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Source: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
9 August 2005


Latest updated on: 9 August 2005

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), oPt


Disengagement in the northern West Bank
Contingency Plan


1. Context

As part of Prime Minister Sharon’s disengagement plan, four settlements and a number of military outposts in the northern West Bank are slated for evacuation. Sanur (pop 105) and Khomesh (pop 228) are located along road 60 north of Nablus town, and are mainly inhabited by religious settlers. Conversely, the inhabitants of Ganim (pop 172) and Kaddim (pop 149) located southeast of Jenin town are considered more secular.

According to the Israeli government, once the evacuation has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military installations and no non-essential civilian infrastructure in the area. However, the Israeli government has up to now rejected a Palestinian request that the northern area be handed over to full Palestinian control.

2. Contingencies and Scenarios

Timetable

§ According to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the actually pull out will take place in the period 4-9 September (i.e. in principle after the Gaza disengagement). Relocation orders will be distributed to the settlers on 15 August and the settlers will hereafter be given two days to voluntarily vacate their dwellings if they opt for this option. However, from 17 August, the IDF will have the military authorisation to conduct the evacuation (only of the human individuals), thus, theoretically, the evacuation can take place any time after this date at the discretion of the IDF. Removal of personal effects will take place immediately after departure of the settlers.

Key Planning Assumptions

§ The inhabitants from the two secular settlements of Ganim and Kaddim are likely to be evacuated (first) on road 60 through Al Jalama checkpoint on the Green Line north of Jenin town and further to Afula (see map). The vast majority of these settlers have already left their homes and only few families remain. It is not anticipated that the evacuation of these settlement will be the cause of any humanitarian concerns.

§ The inhabitants from the two more religious settlements of Sanur and Khomesh north of Nablus are likely to be evacuated subsequently on the most direct route into Israel proper, i.e. north on road 60 via Arraba junction and finally through the Rehan Barrier gate. A back-up route for Khomesh has been mentioned by the IDF as a second contingency, which could take these settlers on road 60 further south through Shave Shameron checkpoint and further on road 57 via Enav junction to finally reach Israel through Kafriat checkpoint and Taybeh (see map).

§ The evacuation will as minimum entail temporary prohibition of all movement on the sections that are part of the evacuation during the disengagement period; for the northern part of Jenin, the prohibition will apply to road 60 from Bazic junction to Al Jalama checkpoint and for the evacuation of Sanur and Khomesh, the prohibition will apply to road 60 from Shave Shomeron to Arraba junction and road 596 and 585 to Rehan Barrier gate. It is also expected as minimum that all access roads to the planned evacuation routes will be closed with earthmounds/roadblocks, perhaps supplemented by flying checkpoints combined with closures/curfews of selected villages in proximity of the settlements and the evacuation routes (in worst case, this could also include Jenin and Nablus towns thereby affecting movement through Beit Furik, Awarta, Tappuah Beit Iba and Shave Shomeron checkpoints).

§ Apart from the planned evacuation route as described above, the IDF has further announced that closures could/will apply to the following road sections: Jalama checkpoint, the road section between Jit and Shave Shomeron junctions, and; Tappuah checkpoint on road 60 south of Nablus town.

§ Alternative bypass roads will be created by the IDF in order for Palestinians to reach daily services. It is likely to expect that road 588 between Jenin and Nablus through Qabatiya and Al Badhan via Tubas town will remain open, with flying checkpoints at the most, which also will help to facilitate access of these villages located in eastern part of Jenin. Further, the IDF has announced that an alternative route to a closure of Tappuah checkpoint will be through Beita, Aqraba and Jurish east of road 60. An alternative route for the closure of the section north of Jit junction fro commuters coming from mainly Qalqiliya to Nablus will be through Qusin village to reach Beit Iba checkpoint.

§ If the evacuation alternatively will be conducted through Tulkarm governorate, this will also affect Tulkarm town (closure of Anabta road at Enav junction) and surrounding villages. Movement will be prohibited on road 60 through Shave Shameron junction and further on road 557(57) to Kafriat checkpoint via Enav junction.

§ Following Barrier gates in Jenin governorate are expected to be affected as follows: Reikhan gate will be closed for Palestinians, but open for international organisations; Salem gate will operate as back-to-back terminal and be open for international organisations; Baarta gate will remain open for all with valid permits; Shaked gate will be open 3 times a day for students and permanent residents in the closed area.

§ It is not expected that restrictions will be placed on humanitarian movement, however prior co-ordination with the Israeli DCL for movement on these sections that are included in the evacuation during the disengagement can be expected.

Risks factors and pre-emptive measures

§ Movement restrictions will be imposed on settlers and other Israeli citizens to the north (from Tappuah junction) and in the north in order to reduce tension and possible confrontations between settlers and Israeli forces and between settlers and Palestinians. According to the IDF, the prohibition will already in principle take effect from 15 July and be enforced from 15 August.

§ It is likely that the evacuation will be subject to international media attention and the presence of international activists around the potential hot spots (see table below). This could have a mitigating effect on potential clashes between Palestinians, settlers and the Israeli forces.

§ Nablus, and more in particular its surrounding villages are vulnerable and could be subject to attacks and harassment from the nearby settlements (Nablus is surrounded by seven settlements – all considered extreme religious and especially ‘Tel Hayim’ is notorious for its aggressive behaviour). It is very unlikely that settlers will attempt to enter Nablus city.

§ Vast presence of IDF and Israeli Police Forces are expected in the area of operation prior to and during the disengagement.


Scenarios
Potential Hotspots
1. Clashes between IDF and Palestinians§ Eastern part of Jenin city (Area of Kaddim settlement
§ Area around Ganim settlement
§ By pass road (northern section of road 60) of Kaddim and Ganim settlement
§ Silat adh Dhaher village on road 60 (Near Khomesh settlement
§ Al ‘Asa’asa village on road 60 (near Sa Nur settlement
§ Road 585 near Arraba and Ya’bad towns
2. Localised Settler ViolenceJenin
§ Khermesh settlement (affecting road 585 Ya’bad town);
§ Move Dotan settlement ((affecting road 585 Ya’bad and Arraba towns);
§ Khomesh settlement (affecting Silat adh Dhaher, Burqa Al ‘Asa’sa villages);
§ Sanur settlement (affecting Al ‘Asa’sa village).
§ Kaddim settlement (affecting ‘Arab as Suweitat, eastern part of Jenin)
§ Ganim settlement (affecting Wad ad Dabi and ‘Aba villages)
§ Around Tayasir checkpoint in Jordan Valley (Tubas Governorate)
Nablus
§ Tel Hayim “Itemar” settlement affecting Yanun, Beit Furik, Awarta and Huwwara checkpoint junction,
§ Elon More settlement affecting bypass road from the settlement to Huwwara checkpoint junction, Salim, Deir Al Hatab and Azmut villages,
§ Yits’har settlement affecting Huwwara, Madama, Urif, Asira al Qibliya and Yits’har junction,
§ Berakhya “Brakha” settlement affecting Burin and Kfar Qalil villages,
§ Tappuah junction on road 60 south of Nablus city,
§ Jit junction between Tulkarm, Qalqiliya and Nablus.
3. Attacks by Palestinians
    An increase in Palestinian attacks in the area of settlers and IDF movement/ presence :
§ Along road 60 from Burqa to Arraba junction.
§ Along road 60 from Ganim/ Kaddim settlement to Al Jalama Barrier gate.
§ From Silat adh Dhar village north of Khomesh settlement adjacent to road 60.

Best Case Outcome

§ No hostilities between Israeli forces and settlers;
§ Limited and isolated incidents between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants;
§ Time period of evacuation is short – max 4 days;
§ Limited closure and curfews in the vicinity of the settlements;
§ Humanitarian access to closed areas will be possible with prior coordination;
§ Closures will not affect all access roads to main services;
§ No settler attacks take place on Palestinian populations.

Worst Case Outcome

§ Major clashes take place between Israeli forces and settlers, mainly from Khomesh and Sanur and supporters from other settlements in the West Bank, with many injuries and perhaps casualties as a result;
§ Major clashes take place between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants. Some Palestinian militants might take the opportunity to attack settlements or Israeli forces with potential use of weapons and road side bombs;
§ Extensive closures and curfews, with possible extension to the whole West Bank;
§ Attacks on Palestinians and staff of international organisations, incl. UN;
§ The disengagement is postponed indefinitely.

3. Humanitarian analysis

The process of evacuation in itself is expected to generate little humanitarian impact and additional needs. Since movement to both Nablus and Jenin could be restricted during the disengagement, this will affect local populations’ access to workplaces, education facilities and markets. Special attention should be placed on isolated communities and communities subjected to curfews.

In general, the disengagement could entail that local populations would need to find alternative ways to reach services in alternative cities, such as Tubas, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya, where access is expected to be slightly easier. For Jenin, this will in particular apply to Silat Adh Dhar, Al’ Attara, Ajja, Ar Rama, Kfar Ra’I Fahma, Imreiha and Arraba that all are located southwest of the evacuation route and thus are left with restricted access to Jenin town. For Nablus, particularly Bizzariya will be affected, although the IDF has announced that a humanitarian path will be created to ensure access to Nablus town.

Education

In case of closures, education will become a cause for concern mainly for the movement of teachers. In particular for those villages that are in danger of being placed under curfew, the movement restrictions will affect the access to schools for both children and teachers. For UNRWA teachers, the vast majority comes from the villages and therefore need access to Jenin town.

Food

Food distribution would only be relevant to consider for isolated families/populations and those villages that are in danger of being placed under curfew (more than 3 days).

Health

Access of patients to health facilities and the access of health workers to their places of work in addition to delivery of drugs and medical supplies to the health facilities will the main issues during the disengagement.

In spite of the availability of primary health care services in most of the villages, special attention from Health Inforum will be given to the chronic patients. Secondary health care services are available in Jenin and Tulkarm cities while the tertiary care is available in Nablus only.

For PRCS and UNRWA, it is expected that their mobile clinics will be able to move with prior coordination.

Water and Sanitation

The general water situation in Jenin governorate in particular is poorly developed and not up to standard. According to Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), 43 villages in Jenin and 29 villages in Nablus are not connected to water networks and consequently depend on access of water tankers. In case of closure and curfew, these villages would depend on access of water from outside. Garbage collection could also be a cause of concern for closed/isolated villages.

A cut off of water and electricity supplies in the four settlements in conjunction with the evacuation, will directly affect two villages (Silat Adh Dhaher and Al Fandaqumiya), as these are connected to the water network in Khomesh settlement, and consequently would need water tankers from other sources in case of closure and curfew. In addition, Burqa and Bizzariya receive water from Shave Shomeron settlement.

Consequently, the EWASH group recommends that communities try to be as self-sufficient as possible, at least for the first 72 hours, i.e. to start stocking up enough water before the disengagement starts. Water supplies in school cisterns could be used in an emergency.

4. Humanitarian impact on neighbouring governorates

Tulkarm

In case the evacuation involves Tulkarm, a closure of road 57 will then mostly affect villages south of Tulkarm town (Ar Ras, Saffarin, Beit Lid, Kfur Sur, Kur, Kfur Jamal, Kfur Zibad, Kfur Abbush) and Jbara, which is located behind the Barrier, and Shufa, which is located adjacent to Avnei Khefets settlement. Only access to services in Tulkarm town for these villages is to cross road 57. For Jbara, it could entail complete closure, unless IDF agree to open the Barrier gate near Ar Ras, which will enable villagers to reach Qalqiliya.

Qalqiliya

No significant humanitarian concerns are envisioned apart from closure of Barrier gates in worst case, which mainly will affect farmers’ access to agricultural land.

Tubas

No significant humanitarian concerns are envisioned for residents of Tubas governorate in conjunction with the disengagement. If Al Badhan road remains open (- or partially open, i.e. with a flying checkpoint) as expected, residents from Tubas will continue to have access to Nablus.

Salfit

No significant humanitarian concerns are envisioned for residents of Salfit district in conjunction with the disengagement.

Ramallah

No major impact is anticipated on the Ramallah/Al Bireh governorate during the disengagement, therefore no major humanitarian consequences are expected. However, an increase in violence cannot be discounted. The Palestinian DCL anticipates that there will be a rise in settler harassment/violence. It appears that most settlers in the district are opposed to disengagement – the majority of settler (and some IDF) vehicles are flying anti-disengagement orange ribbons.
The IDF may impose strict closures if settler protests/violence breaks out in the area, and if there are Palestinians attacks on settlers and IDF. According to the Israeli Liaison Officer (16 June), the IDF are discussing a number of scenarios but are anticipating that the area will be quiet.

Hebron / Bethlehem

The IDF DCL offices in Hebron and Bethlehem do not anticipate the imposition of full closure on the southern part of the West Bank while the disengagement is carried out. Most humanitarian actors do not expect significant implications for the delivery of services in the southern part of the West Bank, although an intensification of harassment from settlers in specific areas and the resulting efforts of the IDF to contain it might result in some disruption. No stocks (except for UNICEF) are being pre-positioned in the southern part of the West Bank at the time of writing. Stocks of food, medicines and Non-Food Items are, however, available in Hebron - H2 for contingency purposes unrelated to the Disengagement.

The scenarios developed by OCHA field office in Hebron in consultation with the main humanitarian partners in the area revolve around the impact level of settler violence and the ability/willingness of the IDF/Police to contain it.

One important aspect that was not included in the scenarios but will surely affect the security environment during the time of the disengagement might be the internal dynamics created by the results of the PLC round of elections scheduled for July.

5. Coordination structures and the Emergency Room

Under the auspices of OCHA, an emergency/coordination committee for the disengagement has been established under the responsibility and overall coordination of the Governor’s office in Jenin. Chaired by the office of Jenin Governorate, this committee comprises of representatives of from the humanitarian community as tabled below:

SectorLead Agency
CoordinationOCHA, UNRWA, PDCL, ICRC
EducationUNICEF, UNRWA
Food SecurityWFP, UNRWA
ProtectionICRC
Water & SanitationEWASH
HealthWHO/Health Inforum, MSF
Note: Protection issues handled by the ICRC are considered confidential information.

The composition of the emergency/coordination committee takes advantage of the existing coordination mechanisms already in place and it maintains the integration between the local institutions and the international community.

An Emergency Room has been established to help the emergency/coordination committee in ensuring that humanitarian concerns that occur in conjunction with the disengagement are being addressed in an appropriate and timely manner.

Structure of the Emergency Room

The Emergency room will operate as a focal point for coordination of information delivered by villages in the Governorate and humanitarian partners. The Emergency Room will comprise of nine people (identified by Jenin Governorate) who will work in 3 shifts 24 hours during the disengagement. The Emergency Room will have three open telephone lines, of which two will be reserved for emergency calls and the third line will be reserved for in-coming calls to obtain general information of the humanitarian situation.

Communications procedures

All incidents and/or humanitarian concerns during the disengagement are to be reported to the Emergency Room. When the Emergency Room receives a report on an incident, the information will then be passed on to the identified focal points (see contact list in Annex) from the lead agency of each sector as outlined in the table above. Once the information has been received, it will be the responsibility of the lead agency to:

1) Further disseminate the information within their respective sector (e.g. EWASH focal point to inform other members of the EWASH group),
2) Decide on appropriate action, if necessary, and
3) Report back to the Emergency Room.

The Office of Jenin Governorate will be responsible for disseminating to all village councils (who will be identified as focal points in villages) on the communications procedures.

For emergency cases (acute medical cases, outbreak of fire, etc.), it is not expected these be coordinated through the Emergency Room, but handled directly by, e.g. the PRCS. However, communication will be established between the Emergency Room and PRCS for the purpose of recording number and nature of cases during the day.

6. Annex

§ Contact list
§ Local capacity and preparedness for humanitarian response
§ Map



Contact list

Organisation
Contact person(s)
Phone number(s)
Governor’s office JeninEmergency Room

§
§
§

Dept. of International Affairs

§ Sana’ Badawi, Head of Dept.

Operations: 04 250 3220

Operations: 04 250 3221

Operations:

Office: 04 250 3220/1/2

Mobile: Not available

UN OCHANablus Office

§ Kasper Engborg, HAO
§ Saad Abdel-Haq, HAA
§ Adeeb Salman, HAA

Office: 09 234 3606

Mobile: 0577 406 557
0572 212 013
0577 274 241
UNICEFNablus Office:

§ Maryam Tell, Ass. Project Officer

Jenin Office:

§ Naim Sadi, Ass. Project Officer

Tulkarm Office

§ Hanadi Abu Taqa, Ass. Project Officer

Office: 09 239 5488

Mobile: 0577 295 038

Office: 042 433 146

Mobile: 0577 784 369

Office: 09 268 4001

Mobile: 0577 282 452

UNRWAUNRWA OSO teams

§ Thomas White, Operations Officer

UNRWA Jenin Camp

§ Nathmi Abada Abu Ali, Camp Manager

UNRWA Jenin Clinic

§ Mohammad Al Huwati, Director

UNRWA Nablus Camps

§ Taysir Daud (Balata camp), Manager
§ Ibrahim Saleh (Askar camp), Manager,
§ Jamal Mosa (Camp No 1), Manager

UNRWA Nablus Area Officer

§ Mahmoud Hamou, Area Officer

Office: 02 589 0460/1/2/3

Mobile: 0542 168 311

Office: 04 2501 113

Mobile: 0599 312 921

0542 168 320

Office: 04 2436 388

Mobile: 0599 837 364

Mobile: 0542 168 416

Mobile: 0542 168 386

Mobile: 0542 168 418

Office: 09 238 1201

Mobile: 0542 168 299

UN WFPJerusalem Office
§ William Hart, Head of Programmes

Nablus Office
§ Sima Dowani, Food Assistant
Office: 02 540 1340
Mobile: 0577 267 371

Office: 09 234 3855
Mobile: 0577 615 970
WHO/Health InforumJerusalem Office
§ Dr. Fathi Abu Mughli, WHO National Health Officer, WB and Gaza.
§ Yousef Muhaisen, Health Inforum Project Manager
Office: 02 540 0595
Mobile: 0548 022 754

Mobile: 0544 810 382
ICRCNablus Office

§ Florence Anselmo, Head of Sub -Delegation

Jenin Office

§ Marie Dessonquères, Protection Delegate

Tulkarm Office

§ Pierre Van Male, Protection Delegate

Office: 09 238 5077

Mobile: 0577 246 678

Office: 04 250 1251

Mobile: 0577 243 803

Office: 09 267 2240

Mobile: 0577 743 815

PRCSNablus Branch

§ Mohammad Awadeh, Director

Jenin Branch

§ Farida Irsheid, Director

Office: 09 238 0215

Mobile: 0577 245 205

Office: 042 501 090

Mobile: Not available

EWASH GroupRamallah Office

§ Basema Bashir (PHG)
§ Majeda Alawned (PWA)

Office: 02 656 5887

Office: 02 240 9663

OXFAM UKNablus Office

§ Ghazi Al-Kelani, Project Officer

Office: 09 233 5272

Mobile: 0577 399 775

0599 799 599

CARE InternationalJenin Office

§ Othman Abbas, Project Officer

Office: 042 243 6366

Mobile: 0599285212

MDMNablus Office

§ Line Robin, Field Coordinator

Office: 09 233 9489

Mobile: 0577 249 445

MSFNablus Office

§ Cyril Bertrand, Field Coordinator

Office: 09 233 9491

Mobile: 0577 401 736

Palestinian DCLJenin Branch

§ Jamal Jaradat, Head of Office
§ Majdi Alawnah, Area Coordinator

Office: 04 250 1555

Mobile: 0599 557 244

Mobile: 0577 822 349

Israeli DCL NablusDCL Officer

§ Lt. Avi Rothenburg

Operations: 02 548 6218

Mobile: 0506 234 167

Israeli DCL JeninDCL Officer

§ Sec. Lt Roee Oren

Operations: 04 640 7312

Mobile: 0506 234 182

Israeli DCL TulkarmDCL Officer

§ Lt. Omri Gilboa

Operations: 09 894 8803

Mobile: 0506 234 168

Local capacity and preparedness for humanitarian response
Sector
Lead Organisation (s)
Roles and Responsibilities
Capacity
CoordinationGovernor’s office of JeninGovernorate Emergency Committee. Has been reactivated in conjunction with the disengagement. Under this, the Governor’s office will:

§ Establish an emergency / coordination room to consolidate and share information,
§ Establish a monitoring system in all villages,
§ Relevant UN agencies, local authorities, ICRC and NGOs form part of the overall coordination under the umbrella of this Emergency Committee,

§ Emergency room with previous experience from 1991 during the Gulf war and in 2002 during operation ‘Defensive Shield”.
§ Direct communication to all local PA institutions on village level,
§ Immediate capacity to repair water and electricity networks,
OCHA§ Support to Governor’s office in local coordination through the established emergency room,
§ Monitoring and reporting on access, humanitarian impact and security (support to DSS),
§ Liaise with Israeli and Palestinian DCLs,
§ Support UN emergency operations and ensure access of humanitarian assistance,
§ Advocacy and ad hoc interventions related to access of Palestinian population,
§ Field office in Nablus (1 expatriate and 2 local staff),
§ Established working relations with Israeli DCL in both Nablus and Jenin,
UNRWA§ UNRWA will concentrate its efforts on the refugee population in Jenin and other governorates as appropriate,
§ Coordination will be conducted through the UNRWA Operations Support Office (OSO) in close co-operation with camp managers, OCHA and the Emergency Room,
§ UNRWA OSO will during the disengagement place three teams in the field (3x2), of which one will be based in OCHA/WFP office in Nablus,
§ Stocks will be pre-positioned in UNRWA warehouses in Jenin and Nablus.
ICRC§ Coordination of access for PRCS ambulances,
§ Coordination of local water and electricity teams,
§ Field offices with expatriate staff in each governorate, including Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm,
PDCL / PDCO§ PDCL: Coordination with Israeli DCL on access for PA officials, local authorities, individual humanitarian cases and information collection,
§ PDCO: Coordination with Israeli DCO on a access and movement for all non-civilian personnel,
§ Established working relations with Israeli DCL in both Nablus and Jenin,
§ Direct communication to all local PA authorities,
ProtectionICRC§ Monitor compliance with IHL,
§ Monitor humanitarian impact of DP operation,
§ Written preventive interventions on: humanitarian space, main ICRC humanitarian concerns,
§ Collection of information regarding attacks/harassment of Palestinians by settlers to be documented,
§ Same as under ICRC coordination (see above)
Water/SanitationEWASH Group

(Emergency Water & Sanitation and Hygiene Group)

Partners

UNRWA, OXFAM, CARE, PHG, PWA, UNDP, Caritas, PWEG

§ Support and feed into the Emergency Room on all water & sanitation related issues pertinent to the disengagement,
§ Monitor water supplies and consumption in villages of concern,
§ Monitor sanitary conditions during closure,
§ Facilitate access of water to communities affected by closure,
§ Support to disposals of waste
§ Established coordination structures with all water & sanitation stakeholders in the West Bank,
§ Complete and up-to-date database of all players, interventions and current situation in the water & sanitation sector,
§ Stock of chlorine tablets ready for delivery,
§ Can preposition emergency tanks in most vulnerable communities,
FoodWFP, UNRWA§ Provision of food (refugee and non-refugee),§ WFP: Warehouses in Jenin Town (MSA) and Az Zababida (PARC).
§ Swift emergency response and logistics,
§ UNRWA: Warehouse in Dahiyat Sabah al Kheir north of Jenin Town. Could be a problem due to its location as the road through this village is expected to be closed during evacuation.
§ Swift emergency response and logistics,
ICRC§ Can provide minor food for isolated households; however, it is more likely that ICRC will coordinate the passage of essential goods rather than to give ICRC assistance.§ Family parcels (around 50) to be stored in PRCS warehouse in Nablus and some 25 parcels to be stored in each of the ICRC field offices in Jenin and Tubas
Health

WHO/Health Inforum

Partners

MOH, MDM, UNICEF, PRCS, PMRS, CARE, UHWC

§ Coordination with MoH and other health providers on health related issues,
§ Support and feed into the Emergency Room on all health related issues pertinent to the disengagement,
§ Facilitate delivery of medicine from central drug stores in Ramallah through coordination with other international agencies,
§ UNICEF: Psychosocial support to children, Early childhood care, Provision of vaccines and medical kits,
§ MDM: Provision of medical supplies, Psychosocial emergency support, Debriefings,
§ Established coordination structures with all health stakeholders in the West Bank,
§ Complete and up-to-date database of all players, interventions and current situation in the health sector,
§ UNICEF will continue to operate from its field offices, mainly the ones located in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm,
§ MDM: Operate in Nablus only, One mental health mobile clinic, no doctor only one nurse, 2 psychologists + social workers, Youth counselling centre in Nablus town,
PRCS, UHWC, UPMRC, UNRWA§ Emergency Medical Service (Ambulance Service),
§ First Aid,
§ Primary Health Care,
§ Psychological support,
§ PRCS is included in the ICRC contingency plan.
§ UNRWA responsible for transport of refugee population,
§ PRCS: 12 ambulances in Nablus (can operate 24 hrs), 2 sub-stations in Beita and Salfit, 6 ambulances in Jenin (can operate 24 hrs), 2 sub-stations in Jaba and Arraba, 6 ambulances in Qalqiliya, 1 sub-station in Hajja, 3 ambulances in Tulkarm, 2 sub-stations in Anabta and Attil,
§ Radio contact with all MoH hospitals (not private), coordinates all emergency calls on 101, referral hospital in Nablus,
§ Emergency Response Unit (ERU) with a 100-bed capacity. ERU still in process of development, specialist doctors are needed, equipment and nurses available.
§ 3-6 months contingency stock of medical supplies, incl. chronic cases, e.g. diabetes,
§ UPMRC and UHWC: 1 ambulance each,
§ UNRWA: Hospital in Qalqiliya, Mobile clinics, Chemotherapy clinic in Jenin town,
MSF§ Supplies of drugs through MoH centres,
§ Mobile emergency health care.
§ Can mobilise emergency staff (doctors and nurses) within 48-72 hrs.
§ 4 vehicles in Nablus, more can be dispatched if necessary,
§ Has field office and ongoing projects in Nablus, but could extend its capacity to Jenin, if situation requires it,
EducationUNICEF, UNRWA§ Both agencies will ensure access to schools for children and teachers (refugees and non-refugees), with special emphasis on villages/towns under curfew,
§ UNICEF will capitalize on existing interventions, incl. summer camp activities, since they are already designed to meet current emergency needs,
§ UNICEF will continue to operate from its field offices, mainly the ones located in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm,
§ UNRWA OSO will during the disengagement place three teams in the field (3x2), of which one will be based in OCHA/WFP office in Nablus,


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