justification, evaded its responsibility by referring the question back to the General Assembly. He stressed that the only directive which the Council had received on the question of the Statute was the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 and that it had received no instructions modifying or suspending that resolution. He therefore proposed that the Council should at once take up the question of the Statute of the City of Jerusalem. The U.S.S.R. delegation wished to offer amend-ments to the Statute as soon as the Council embarked upon its consideration.

The Council, however, by a vote of 8 to 1, with 3 abstentions, adopted the Belgian motion for in-definite postponement of the consideration of the question of the Statute of the City of Jerusalem.

b. THE PROTECTION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AND ITS INHABITANTS

The General Assembly at its second special session by a resolution (185 (S-2)), dated April 26, 1948, referred the question of the protection of the City of Jerusalem and its inhabitants to the Trusteeship Council.

The Council submitted a separate report (A/544) on the question to the General Assembly on May 5, 1948.40/

END NOTES

38/See General Assembly, pp. 254-56.

39/See p. 281.

40/See pp. 265-66.
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