



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/17557
10 October 1985

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period from 12 April to 10 October 1985)

Introduction

1. In its resolution 561 (1985) of 17 April 1985, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until 19 October 1985. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978); called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council.

2. The present report contains an account of developments relating to UNIFIL from 12 April to 10 October 1985.

Organization of the Force

3. As of October 1985, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Infantry battalions

Fiji	627
Finland	509
France	608
Ghana	573
Ireland	644
Nepal	665
Netherlands	161
Norway	649

Headquarters camp command

Ghana	133
Ireland	91

Logistic units

France	785
Italy	48
Norway	203
Sweden	<u>146</u>
	<u>5 842</u>

In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL was assisted by 75 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Those unarmed observers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan.

4. In view of changing operational requirements following the redeployment of Israeli forces, the areas of responsibility of various battalions were adjusted, in particular those on the southern and eastern perimeters. The deployment of UNIFIL as of October 1985 is shown in the annexed map.

5. The military observers of UNTSO continued to man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line and to maintain teams at Tyre, Metulla and Chateau de Beaufort. In addition, they continued to operate four mobile teams within the UNIFIL area of operation.

6. The Lebanese internal security forces continued to co-operate with UNIFIL in maintaining order in its area of operation. They carried out independent patrols and assisted UNIFIL in special investigations of mutual concern. The Lebanese army unit serving with UNIFIL maintained a strength of 100, all ranks. They were deployed in the UNIFIL area and attached to different battalions.

7. Logistic support for UNIFIL continued to be provided by the headquarters logistic branch, the French logistic component, the Norwegian maintenance unit, the Ghanaian engineer unit, the Swedish medical company and the Italian helicopter wing. UNIFIL continued to experience difficulties in transporting goods from Beirut to its area of operation as a result of the closure of the coastal road from Beirut to Sidon. In these circumstances, the largest part of UNIFIL supplies had to be transported through Tel Aviv and Haifa. Despite the difficulties involved, certain supplies, particularly fresh rations, petroleum products and other commodities, were procured from Lebanese sources. A small transit base will be established in Tyre and should become operational within the next months.

8. The Italian helicopter wing continued to play an important role in the logistical support of UNIFIL and in providing humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese civilian population. Flight clearances were occasionally delayed but were all granted by the Israeli military authorities during the reporting period.

9. In addition to its other tasks, the French engineer company continued to search for and defuse unexploded mines, shells and bombs. It demolished 40 roadside bombs, 12 of which were radio-controlled, 50 Katyusha rockets and numerous explosive charges of various types, including cluster bombs and hand grenades.

10. During the period under review, eight members of the Force lost their lives, one French soldier when a bulldozer overturned, two Nepalese soldiers by natural causes, one Nepalese soldier in a shooting incident, three Finnish soldiers when an armoured car personnel carrier overturned and one Finnish soldier in a land-mine explosion. Since the establishment of the Force, 111 members of the Force have died, 44 of them as a result of firing and mine explosions, 52 in accidents and 15 from natural causes. Some 149 have been wounded in armed clashes, shellings and mine explosions.

11. The discipline and bearing of the members of UNIFIL, as well as of the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force, have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, their commanders and their countries.

12. The Government of the Netherlands has informed the Secretary-General that it has reluctantly decided to withdraw its contingent at the end of the present mandate because UNIFIL, in its view, has not been able to fulfil its mandate and the situation is not likely to improve in the near future. The Government has indicated, however, that it would consider resuming its contribution to UNIFIL should the Force be enabled to play the role envisaged for it by the Security Council.

Redeployment of the Israeli forces

13. It will be recalled that the Secretary-General had convoked in November 1984 a conference of military representatives of Lebanon and Israel with a view to expediting the orderly withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and discussing security arrangements in southern Lebanon after that withdrawal. The conference, which was held under United Nations auspices at UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura, lasted into January 1985 but produced no results.

14. On 14 January, the Government of Israel announced a plan for the unilateral redeployment of Israeli forces in three phases. As indicated in the Secretary-General's report on UNIFIL of 11 April 1985 (S/17093), the first phase of the Israeli redeployment was completed on 16 February with the evacuation of the Sidon area. The second phase of redeployment was carried out gradually in the course of the months of March and April. The Israeli forces withdrew from the Nahatiyah area on 11 March. The Jezzine area and the north-eastern sector, including the Bekaa Valley and the strategic position at Jehal Baruk, were evacuated on 14 April. On 29 April the Israeli forces withdrew from the Tyre pocket and from positions they had established in the western sector of the UNIFIL area. At the end of the second phase, the Israeli forces were redeployed in a strip of land north of the international border extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Hashaiya area with a depth varying between about 2 kilometres at its

narrowest point and about 10 kilometres at its widest. In accordance with the Israeli plan, this strip of land, which extended into part of the UNIFIL area, was to be maintained as a "security zone" where the so-called "South Lebanon Army" ("SLA") and other local militias armed and controlled by the Israeli forces were to function with the latter's backing, after the completion of the third and last phase of the Israeli redeployment.

15. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 561 (1985), the Secretary-General initiated a new effort along the lines indicated in his report of 11 April 1985 (S/17093, paras. 40-42) through his personal representatives dispatched from United Nations Headquarters and the Commander of UNIFIL. The objective was to work out, in consultation with the Lebanese and Israeli authorities, arrangements which would lead to the full withdrawal of the Israeli forces, the deployment of UNIFIL to the international border and the establishment of international peace and security in the area. Unfortunately, these efforts were inconclusive and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) proceeded with the third phase of the unilateral redeployment plan without change in May and the early part of June. During that period, the Israeli forces progressively withdrew from positions established in the "security zone", handing them over to "SLA". By 10 June, the Israeli Government announced that the third phase had been completed. It indicated that, while all combat units had been withdrawn from Lebanese territory, some Israeli troops would continue to operate in the "security zone" for an unspecified period of time and act as advisers to "SLA".

16. In these circumstances, UNIFIL has not been able to extend its deployment to the border. Moreover, in that part of its area of deployment which overlaps with the "security zone" it finds itself confronted with many positions manned by IDF and/or "SLA". There were, at the completion of the Israeli redeployment plan in June 1985, 21 such positions. Three of these positions were manned by IDF personnel, 16 of them by "SLA" and the remainder jointly by the two. Concerning the situation in the remaining part of the "security zone", which includes the former enclave and the Hashaiya area, UNIFIL has only limited information because of restrictions imposed on the movement of its personnel. It has, however, been able to observe that Israeli forces have continued to operate in that area with elements of "SLA" and other local forces controlled by them.

17. After the completion of the Israeli redeployment plan, the Commander of UNIFIL continued his negotiations with the Israeli authorities in an effort to get the Israeli forces and "SLA" to evacuate all positions still held by them in the UNIFIL area of deployment as a first step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 561 (1985). On 16 July, "SLA" withdrew from three positions at Majdal Silm, Baydar Humayd and Jumay Jimah. Since then, despite UNIFIL's efforts, no further evacuation has taken place.

Situation in the UNIFIL area

18. The greater part of the UNIFIL area has been relatively quiet since its evacuation by the Israeli forces. UNIFIL has continued to maintain liaison with the local leaders of Amal and other Lebanese groups, which have generally co-operated with the Force in the performance of its tasks. On the other hand, those leaders have made clear that the Lebanese resistance would continue to attack the Israeli forces and associated Lebanese irregulars in the "security zone".

19. In contrast, the situation in the "security zone" has been very tense. Lebanese resistance groups have launched frequent attacks on Israeli troops and the Lebanese irregulars associated with them throughout that zone both within and outside the UNIFIL area of deployment. In those attacks, small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and roadside bombs have been employed against IDF/"SLA" positions and personnel. According to information available to UNIFIL, there were about 60 such attacks in May, 52 in June, 92 in July, 21 in August, 23 in September and 2 during the first nine days of October. In addition, there were a number of suicide bomb attacks. On 15 August, a suicide car bomb attack was carried out against a position manned by Israeli soldiers and local irregulars at Bayt Yahun in the UNIFIL area; one of the men manning the position was killed together with the three persons who were in the car. Seven suicide bomb attacks outside the UNIFIL area were also reported. These occurred on 9 May and 6 August at Hasbaiya, on 9 July and 18 September at Al Bayyadah, on 15 July at Kafer Tibnite, on 31 July at Arnaoun and on 15 August at a position south of Tibnin. Six of these attacks were by car and, in the attack at Hasbaiya on 6 August, a mule was used.

20. On the other hand, IDF and elements of "SLA" carried out a number of cordon-and-search operations against Shiite villages, nine of them in the UNIFIL area: On 16 April at Yatar, on 17 April at Shhur, on 26 April at Aytit, on 5 May at Sawwana, on 28 May at Naqoura, on 3 June at Majdal Silm, on 18 June at Al Tiri, on 3 August at Qusayr and on 28 August at Qabrikha. UNIFIL monitored closely those operations which took place in its area with a view to preventing, within the limits of its means, acts of violence against the population and the destruction of property. It also dispensed humanitarian assistance to the affected villagers. Notwithstanding its efforts, UNIFIL recorded the demolition of 16 houses and the arrest of 73 persons by IDF or Israeli security personnel. Each of those incidents was strongly protested to the Israeli authorities.

21. "SLA" also shelled Shiite villages on some occasions. The village of Yatar was shelled from an "SLA" position on 9 and 20 June; two persons were killed and several others injured. Kafra was shelled on 9 and 27 June, with three persons injured. On 9 and 10 August, Majdal Zun was shelled and 10 houses were damaged. On 15 August, Yatar was shelled again; one person was killed. On 18 August two mortar rounds were fired at Haddathah; one of these hit a UNIFIL position but failed to explode. Following the attacks on Yatar and Kafra in June, about 2,000 persons left the two villages and sought temporary refuge in and near Qana where the Fijian battalion is headquartered. UNIFIL strongly protested the indiscriminate shelling of population centres to the Israeli authorities. It also provided emergency relief assistance in the form of food, supplies, blankets and

mattresses to the persons displaced as a result of the shelling. The Force later established additional positions at the two villages to encourage the return of the inhabitants.

22. The activities of "SLA" and other irregulars armed and controlled by IDF were limited essentially to the "security zone". Where this zone extends into the UNIFIL area of deployment, UNIFIL continued its efforts to contain those activities. This led to frequent and dangerous confrontations between the irregulars and UNIFIL personnel involved. Most of the incidents that developed related to firing at or near UNIFIL positions and attempts to break through UNIFIL checkpoints, at times using tanks and armoured personnel carriers. At checkpoints controlling entry to the "security zone", "SLA" and other irregulars armed and controlled by IDF from time to time imposed restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel, particularly in the Norwegian battalion sector and the eastern part of the Finnish battalion sector. These restrictions were usually of short duration and were lifted after negotiation. The increasing number of attacks by Lebanese resistance groups on checkpoints manned by "SLA" and other irregulars apparently made these personnel very nervous. This was reflected by frequent closures of these checkpoints to all traffic, including that of UNIFIL, and indiscriminate firing at approaching vehicles. There were many such firings at UNIFIL vehicles, including ambulances. In a serious incident on 1 October, a French officer was shot at close range and wounded at an "SLA" checkpoint near Alman. All the incidents were protested to the Israeli authorities.

23. In the part of the UNIFIL area that was evacuated by the Israeli forces, a number of confrontations occurred when UNIFIL denied passage through its checkpoints to unauthorized armed personnel.

24. There have been frequent reports of desertions among "SLA". In this connection, a serious incident involving UNIFIL occurred on 7 June. Following the defection of 11 "SLA" personnel from a position established near Al Qantarrah in the Finnish sector, 23 members of the Finnish battalion were detained by "SLA". The Force Commander and the Secretary-General himself immediately approached the Israeli authorities and requested their assistance in securing the safe return of the detainees. Following lengthy negotiations, the Finnish soldiers were released unharmed on 15 June.

25. UNIFIL continued to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities, as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in extending assistance to the local population. Besides UNIFIL personnel, a significant number of Lebanese civilian patients were treated in UNIFIL medical centres. UNIFIL medical personnel at the hospital in Naqoura performed 332 surgical operations and treated 6,400 patients including 500 in-patients.

26. During the period under review, the Commander of UNIFIL and his civilian and military staff maintained contact with the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese regional authorities. They also maintained contact with the Israeli authorities on matters pertaining to the functioning of the Force.

27. Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited UNIFIL headquarters and held discussions with government officials in the region in June and October 1985.

Financial aspects

28. By its resolution 39/71 A of 13 December 1984, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed \$11,741,000 gross (\$11,574,333 net) per month for the period from 19 April to 18 December 1985 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 555 (1984), subject to obtaining the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the actual level of commitments to be entered into for each mandate period that might be approved subsequent to 19 April 1985. On that basis, the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee was obtained in entering into commitments for UNIFIL in an amount of \$70,446,000 gross (\$69,446,000 net) for the six-month mandate period until 19 October 1985. Should the Security Council extend the UNIFIL mandate beyond 19 October 1985, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining UNIFIL up to 18 December 1985 inclusive will be limited to the commitment authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 39/71 A, assuming continuance of the Force's existing strength and responsibilities. The Secretary-General will request the General Assembly at its present session to make appropriate financial provisions for UNIFIL in respect of periods after 18 December 1985, if the period of extension determined by the Security Council goes beyond that date.

Observations

29. In my last report on UNIFIL (S/17093), I stated that "The main problem is to reach a situation in Lebanon south of the Litani after the Israeli withdrawal in which international peace and security can be assured and normal conditions progressively restored." I went on to say that I believed that the best means of achieving that would be an orderly take-over by UNIFIL from the Israeli forces with the ultimate aim of restoring Lebanese sovereignty in the area. In the same report I emphasized the need to establish, under the authority of the Security Council, conditions in which UNIFIL could function effectively.

30. With these objectives in mind, I and my colleagues have maintained contact with both the Lebanese and the Israeli authorities in the hope that the completion of the announced Israeli withdrawal would be succeeded by a satisfactory arrangement for maintaining international peace and security in the area and for promoting a steady return to normality.

31. On 10 June, the Israeli Government announced its withdrawal from Lebanon but made it clear that for purposes of self-defence it would maintain a "security zone" north of the Israeli-Lebanese border which would be manned by the "South Lebanon Army" assisted by elements of the Israel Defence Forces. I and my colleagues have discussed this matter on many occasions with the Israeli authorities at various

levels and have done our best to make clear our view that such an arrangement, being contrary to Security Council resolutions and a violation of Lebanese sovereignty, will be certain to attract increasing opposition and is likely to give rise to a whole new round of violence in the area. In fact, as indicated earlier in this report, the "security zone" has already been under constant attack by Lebanese resistance groups. These activities have given rise to counter-measures by Israeli forces and the "South Lebanon Army".

32. So far, the level of violence in southern Lebanon has been limited to some extent, particularly, I believe, because of the presence of UNIFIL. Leaders of Amal and other Lebanese groups have generally co-operated with UNIFIL in the area evacuated by the Israeli forces.

33. However, in my view the current situation in Lebanon south of the Litani is not only unsatisfactory but also dangerous. It has meant that UNIFIL finds itself once again between hostile forces and is precluded from deploying right up to the international border in accordance with its mandate. Moreover, I have little doubt that, if the Israeli presence in the "security zone" is to continue for long, violence will inevitably escalate and spread. In such an event, UNIFIL's situation would become even more difficult.

34. In the light of the above, making a recommendation to the Security Council on UNIFIL poses a dilemma. On the one hand, the conditions still do not exist in which UNIFIL can fully perform its functions or completely fulfil its mandate, and the situation is most likely, in my opinion, to deteriorate rather than to improve. Such a state of affairs is contrary to the intentions of the Security Council and also imposes a severe strain on the contingents of UNIFIL and on the Governments which have so loyally supported the operation by making troops available.

35. On the other hand, I am convinced that UNIFIL is an extremely important factor in whatever peace and normality exists in southern Lebanon. I believe that, if for some reason UNIFIL were to disappear, the level of violence would inevitably increase dramatically, resistance operations giving rise to reprisals in a spiral of violence. Such a situation could well develop into a new and serious international crisis. Moreover, the Lebanese Government has requested that the mandate of UNIFIL be extended for a further period of six months (see document S/17526). The members of the Council should also know that we receive regular, urgent and pressing requests in the same vein from representatives of the population of southern Lebanon.

36. Needless to say, I hope that the Israeli authorities will conclude that, of all the options available, the effective implementation of UNIFIL's mandate would in the long run be the least hazardous for all concerned.


37. In the meantime, however, the Council is obliged to take action on this matter no later than 19 October. After much thought, I have concluded that, especially in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, it is my duty to recommend a further extension of the mandate of UNIFIL. I believe, however, that such a decision, were it to be taken by the Council, must not be understood to mean that

UNIFIL will be allowed to become an open-ended commitment for the troop-contributing countries and for the United Nations if the requisite conditions for the effective operation of the Force continue to be absent. I believe that there is still a good chance of re-establishing international peace and security in Lebanon south of the Litani if the correct actions are taken soon by all concerned, but I also believe that further undue delay is likely to produce a new and serious crisis, possibly with widespread ramifications. I and my colleagues will, of course, continue our efforts to establish a firm basis for international peace and security in this area, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNIFIL.


38. In recommending a further extension of UNIFIL, I must once again draw the Security Council's attention to the financial difficulties faced by the Force. There is, as of the beginning of October 1985, an accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account of some \$224 million. As a result, the Organization is falling behind in the reimbursement of the troop-contributing countries, thus placing an unfair and increasingly heavy burden on them, particularly on the less wealthy ones. I am extremely concerned about this state of affairs for the above-mentioned reason and also because it could jeopardize the functioning of this important operation. Therefore, I must again strongly appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments without delay. I would like also to appeal to the Governments of the more developed countries to consider making available, as a practical measure, voluntary contributions to the UNIFIL Suspense Account, to be used for the reimbursement of Governments contributing troops, equipment and supplies to UNIFIL.

39. In concluding this report, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the troop-contributing countries for their steadfast and generous support of the Force. I also wish to pay tribute to the Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, and his staff, civilian and military, and to the officers and men of UNIFIL as well as to the UNTSO military observers assigned to the area. They have performed their difficult tasks with exemplary dedication and courage.

جنوب لبنان
 黎巴嫩南部 • SOUTHERN LEBANON
 LIBAN MÉRIDIONAL
 ЮЖНЫЙ ЛИВАН • LÍBANO MERIDIONAL



The map is not to be used for any purpose other than that for which it was prepared. It is not to be used for any purpose other than that for which it was prepared. It is not to be used for any purpose other than that for which it was prepared.



قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان اعتباراً من تشرين الأول/أكتوبر ١٩٨٥
 一九八五年十月黎黎部队的部署情况
 UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF OCTOBER 1985
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS D'OCTOBRE 1985
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ОКТЯБРЬ 1985
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN OCTUBRE DE 1985

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|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 2-12 * مركز مرآة | * حاجز طريق |
| 观察所 | 路障 |
| Observation post | Road block |
| Poste d'observation | Poste de contrôle routier |
| Наблюдательный пункт | Заграждение на дороге |
| Puesto de observación | Barrera de caminos |

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|--|-------------------------|
| حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان | ⊠ وحد عسكرية |
| 黎黎部队活动范围的界限 | 黎巴嫩单位 |
| UNIFIL operational boundaries | Lebanese unit |
| Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force | Unité libanaise |
| Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ | Ливанское подразделение |
| Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza | Unidad libanesa |