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UNITED
NATIONS
S

        Security Council
S/PV.640
20 November 1953

Held on 20 November 1953, at 3 p.m.
Provisional agenda
(S/Agenda/640)
1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The Palestine question

Compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreements, with special reference to recent acts of violence, and in particular to the incident at Qibya on 14-15 October 1953: report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The Palestine question

Compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreements, with special reference to recent acts of violence, an in particular to the incident at Qibya on 14-15 October 1953 (S/3109, S/3110, S/3111, S/3139) (continued)

REPORT 13Y THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (Continued)

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Eban, repre-sentative of Israel, Mr. Haikal, representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, and Major General Bennike, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, took places at the Security Council table.

1. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States): In joining with France and the United Kingdom in sponsoring the pending draft resolution [S/3139], the United States gives effect to the belief that the Security-Council must sustain the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan. It is equally obvious that recent events have brought the situation in Palestine perilously close to a breach of the peace. The Security Council, as the primary body of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, must in our opinion deal effectively with this immediate and overriding problem.

2. The pending draft resolution is directed primarily to this end. As indicated in the preamble, it rests on the resolution of this Council [S/902] calling first, in July 1948, for a cease-fire and the establishment of a truce; the resolution of 11 August 1949 [S/1367], approving the armistice agreements between Israel and the various Arab States and the establishment of mixed armistice commissions and the Truce Supervision Organization; and the resolution of 18 May 1951 [S/2157] supporting the principle that it is essential that the armistice agreements be observed faithfully if permanent peace in Palestine is to be promoted. These resolutions are, in the opinion of the United States, the essential framework in which the Security-Council and the parties to this question must co-operate. It is from the starting point of these resolutions that we must consider inci-dents such as those recent tragic events which have caused the Security Council again to take up the Palestine question.

3. Within this framework, the pending draft resolu-tion would have the Security-Council find that the recent action at Qibya, as reported to the Security Council by the Chief of Staff, is in violation of the cease-fire resolution of 15 July 1948 and is inconsistent with the carrying out of the General Armistice Agreement and the obligations of the Charter. It is important in our opinion that there be no mistake as to the attitude of the Security Council on such an action and the prejudicial effect which it can have on progress towards peace. After all, lasting peace in the area is the goal towards which we must work.

4. The Security Council must, however, recognize that the incident at Qibya is one among many which are prejudicial to the establishment of peace in the area, and in part B of the draft resolution we take note of the fact that violence is a common result of failure to maintain the security of the demarcation lines estab-lished under the Armistice Agreement. We believe that the Government of Israel and the Government of Jordan have a clear responsibility for taking the strongest measures consistent with law and order to see to it that from their side the demarcation lines remain inviolate.

5. Part C of the draft resolution expresses the views of the three Governments that it is only by the strictest adherence to the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement and the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly that progress towards settlement of the outstanding issues between the parties can be made. The obligation of the Governments of Israel and Jordan to co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization is therefore emphasized, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to consider with the Chief of Staff means of strengthening the organization for the better performance of its duties.

6. Finally, the draft resolution requests that the Chief of Staff report on the situation with particular reference to the provisions of t1iis draft resolution and make such recommendations as he might consider appropriate within three months.
7. The United States realizes that there are grave and difficult problems which even the strictest compliance with the Armistice Agreement may not necessarily solve. We feel a deep concern with respect to these basic and overriding problems and a sincere desire to be helpful in arriving at an equitable solution. But the established machinery for the maintenance of security in the area must be upheld and strengthened if these funda-mental problems are to be solved in a spirit of justice and good will. While adherence to the Armistice Agree-ment will not alone bring peace, peace is impossible without that adherence.

8. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): At the 635th meeting, I explained my Government's views on the question before -the Council, and in particular our views on the tragic and shocking incident at Qibya. Today I want only to speak quite briefly about the draft resolution which I have joined with the French and United States representatives in sponsoring and which is now before us. The United States representative has just explained to the Council the main purposes which the draft resolution seeks to attain, and for my part I entirely agree with what he has said.

9. It seems to us quite right that the draft resolution should deal in the first place with the Qibya incident itself. This is, after all, the central point of our discussions. It has, I think, been established from what General Bennike has told us that the action at Qibya was undertaken by armed forces of Israel, and I think that my colleagues will agree that the Council should place clearly on record its very strong disapproval of that action.

10. There are really two reasons why we suggest that the Council should feel very deeply about this. First, the action taken at Qibya was reprehensible in itself, and, second, such actions and it is our earnest hope that there will be no repetition of them must inevitably create new obstacles to the cause which the Council has at heart, namely, the return of peace in the Middle East as a whole.

11. The draft resolution, as will be seen, then deals with the problem of what has come to be called "infil-tration" into Israel from Jordan. At our 637th -meeting, the representative of Israel spoke of a "guerrilla warfare conducted with full governmental acquiescence" against Israel from Jordan, and in this connection he even spoke, I fear, of what he called the "influence" of the United Kingdom. I need not, I think, defend my Government on this particular point. Its desire for peace and, indeed, its interest in peace, is very well known to all of us. But I should, perhaps, make it entirely clear for purposes of record that I am quite unable to accept the account that Mr. Eban gave us of this problem.

12. The representative of Jordan has told us [638th meeting] that his Government regards it as its duty to co-operate in preventing infiltration, because of the in-ternational agreements to which it has subscribed. It has taken measures to prevent unauthorized crossings of the frontier, and it will, I am sure, continue to do so. But, particularly since such crossings have in the past resulted in acts of violence of a very regrettable kind, it seems to me at least to be reasonable that we should ask the Government of Jordan to continue and to strengthen its preventive measures.

13. Lastly the draft resolution should, as we think, deal with & position of the United Nations machinery in the area. The Council will wish, I am sure, to uphold General Bennike's authority and to give him any further help that he may require. It certainly -looks, on the evidence now available, as if some reinforcement of General Bennike's machinery, at any rate in the more sensitive frontier areas, would be desirable; and we trust that the general will feel quite free to ask -for such reinforcement. In any case, the proposal that he should report back to the Council within three months with any recommendations he considers appropriate seems to us to be particularly important and valuable.

14. I should like to make one final point. My Govern-ment feels that this draft resolution should be voted upon at the earliest possible moment, so that those who are chiefly called upon to take certain measures to relieve the tension along the Israel-Jordan border, and who are now sitting with us, may be released for that essential purpose. My Government hopes that contacts between the authorities on either side can continue and, indeed, become more frequent on questions arising out of the armistice. It seems to me that there is a great deal to be said for the view expressed the other day [638th meeting] by the representative of Jordan, that the most suitable place for such talks would be in Jerusalem.

15. For all these reasons we hope that the Council will be able to approve the draft resolution as soon as possible, and preferably, indeed, this afternoon.

16. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): On behalf of the delegation of FRANCE, I should like to say that it fully agrees with the reasons which have just been explained by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom and which have prompted the three delegations to co-operate in presenting the draft resolution which we are now examin-ing.

17. In our opinion, this draft resolution falls very clearly, within the general framework of the responsibilities conferred upon the Security Council by the Charter, and in particular of the Council's responsibilities with regard to the observance of the armistice agreements signed between Israel and the neighboring countries, and with regard to the desired evolution of the system laid down by these agreements towards the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

18. Basing their conclusions on the facts gathered by the Truce Supervision Organization, the three Powers, in the draft resolution which they have submitted to the Council, have formed a judgment on the Qibya incident which I personally consider moderate and impartial. If the two parties were sincerely to accept this judgment, it would contribute towards the restoration of calm in the minds of those on either side of the demarcation line, and would make possible a real improvement in the relations between the neighbouing States of Israel and Jordan.

19. We also believe that observance by both governments of the agreements they have signed is the essential condition for such an improvement. In my view, therefore, the Council is acting wisely in reminding both parties of their obligation to respect these agreements and in inviting them to give their full co-operation to the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in the task he is carrying out on behalf of the United Nations.

20. Under our draft resolution, the Council requests General Bennike himself to report within three months on the effect given by the two governments to its pro-visions. In his report, he would also tell us what measures he considered we should take in order to ensure the most effective observance of the armistice agreements in the future. We very much hope that General Bennike's study may be carried out on the spot under the best possible conditions, and that the two govern-ments will assist him either by their suggestions or, more usefully, by maintaining, throughout the time he is making his study, a favourable atmosphere in this region, so lately the scene of tragic disturbance.

21. When General Bennike's report reaches us, we can perhaps resume the examination of the general conditions in the area in a more detached manner, since we shall be further removed from the events which have so much aroused public opinion, and may hope that our deliberations will give rise to more permanent and, I hope, more constructive proposals.

22. In conclusion, I emphasize that I fully associate myself with the desire expressed by the United King-dom representative that the present debate should be concluded as soon as possible. I think that both parties have had ample opportunity to express their views and that it would have been difficult for the Council to be
more fully enlightened than it has been by the long and interesting statements of Mr. Eban, of the representa-tive of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, and of Mr. Malik.

23. I agree with Sir Gladwyn Jebb that hardly anything could be said now except by way of repetition. I earnestly hope, therefore, that speakers will limit their remarks to the essential, say only what they consider absolutely necessary, and refrain altogether from pro-paganda, so that this debate may shortly be brought to an end. I believe that the Council as a whole is anxious to vote on this draft resolution as soon as possible. I do not know whether it will be able to do so today. I hope, however, that we may in any case take a decision at the beginning of our next meeting, the date of which will be fixed at the end of this one.

24. Mr. Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan): I noted with respect the President's appeal to the members of the Council at the, close of his observations. While I endorse that appeal and accept it, I am unable to guar-antee that my first intervention in the debate at this stage will be brief. This is a very serious matter, both the principal incident that prompted the bringing of the matter to the Security Council and the whole back-ground of the problem with all its implications. It is therefore, in my judgment although I may be wrong 7 very necessary that we should have a correct perspective of the situation with which we find ourselves faced, before we can decide what is needed at this stage to foster, advance and safeguard the very purposes and objectives that the President mentioned. I shall therefore proceed to make my submission with, if you like, an apology in advance that I am likely to occupy the Council for some time over it.

25. The discussion has already ranged over a wide field. The representatives of the parties, and more particularly the representative of Israel, have placed before the Security Council very rightly and very properly a much wider background to these questions than the immediate security situation; and that indeed was necessary. The representative of Israel, again quite properly, made a strenuous effort to develop a certain case regarding the whole situation between the State of Israel and the State of Jordan and all the Arab States. He strove to establish a certain thesis. In his zeal and devotion to the cause that he has espoused in the spirit of a crusader if he will forgive the etymological implications of that expression, which is not intended to be applied to him in any derogatory sense he pressed into the service of that cause all his undoubted and almost unmatched powers of oratory and polemics. Indeed he was fully entitled to do so.

26. The representative of Israel marshaled his facts not by any means all the relevant facts, but such as suited his purpose with a masterly and military skill amounting to genius. I listened to him, as was his right, with care and attention. But, as he proceeded with his exposition, my admiration of his skill began to be tinged with a sense of uneasiness. It seemed to me that the picture he was painting -not merely for the benefit of the Security Council but undoubtedly also for the benefit of a much wider audience - was an altogether one-sided one. Indeed, he was under no obligation, any more than was the representative of Jordan, to do more than present his own version of the case. But the duty of the Council is not limited to a determination of the matter merely on the presentation made by the parties. That presentation must be weighed and appraised against the background of the complicated problem of which these deplorable incidents are but natural and inevitable manifestations.

27. First, let us remind ourselves of the salient features of the picture which the representative of Israel sought to present to us. He presented to us the picture of a gifted people, oppressed and persecuted for centuries, seeking to establish a sanctuary for themselves. He brought into high relief the grand conception, the heroic struggle, the zeal, the effort, the initiative and the enterprise all compelling admiration and worthy of encouragement. He dwelt upon the constant threat to security and the pursuit of peaceful occupations and purposes on the part of what he, described as hostile and implacable enemies. He referred [637th meeting] to, and indeed set out in detail, a continuous succession of alarums and "murderous incursions", imposing constant vigilance and alertness and nerve wracking strain. Occasionally, according to him, there is regrettable but quite understandable snapping of control under this strain, resulting in loss of innocent lives on the other side, which is regretted and deplored. But, he stressed, Israel is always ready, indeed it is anxious and eager, to discuss, to make and to live in peace with its neighbors. He expressed his sorrow that these neighbors, most perversely, refuse to discuss, make and live in peace with the State of Israel.

28. I hope it will be considered that that is a fair summary of the outstanding features of the picture which the representative of Israel presented to us. It cannot be said that the picture, in its main features, is too remote from reality. Its faults are, however, that it over emphasizes that which it presents and leaves out far too much that is relevant and essential to a proper appreciation of it. It seeks to create and if it does not seek to create it has at least the effect of creating-a false perspective.

29. For that reason, we must also consider how the picture presents itself to Arab eyes. The gifts of Israel, the oppression and the persecution are conceded. One Calvary has entailed a whole succession of calvaries, and ever since, in one part of the world or another, the Hebrew race has been subjected to persecution. An Arab might, however, be tempted to observe that so far as the humanitarian aspect is concerned, while Christian Europe took delight in persecuting that gifted race and the persecution was perhaps all the severer on account of its gifts and their exercise, Arab Spain furnished a sanctuary.

30. But let us leave the Middle Ages behind and come to modern times. Let us get down to the First World War. Turkey's entry into the First World War on the side of Germany created a very delicate situation for the Allies in the Middle East. To redress the balance, among other steps taken, efforts were made to persuade the Arabs to throw off their allegiance to Turkey and to assist the war effort of the Allies. That effort succeeded. As part of the pledges given to the Arabs was the pledge, clearly established during discussions later when the matter came under discussion, that, at the end of the war, and in case of the victory of the Allies, Palestine would be independent, along with other Arab countries. The Arabs put faith in those pledges. When the time came for fulfillment, those who had pledged their word and honor forswore themselves. It has since been contended that they carried out ninetenths of the pledge. That is not a standard which should be acceptable and which should be applicable to the redemption of pledges among honorable people, whether individuals or States. But let that be.

31. Even then the situation could have been saved and the inconsistent pledges given to both sides could have been so interpreted on occasion it was sought so to interpret them as to bring about a reconciliation in their intent and to eliminate the inconsistencies. But unfortunately then came Hitler, antisemitism and a period of another intense Jewish persecution in Europe. When Hitler was defeated, the Arabs were called upon to pay the penalty for his misdeeds so far as Jewish persecution was concerned. It was a strange and ironic instance of international justice.

32. The matter came to the General Assembly. The Assembly proceeded to do what it had no authority to do, what it had no power jurisdiction to enforce. The methods and manoeuvres employed to bring about that result reflect no credit upon those who had recourse to them. It is unnecessary at this stage to dwell upon them. The resolution of the Assembly was adopted in face of clear warnings of the consequences to which it would lead.

33. The responsibility for all the ills, the misery and the suffering that have since ensued in that part of the world rests clearly upon the shoulders of those who voted in support of partition. They cannot today repudiate that responsibility. A country with a settled population and institutions was handed over to alien immigrants who could claim no tangible connection with it for over 1,800 years. The people of the country, contrary to every canon of justice and fair dealing, in defiance of all the purposes and principles of the Charter and in complete violation of solemn pledges given to them, were handed over to the mercies of an immigrant population amply equipped with every advanced skill and every resource, eager, naturally, to extend and bent upon extending through every means the area and frontiers of the territories handed over to them. These incoming people shared neither culture nor outlook with the people of the country. In consequence, that happened and continues to happen which was bound to happen, of which warning had clearly been given and therefore which was known would happen. That happened and continues to happen, which is a natural consequence of that which was done and consequently must be presumed to have been intended by those who voted for partition,

34. An era of conflict, of hostility, of bitterness and every form, shape and degree of human suffering and misery was inaugurated, the responsibility for which does not in the first instance rest upon Israeli or Arab. It rests upon every one of those who, by design or through over persuasion or in consequence of igno-rance, gave their support to that which in its concep-tion was inequitable, which in its execution was a horror and the continuance of which spells an unending vista of conflict, suffering and misery.

35. The Charter sets up the ideal of the resolving of disputes and conflicts through peaceful means. Here a dispute was deliberately created for that was the effect of the Balfour Declaration and a solution was ultimately found, based on force. The State of Israel was established by force and continues by force. When it exercises force, or force is exercised against it, let us not in fairness confine our censure to the instrument alone. Those who fashioned, or assisted in the fashion-ing of the instrument deserve the censure in the first instance for that which they must be presumed to have intended.

36. The Assembly had no authority to hand over any country or territory to anyone. It could confer no title. The so-called State of Israel is, in Arab eyes and I am giving you the picture as it appears to the Arabs a manifestation of force in support of a continuing wrong. That is how it appears to the Arabs. Their reaction is in accord with that concept. When the representative of Israel complains that the Arabs do not hasten to make peace with Israel, he wishes it forgotten that the Arabs regard Israel as an intruder which has, through guile, force and oppression-, possessed itself of Arab lands and Arab homes, and has turned nearly a million Arabs loose in neighboring Arab lands as homeless wanderers and derelicts.

37. And what kind of peace does Israel invite the Arabs to make with it? Does it offer to negotiate on the basis of the rehabilitation of Arab refugees in their homes and the restoration of their lands and properties to them? No. It has persistently rejected that position. It offers to co-operate in their rehabilitation in Arab lands. It is argued that. the Arabs have vast territories, that they have great undeveloped resources, that they can easily take in these refugees and make room for them. But these refugees are out of their own homes and lands. It is no consolation to them that other Arabs have vast lands and large areas. Besides, the economy of neighboring Arab lands is already being disrupted through this influx of refugees from Palestine. That, again, is a pressing problem. Their appreciation of all these matters and questions and problems is colored by these facts.

38. Then, Israel bases itself on the Assembly resolutions. Has Israel itself kept to those resolutions? The Arabs do not accept them. But is Israel willing to revert to the Assembly resolutions in the matter of frontiers? With regard to frontiers, the authorized declaration on behalf of Israel, quoted to the Council the other day [639th meeting] by the representative of Lebanon, is: our frontiers were established by war; they will be changed only by war. Is that an invitation to peace or is that a challenge to war?

39. What is Israel's position with regard to Jerusalem, clearly required by the Assembly resolution to be inter-nationalized? Israel has converted it into its capital.

40. The truth is that Israel talks peace and acts war. It steals marches and it confronts the Arabs and the United Nations with faits accomplis, and then insists that these faits accomplis should be confirmed as part of -the peace settlement. And there is yet no end to its ambitions, designs and projects of expansion.

41. These are not the only factors blocking a peace settlement. There is no guarantee that Israel would keep a peace that it might make. True, it is a small State in terms of population and area. But it is dynamic, it is strong, it is well equipped and well trained, with enormous resources capable of development inside Israel and almost unlimited liquid resources outside. For none of these is it to be blamed. These are all elements worthy, of appreciation. But they must be taken note of when Israel paints a picture of a weak, small, persecuted, harassed people surrounded by hostile and implacable enemies. I shall not attempt to draw a picture of the surrounding Arab States in respect of their strength and resources, lest it offend their suscep-tibilities. But it is a fact that, by its very needs, the State of Israel is forced to adopt a policy of expansion -and in support of that expansion, if need arises, of aggression. It has to provide for a constant stream of immigrants. How is it going to do this? This feature was stressed during the debates in the Assembly when partition was being discussed. Israel gave assurance after assurance that not only would no harm come to the Arabs within the State of Israel, but that under the State of Israel the Arabs would be more prosperous, would he happier, than they had ever been before in that land. It was pointed out as an elementary factor in the situation that, if more immigrants have to come into Palestine, by the very nature of that fact the Arabs must be- pushed out and that that was bound to happen. Today, there are very few Arabs left in Israel, but Israel's problem of immigration is not yet over. And not only immigration. The doctrine is now preached that this State of Israel is the homeland of the Hebrew race all over the world and that all patriotic Hebrews must, sooner or later, revert to their homeland.

42. As I have said, the very nature of that need im-poses an obligation upon the State of Israel to expand. Where can it expand? Not into the Mediterranean. It has been demonstrated that the surrounding Arab States are not in a position today to check and curb these. policies, tendencies and activities on the part of Israel. Until they are strong enough to enforce the peace that they might make, they dare not make one. Indeed, not until then could a just and fair peace be made. There is never, never any question of a just, fair and equitable peace between the strong and the weak. It is only such a peace -a just, fair and equitable peace that could be acceptable to the people of the Arab States and that would have a chance of enduring.

43. These are some of the. features of the background of the picture, as it appears to Arab eyes, on the history and the establishment of the State of Israel during. the brief period it has been in being, and on its policies, its activities and their consequences.

44. I now come to the present situation, which is more directly the subject matter of discussion before the Council. The representative of Israel, as part of the picture of the present situation, has stressed the con-tinuation of what he has described as "murderous in-cursions". I make no objection to the use of that expres-sion. Whatever view the Arabs might take of the State of Israel and its policies, we are emphatically of the view that the armistice agreements must be strictly ob-served and adhered to. It is true that the State of Jordan has declared its acceptance of that responsibility in full. We appreciate it. It has urged the consideration, as a factor showing how difficult the problem is in the actual situation, that the demarcation line has resulted in the separation of families from friends and of homes from lands.

45. It has been pointed out to the Council that there are two types of violations of the demarcation line. The economic and sentimental factors have been stressed where people are under temptation to go across the demarcation line to cultivate lands or to gather crops or fruits or to visit families and friends. Then there are those who cross over with aggressive and mischievous intent and design. Both types must be checked and stopped. That is a clear obligation. But it has been pointed out that so long as economic and sentimental factors continue to operate, it is difficult to ensure the complete stoppage of that type of infiltration, or cross-ing of the demarcation line. 'Some objection was taken to that by the representative of Israel, but that does present a human problem. Nevertheless, as I have said, and I emphasize it again, our view is, and the State of Jordan accepts that obligation, that all efforts must be made to put an end altogether to all types of crossings of the demarcation line. That is an obligation which these States have undertaken irrespective of what has gone before, irrespective of any provocation that might occur. That is an obligation which they have voluntarily undertaken, and they must fulfil it completely.

46. We endorse all that the representative of Israel said with regard to what he described as "murderous incursions". All human life is sacred. There are divi-sions of mankind, based upon faith, based upon culture, based upon race and, unfortunately, sometimes though we do not recognize them - based even upon color, but that does not make one human life more precious than another nor one less sacred than another. In these areas, whether it is a Jew who is killed or an Arab who is killed, each such incident imports equal horror, inasmuch as it constitutes a trespass against the most sacred human right. Sometimes the question may arise, where does the responsibility rest? That can be worked out on the evidence available, but, with regard to the character of these dastardly acts, there can -be no dif-ference of opinion. At least, we see none.

47. The incident of 13 October at Yahud was referred to. Now, whoever committed it is worthy of condemnation and must be punished, provided it can be determined beyond doubt who was guilty of it. In respect of that incident, unfortunately, the responsi-bility has not yet been established. I will come back to it later in connection with another aspect of the matter.

48. We now come to the Qibya incident and those which led up to it. What is the Israel version of it? All that we have been told about it on behalf of Israel is contained in two passages, to which I shall proceed to draw attention. In his statement on 12 November [637th meeting] before the Council, the representative of Israel said:

"The mood and background of the Qibya incident can only be understood in the light of this atmosphere in which our hard struggle for security and peace is conducted. In instructing me to portray this back-ground as fully as possible, the Government of Israel directs me, nevertheless, to state that it regards the loss of innocent life at Qibya with profound and unreserved regret. This was a most unfortunate explo-sion of pent-up feeling and a tragic breakdown of restraint after the provocation of brutal attacks such as the cold-blooded murder of a mother and her children in their sleep."

The second passage is from the same record. It is as follows:

"The attacks on Israel's life, property and com-munications under cover of armistice agreements are purposeful and deliberate. They have unfortunately led to counter actions, some of which, such as the Qibya incident, cause a, loss of innocent life which Israel deeply regrets and unreservedly deplores."

49. At this stage, all that I will say by way of com-ment is that we are not told what happened.. The representative of Israel expressed disappointment and in-dignation at the lack of emphatic condemnation by the representative of Jordan in respect of the loss of Israel life at the hands of Jordan infiltrators. These two passages contain not a version of what happened but the excuse for it; and all that is said is that it is unreservedly deplored. .

50. But we are not here to compare the degree of con-demnation which each side may have expressed of deeds of violence evoking expressions of horror from all right -thinking people, irrespective of the side by which they are perpetrated. The Qibya incident was of a nature and volume which have deeply shocked the conscience of the civilized world, Jewish as well as Gentile, what-ever the position may be which the State of Israel takes with regard to it. In fact, the tragedy of Qibya is a link in the chain of deliberate Israel design to force its recognition and the acceptance of its terms upon the Arabs through a mounting crescendo of violence and horror.

51. One regrettable feature of one class of these inci-dents, all condemnable, is that neither Government has been able to control its armed forces and to prevent
them from committing a breach of the Armistice Agreement.

52. It has been elicited by questions put to General Bennike that, on three occasions since the armistice agreements were entered into in 1949-or perhaps in the course of this year, I forget which - Jordan armed forces were concerned in these incidents and were con-demned for them, though it was explained that the Arab Legion was not involved - but that, to our mind, makes no difference. On the other hand, out of twenty-one incursions for which Israel was condemned by the Armistice Commission, sixteen were carried out by Israel military forces. For purposes of the record, I draw the attention of the Security Council to that por-tion of the statement of General Bennike which is contained in the record of the meeting of the Security Council of 9 November 1953 [635th meeting, annex, section VII].

Question 3

"Can General Bennike state how many Israeli at-tacks were carried out by Israeli military forces in relation to the total violations by Israelis?"

After an analysis of the different resolutions, the Gen-eral summed up by saying: "The answer to your question is sixteen." That is to say, sixteen out of twenty-one. That is a very discouraging and a very significant feature of these incursions: regular forces acting regularly in that manner. When, out of twenty-one incur-sions of that kind, sixteen are by the armed forces of a State, they must be acting under orders. There is no other conclusion that is reasonably possible.

53. But there is a further disquieting feature. The tempo of such incidents is mounting, which again con-firms one's conclusion that there is a design. I draw the attention of the Security Council again to an answer of General Bennike. At the same meeting, the question is asked:

Question 1

"Does General Bennike consider that attacks carried out by regular -Israeli forces are becoming more frequent? Are they becoming more serious in relation to Jordanian loss of lives and material damage? Do increasingly larger Israeli armed forces participate in such attacks on Jordan territory?”

The answer is:

“In the light of events since the beginning of this year, I must answer ‘yes’ to the three parts of this question, with the exception of the part relating to damages.”

And that is not because damage is not mounting but because, as he explains in answer to the next question:

I am not in possession of information which would enable me to answer this question, since neither the Truce Supervision Organization nor the Mixed Armistice Commission is required to measure or assess damage.

54. Thus during the course of the current year, attacks carried out by regular Israeli forces are becoming more serious in terms of loss of Jordanian lives and attacks carried out by regular Israeli forces are being participated in by increasingly larger numbers of those forces. That again clearly established design and a mounting crescendo.

55. These are the methods through which Israeli is seeking to make, or to enforce, as it appears to the Arabs, peace. It is then made a grievance that the Arabs do not accept the invitation to the peace tea-party in the Israeli parlour!

56. Let us get down to the background of the current tension and the commencement of aggression during this year. In this connection, I shall draw the attention of the Council to the report of General Bennike [630th meeting]. In that report, the General thus describes the situation as it stood at the end of last year and as it developed in the beginning of the year:

“At the end of December 1952, the situation was quiet. On 29 December, an 'Agreement to reduce border incidents’, valid for one month, was signed. The conclusion of that agreement could be interpreted as indicating a desire to settle current problems in a more co-operative spirit. Its provisions could be considered as greatly improving the ‘Agreement on measures to curb infiltration’ which had been in force since May 1952” [para. 29].

I shall leave out the details of the agreement and shall continue to quote from the General’s report as follows:

“A few days after the new agreement had come into force, the Jordanians captured an Israel driving school vehicle which had made an apparently strange mistake in leaving the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway and crossing the demarcation line in very difficult terrain in the Latrun area” [para. 31]

The very difficult terrain could not have been mistaken for the highway, in any case. I continue the quotation:

“There were in the vehicle a civilian and three soldiers. The new agreement provided that members of the security forces of either party who crossed the demarcation line ‘by mistake’ should be returned after interrogation. The Jordanians having delayed the return of three soldiers” I repeat, “delayed”
"Israel announced on 8 January that the new agree-ment to reduce and solve incidents was null and void."

Does that argue an anxiety to come to a settlement, to promote the stoppage of incidents? I continue:

"The agreement provided that, if it came to expiration, the old agreement on measures to curb infiltration, signed on 13 May 1952, would automatically re-enter into force. On 8 January, Israel also gave formal notice of its desire to terminate the old agreement in two weeks' time, as permitted by the text of that agreement".
Again does this show a desire to stop infiltration, to co-operate in the stoppage of these incidents? And for what? Not even a retaliation for an outrage committed but because there was delay in returning three soldiers. Naturally, since they were straying in a dif-ficult part of the country away from the highway, there had to be an investigation to ascertain whether there had been a mistake or not. I proceed with my quotation:

"Thus, on 22 January," and we are getting nearer now to the commencement of this series of tragedies "the local commanders' agreement for the prevention and settlement of minor incidents, particularly the crossing of the line by infiltrators or by flocks, came to an end. On that day, an Israeli soldier was killed when an Israeli patrol crossing the demar-cation line and exchanged fire with the inhabitants of Falameh village" [para. 32].

57. In respect of this incident -it was not very important in itself but was a symptom or an indication of what was about to commence some doubt was cast, or was sought to be cast, on the question whether it was an Israeli soldier or not. With regard to that a question was put to General Bennike by the representative of Israel [635th meeting, annex, section VI]. I shall read out that question and the answer.

Question 16

''In paragraph 32 of General Bennike's report, it is stated that an Israeli soldier was killed when an Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation line and exchanged fire with the inhabitants of Falameh village. Would the general tell us whether the body had any identification disc which would have identified him as an Israeli soldier; whether the number on the disc was communicated to the Israeli authorities, and whether the body was handed over to Israel?"

The object of the question, obviously, was to show that though the person killed may have been dressed, per-haps, in some sort of a uniform or clothes resembling a uniform, it may not have been an Israeli soldier. The answer to the question was:

"The body had an Israeli identification disc marked with the number 232046 and the name Yehuda Kacim, in Hebrew. This information was communicated to the Israeli authorities. On 23 January" that is to say, the next day "the body was handed over to two officers of the Israeli Army, who accepted it as that of an Israeli soldier without any reservations on this point."

58. Now that was the - atmosphere created in the beginning of the year. Once these agreements were got rid of, incidents, began to-happen, some of them so grave that, in our judgment, they constitute clear aggression by the State of Israel as such by the State inasmuch as they were in the nature of military expeditions by its armed forces, presumably carried out under the orders of its Government or in pursuance of its policies, Each of these incidents to which I shall presently draw atten-tion constituted a breach of the Armistice Agreement and a casus belli.

59. The first one in the report of General Bennike [630th meeting] reads:

"On 28-29 January 1953, Israeli military forces estimated at 120 to 150 men, using two-inch mortars, three inch mortars, P.I.A.T. (projector, infantry, anti-tank) weapons, bangalore torpedoes (long metal tubes containing an explosive charge), machineguns, grenades and small arms, crossed the demarcation line and attacked the Arab villages of Falameh and Rantis. At Falameh the mukhtar was killed, seven other vil-lagers were wounded, and three houses were demol-ished. The attack lasted four and a half hours. Israel was condemned for this act by the Mixed Armistice Commission" [para. 13].


60. Consider the character of this expedition. No well organized State - and the State of Israel, by its very existence in the circumstances, by its background, which the representative of Israel himself sketched for us, is an extremely well organized State can claim that 120 to 150 men of its regular forces, armed with those weapons, could act merely, if I may say so, on the sly. This was exactly one week after they had denounced the first agreement, which should have automatically come into force on denunciation of the second.

61. The second incident appears in paragraph 17 of the same report, which I quote:

"On the night of 11 August 1953, Israel military forces using demolition mines, bangalore torpedoes, two-inch mortars, machineguns and small arms, attacked the villages of Idna, Surif and Wadi Fukin, inflicting casualties among the inhabitants and destroying dwellings. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel for these attacks."

62. We now come to the culmination of these incidents, the one which the Council is now considering. We do not know yet whether even this constitutes the culmina-tion of this tragedy. General Bennike reported in the following terms this incident at Qibya, paragraphs 18 and 19:

"The information I am going to submit on the Qibya incident is based on reports received from United Nations observers, in particular from the senior officer who is the acting chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

"Following the receipt of a Jordan complaint that a raid on the village of Qibya had been carried out by Israel military forces during the night of 14-15 October, between 9.30 p.m. and 4.30 a.m., a United Nations investigation team departed from Jerusalem for Qibya at about 6.30 a.m. on 15 October"that is, about two hours after the termination of this raid. "The acting chairman also left for Qibya on the same morning. On reaching the village, he found that be-tween thirty and forty buildings had been completely demolished, including the school, the water-pumping station, the police station and the telephone office”.

“Near the police station, one lorry had been completely destroyed by fire. The necks and trigger attachments of incendiary bombs were found nearby.

“Bullet-riddled bodies near the doorways”and this is very important“and multiple bullets hits on the doors of the demolished houses indicated that the inhabitants had been forced to remain inside until their homes were blown up over them.

“There were several small craters along the western perimeter of the village, “and the tails of two-inch mortar shells were found. Four gaps, approximately 3 meters in width, had been blasted in the barbed-wire protective fence surrounding the village. Fragments, easily identifiable as parts of bangalore torpedoes, were found near these gaps.

“By the time the acting chairman left Qibya, twenty-seven bodies had been dug from the rubble.” Information submitted to the Council since then indicates that the number of killed has been more than fifty.

“The villagers were digging for others who they claimed were still buried beneath the building stones. They believed that the number of dead might reach sixty. Six wounded persons were seen in the village, and the acting chairman was told that there were other wounded persons in the hospital.

“Witnesses were uniform in describing their experience as a night of horror, during which Israel soldiers moved about in their village, blowing up buildings, firing into doorways and windows with automatic weapons and throwing hand grenades, marked with Hebrew letters indicating recent Israel manufacture, and three bags of TNT were found in and about the village” [para.18-24].

63. Thereupon an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission was held on the same afternoon, that is to say, the afternoon of 15 October, and the following resolution was adopted:
...
“Part one

“(a) The crossing of the demarcation line by a force approximating one half of a battalion from the Israel regular army, fully equipped, into Qibya village on the night of 14-15 October 1953 to attack the inhabitants by firing from automatic weapons and throwing grenades and using bangalore torpedoes together with TNT explosive, by which forty-one dwelling houses and a school building were completely blown up, resulting in the cold-blooded murder of forty-two lives, including men, women [and] children, and the wounding of fifteen persons and the damage of a police car, [and] at the same time, the crossing of a part of the same group into Shuqba village, [are] a breach of article III, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement.

"(b) The shelling by a supporting unit to that force by three-inch mortar guns from across the demarcation line on Budrus village, which resulted in the damage of some houses and a bus and the wounding of an N.C.O. in charge of the National Guards, is a breach of article III, paragraph 3 of the General Armistice Agreement.

"Part two

"The Mixed Armistice Commission decides that it is extremely important that the Israel authorities should take immediately the most vigorous measures to prevent the recurrence of such aggressions against Jordan and its citizens" [para. 25].

64. The number of dead mentioned here, it will be observed, is forty-two, but this was on the afternoon of the morning on which these occurrences took place in Qibya; apparently more dead were discovered there-after.

65. This resolution was adopted, with the Israel representative voting against it. Can we have any clue from these proceedings of why the Israel representative voted against it? The action was obviously a breach of the Armistice Agreement. No objection could be taken to that statement. But one finds two reasons for the opposing vote cast by the Israel representative. One is that the responsibility in this resolution is laid upon the Israel regular army and that is still the position of the State of Israel. We shall be able to show indeed it appears already to be the view 6f the Security Council and it was the view of the Commission that there can be no doubt on the question that this expedition was carried out by the Israel regular army, and therefore the Israel representative must have known it. What does he object to in the resolution? Apparently he objects to part two. So far as the Israel representative was con-cerned, he was not prepared to endorse the statement that they would take immediately the most vigorous measures to stop such raids, incursions, or whatever one may call them.

66. With regard to this incident, the Prime Minister of Israel stated:

"The Government of Israel rejects with all vigour the absurd and fantastic allegation that 600 men of the Israel defense forces took part in the action against the village of Qibya. We have carried out a searching investigation and it is clear beyond doubt that not a single army unit was absent from its base on the night of the attack on Qibya."

The Prime Minister describes this allegation that 600 men of the defense forces took part in the action against this village as "absurd and fantastic". It is inherently neither absurd nor fantastic. The damage done and the activities carried out might well have been the doing of 600 members of the regular armed forces. He apparent-ly rejected the idea that, whoever they were, they were members of the regular armed forces of Israel. And in support of that contention he makes the statement that "a searching investigation" had shown that "not a single army unit was absent, from its base on that night".

67. The representative of the United Kingdom, when he spoke the other day [635th meeting], thought he could reconcile this statement with or, at any rate, he described it as not being contradictory of the finding of the Commission. He did not analyse it further, but pos-sibly he meant that it might be that the number of people who took part in this raid was not 600, but less, and that, therefore, it could be said that 600 was a fan-tastic figure; and also that no single unit as such may have taken part, but only bits of units put together -which would also make the statement correct that no single -army unit was absent from its base that night.

68. If that is the best that can be said for this state-ment, then on that construction it is a forced con-struction in any case the statement may be true in the letter, but is false in the intent.

69. It is important to determine the question whether this military expedition was or was not of the nature described by the Commission. We start with this, that although it is claimed by the Prime Minister of Israel that a searching investigation has been carried out, Israel has not chosen to tell the Council at least I am not aware that it has told the Council the result of such investigation or to furnish it with an account of what happened and who did it. If Israel has made a searching investigation, why does it not tell us: "Your Commission goes on saying that this was done by regular Israel armed forces. It is utterly wrong. This is the investigation we have made, these are the conclusions to which we have come, this is the evidence upon which 'they are based." But Israel does not do that; at least I have not been able to discover it in the record. There appears to be no account in the record of what actually happened; therefore the inference is absolutely clear and conclusive, namely, that there is nothing which would contradict the finding of the Commission. I would put it this way, that the most "searching investigation" has not -revealed that there is any ground for contesting the conclusion to which the Commission came.

70. A suggestion, or perhaps an insinuation, has been introduced that Israel armed forces were riot concerned, but that this expedition was carried out by Israel citizens along the border as part of their security arrangements. Let us see first what is the material on which the Com-mission based its conclusion. General Bennike's report says [630th meeting, para. 26]:

"I discussed with the acting chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission the reasons why he had supported the resolution condemning the Israel army for having carried out this attack and, after listening to his explanations, I asked him to state them in writing. I shall now read out his memorandum."

I do not apologize for reading out these extracts from documents already On record because we must have present to our minds the different features of this case to enable us to determine what is the correct account. Here is the memorandum:

"The following evidence led to my conviction that Israel military forces planned and carried out this attack:

"1. Witnesses to the attack described the attackers as Israelis in military uniform with full equipment.


“2. The use of 81-mm. mortars against the village of Budrus. At least twenty-five hits of these shells were noted in and about Budrus and the tails of many were brought in as evidence by the United Nations observer. The 81-mm. mortar is a standard weapon of the Israel army, and we have had no discussions in the Mixed Armistice Commission that would indicate that this weapon is used by other than military forces.

"3. The use of bangalore torpedoes to blast open-ings in the barbed wire fences, concertina type, surrounding the village of Qibya. The bangalore torpedo is normally used by military forces during an offensive action to blast a pathway through barbed wire entanglements and mine fields. On 28-29 January 1953, Israel military forces raided the village of Falameh. inside Jordan. In this instance 81-mm. mortars, P.I.A.T. and bangalore torpedoes were among the weapons used. Israel was condemned for this action and it was brought out, not only in the dis-cussion of the Falameh incident but in the discussion of the Israel counter-complaints, that Israel military forces had carried out this raid. In August 1953, Israel was condemned for attacking the villages of Wadi Fukin, Idna and Surif in Jordan territory on the night of 11-12 August. In Wadi Fukin the attackers used bangalore torpedoes, demolition bombs and automatic weapons. The resolution passed by the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel regular forces for having carried out this raid. Sub-stantiating the contention that regular military forces took part in these raids is the fact that the body of an Israel soldier in full uniform with identification tag was found in the village of Idna after the attack. Again, we have discussed no complaint that would indicate that the bangalore torpedo is used by other than military forces.

"4. The use of TNT demolition bombs in such quantity and with such expert results. One United Nations observer, a demolition expert, present at the investigation pointed out the heavy construction of the cut stone buildings and the fact that many of them had overheads reinforced by steel rails. He estimated that at least seventy demolition bombs were used to accomplish the complete destruction noted.

"5. The use of two-inch mortars against the village of Qibya. This weapon is also standard military equipment, and we have discussed no case that would indicate that this weapon is used by other than military forces.

"6. The use of specially manufactured incendiary bombs to destroy a lorry inside the village of Qibya. The necks and trigger attachments of these bombs were found near the burned vehicle. This type of bomb was used by Israel military forces to burn a field of grain inside Jordan on 28 May 1953 in the Dawayinia area. This incident was discussed at the hundred and twenty-second Mixed Armistice Com-mission meeting, and the following resolution was passed: "The Mixed Armistice Commission decides that the burning of crops by Israel soldiers in Jordan territory is a breach of the General Armistice Agreement, article III, paragraph 3.'

"7. The method of attack. The evidence noted indicated that this raid was well planned and carried .out by men expertly trained in the fundamentals of sudden and sustained attack. It seems highly improbable that other than active military forces could have carried out this raid without suffering heavy casualties from their own fire, or from the explosions of their demolition charges.

"8. The approach to these villages from inside Israel is through an area protected by Israel military forces." This is a very significant fact. "No group the size of that employed in the Qibya-Budrus~Shuqba attack could move into this area or withdraw from this area undetected.

"In my estimation between 250 and 300 well trained Israel soldiers carried out this operation. As a break-down of this figure, I would say that at least 225 men took part in the actual raid inside Qibya. This figure would account for the men used to bring the demolition bombs into the area, the unit handling the two-inch mortars, the infantry units used to protect the demolition groups and the units engaging the guards at different points throughout this village of ap-proximately 1,500 inhabitants. The figure of 225 is considered an absolute minimum, as, it must be noted, the statement of the witnesses and the evidence found pointed out that the village was simultaneously at-tacked from three sides. In addition to the force used at Qibya, at least one section of eight or nine men was used to carry out the raid against Shuqba village, and it is also estimated that at least one platoon from a heavy weapons company was engaged in the operation against Budrus."

71. Again it was suggested, in a question put to General Bennike by the representative of Israel, that all this might have been done by private people in pursuit of their security operations, or possibly as the result of provocation, or as a retaliatory raid. This was also disposed of by General Bennike, in answer to the question of the representative of Israel, at the Security 'Council meeting of 9 November 1953. The representative of Israel put the following question [635th meeting, annex, section VI]:

Question 4

"My fourth question refers to the report by Com-mander Hutchison on the Qibya incident, quoted in the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. In that memorandum the conclusion is drawn that, because certain types of weapons were employed by the attackers, the attacks therefore must have been carried out by Israel defense forces. I would appreciate it if we could be told whether the United Nations observers have examined the defense system of Israel border villages and have concluded that the weapons with which these settlements are armed to repel attacks from across the border are of a type and make different from those employed by the Israel defense forces."

General Bennike replied as follows:

"United Nations observers, who have visited many border villages, have never reported seeing weapons other than machine guns, grenades, rifles, automatic weapons such as Brengun, Stengun and Thompson sub-machine guns, and side arms.

"The records of the complaints and investigations of the Mixed Armistice Commissions since 1949 contain no evidence to show that border villages were ever furnished with bangalore torpedoes, 2-inch and 81 mm. mortars and demolition charges. Nor does the history of incidents show the necessity of border villages being furnished with this type of weapons. The records of the Mixed Armistice Commission show that attacks against villages and persons in Israel take the pattern of raids carried out by small armed groups using hit-and-run tactics. For defense against this type of action, I can see the usefulness of machine guns, small automatic weapons and even hand grenades, but certainly not of mortars, bangalore torpedoes and demolition charges."

72. That disposes completely of any suggestion or suspicion that might be raised that this raid, this expedition, was not carried out by the regular army of Israel. What is the situation? Here is a series of three raids which have been mentioned in this report, each increas-ing in violence, in the number of those who participated, ending in this case of Qibya, by regular armed forces of Israel. In this case the minimum number of those taking part is put at 250 to 300. They are armed with a certain type of weapon. That type of weapon, as has been explained by the Commission, is not issued to the border villages, as suggested. And I would go further and say that it would not be issued. Why would the border villages, for the purpose of repelling any attack 'from infiltrators from Jordan, need bangalore tor-pedoes? Would they wish to blow up their own barbed-wire entanglements in order the better to defend themselves against any attacks from Jordan? Why would ,they need these demolition bombs? Would they wish to explode their own houses and buildings in order to defend themselves against Jordan infiltrators? Ob-viously, by their very nature, these are weapons of offence. They would not be issued, and particularly on a large scale, along border villages.

Then there is this consideration: suppose for one moment we assume the impossible, that this raid was organized and planned by the people of the border villages. We have been told -as a matter of fact there was an implied grievance that though the main-tenance of security on the Israel side and compliance with the armistice conditions was the business of the Israel army, on the Jordan side it was merely left to the police. All right. This is the business of the Israel army. Thus the Israel army is present along the border for the purpose of maintaining-and presumably from both sides respect for and the carrying out of the armistice agreements.

74. Here is this large force, so equipped, and the planning goes on. This thing could not have been planned in half an hour or even in two hours or even in a whole night. It must have been planned over some period. The Israel army does not get to know of it, but even that may be explained by a supposition that the planning was carried out so secretly and so expertly that the army did not get to know about it. But they had to pass through the lines of the army in order to get to this village.

75. If the State of Israel issues, as it implies very clearly through its questions, weapons of this type to its border villages, and if this kind of raid can go on without its army doing anything to prevent it, knowing that it was in progress, the responsibility of the State of Israel is very much heavier and graver, even though it would be heavy and grave enough if this raid was carried out by its regular forces. Why? Because it has put the whole of its border population according to its own showing -in a position to carry out military expeditions against neighboring States. That is not an indication of a desire for peace; that is a declaration of war, continuous war, without even having to face the consequences of war. Israel can choose. Either this was done by its regular army, or this was done, as it alleges though it is impossible to subscribe to that thesis by its border villages. Its responsibility is equally grave.

76. What have the Israel authorities themselves done? According to them, the army was not concerned. They have made the most searching investigation and, therefore, they must have found out who did it. Will they not take the Security Council into their confidence and tell the Council who did it? Also, will they not tell the Council, though they made it a grievance, against Jordan that Jordan does not punish infiltrators from that side Jordan did say that a large number of people had been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for infiltration what their own record is in respect of an incident so far-reaching in its consequences, in the misery inflicted, in the suffering, in the people killed? What is their record after having carried out the most searching investigation, after having discovered who did it if it was not the army? They must know who was the guilty party. What is their record in respect of punish-ment of the people who carried this out? It goes without saying that any State that issues any kind of weapons, particularly weapons of the kind that, according to the representative of Israel, have been issued to border villages, takes a heavy responsibility upon itself to con-trol the use of those arms and to prevent their misuse.

77. Even General Bennike says in answer to a question [635th meeting, annex, section V, question 7] :

"A government which arms private citizens should ensure sufficient control against the misuse of the arms supplied."

78. At least the Council must be assured that that responsibility will be carried out so that this kind of thing would become impossible in the future. There is not a trace of an), information as to how this thing took place, who carried it out, what measures have been taken to punish those who carried it out and what measures have been taken to stop anything of this kind happening again. As I have said, the conclusion is inevitable, is inescapable: that this thing was carried out under the directions of the Government of Israel either general directions laying down a policy or specific directions with regard to this incident and it cannot repudiate its responsibility. It was deliberate, it was planned, it was thoroughly carried out.

81. Knowing the area where this kind of thing was likely to happen, where it was probable that it might happen, and knowing the history and the circumstances, one is puzzled that Jordan took no action whatsoever to stop this horror from proceeding, Its responsibility is to its own people. But there appears to be a gap in the facts. Perhaps it exercised restraint, perhaps it exercised patience, perseverance, forbearance and endurance. These are admirable qualities but in their own proper sphere. True, we have been taught to be patient and to forbear and inculcate patience and forbearance, but we have also been taught: "Guard your frontiers." If Jordan had been provoked by this act into a counter-attack against Israel, that would have been wrong; it would have been as much a breach of the Armistice Agreement as this action was; it would have been as much an atrocity and a horror as this action was. It would have been contrary to the counsel to be patient and forbear. Whether it might have been described as an act of aggression or an act of retaliation, it would have been lack of restraint. But, in defense of one's own people against something of that kind, another State might have taken quite a different view of its duties and responsibilities and obligations towards its own people in such circumstances. The State of Jordan may also feel differently about it if this kind of thing does not cease and if it finds that its forbearance has been mis-understood or is being abused.

79. There is another feature to which I should also like to advert. I have said something with regard to the responsibility of those who are originally responsible for bringing about this state of affairs in that part of the world. I have said something with regard to the responsibility of both sides concerning these incidents. I have said something with regard to the responsibility of the State of Israel, the Government of Israel as such, with regard to these particular incidents. I do wish to say a few words with regard to the State of Jordan also. I am puzzled, I am bewildered, but I am not asking for an explanation as it owes me none; I do not know that it even owes any to the Security Council.80. Anyway, this is what happened. The incident con-tinued from 9.30 p.m. until 4.30 a.m. for seven hours. I will not describe it; the members of the Council can employ such expressions for its description as they consider appropriate; but men, women and children were killed. They were prevented from escaping, houses were demolished; we still have fresh in our minds the picture presented by General Bennike of what happened.

82. Now I should like to say a few words with regard to the draft resolution [S13139] that he’s been presented. In brief, my comment at this stage on the draft resolu-tion is that we find the first paragraph of part A wholly inadequate and therefore unacceptable. It describes the incident as a retaliatory action. Retaliation against what? The only reference to any kind of incident against which this may have been a retaliation is the Yahud incident. I have already expressed my own feelings and I am sure they represent the feelings of my Government with regard to any incident of that kind happening on one side or the other, affecting the life I of any person whatsoever anywhere. That incident happened. It was, whoever was responsible for it, a dastardly thing to do. Jordan was diligent. As soon as it was apprised of it, I believe that the Commander I have not checked the reference of the Arab Legion himself flew over and promised a diligent investigation. The tracks showed that they led to the border, but they did not lead to the culprit because they were lost on the way; thus no con-clusive result has yet been reached. However, realizing that an incident of this kind was bound to provoke very deep resentment, a request was made that care should be taken on the Israeli side that there should be no retaliation. Those were the circumstances with regard to the Yahud incident. Then, as I have endeavoured to show, the Israeli army carried out this military expedi-tion. Retaliation against what?

83. Also, there is this: is it right for a State as such, for a government, to undertake and embark upon retal-iatory expeditions while proclaiming all the time its eagerness for peace or even if not so proclaiming its eagerness for peace? We object to the use of the expression "retaliatory action", first, because what happened cannot correctly be described as retaliatory, and, second, because the use of the expression imports an element of justification or at least an element of excuse. There was none in this case. The resolution of the Commission adopted on the afternoon of 15 October, which I have already read out, describes this action, in its second part, as "aggression" which, at the very least, it was. And we think it should be so described in the draft resolu-tion.

84. Then, there is no provision in this draft resolution that the dependents of those who lost their lives and that those who were wounded shall be compensated, or that the properties that were destroyed shall be restored.

85. Here is a strange spectacle: Israel has, through various means, devices, actions, expelled close upon a million Arabs from within its State, and those Arabs are in the condition in neighboring Arab lands which I have earlier described. Israel then carries out raids, through its regular army, to kill perhaps some of those very refugees this may be a village of refugees or may not be but, at any rate, to kill more Arabs and to 4estroy their properties within their own State. It is a planned campaign to kill and to destroy homes, and possibly, having softened the position by this kind of thing, later to take those areas over.

86. We consider the resolution unsatisfactory in those of its features that we have pointed out and for the lack of those things that we have suggested. We shall later make our own suggestions with regard to its strengthening.

87. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): It remains for us to fix the date of our next meeting. The Council will meet on Monday to continue its examina-tion of the Trieste question, and we could fix for Tuesday our next meeting on the item we are now discussing. Do the members of the Council wish to meet on Tuesday afternoon, 24 November, to try to conclude this debate, or would they prefer to put it off to Wednesday, 25 November?

88. Mr. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombia) (trans-lated from Spanish): I do not see the point of postponing the meeting to 25 November. It seems to me much better for the Security Council to meet on 24 November; we should get on with our work a little faster. That is what my delegation thinks.

89. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I readily associate myself with the Colombian representative's suggestion. If there is no objection to that suggestion, our next meeting on the item we are now discussing will be held on Tuesday next, 24 November, at 3 p.m.

It was so decided.
The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m..



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