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        Security Council
4 November 1966

Official Records

1319th Meeting
Held in New York on Friday, 4 November 1966, at 10.30 a.m.


Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1319) 1

Adoption of the agenda 1

The Palestine question:
Letter dated 12 October 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7540).................................................... pg.1


Relevant documents of the Security Council are published in quarterly supplements to the Official Records.

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

President: Mr. Arthur J. GOLDBERG
(United States of America)

President: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, France, Japan, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1319)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The Palestine question:

Letter dated 12 October 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7540).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The Palestine question
Letter dated 12 October 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7540)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken previously, I shall now, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic to take their seats at the Council table in order to participate without vote in the discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. Comay (Israel), Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. M. A. El-Kong (United Arab Republic) took places at the Council table.

2. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): We deeply regret that, in the course of the consultations which were arranged after the debate on this question began, it was not possible to reach a consensus, as the non-permanent members of the Council and some of the permanent members had hoped, It was difficult to reach a consensus, because we had to work in an atmosphere of extreme tension, due not to the situation itself but to the way in which this situation was presented to the Security Council and to the difficulties which were created concerning the so-called urgency of the question. We have been considering this question for a fortnight, remarkable only for the great haste with which certain members of the Council have tried to ensure the adoption of the resolution which was being prepared. Apparently, for those who sought the condemnation of Syria, it was absolutely necessary to create such conditions during the consultations, in order to force the issue. However, such action was not in the interest of peace and security in the region, nor of world peace.

3. As a result of those conditions, we find ourselves in the present situation, where an attempt is being made to present a consensus which was not acceptable and could not be, since it followed the broad lines of the draft resolution dated 27 October 1966 [S/7568] prepared by the Western Powers-the United States and the United Kingdom-and now takes the form of a draft resolution dated 3 November [S/7575/Rev.l] with six sponsors.

4. The question which the Security Council is now debating must be considered in the light of what has gone before and, in particular, in the context of the events of July 1966-the Israel aggression against Syria-and, above all, in the context of the discussion which took place at that time in the Council and the outcome of that discussion, which was a refusal to condemn open and avowed aggression.

5. In paragraph 2 of the draft resolution submitted by the six sponsors, the Syrian Government is invited to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General. Armistice Agreement. Such an invitation is tantamount to saying that the responsibility for such incidents lies with the Syrian Government. However, no evidence has been adduced to support the Israel representative's assertion that the Syrian Government is responsible for them. Mere assertions and the accusations of interested parties can never be accepted as proof of guilt or of responsibility. Moreover, the representative of Syria has denied those accusations. Moreover, the two reports submitted by the Secretary-General have confirmed that there was no proof to support the accusation that Syria was responsible for those incidents.

6. Some of our colleagues, when speaking of the draft resolution now before the Council, have endeavoured to show that the appeal addressed to the Syrian Government does not imply any responsibility on the part of Syria, We are happy to hear such statements. Nevertheless, other speakers have made it clear that they would not have supported the draft resolution had it not contained elements which would contribute to an improvement of the situation in the Middle East, which according to the Netherlands representative, are those same elements which were contained in the draft resolution submitted earlier by the United Kingdom and the United States.

7. We should like to stress that we are at present discussing a draft resolution in which some members of the Council wish implicitly to condemn the Syrian Government for incidents which took place in Israel, on the basis of mere allegations. However, if they would read a little more carefully the pertinent reports of the Secretary-General, which were requested by the representative of Jordan, they would see that it is not Syria which is responsible, but rather that the present situation has been created by the refusal of certain parties, notably Israel, to collaborate with the Mixed Armistice Commission so as to enable it to function normally. In the first report, one of the main reasons for the situation which has been created in the region is clearly indicated:

8. The present situation in the Middle East is not the result of action taken by the Syrian Government, but is due-as this document indicates, moreover-to the fact that Israel has made it impossible for the Mixed Armistice Commission to function and, above all, to the machinations of the great Powers in whose interest it was to create tension in the Middle East. This situation may become extremely dangerous if an effort is not made to take the necessary steps to remedy it.

9. A resolution such as the one which has just been submitted to the Security Council by the six sponsors, on the tenth anniversary of the war provoked in the Middle East by Israel's aggression against the United Arab Republic at the time of the Suez crisis, would seem to be an undeserved gift to the Israel Government and to pave the way for other developments which will prove even greater threats to peace and calm in the Middle East.

10. For these reasons we believe that this resolution should not be accepted by the members of the Council. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would also like to support the request made by the representative of Mali for a separate vote on paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. Otherwise, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will be obliged to vote against the resolution as a whole.

11. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): We have listened with interest to the interventions made yesterday on the draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] submitted by six members of the Security Council. We certainly would have preferred to see a consensus adopted by the Council reflecting the facts of the case, as explained by the reports and by many delegations, including my own, on this question. We would have preferred a consensus which takes into consideration the important points raised in the two new reports relating to, and directly connected with, the complaint under discussion. This was not possible. The members could not reach an agreement on the consensus. Since reference to these efforts was made by some members round this table, I feel I should make some clarification of this matter.

12. The document prepared by four non-permanent members of the Council as a basis for the consensus was presented to the non-permanent members before the two reports were issued. At a later stage, however, when we received the first report [S/7572], my delegation referred to it and requested that paragraph 12 thereof which was cited yesterday by my able colleague, Mr. Adebo of Nigeria, should be taken into consideration. We felt that this was necessary if we were to reach a fair, balanced, reasonable and helpful consensus. Two of my African colleagues in the Security Council, namely, Mr. Kironde and Mr. Adebo, presented a suggestion to this effect, which was later supported by my colleague, Mr. Keita of Mali. This suggestion, however, which reflected a new, additional and important element appearing in the report, was not acceptable to some members of the Council, and particularly to the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

13. I have taken the time of the Council to explain this in order to show that it was not Jordan, nor many other members of the Council, which did not co-operate. Lack of co-operation, to a great extent, came from two permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, the two sponsors of the first draft resolution [S/7568]. We regret to say this but these are the facts, I never intended to dwell on the question of the consensus which was not reached, but since a reference was made to it we find these observations necessary.

14. Let us be very clear about what has taken place, about the latest attempts and efforts made by many colleagues-and we are grateful to all of them-to reach a helpful and fair consensus. What we have been saying is that the two new reports should be given adequate consideration. Nowhere in the two resolutions is there adequate reference to the fact embodied in the second report of 2 November [S/7573], which states, in paragraph 16, that the inhabitants of the villages of Baqqara and Ghanname were evacuated and their villages demolished. There is no reference to the forcible attacks by Israel regular armed forces on Syria-particularly the attack of 14 July 1966. All this is part of the causes of the tense situation in the area.

15. We feel that the Council must make its stand clear, that violations of the General Armistice Agreement and the changing of the status and character of the demilitarized zone and the no man's land do not help in easing tension. The United States and the United Kingdom, who insisted on having a one-sided draft resolution putting more emphasis on the mine incident while ignoring Israel attacks, know very well from their own experiences in Viet-Nam and in South Arabia that mines are difficult to control. It is fitting to remind them at this stage that the question is not one of mines but one of minds. A change of mind on the part of the Israelis and their supporters is the answer to what is going on in the area.

16. It is difficult for both Jordan and Syria to seal over 700 kilometers of demarcation line. This is beyond the possibility and ability of both Jordan and Syria. Apparently it is even beyond the ability of the United States of America in Viet-Nam. The New York Times of 25 October reported that a Viet-Cong mine exploded under a cross-country bus and fifteen persons were killed, many others were wounded. Our army in Jordan, the army in Syria, is less than the army of the United States in Viet-Nam. If the United States failed to detect the presence of mines near the demilitarized zone in Viet-Nam, how can a small country like mine or Syria be blamed for net being able to control almost 2 million Palestinians, who are the victims of Israel invasions? What is it that a reasonable man expects Syria or Jordan to do? To put them in a detention camp? To jail 2 million Palestinians who have committed no crime other than that of their legitimate claim to go back home?

17. Members may have some suggestions to make on this matter. In their draft resolution the United Kingdom and the United States noted that either "the El-Fatah or the El-Assefa Organization has been responsible for a long series of destructive raids into Israel". This is an "either/or" paragraph. We are supposed to note a statement of fact, yet, on the face of it, this paragraph embodies a statement of doubt. It does not impute responsibility to El-Fatah nor to El-Assefa, but it is simply an "either/or" proposition. Why did not the co-sponsors stick to one of the two organizations? Why did the United Kingdom representative and you, Mr. President, the United States representative, not make up your minds as to which of the two organizations is responsible? Or are they both responsible, and how did you reach this conclusion? What are your convincing facts? Mr. Goldberg is a learned judge, and when he presents a case we expect that all the evidence will be weighed by him as a judge.

18. This draft resolution is a decision prepared for the Council's adoption. It should be based on evidence that is admissible, not hearsay, or rumours, distorted facts or half-truths.

19. How can the highest organ in the United Nations say that an act was committed by either X or Y? How would you, Mr. President dispose of a case based on a charge that a crime was committed by either X or Y? Would you not, in such a case, acquit both X and Y? And if this is the case, are we not entitled to expect from the two permanent members in the Security Council, who assume primary responsibility in maintaining peace and order, that they eliminate any statement which is not factual? Is it enough to present a statement like this based on radio broadcasts, newspaper clippings or somebody's declaration? If these are the bases for incorporating paragraph 4 in the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution, the question then arises: How about other so-called rival organizations? How about the new Palestine organization credited with the latest incidents?

20. The Christian Science Monitor of 28 October 1966 announced that a new Palestine Arab underground organization has emerged to take credit for a recent guerrilla operation inside Israel. The Christian Science Monitor said that this is a self-styled "Organization of Heroes of the Return", the OHR-in Arabic: "Mounazzamat Abtal al Awdah". The OHR statement said that three of its members were killed and one taken prisoner on a guerrilla raid inside Israel on 19 October. The statement added that "armed action was the only way to liberate Palestine".

21. According to Israel reports, the raid of 19 Oc­tober was probably not the work of El-Fatah. Now, with this new rival organization, are the co-sponsors going to insert another "or" in their paragraph 4? Are they going to say El-Fatah or El-Assefa or Abtal al Awdah? And how about other new organizations? We hear of more organizations. They all stem from a movement calling for repelling aggression and liberating a homeland. Can we hold Syria responsible for every one of these organizations? Can we hold Syria responsible for acts that are hundreds of kilometres away from the Syrian border? It may, perhaps, be more accurate to refer to the victims of Israel, the people of Palestine, in this paragraph, since every Palestinian is a "hero of the return".

22. What is more, how did the British and American representatives reach the conclusion that either El-Assefa or El-Fatah is responsible? Is this what the United Nations report told them? The answer is no. Is this what the truce investigation team told us? The answer is no. Is this what the Israelis claimed before the United Nations machinery in the area? The answer is no. And if the machinery in the area could not establish this claim as a fact, how can the United Kingdom and United States representatives, sitting thou-sands of miles away from the area, come here and say that it is either El-Fatah or El-Assefa? And if in their complaint the Israelis condemn the unknown, how come the United States and the United Kingdom are more certain than the Israelis? Is it an attempt by one of the two co-sponsors to capitalize on the incident in an election year, and thus be more pro-Israel than the Israelis? All these are important questions because they expose the real motives.

23. If is indeed unfortunate that both draft resolutions make no reference to continued Israel attacks against Jordan and Syria. These attacks by regular Israel armed forces and by the Israel air force certainly contributed to tension in the area. If the idea behind the Security Council action is to ease tension and not to increase it, then I submit that the two great Powers should be fair and objective. They should not incorporate rumours, ignoring facts which are based on United Nations findings and determinations. The United Nations report tells us very clearly that"

The Secretary-General in his report reminds the Council that the Mixed Armistice Commission is "the machinery created by the parties and for whose operation they alone are responsible" [ibid.].

24. We believe that any resolution adopted by the Council should make reference to Israel's continued failure to resort to the Mixed Armistice Commission, to its continued encroachment on the demilitarized zone, to its continued violation of many aspects of the Armistice Agreement, to the fact that, because the Mixed Armistice Commission is unable to function, efforts to maintain quiet along the armistice demarcation line are weakened. With such reference any resolution would be neither fair nor balances, nor would it reflect the reality of the situation.

25. In his intervention yesterday, the representative of the Netherlands said:

26. Perhaps my friend and colleague, Mr. de Beus, would find time in this busy session to make a further study of this question. He would then find, I am sure, that article VII, paragraph 8, leaves no room for unilateral interpretation. The armistice Agreement expressly provides for interpretation. Article VII, paragraph 8, is very clear and I shall read it; it ways:

It does not say a thing about a unilateral interpretation, but that “the Commission's interpretation shall prevail".

27. Thus, the interpretation is a matter for the Commission. It is not up to Israel to have a veto power on what it should accept and what it should reject. This was never the intention of the parties who signed the Armistice Agreement. Nor is it up to Israel to define the status of the demilitarized zone, which is specifically defined in the Armistice Agreement.

28. The status of the demilitarized zone is derived from the principal text of article V and other provisions of the Armistice Agreement. This was made more explicit by Mr. Bunche in his letter on the question. 2/ Mr. Bunche is here with us and I am sure that he remembers all this. This status was established by the mutual consent of the two parties. It can only change by their agreement. Neither side can, therefore, exercise any of the attributes of sovereignty.

29. The report we received yesterday [S/7572] explains in paragraph 6 that the stand of Israel, vis-a-vis the status of the demilitarized zone and the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission, had changed since 1951. Prior to that-prior to 1951-Israel did not challenge the armistice machinery in the area. The question of principle and the matter of interpretation were never in the thinking of the Israelis at that time. Not only that, but if my friend and colleague, Mr. de Beus, would find the time in this busy session, or later, to read document S/1459 of 20 February 1950, he would find that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established his authority of supervision during the first year of the Armistice Agreement. He ruled that a new settlement created by Israel "was established without the concurrence of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission charged with the normal restoration of civilian, life in the demilitarized zone, was fenced in so as to be in the nature of a military outpost, and should therefore be removed". That was the decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, requesting Israel to remove a certain settlement of a military character.

30. Israel thereupon complied with that decision; it did not raise any question of competence or sovereignty, nor anything of the kind, nor of interpretation. Thus, it cannot be argued that this new attitude of Israel was anything but another defiance by Israel of the authority of the armistice machinery, and part and parcel of its expansionist designs. I therefore submit that only by respecting the status of the demilitarized zone can it be maintained as a buffer between the two sides.

31. I hope that my colleague and friend, Mr. de Beus, agrees with me that, under the Armistice Agreement, any unilateral action is excluded and that it is unilateral action which leads to complications which, in turn, lead to chain reactions. I am sure that Mr. de Beus knows that the demilitarized zone was occupied by Syrian forces at the time of the armistice. Cer­tainly Syria would not have withdrawn from it if it was the intention that that area would be annexed as part of the Israel-held territory.

32. I should like to say, in concluding, that only with an awareness of the seriousness of the problem comes knowledge of all facts, and only with knowledge and understanding can the problem be solved on the basis of justice and truth. Indeed, peace in the region cannot be the result of resolutions. It can only be the result of understanding-understanding the whole problem in all its dimensions and understanding all its implications.

33. Under these circumstances, we regret that we have no other alternative but to vote against the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution [S/7568] when it is put to the vote, and also against the six-Power draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] if it is put as a whole to the vote.

34. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The position of the Soviet Union on the question under consideration was explained in the statement by our delegation to the Council on 14 October 1966 [1307th meeting], and we confirm it in its entirety. In our statement we stressed, inter alias that the reasons for the deep concern felt by peace-loving peoples over the situation in the Middle East are the generally aggressive policy pursued by the ruling circles in Tel Aviv and those behind them towards the Arab countries and the attempts of the imperialist countries to prevent, by force, the development of the national liberation movement of the people of the Near and Middle East.

35. Now that we are approaching the end of the discussion of the item on our agenda, it must be pointed out that all the efforts of a number of members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, to secure an objective decision in the Council have failed to achieve any positive results.

36. Now it is especially clear that the draft resolution submitted to the Council by the United States and the United Kingdom [S/7568] reflects the one-sided, biased position of the Western Powers, which, throughout the discussion of the question in the Council, have tried to distort the true state of affairs and justify Israel's extremist policy, which is causing a dangerous state of tension in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the six-Power draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l] cannot be considered satisfactory either, although it contains a number of provisions which are unobjectionable.

37. It is impossible to disregard the fact that the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution now before us have in fact ignored the clear and responsible statements made by the representative of Syria in the Security Council to the effect that the Government of Syria rejects as unfounded and misrepresenting the true situation the accusations that Syria is being used as a base for subversive activities and to the effect that the Syrian Government bears no responsibility whatsoever for the incidents which have taken place on Israel's territory.

38. Disregarding these statements by the Syrian representative, the sponsors of this draft resolution, in operative paragraph 2, nevertheless attempt, in essence, to make Syria responsible for the tense situation on the borders between Israel and the Arab States. But the reports submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council concerning the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel and the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission make the situation clear. These reports shove once again very clearly that it is certainly not Syria but Israel which is violating the status of the demilitarized zone, provoking a permanent state of tension on the armistice lines and hindering the work of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

39. The Secretary-General's report concerning the demilitarized zone, states that:

Such was the situation in 1956, and such is the situation even now, ten years later, as a result of the position taken by Israel.

40. As the Secretary-General's report concerning the Mixed Armistice Commission points out, and I quote: "... matters which properly should first be considered in the Mixed Armistice Commission and which often might well be disposed of there, are brought instead directly to the attention of the Security Council" [5/7572, para. 12]. This is done, of course, in the pursuit of aims which have nothing to do with a true concern for the maintenance of peace in the Near East region.

41. it cannot fail to cause surprise that the objective information on the actual situation in the area of the armistice line between Syria and Israel and the position of the parties concerned has not been given due weight by the sponsors of this draft resolution and has not been properly reflected in the text.

42. The Soviet delegation cannot agree with the one-sided approach to this question in the six-Power draft resolution and considers that the adoption, in particular, of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution could only have dangerous and harmful consequences for peace in the Middle East. It would only encourage Tel Aviv's aggressive policy towards the neighbouring Arab States and would complicate the situation in the region.

43. For the reasons I have stated, the Soviet delegation appeals to the sponsors of the draft resolution to delete this paragraph, or at least to agree to a separate vote on it, as the representative of Mali suggested at the 1317th meeting of the Council. If this proves unacceptable to the sponsors of the draft resolution, the Soviet delegation will be obliged to vote against their draft resolution as a whole.

44. The PRESIDENT: The list of speakers who wish to take the floor before the voting has been exhausted. The Council will now proceed to vote on the draft resolutions before it. I should like to recall that two draft resolutions have been tabled: the first, sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States of America [S/7568]; the second, sponsored by Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Uganda [S/7575/Rev.1]. I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order.

45. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I merely wish to say that the first of the two draft resolutions to which you referred, tabled in the name of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, should not take precedence over the second and, therefore, I waive any right to have the former draft resolution voted on first.

46. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution S/7568, has conceded priority in the voting to the draft resolution contained in document S/7575/ Rev.1. Accordingly, I shall now ask the Council to vote on the six-Power draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.l].

47. The representative of Mali, in his statement yesterday [1317th meeting], indicated a desire for a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. Does he want to renew that request at this time? I give the floor to the representative of Jordan on a point of order.

48. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): The request is there; it has not been withdrawn: it is still in existence; it does not, I think, require renewal simply because we are in another meeting.

49. The PRESIDENT: I note the comments of Mr. El-Farra. I address myself to Mr. Keita.

50. Mr. KEITA (Mali) (translated from French): I had hoped, as I have already said, that the sponsors would agree to a vote by division. I reiterate my request, therefore, hoping that the sponsors will agree to it.

51. The PRESIDENT: I recognize the representative of Uganda.

52. Mr. KIRONDE (Uganda): The sponsors are extremely loath to deny the request made by the representative of Mali and expressed also by the representative of the Soviet Union. But, much as we desire to accommodate them, we have found it difficult to do so, because that would definitely upset the balance that was originally intended. In addition to that, the reasons which were advanced against inclusion of operative paragraph 2 have not, in our view, been sufficiently convincing.

53. Exception was taken to the use by one of the co-sponsors of the word "admonish". I have since taken the trouble to consult the dictionary and I find that "admonish" means: to put in mind of duties: to counsel, to warn: to inculcate". And I suppose the worst of the three meanings is to warn someone of his duties.

54. The sponsors who spoke in support of the draft resolution took pains to say that there was no intention whatever of condemnation in operative paragraph 2. It has been said that Syria is being condemned by implication; but this is taking an unduly pessimistic view of the paragraph; this is reading more into paragraph 2 than was intended by the original sponsors. There is no intention whatsoever of condemning either of the parties. The purpose of operative paragraph 2 would be completely defeated if it were removed and the whole resolution would be completely out of balance. For those reasons we have found it impossible to accede to the request of the representative of Mali.

55. The PRESIDENT: Objection having been made to a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 by the original sponsors, we will now proceed, in accordance with rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, to the vote on the draft resolution [S/7575/ Rev.1] as a whole.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Uruguay, United King­dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: China.

The result of the vote was 10 in favour, 4 against, with one abstention.

The draft resolution was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that of a permanent member of the Council.

56. The PRESIDENT: Now, in my capacity as the representative of the UNITED STATES, and on a point of order, I wish to say on behalf of ourselves and of the United Kingdom that we will not press to the vote the resolution contained in document S/7568, in the light of the veto by a permanent member of the Council of even what we conceive to be the milder text presented by Argentina, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria and Uganda.

57. In my capacity as PRESIDENT, I would inform the Council that there are several speakers who have requested an opportunity to speak after the vote. The first on my list for this purpose is the representative of New Zealand.

58. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand): It had been the hope of my delegation that the resolution which New Zealand had the honour of co-sponsoring would make its contribution to the reduction of tension in the area.

59. The Soviet Union, never loath to assume that particular form of responsibility, has now moved to ensure that it will not. The privilege, which would be a proud one, were it not so tragic, of being felled with the last desperate weapon in the Soviet armory, is one which is perhaps not new to some non-permanent members of the Council. It is a new one to the African sponsors serving on the Council for the first time, to whom we mainly owed the six-Power draft.

60. This veto, the 105th from the same great Power-if I am not mistaken-has at least one advantage, from my delegation's point of view: it enables me to state, perhaps more frankly than would have been the case has the resolution been adopted, that this text represented the absolute minimum, in the view of my Government, that was required to meet the situation confronting us. The genesis of the draft resolution has already been set out by other sponsors. We, for our part, would have thought the draft resolution submitted in the names of the United Kingdom and United States an appropriate, indeed, a sober response to the serious complaint of which the Council had been seized, as already indicated by the statement in support of that draft made in the 1317th meeting. My Government was, nevertheless, prepared to authorize New Zealand's co-sponsorship of the resolution now obstructed. It did so, in the first place, in recognition of the wide support which it enjoyed among the non-permanent members, in particular, support which the vote has now shown was forthcoming from no fewer than ten members of the Council. Above all, however, the text seemed to state fairly, and with appropriate order and emphasis, the main elements preoccupying a majority of the members of the Council in their attempt to intervene objectively in order to prevent a deterioration of the situation and to enjoin such further measures as might assist in reducing tensions.

61. Because of the nature of the serious incidents that necessitated this series of Security Council meetings, the text was based-as it had to be-on a recognition that Syria has a responsibility to prevent organizations established on its territory from mounting terrorist attacks upon Israel. The text also recalled-as it was bound to do-that Israel's long-standing responsibilities under the cease-fire agreements include the responsibility to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission.

62. The first of these elements, a recognition of Syria's responsibility to prevent activities within its territory, was an essential one, given the basic position on the substance of the Israel complaint, which I set out in the course of two statements at the Council's 1307th and 1309th meetings.

63. It is not an attitude which applies to the present question alone, much less one which should be construed as indicating a partisan pro-Israel or pro-Arab stand. New Zealand's own area of the world contains the seat of a regime which openly proclaims doctrines of so-called people's wars of liberation on a universal scale, in disregard of the United Nations Charter and of the principles of international law. We have heard similar views proclaimed in the Latin American region.

64. It is, therefore, within the framework of a general concern about the spread of such views, which ultimately lead to world anarchy and the negation of the Charter, that we view statements-such as that reportedly made only the day before yesterday by the Syrian Head of State and already referred to in this chamber-which tend to a similar end and which constitute the backdrop against which the Council must view the specific incidents that form the first part of the complaint with which we have been dealing.

65. There are, perhaps, two main points to be made in this respect. First, there is the obvious danger that continuation of provocative incidents in a situation made more tense by the political attitudes adopted may lead the Government of Israel to take measures in its own defence, with all the consequences which that might entail. Secondly, and more important, so far as the longer term is concerned, is the consideration that the further development of the present situation, which I have described, risks distorting the whole framework of reference within which the basic and longstanding problem is judged. A new situation might then arise in which old elements of justice, still widely acknowledged, are eventually lost from sight, or submerged in a new reality.

66. In the face of the veto, what more can one say? The one thing, perhaps, that might be said is that such use of the veto must surely carry with it at least the risk that the new situation, to which I have just referred, may, indeed, come about. And in whose interest will that be? Probably not of Syria or of Israel. Certainly not of the refugees. And perhaps not even of the Soviet Union itself, in spite of the national self-interest, which is a very different thing from the safeguard of a vital interest, on which the Soviet veto was presumably based. National self-interest was no doubt seen rather differently in 1948, when the Soviet Union played a leading role in pressing through the General Assembly the partition resolution [181 (II)], and hastened to recognize Israel a few hours after the United States.

67. At this point, one would like to be able to go on to consider what further steps it might still be possible to take. It is perhaps too early to do so. Nevertheless, on one point we can be clear: that the draft resolution, even though not adopted, did receive a degree of support sufficient to indicate beyond possible doubt the responsible position of the international community in the face of the present situation. It continues to be my delegation's hope that, despite the Council's failure to act in the strict sense, both parties will be guided by this expression of view.

68. The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Corner for his remarks. The next speaker on my list is the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, to whom I now give the floor.

69. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): Speaking in explanation of vote, I shall be as brief as possible, and to save time I shall dispense with consecutive interpretation. Nothing that has been said, and nothing that has occurred, during this long debate, has changed the views which I expressed nearly three weeks ago [1307th meeting] regarding the seriousness of the dangers of the situation. I have no doubt that the grave concern which I then expressed was fully justified, nor do I doubt that we in this Security Council should deplore and condemn terrorist acts, or any other resort to violence. Nor should we fail to repeat, as we unanimously declared last month, in regard to the Congo, that it is the duty of any Government to prevent and oppose, by all means at its disposal, the use of its territory for the mounting of any activity the aim of which is violence against another. That is the inescapable obligation of article III, paragraph 3, of the General Armistice Agreement, which stipulated that:

70. It is in this sense that my delegation interprets the invitation to the Government of Syria in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, and it is in accordance with article III, paragraph 3, of the Agreement that we look to that Government to discharge its responsibilities.

71. Our purpose here in this Council should surely be to do everything in our power to ensure that violence is not encouraged, but stopped, and stopped before any wider conflict is caused. No one can doubt that this aim is in the best interests, not only of one side or the other, but of everyone concerned.

72. Having said that, I wish to pay a tribute to the persistent efforts of the six sponsors of the draft resolution. They strove to arrive at a conclusion most likely to achieve our common purpose, and, especially, I admire the spirit in which their consultations have taken place. These efforts have been in the highest tradition of the Council, and I should add that it was a matter of some satisfaction, and some hope too, that all members of the Council, permanent and non-permanent, showed a readiness to consider the issues and to co-operate together in the consultations which took place.

73. Many of us had very greatly hoped that, although some measure of disagreement might possibly continue, no member of this Council would seek to frustrate the wish of the majority. It is all the more a matter for very deep regret and disappointment that the efforts of recent weeks, in which we have all participated, have not succeeded in achieving what, was within our grasp: a unanimous decision of the Council, which must have had a salutary effect on the dangerous situation with which we deal.

74. We have seen much evidence in this debate of intense feeling and harsh judgements and bitter enmities and, I regret to say, the imputation of base motives. Despite the result of the voting, I trust that it can be recognized that all of us have an interest and a duty to exert every effort to stop violence, to reduce tension, to prevent any extension of conflict and to enlist the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations to the full to restore and maintain peaceful conditions. That was our stated purpose at the outset of this debate, and we must surely persevere in it in spite of setbacks and disappointments.

75. We voted for the draft resolution because it seemed to us that it maintained the essential requirements for dealing with the present situation, and, at the same time, provided the best basis for whatever action this Council may be called upon to take in the future. Although the draft resolution and the will of the majority have been frustrated, I trust that the draft resolution on which we voted just now, supported by such a substantial majority of the members of this Council, will be recognized as a clear expression of the determination of the majority of the members of the Council to do their utmost to maintain peace and stability, and to establish them for the future.

76. The PRESIDENT: I thank Lord Caradon for his comments. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Israel, Mr. Comay, to whom I now give the floor.

77. Mr. COMAY (Israel): I have asked for the floor to sum up in general terms my Government's views and position on the matters which have come up in the debate and have been reflected in the draft resolutions that were tabled.

78. On 12 October, the Government of Israel asked the Security Council to intervene urgently in a situation which had become tense and ominous. Armed groups were penetrating, and still penetrate, our territory at night, from across the border, dynamiting dwellings, houses and installations, laying land mines on the roads and even, as we have recently seen, trying to blow up trains. It was clear that these were not sporadic and unrelated incidents carried out by individuals, but a series of destructive raids, organized and directed by a central authority. Some of these attacks came through the territory of neighbouring States, and those States, too, have inescapable obligations to take all possible preventive measures. In this regard, may I say that, when the representative of Jordan makes ferocious and threatening statements here, he needs to be reminded that his country and mine are fellow-Members of this Organization, that his Government and mine are co-signatories of the same Armistice Agreement, and that there exists a framework of reciprocal obligations between the two Member States.

79. However, it has been clear that the raids originated in Syria, and were aided and abetted by the Syrian authorities. In fact, Syria publicly identified itself with this violence. Through the utterances of Syrian political and military leaders and through Government media, the acts of sabotage have been glorified and have been presented as the opening phase of a so-called popular war aimed at another United Nations Member State. This is further corroborated by the latest statements quoted in my letter to you, Mr. President, of 3 November [S/7576].

80. The proclaimed policy of the Syrian Government is the political context for the bombs and land mines exploding in Israel. From the beginning of the debate, most members of the Council took the state of affairs very seriously and were deeply concerned about its implications for the peace and security of the area. Two central and interrelated elements have emerged in the debate. One is the recognition that we are faced with an organized pattern of guerrilla activity, with which Syrian territory is connected, and the second element is that the Government of Syria has to fulfill its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and its specific commitments under the 1949 Armistice Agreement, by preventing such acts of violence.

81. A number of Council members have insisted rightly that this was a governmental responsibility which could on no account be repudiated or shirked. I would stress that the Council is dealing with the responsibility of a State Government in relation to its territory and its inhabitants. As the representative of Uganda has previously pointed out, these State responsibilities apply also to those inhabitants who may have been refugees from elsewhere. The refugee problem is not under discussion here, however, but in one of the main Committees of the General Assembly. Let me only say in passing that the refugee problem was born out of one war and will not be resolved by another war. That is a doctrine of dangerous folly which can only produce more bloodshed and more misery. Anyway, we do not believe that the refugees are to blame for this violence. We are dealing with paramilitary forces, operating as an arm of regular forces, and in pursuance of Government policy.

82. My Government has taken note of the clear and forthright response to its complaint in many statements made in this debate. That response was reflected in two draft resolutions, one of which has now been supported by ten members of the Council, although its formal adoption has been prevented by a veto. The central theme of both resolutions was the deploring by the Council of the incidents which have been the subject of this debate, and the loss of life and casualties caused by these attacks and, secondly, the need for action on the part of Syria to prevent such incidents in the future. My delegation is interested to note that the significance of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which has just been voted upon was understood by these to whom it was addressed. It is unusual for our view to coincide with that of the Syrian delegation, but on this occasion I find myself in agreement with what was said yesterday by the representative of Syria, namely, that "operative paragraph 2 implies that Syria is being admonished, that Syria is being blamed for not having taken the necessary measures" [1317th meeting, para. 16].

83. The Israel complaint against Syria has thus been vindicated in its essential, substantive aspects. The fact that normal adoption of even such a moderate draft resolution has been prevented by a veto of a permanent member does not detract, in the opinion of my Government, from the political and moral weight behind the findings of facts and the fixing of responsibility. This broad expression of international opinion is underlined by the fact that the majority supporting this resolution is made up of Council members from all the five continents, including three of the big Powers who are permanent members of the Council. We note further that many of those who have voted in its favour indicated clearly that they would have been ready to support a stronger text. My delegation does not conceal its view that a more vigorous formulation of Syrian responsibility would have been appropriate.

84. The salient political fact, however, is that the large majority of the Council have acknowledged the incidents brought to its attention in Israel's complaint, the losses they have caused and Syrian responsibility to prevent their recurrence.

85. My Government is aware that the issue is not resolved by the adoption or non-adoption of a resolution in the Security Council. It can be resolved in Damascus. It is our earnest hope that the Syrian Government will pay heed to the collective concern and admonition which have been so strongly reflected in the debate and in the two draft resolutions, the language of which was cautious but the meaning of which was plain. It is regrettable that a permanent member of the Council should have been opposed to a draft resolution on a matter so obviously involving peace and security. Moreover, this resolution was couched in the spirit of non-intervention, of peaceful coexistence and respect for international obligations. It is vital for these principles to be applied to the troubled Middle East as well. This refusal to allow the majority view to be formally adopted does not contribute to the reduction of tension in the Middle East nor to the furtherance of co-operation and peaceful coexistence in that region.

86. At the outset of this debate charges were made that Israel had been concentrating its forces on the border for an attack upon Syria. These charges certainly added to the tension in the area and those who spread them assumed a serious responsibility. At the instance of Israel, United Nations military observers carried out an inspection, and on 23 October the Secretary-General submitted General Bull's report which stated that "there was no build-up of forces or equipment observed either in the demilitarized zone or the defensive areas on either side" [S/7561/Rev.1, para. 11]. The story has thus been certified as baseless. It may be recalled that similar allegations were made a few months ago and that then, too, General Bull reported that he had found no evidence of any such military build-up. We leave it to Council members to draw their own conclusions.

87. Regarding the armistice machinery, I have little to add to the statement my delegation made to the Council on 20 October. I believe that statement showed the Council that our attitude is positive and constructive and that there is close co-operation between the Israel and United Nations authorities at all levels. The Secretary-General's report indicates what the problem is regarding plenary meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. I note with approval the last sentence in that report, which reads as follows: "Serious consideration might well be given now as to whether there might be some more fruitful approach to the goal of enabling the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function effectively." [S/7572, para. 12.]

88. To start with, the sensible course would be to disengage the Commission from the 66,085 accumulated old complaints and let it look to the future. We are particularly interested in the Mixed Armistice Commission being put into a position to deal with incidents as they occur. It is not Israel that prevents that. I would, however, repeat my delegation's view, and my Government's view, that the basic problem here is not one of machinery but of Government policy.

89. The other report [S/7573] regarding demilitarized zones has just become available and I have sent it to my Government for study. I would reserve our position on the contents of that report.

90. Reference has been made in this debate to the need for a broader settlement. Let me say that my Government would gladly join at any time in an effort to move forward from a brittle armistice regime to the firmer ground of peaceful and normal relations. That is what was contemplated when the armistice regime was set up so many years ago. If our neighbours doubt our sincerity about this, let them sit down with us and put our intentions to the test.

91. But if we have to live awhile longer with the armistice regime, it becomes all the more important to preserve it. The Israel Foreign Minister said at an earlier meeting of this Council that at this stage: "We want nothing from Syria-nothing-except the precise fulfilment of its obligations towards Israel as laid down in the United Nations Charter and in the 1949 Agreement" [1307th meeting, para. 45]. I would add that if my Government wants nothing more than that from Syria, it also cannot accept anything less than that from Syria.

92. If the Government of Syria decided to reaffirm that basis for its present relationship with Israel, if it took the necessary measures to control the border and stop raids, if it stopped proclaiming war against Israel, the trouble and tension on the Israel-Syrian border would die down. Despite every adverse circumstance, my Government and my people hope that that prospect will be realized. We would like now to believe that what Mr. Corner has rightly called "the responsible position of the international community" will be respected by Syria in the interest of peace and stability in the region which Syria and Israel share and will go on sharing as neighbouring States.

93. The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Comay for his comments. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Syria, Mr. Tomeh, to whom I now give the floor.

94. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): In explaining yesterday [1317th meeting] the stand of the Syrian delegation regarding draft resolution S/7575/Rev.1, I stated very clearly our reasons for rejecting this resolution, the most important of which, among other things, is the fact that when Syria complained of the unprovoked act of war committed by Israel against Syria on 14 July 1966, an act of aggression which was admitted by the Israel authorities themselves, no resolution was then passed by the Council. But, as the Council is now concerned, as it should be, with decreasing tension in the area, it is only fair that we should reflect here on what the reaction of the people in the area would be, for surely the Arab peoples will necessarily compare that naked act of aggression of 14 July on Syrian territory and people with the artificial complaint placed before this Council by Israel against Syria.

95. Four reports were submitted by the Secretary-General in connexion with this complaint. One of them proved the utter falsehood of the alleged accusations against Syria and two proved beyond any doubt the continued utter cynicism and complete disregard of Israel authorities to the General Armistice Agreement, the Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations machinery in the area on the whole. Thus, while nothing has been proved against Syria the Israel complaint should have been dismissed as utter falsehood and artificiality. We find regrettably, after carefully going through the reports of the Secretary-General, that as far as the machinery of the United Nations is concerned, Israel continues to completely ignore it, not to speak of scores of United Nations resolutions which, if observed by Israel primarily, would have led to the lessening of tension in the area.

96. The veiled threats in Mr. Comay's statement of today do not, I am sure, escape the attention of anyone here. Among other things, Mr. Comay said that the problem of the refugees was created by one war only and will not be resolved by another war, It is our sincere hope that it will not be resolved by another war; but as to the responsibility of that war which created the problem of the refugees I believe that I have placed before this important body enough documentation to prove whose responsibility it was in starting, planning and executing that war.

97. But surely-one must raise the question-in view of the utter defiance of Israel of all United Nations, resolutions and machinery what is it that enables Israel to pursue such an aggressive policy. How is it that after eighteen years, one and a half million Arab refugees are still living homeless and in exile. Israel would not have done so had it not been for the unconditional support-financial, military, political and otherwise-given to it by the United States and the United Kingdom. Israel is the guardian of the interests of those two States and a smoke-screen for their oil interests in the area.

98. Nevertheless, after this debate we are sure that every Arab realizes by now who is the real enemy in the area. Furthermore, it is my duty to warn the Council once more of the aggressive intentions of Israel. The number of false accusations made by Israel against Syria is in itself indicative of the fact that Israel is preparing aggression. The news coming out of Israel proves this fact, no matter how strenuously they may deny it. In fact, the report of the Secretary-General [S/7573] speaks for itself when it clearly states that the United Nations military observers have been prevented from carrying out investigations in the demilitarized zone.

99. Yesterday, I also quoted General E.L.M. Burns, a Canadian, in his honest explanation of the deliberate and premeditated attack by Israel against Syria in December 1955, and how this attack was preceded by at least twenty-five alleged incidents to prepare for that attack. However, I did not read General Burn's complete interpretation, but it becomes especially relevant today when the news of a defensive pact between Syria and the United Arab Republic has been made known. General Burns wrote the following interpretation of the Israel attack of 1955:

100. Many members have spoken about the General Armistice Agreement and the responsibility of the Syrian Government under that Agreement. I wish in that connexion to state the following. Syria is a founding Member of the United Nations, whose statesmen and jurists have played their role in the San Francisco Conference and contributed towards the formulation of the United Nations Charter. The implications of this fact are clear: that the Government and people of Syria are fully aware of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as a guarantor of peace and of our full co-operation with the world organization. This deep sense of responsibility cannot be made more obvious than is proved by Syria's record at the United Nations and in the Security Council.

101. The Government of Syria has maintained, and still maintains, that it has no relation with the two organizations of El-Fatah and El-Assefa, and is in no way responsible for their actions. In its quest for peace, the Council should, however, be aware of the following irreducible, undeniable facts. First, that there are one and a half million Arab refugees living in four Arab States-Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic-and that there is an equal number of Arab Palestinians in various parts of the world who, in all, constitute two and a half million. Secondly, that this is a people whose physical existence at least cannot be denied, disregarded or forgotten. This people-separate by its efforts and having its own organizations-know of the principle of self-determination enshrined in the Charter, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and of at least seventeen United Nations resolutions that have confirmed their right to repatriation or compensation. Syria cannot be held responsible for a whole nation in exile in three countries other than its own.

102. Nevertheless, Syria has never ceased at any time, as proved by the reports of the Secretary-General, to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, as I showed in my intervention of yesterday. We have maintained and we still do maintain our complete readiness and will to continue to do so. In the same spirit, the Security Council must also remind Israel of its obligations to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission and not simply to pay lip-service to it. The threats of war coming from Israel time and again-in fact, from the very mouth of the Israel speaker here-are proof of what Israel's intentions are. Members of the Council might recall that, during the discussion of our complaint of 21 July 1966, I submitted statements by Israel leaders threatening to use force to prevent the execution of a development project inside Syrian territory. In fact, Israel regular forces have done so several times. Is the Israel representative ready to declare here and now in the Council that his authorities will not use force in preventing the execution of this development project? Or are we to be misled again by big statements about peace and the intentions of peace? Are Israel authorities ready to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission and co-operate with it, as specifically stipulated in the General Armistice Agreement and to stop boy­cotting the Mixed Armistice Commission and paralysing its work?

103. Syria has given its answer in deeds, not in words. We will continue to do so. Finally, I would be remiss in my duty if I did not thank most sincerely the representatives in the Security Council who voted against the draft resolution, [S/7575/Rev.1], as well as the delegation which abstained.

104. The PRESIDENT; I thank Mr. Tomeh for his comments and I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. El-Kony.

105. Mr. EL-KONY (United Arab Republic): I very much regret that some delegations have deemed it fit to table the draft resolution contained in document S/7575/Rev.1. We believe it was unjust and partial. We regret all the more that two African delegations co-sponsored that draft resolution; they and I come from a continent which is still suffering from colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination. This case, which the Council was discussing, is a flagrant example of the three evils combined. It is a great pity that the influence of imperialism represented here by the United States Government, colonialism represented here by the United Kingdom Government, and racial discrimination represented by both, have prevailed; but, fortunately, not to the end.

106. The draft resolution, if adopted, would not have contributed to the peace in the Middle East. On the contrary, this constant persecution and injustice against the Arabs by certain quarters in the United States and the United Kingdom, as was revealed once again in the Security Council, will undoubtedly increase the bitterness of the Arabs and their disillusionment with the world Organization.

107. My delegation is very grateful to the delegation of the Soviet Union for having taken the right measure to stop the machinations of these two Governments. The Soviet Government has proven consistently that it is upholding firmly the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

108. Equally, I should like to thank the delegations of Bulgaria, Mali and Jordan for their opposition to the draft resolution, and the delegation which abstained. I thank them for their fair and wise judgement.

109. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) (translated from French): Although the Council was not able to adopt the text submitted to it, I consider it necessary, before the closure of this debate, to draw the attention of the parties to the General Armistice Agreement to the statements which have been made here regarding their respective responsibilities under the Agreement as a whole, and, particularly, article III, paragraph 3, of that text.

110. It is the sincere hope of my Government that the parties concerned will make an effort to observe the letter and the spirit of the Agreement more strictly and, to that end, will not neglect to consult the statements made here by the various delegations. Nor should the parties underestimate the efforts which have been made by the Members of the Council to reach a consensus-which did, at one time, seem possible. The statements of the permanent members and our joint search for a constructive solution show, in our opinion, that all of us here are inspired by a common concern to do our utmost to prevent a situation which has once again become tense from deteriorating further and endangering peace in the Middle East.

111. Mr. KEITA (Mali) (translated from French): Once again, what have we just proved? It saddens me, as a representative of a young country and a newcomer to the Council, as the New Zealand representative has stressed, to see that we seem to be playing with the lives of entire peoples. The proof of this has just been given. All these statements drawn up carefully in advance prove that, whatever may be said, everyone here knew quite well what the result of this vote should be.

112. I turn first of all to the statement by the representative of New Zealand. What must the world think of our work? Quite simply, that we are concerned about something quite other than the security and the right to life which entire peoples are seeking to enjoy, as others do. We are playing at wars of resolutions, Should we not rather give thought to the interests of the peoples concerned? Need I say once again, with all impartiality, that Mali has always and will always continue to contribute to the success of the work of the Council, where it takes its seat as a result of the trust placed in it by more than 100 Members of the United Nations. Mali does not want to betray that trust. That is why we had hoped to have a separate vote, which would have enabled us, while demonstrating our constant and active solidarity with our brothers from Uganda and Nigeria, to make our contribution to the Council, in all objectivity and fairness, Despite all the efforts which we realize were made by Council members, we were unable to reach a consensus.

113. Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution submitted to us happened to be in contradiction-I repeat, in contradiction-with the official Secretariat documents relating to the question. We are sorry that the sponsors of the resolution were not responsive to our appeal; we were thus unable to join in supporting a resolution which we considered unfair.

114. I have already stated here that we are not taking sides either with Israel or with Syria. Our vote is dictated solely by the desire to see a reduction of the tension in the area and, to respect the trust placed in us by more than 100 States Members of the United Nations. In our previous statements, we have never asked that the Jews should be driven out of Israel, but we have supported and shall continue to support the cause of the Palestine refugees who wish to return to their homeland.

115. I read out to the Council, at the 1310th meeting, a newspaper article in which it was stated that Syria, like Lebanon and Jordan, is continuing to take steps to contain terrorist activities, and-which is no secret to anyone-that the so-called terrorist movements in question are a part of the struggle for national liberation, which is beyond the control of the Syrian authorities, whatever steps they may decide to take.

116. Again, documents S/7572 and S/7573 have further confirmed that, despite Syria's efforts, it had become impossible for the United Nations machinery to fulfill its task. We therefore felt, after reading those two reports establishing that the United Nations machinery in the region was unable to function, that the sponsors would have to agree, if not to a revision of paragraph 2, at least to a separate vote. To our great regret, they did not comply with our request. You will thus realize that Mali was unable to support the draft resolution. We think, however, that it is necessary and that it would be more constructive for the Council to concern itself more with the real issue and the underlying causes of this question, which has been on the agenda for nearly twenty years, instead of with interpretations which serve quite other interests than those of the peoples concerned.

117. The delegation of Mali remains, as always, firmly resolved to co-operate unreservedly in seek­ing an effective solution to the problem, and, while we fervently hope that peace may be established in the region for the sake of its inhabitants, we regret that we could not, in the interest of the United Nations, the Security Council and, above all, the peoples of the Middle East, support a resolution which we considered one-sided.

118. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): I should merely like to say a few words on what has occurred here following the rejection of the draft resolution.

119. Mr. Corner, representative of New Zealand, has seen fit once again to attack the Soviet Union because it voted against the draft resolution, as a result of the intransigent attitude of the United Kingdom and the United States in their refusal to reach a consensus and the support which they gave to the draft resolution, which, had it been adopted, would have served to encourage blatant aggression.

120. In view of the efforts expended on the preparation of this resolution, which was unacceptable not only from the viewpoint of one of the parties concerned but also-and I wish to stress this-of peace and security in the Middle East and throughout the world, we must say that we are particularly gratified that such a resolution was not adopted, thanks to the opposition of one of the great Powers. To prevent the adoption of a draft resolution which might endanger peace is no sin, but that Power should be proud of the stand which it has taken.

121. The PRESIDENT: The list of speakers has now been exhausted, except that, In accordance with the usual practice of the Council, I should like to make a statement in my capacity as representative of the UNITED STATES in explanation of our vote.

122. The United States regrets that the resolution sponsored by the six Powers was not adopted. The United States voted for the resolution which by its terms deplored the incidents which have been the subject of this debate, asked Syria to strengthen measures to prevent such incidents and asked Israel to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission. It was the view of the United States that the adoption of such a resolution in the even-handed manner in which it was drafted by the six sponsors would contribute to peace and stability in the area. Despite the Soviet Union veto, it is nevertheless a matter of high import not to he ignored that the resolution received such widespread support by members on a broadly geographical basis.

123. I have already stated in this debate that the fundamental United States policy in the Middle East is to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the maintenance of unbroken peace. And, indeed, I do not have to refer to history well known to every member of the Council to demonstrate that the United States has acted in this spirit. The United States has exerted, and will continue to exert, its influence to prevent and bring to an end all use of violence across existing frontiers, regardless of the direction in which they occur. This is the stand my Government has taken for many years and we reaffirm it now.

124. We believe, notwithstanding our inability to adopt a resolution today, that, under the Charter, it is the continuing responsibility of the members of the Security Council, and especially of the permanent members, to exercise comparable influences against violence across frontiers in the Middle East and to do so regardless of the direction in which the violence occurs. It is only such a policy that can contribute to stability, rather than to instability, in the area.

125. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution presented by Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria and Uganda [S/7575/Rev,1],because we fully accept that its even-handed objective was to assure such peaceful conditions and to assure them irrespective of the source of the trouble. It was the conviction of the sponsors, which we respected, that this common objective could best be achieved in the language of their draft rather than the language of the draft presented by the United Kingdom and the United States IS/7568] and, in the spirit of compromise, we supported the six-Power draft.

126. We commend the sponsors for their patient efforts to achieve a fair resolution of this debate, and we do not believe that, although it has been vetoed, they have been unsuccessful in their efforts. The language of the draft resolution and the vote taken thereon stand as a matter of record for all the world to see and for the parties duly to notice. We urge that all members of the Council, indeed, all Members of the United Nations, exercise their direct influence to assure the implementation of the essential features of the resolution which only seek peace and stability in the area.

127. In the previous debate, I voiced the concern of my Government that the pattern of violence which has been taking place in Israel is a pattern whose cumulative effects can only result in great dangers to peace and security. Then we voiced similar concern in the July debates which took place on the Syrian complaint. With respect to the incidents which were the subject of our present debate, I pointed out in my previous statement that it is a matter of record that the organization which takes credit for these incursions is centred on Syrian soil. We therefore fully concurred with the sense of the draft resolution that effective steps are necessary on the part of the Government of Syria to ensure by all efforts within its power, in the words of the General Armistice Agreement that:

128. The draft resolution, in an even-handed manner, also made reference to the General Armistice Agreement and the obligations of the parties there under, The General Armistice Agreement provides, as we all know, in article VII, for implementing machinery, including a Mixed Armistice Commission, with responsibility for supervising the execution of the Agreement and with power to employ observers and to investigate complaints and claims with a view to an equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement. This machinery has the full support of the United States, and we fully concurred, and do concur, with the sense of the draft resolution that would have said that Israel should co-operate fully with it.

129. We also concur with the comment of the Secretary-General in his report that: "Serious consideration might well be given now as to whether there might be some more fruitful approach to the goal of enabling the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function effectively." [S/7572, para. 12.]

130. And the United States likewise endorsed, and still endorses, the call upon both Governments to facilitate the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the area, especially in light of the reports of the Secretary-General on the violations of the demilitarized zones and the defensive areas [S/7561/Rev.1 and S/7573].

131. The deep concern of the United States is that peace be preserved in the Middle East. This is, we trust, a common concern. The responsibility of all Members of the United Nations, and particularly the members of the Security Council, is to encourage restraint and to urge governmental action to prevent violence. The draft resolution was directed solely towards that aim, We trust that the concepts it contains and which have received the support of the great majority of members of the Council will be fully understood in the area and that they will be acted upon. Only a policy of peace on both sides of the borders can be acceptable if the Charter obligation of all Members of the United Nations is to be observed.

132. Before adjourning the meeting, I want, as PRESIDENT, to express my appreciation to the members of the Council and all who have participated in the debate for their co-operation in dealing with this very difficult problem.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

1/ Official records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special supplement No. 2.

2/ Ibid., Supplement for August 1949, document S/1357.

3/ Lieutenant-General E, L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli
(Toronto, Clarke, Irwin and Co., Ltd., 1942), pp. 118-119.

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