Question of Palestine home || Permalink || About UNISPAL || Search
"As is" - not a UN document
Follow UNISPAL RSS Twitter

"As is" reference - not a United Nations document

Source: King-Crane Commission
29 August 1919

Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission with regard to Syria-Palestine and Iraq (August 29, 1919)

I. Syria-Palestine

A. We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one or more Powers) is brought into Syria, should come in not at all as a colonising Power; in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory under the League of Nations with a clear consciousness that "the well-being and development," of the Syrian people form for it a "sacred trust."
(1) To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to fear, in the annual reports of the Mandatory to the League or in other ways.
(2) The mandatory Administration should have, however, a period and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new state; and especially to make possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings, essential to secure founding of the State.
(3) The mandatory Administration should be characterised from the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis in clear recognition of the imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state, and for the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which has only recently come to self-consciousness.
(4) The Mandatory should definitely seek, from the beginning of its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic state, and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in the progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group of disciplined civil servants.
(5) The period of "tutelage" should not be unduly prolonged, but independent self-government should be granted as soon as it is can safely be done; remembering that the primary business of governments is not the accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.
(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatory in a country like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is ensured, both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a jealous care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more vital than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.
(7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of indebtedness on the part of the new state should be avoided, as well as any entanglements financially with the affairs of the mandatory Power. On the other hand, the legitimate established privileges of foreigners, such as rights to maintain schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject to reviews and modification under the authority of the League of Nations in the interest of Syria. The mandatory Power should not take advantage of its position to force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment either of Syria or of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as possible to economic independence as well as to political independence.
Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the Commission, the fulfilment of at least the conditions now named should be assured, if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the policy of mandatories already embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria, however the machinery of administration is finally organised. The Damascus Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country should become, though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other Power. That fear must be completely allayed.

B. We recommend, in the second, that the unity of Syria be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria.
(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too small and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to make the setting up of independent States within its boundaries desirable, if such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in language, culture, tradition, and customs.
(2) This recommendation is in line with important general considerations; already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations, as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.
(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general allotted. The Commissioners believe; however, that the claim of the Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking and the Turkish-speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has not such need of further seacoast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.
(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the units of Syria, the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon, which have already had a measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity, undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy and especially in the case of strongly unified groups. Even the "Damascus Programme" which presses so earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government "on broad decentralisation principles."
Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State rather than entirely independent of it.
As a predominantly Christian country too, Lebanon naturally fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she would have a four-fold safeguard; her own large autonomy; the presence of a strong mandatory for the considerable period in which the constitution and practice of the new State would be forming; the oversight of the League of Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities; and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity of such a State, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations. Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if Christians were present in the State in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the State, as experience of the relations of different religious faiths in India suggest.
As a predominantly Christian country it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be made for Palestine; though, as the Holy Land for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed more particularly in connexion with the recommendation concerning Zionism.

C. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be placed under one mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity.

(1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria among several mandatories, even if existing national unity were recognised; or to attempt a joint mandatory of the whole on the commission plan:-neither of these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such form of divided Mandate; but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations already urged indicate.
(2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are handled politically, the people of Syria are three, forced to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another--the Arabs of the East and the people of the coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a single mandatory? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians.
The relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable. But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social consciousness points to the necessity of understanding the other half, as it can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatory ought to form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the State, and ought to steadily improve group relations. The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike, not their exploitation, then can decent human relations be secured-a foundation which could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic groups.
The Commissioners urged, therefore, for the largest future good of all groups and regions, alike the placing of the whole of Syria under a single Mandate.

D. We recommend, in the fourth place, that Amir Faisal be made head of the new united Syrian State.

(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the representative Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of Syria sincerely desire to have Amir Faisal as ruler.
(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their long training under tribal conditions, and with their traditional respect for their Chiefs. They seem to need, more than most people, a king as the personal symbol of the power of the State.
(3) Amir Faisal has come, too, natural into his present place of power, and there is no one else who could well replace him. He has the great advantage of being the son of the Sharif of Mecca, and as such honoured throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the complete deliverance of the Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He was as consequently hailed by the Damascus Congress as having merited their full confidence and entire reliance. He was taken up and supported by the British as the most promising candidate for the headship for the new Arab State-an Arab of the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Sharifian connection, and through his broad sympathies with the best in the Occident. His relations with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his kingdom would not be threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to the Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East; but no man can be named who would have a stronger general appeal. He is tolerant and wise, skilful in dealing with men winning in manner, a man of sincerity insight and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is too early too early to say; but certainly no other Arab leader combines so many elements of power as he, and he will have invaluable help throughout the mandatory period. The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state in the Near East.

E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish state.

(1) The Commissioner began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favour, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.
(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist programme by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming great natural obstacles.
(3) The Commission recognised also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to-favouring "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" - it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist programme must be greatly modified. For a national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conferences with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete disposition of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase. In his address, of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great "ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting": "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material Interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery." If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine-nearly nine-tenths of the whole emphatically against the entire Zionist programme. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law. It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist programme is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than seventy-two percent-1.350 in all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist programme. Only two requests--those for a united Syria and for independence had a larger support. This general feeling was duly voiced by the General Syrian Congress in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of the statement.
The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate the programme. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions requiring armies to carry out are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of serious injustices. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.
There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely-Jewish State, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out the fact that Palestine is the Holy Land for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole.
The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to Christians those having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are, sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning in this respect of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist programme. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate; the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as the Holy Land.
In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist programme be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.
There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an international and inter-religious commission, somewhat as at present under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this Commission.
The recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity of recommending what power shall undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.
(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the qualifications ideally to be desired in the mandatory Power: First of all, it should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter heartily into the spirit of the mandatory system, and its possible gift to the world, and so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to exploit the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the education of the common people and for the development of the national spirit. It needs unlimited sympathy and patience in what is practically certain to be a rather thankless task; for no Power can go in honestly to face actual conditions (like land-ownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making many enemies. It should experience in dealing with less-developed people, and abundant resources in men and money.
(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications, certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these qualifications that has not been more or less definitely indicated in our conference with Syrian people and they certainly suggest a new stage in the development of the self-sacrificing spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power that undertakes the single Mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these qualification will have the possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but the world, and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the War, and give proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And that would mean very much just now, in enabling enabling the nations to keep their faith in one another and in their own highest ideals.
(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30, 1919, quoted in our instructions, expressly state for regions to be "completely severed from the Turkish Empire", that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the election of the mandatory Power." Our survey left no room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people. Although it was not known whether America would take a Mandate at all; and although the Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but had rather to discourage expectation; nevertheless, upon the face of the returns, America vvas the first choice of 1,152 of the petitions presented-more than sixty per cent-while no other Power had as much as fifteen per cent for first choice.
And the conferences showed that the people knew the grounds upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared that their choice was due to knowledge of America's record; the unselfish aims with which she had come into the War; the faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria, especially the College in Beirut, with its well-known and constant encouragement of Syrian national sentiment; their belief that America had no territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian State was well established as her treatment both of Cuba and the Philippines seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; and her ample resources.
From the point of view of the desires of the "people concerned," the Mandate should clearly go to America.
(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already stated as needed in the Mandatory of Syria, America, as first choice of the people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the Standard involved in our discussion of qualifications; though she has much less experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely to show less patience; and though her definite connexions with Syria have been less numerous and close than those of France. She would have at least the great qualification of fervent belief in the new mandatory system of the League of Nations, as indicating the proper relations which a strong nation should take take toward a weaker one. And, though she would undertake the Mandate with reluctuctance, she could probably be brought to see how logically the taking of such responsibility follows from the purposes with which she entered the War, and from her advocacy of the League of Nations.
(5) There is the further consideration that America could probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people, as has been seen, favour her coming, rather than that of any other Power. Both the British and the French would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests to press. She would have abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of Syria; and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the nations which have had closest connexion with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be more welcome as a neighbour to the British with their large interests in Egypt, Arabia and Iraq; or the Arabs and Syrians in these regions; or the French with their long-established and many-sided interests in Bairut and the Lebanon.
(6) The objections to recommending at once a single American Mandate for all Syria are: First of all, that it is not certain that the America people would be willing to take the Mandate; that is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America's coming, a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large influential Jewish population; and that, if America were to take any mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For there is a task there of such peculiar and world-wide significance as to appeal to the best in America, and demand the utmost from her, and as certainly to justify her in breaking with her established policy concerning mixing in the affairs of the eastern hemisphere. The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come into Asia Minor with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples concerned.
To these objections, as a whole, it is to be said that they are all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they only form the sort of obstacles that must be expected in so large and significant an undertaking. In any case they do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of recommending the course which, in their honest judgment, is the best course, and the one for which the whole situation calls.
The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.
If for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request of the majority of Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great Britain. The tables show that there were 1,073 petitions in all Syria for Great Britain as mandatory, if America did not take the Mandate. This is very greatly in excess of any similar expression for the French.
On the contrary-for whatever reason-more than sixty percent of all the petitions presented to the Commission directly and strongly protested against any French mandate. Without going into discussion of the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners are reluctantly compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to recommend a single French Mandate for all Syria.
The feeling of the Arabs of the East is particularly strong against the French. And there is grave reason to believe that the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between the Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous alternative. The Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that this conclusion is contrary to their own earlier hope, that because of France's long and intimate relations with Syria, because of her unprecedented sacrifices in the War, and because the British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater accessions of territory from the War-it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the entire Mandate for Syria. But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more clear it became that the course could not be taken. The Commissioners recommend, therefore, if America cannot take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain; because of the choice of the people concerned; because she is already on the ground and with much of the necessary work in hand; because of her trained administrators; because of her long and generally successful experience in dealing with less developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a mandatory Power, as we have already considered them.
We should hardly be doing justice, however, to our sense of responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add some at least of the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and implied in our conferences, which led to the preference for an American Mandate over a British Mandate. The people repeatedly showed honest fear that in Bntish hands the mandatory power would become simply a colonising power of the old kind; that Great Britain could find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in case of a people thought inferior; that she would favour a civil service and pension budget too expensive for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after all, too much exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready to withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not really believe in universal education, and would not provide adequately for it; and that she already had more territory in her possession-in spite of her fine colonial record-than was good either for herself or for the world.
These misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely explain their demand for "absolute independence", for a period of "assistance" of only twenty years, their protest against Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations, etc. They all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria, should go in as a true mandator) under the League of Nations, and for a limited term. Anything else would be a betrayal of the Syrian people.
It needs to be emphasised, too, that under a true mandatory for Syria, all the legitimate interests of all the nations in Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory Power, or in an independent Syria.
There remains only to be added that, if France feels so intensely concerning her present claims in Syria as to threaten all cordial relations among the Allies, it is of course, possible to give her a Mandate over the Lebanon (not enlarged) separated from the rest of Syria, as is desired by considerable groups in that region. For reasons already given, the Commissioners cannot recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement.

II. Iraq

In view of the Resolutions, passed by the Peace Conference on January 30, 1919, and the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918-on the eve of the Armistice- both of which documents class Syria and Iraq together to be treated in the same way, and make to them the same promises and assurances, the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference adopt for Iraq a policy in general parallel to that recommended for Syria, in order that the Anglo-French Declaration may not become another "scrap of paper."
1. We accordingly recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our instructions, that whatever foreign administration is brought into Iraq, should come into Iraq not at all as a colonising power in the old sense of that term, but as a mandatory under the League of Nations, with clear consciousness that the "well-being and decelopment" of the people form for it a sacred trust. To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, whether in the annual reports of the mandatory to the League or in other ways.
The entire test of the first recommendation for Syria, with its subordinate recommendations, applies point by point to Iraq as truly as to Syria.
If the Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the appointed mandatory Power loyally carry out the policy of mandatories embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the most essential interests of Iraq would be fully safeguarded-but only so.
2. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Iraq be preserved: the precise boundaries to be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Mandate has been assigned. It should probably include at least the Vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. And the Southern Kurds and Assyrians might well be linked up with Iraq. The wisdom of a united country needs no argument in the case of Iraq.
3. We recommend, in the third place, that Iraq be placed under one Mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity. The economic, political social and educational development of the people all call for such a unified mandate. Only waste, confusion, friction, and injury to the people's interests could come from attempting a division and "spheres of influence" on the part of several nations. But this implies that the mandatory Power shall not itself be an exploiting Power, but shall sacredly guard the people's rights.
4. Since it is plainly desirable that there be general harmony in the political and economic institutions and arrangements of Iraq and Syria; and since the People themselves should have chief voice in determining the form of of government under which they shall live, we recommend that the Government of Iraq, in harmony with the apparent desires of its people, be a Constitutional Monarchy, such as is proposed for Syria and that the people of Iraq be given opportunity to indicate their choice of a Monarch, the choice to be reviewed and confirmed by the Leaguet of Nations. It may be fairly assumed that the 1,278 petitions from Syrians for the independence of Iraq percent of the total number received the feeling in Iraq itself; and such contact as we have been able to secure with Iraqis confirms the assumption, and leads to the belief that the programme, presented at Aleppo by representative Iraqis, headed by Ja'far Pasha, Military Governor of the Aleppo District, and practically parallel to the, Damascus Programme, would be generally supported by the Iraqi people. Whether this support extends to each item in the programme alike, and so the naming of a king from the sons of the King of the Hejaz, we have not sufficient data to determine, and so have recommended that a plebiscite be taken upon that point; although there is British evidence that many Iraqis have expressed themselves in favour of one of the sons of the King of the Hejaz as Amir.
5. The Iraqi Programme expresses its choice of America as mandatory, and with no second choice. Undoubtedly there has been a good deal of feeling in Iraq against Great Britain, and the petitions specifically charge the British authorities in Iraq with considerable interference with freedom of opinion, of expression, and of travel of which might be justified in time of military occupation. But feeling so stirred might naturally breed unwillingness to express desire for Great Britain as mandatory.
On the other hand, the material in the pamphlet called "Copies and Translations of Declarations and other Documents relating to Self-Determination in Iraq" was called out by an attempt on the part of the British Government in Iraq to secure the opinions of leading men of all groups concerning "self-determination." This material, just because reported directly to British officials, is doubtless somewhat more favourable to the British than it would otherwise be; but it gives unquestionable good evidence of much opinion likely to choose a British Mandate. And after all, the range of choice of a mandatory, of sufficient power and experience and of essential justice, is decidedly limited. and it is by no means improbable that if the Iraqis were confronted by a refusal of America to take a Mandate for Iraq, they would make Great Britain at least second choice, as the majority of the Syrians did. There is supplementary evidence also upon this point.
Now it seems so unlikely that America could or would take a Mandate for lraq, in addition to the possible consideration of Syria and Asia Minor, that the Commissioners recommend that the Peace Conference assign the Mandate for Iraq to Great Britain: because of the general reasons already given for recommending her as mandatory in Syria, if America does not go in there; because she is probably best of all fitted for the particular task involved, in view of her long relations with the Arabs; in recognition of the sacrifices made by her in delivering Iraq from the Turks, though with no acknowledgment of right of conquest, as her own statements expressly disclaim; because of the special interests she naturally has in Iraq on account of its nearness to India and its close connexions with Arabia; and because of work already done in the territory.
These reasons make it probable that the largest interest of the people of Iraq as a whole will be best served by a British Mandate, in spite of the fact that from the point of view of world-interests, in the prevention of jealously, suspicion, and fear of domination by a single Power, it were better for both Britain and the world that no further territory anywhere be added to the British Empire. A British Mandate, however, will have the decided advantage of tending to promote economic and educational unity throughout Iraq and Syria, whether Syria be under Great Britain or America, and so will reflect more fully than ever before the close relations, in language, customs, and trade between these parts of the former Turkish Empire.
In a country so rich as Iraq in agricultural possibilities, in oil, and in other resources with the best intentions, there will inevitably be danger of exploitation and monopolistic control by the mandatory Power, through making British interests supreme, and especially through large Indian immigration. This danger will need increasingly and most honestly to be guarded against. The Iraqis feel very strongly the menace particularly of Indian immigration, even though that immigration should be confined to Moslems. They dread the admixture of another people of entirely different race and customs, as threatening their Arabic civilisation.

Respectfully submitted,
Henry C. King,
Charles R. Crane.

Follow UNISPAL RSS Twitter