February’s events illustrate how policies implemented in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) undermine the resilience and coping mechanisms of Palestinians, further weakening vulnerable communities.
This is particularly evident in the case of the northern West Bank village of Khirbet Tana (Nablus), where Israeli authorities carried out extensive demolitions this month, leaving 55 people displaced. Stop-construction orders were also given to the community’s school. This was the sixth demolition that the village has endured, and the third in just over a year.
Demolitions also occurred in other parts of the West Bank, including the demolition of six cisterns, which are used to harvest rainwater for both human and animal consumption in rural areas. Since the beginning of 2010, 27 water cisterns and other water-harvesting infrastructure have been demolished. The demolition of cisterns is of particular concern, as annual rainfall in the West Bank currently stands at less than 50 percent of the historical average.
Although the Israeli authorities maintain that these demolitions are carried out due to the lack of Israeli-issued permits, the highly restrictive and often discriminatory nature of the planning regime implemented by the same authorities rarely grants Palestinians such permits in Area C, leaving them with no choice but to build “illegally”, or to leave the area.
Vulnerable communities also face repercussions when they protest against the policies of the occupying power. Residents of at least three West Bank communities that hold regular protests against Israeli settlement activity in the vicinity of their villages have reported that their children, some as young as ten years of age, are increasingly being arrested. Both Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations have also raised concerns of alleged mistreatment of children in the custody of the Israeli authorities.
Israel’s blockade of Gaza continues to restrict the movement of people and goods in and out of the Gaza Strip, and has rendered its population largely dependent on smuggling activities through unregulated underground tunnels under the border with Egypt and the limited opening of Rafah Crossing. This dependence was underscored by the recent turmoil in Egypt, which had a negative impact on the flow of people and goods between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
As the humanitarian and development community attempts to address some of the problems facing the most vulnerable communities, they face the prospect of increasing costs and shrinking humanitarian space. A recent survey by the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA) highlights how access restrictions have negatively impacted the quality and sustainability of the programs being implemented by international NGOs in the oPt, and have increased the cost to donors—to approximately 4.5 million dollars per year. Given the above concerns, only fundamental changes to the occupying power’s policies, including a full lifting of the Gaza blockade, the removal of restrictions to land use within Area C and East Jerusalem, and a freeze on demolitions, allowing greater humanitarian space to the humanitarian community, the vulnerability of affected Palestinian civilians will continue. Basing such policy changes on international humanitarian and human rights law will ground them with a firm foundation to support these affected populations.
Child Arrests in Communities Protesting Settlement Activity
In at least three communities that are holding regular protests against Israeli settlement activity1, residents are reporting that their children are being targeted with arrest, with incidents of children as young as 10 being taken into Israeli custody. Accounts of mistreatment have prompted allegations of abuse from Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations.
Since mid-2009, residents of the village of Beit Ummar in the Hebron governorate have held a weekly demonstration protesting the expansion of Karmi Tzur settlement by taking-over privately-owned Palestinian agricultural land, to which Palestinian farmers are denied access. During the first two months of 2011, 27 children from Beit Ummar, some as young as 13, have been arrested, with 16 in Israeli custody by the end of the month. By comparison, in all of 2010, a total of 43 children from the village were arrested; 33 of whom were sentenced by military court to anywhere between three to six months in prison.2 Most of these children were arrested during night raids of the village and accused of throwing stones at Israeli military patrols.
Similar reports of child arrests have been received from the village of An Nabi Saleh in the Ramallah governorate, where, since December 2009, residents have been carrying out regular demonstrations against the take-over of village land by settlers from Hallamish settlement.3 Since then, the An Nabi Saleh popular committee reports that some 25 Palestinian children from the area have been detained. In recent weeks, there has been increased Israeli military activity in the village, targeting children and young men. This has included a series of middle-of-the-night raids, during which homes are searched and residents, including young children, have been roused out of bed in order to be photographed.4
There is also a pattern of increasing arrests of children from the Silwan neighbourhood of East Jerusalem. These arrests, which have been the subject of local and international concern, occur in the context of rising tensions over ongoing Israeli settlement activity in the area and the high risk of displacement of hundreds of its Palestinian residents. According to Wadi al Hilweh Information Center, the main community organization monitoring the situation in Silwan, 48 children have been arrested from the neighborhood since 1 December 2010, including 14 in February. These constitute 47 percent of all Palestinians arrested from Silwan during the same period.
Detained children from all of these communities report a similar pattern of treatment. They are generally subject to physical abuse and threats, are handcuffed and blindfolded, and are detained without a family member during the arrest and interrogation process. In one of the most serious incidents of recent months, on 28 February, an 11-year-old boy from Silwan was reportedly hospitalized for cerebral damage after he was physically assaulted and injured during his arrest by Israeli under-cover police units.5
The general pattern of treatment is in line with that of children arrested in other parts of the West Bank. According to Defence for Children International / Palestine Section (DCI/PS), since 2000, the Israeli authorities have detained and prosecuted approximately 700 Palestinian children each year. The most common charge is for throwing stones at Israeli military forces or settlers in the West Bank. Recent research by DCI/PS, based on 40 testimonies of children detained in the second half of 2010, indicates that the majority of these children suffer mistreatment, including 70 percent who reported they were beaten or kicked during their arrest, transfer or subsequent interrogation.6
The majority of Palestinian children who are charged with offences, except for those from East Jerusalem, are tried in Israel’s military court system. In June 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers expressed concern that the Israeli military court system’s “legal foundations and practices … do not comply with international standards.”7
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Israel is a State Party, outlines that “State Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society.”
I was standing with a group of children near the gas station at the entrance to An Nabi Saleh. An Israeli police vehicle drove by and I threw a stone at it. The vehicle stopped and several special police jumped out, chased us and took me into custody. A woman from our village tried to protect me, but the police shoved her to the ground.
I was taken first to the military tower at the entrance of An Nabi Saleh, where the police forces kicked me in my leg and arm and my hands were bound behind my back with plastic ties. Next, I was taken to Hallamish settlement and then transported to an interrogation center about 45 minutes from my house, at Geva Binyamin settlement. There, I was taken to an interrogation room.
The interrogator asked me if I threw stones and I said ‘yes,’ and I told them why; ‘you arrested my 14-year-old brother in the middle of the night this week and now I have no one to play with. I was angry, so I threw a stone.’ Next, they showed me pictures of boys and asked me to identify them. I told them I don’t know these boys; they aren’t from our village. The whole interrogation lasted around 15 minutes, but I spent another two hours waiting after the interrogation until my father came and picked me up. No one from my family was with me during the process.
Basil, 12 years old, from An Nabi Saleh village9
I was arrested, along with three other people, by undercover Israeli forces in the village, while watching clashes between demonstrators and Israeli soldiers. … They took us to an army jeep, tied our hands behind our back and blindfolded us. We were taken to Hallamish settlement, where my blindfold was removed and replaced with a black hood that covered my head. I was taken to interrogation and the interrogator asked me if throw stones. I said ‘yes.’ He wanted me to tell him the names of other boys who threw stones and I said, ‘I don’t know them.’ After interrogation, I was taken to a jeep and transported to the entrance to the village, my eyes were uncovered and I was released. The whole process took around 2.5 hours, during which my eyes were covered the whole time and no one from my family was with me.
Mother of Four Boys from Beit Ummar Village, All of Whom Were Arrested at Least Once as Children; One Child, a 16-year-old, is Currently Detained10
“We live next to Karmi Tsur settlement. I have spent many years of my life traveling from one prison to another to visit my sons, I am afraid that their father will be arrested at some point too … I am also terrified and afraid that they will come and arrest my other children again, I pray for the day, when my family will be re-united again around our table.”
Demolition and Displacement
The ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes and other civilian property by Israeli authorities, and its humanitarian consequences, continues to raise concerns. At least 67 Palestinian owned-structures, including residential structures, animal shelters and water cisterns, were demolished during the month of February. As a result, 105 Palestinians, including 43 children, were forcibly displaced and another 195 people were otherwise affected.
Since the beginning of the year, 96 Palestinian structures have been demolished throughout the West Bank, including 32 homes and other residential structures. In total, 175 people, half of them children, have lost their homes as a result, while around 260 people have been otherwise affected. This means that, on average, almost three people have lost their homes every day since the beginning of the year.
All of the demolitions, apart from one, took place in Area C. In the village of Khirbet Tana in Nablus Governorate, extensive demolitions were carried out on 9 February and again on 20 February. The demolitions, which included ten residential structures and 33 animal shelters, forcibly displaced 55 people. These were the third and fourth demolitions to take place in the community since January 2010.
According to the Israeli authorities, the demolitions were carried out due to the lack of Israeli-issued permits. However, as the planning regime enforced in these areas is highly restrictive, it almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain such permits, leaving them with no option but to build “illegally” or leave the area and move abroad or into Areas A or B.
The United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the oPt, Maxwell Gaylard, condemned “the destruction of basic rain water collection systems, some of them very old, which serve marginalized rural and herder Palestinian communities where water is already scarce and where drought is an ever-present threat.”
Attacks and Disruptions Affecting Education in the oPt
Israeli air strike in February results in damages to school in Gaza
Throughout the oPt, violent incidents that disrupt or deter access of Palestinian children to education continue to be reported. These include air strikes, demolitions and acts of vandalism. So far in 2011, there have been ten such incidents reported. In 2010, there were 37 incidents reported, and 15 were reported in 2009. 11
Early in the morning of 9 February, the Israeli Air Force launched several air strikes targeting a number of buildings throughout the Gaza Strip, resulting in the injury of 11 civilians, including four children. According to the Israeli military, the attack was in response to rocket fire by Palestinian armed groups in Gaza. One of the targets, a consumer plastic product factory in Gaza City, is located next to the Nour al Ma’aref private school and kindergarten.
Although there were no injuries reported at the school, its premises sustained considerable damage: windows, doors and classrooms were destroyed, and structural damage occurred to the recreational area and the eastern walls of the school. As a result, classes were suspended from 9 February through 13 February, resulting in four days of lost schooling for over 600 students. The incident compounds existing damage that occurred to the school during Israel’s “Cast Lead” offensive (December 2008 – January 2009) and which has not been repaired owing to the unavailability or unaffordability of construction materials, due to the ongoing blockade.
The provision of education in Area C communities also continues to be undermined by the lack of classrooms, due to the restrictive and discriminatory planning regime implemented by the Israeli authorities, which largely prevents Palestinians from obtaining permits to build new schools or upgrade existing ones. In February, a school in the community of Khirbet Tana received stop-construction orders against a foundation structure for new classrooms. The Israeli authorities had previously demolished the school in December 2010 for lack of Israeli-issued building permits. Of note, this was the second time in one year that the school in Khirbet Tana was demolished, the first time being in January 2010. In January 2011, the Israeli authorities also partially demolished another Area C school in village of Dkaika (Hebron).
As the Occupying Power, Israel has the legal duty to “facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children,” and the duty to respect the right to education of all children in the oPt.12 Derived from this is the obligation to allocate adequate space, and allow access to the materials needed, for the construction and upgrading of schools, as well as to take all measures needed to avoid disruption in the functioning of schools, either by its military forces or its citizens. Furthermore, IHL expressly prohibits the destruction of property belonging to individuals or communities, except when absolutely required by military operations.13 When hostilities occur, all parties to a conflict must ensure that attacks are in conformity with the principle of proportionality, and take all precautionary measures to avoid or minimize harm to the civilian population and infrastructure.14 Similarly, all parties have an obligation not to locate military zones, installations, or assets in or near civilian areas.
Impact of Egypt Unrest on Gaza
The outbreak of political unrest in Egypt, and its immediate impact on the flow of people and goods between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, highlighted the vulnerability of Gaza’s population. The restrictions on the movement of people and goods through the official crossings with Israel, as well as Israel’s ban on access to Gaza by air and sea, have rendered the population largely dependent on trade activities through underground tunnels under the border with Egypt and the limited opening of Rafah Crossing.
When the protests began in Egypt, the Egyptian authorities closed the Rafah crossing for over three weeks. Rafah is the only passage between Gaza and the rest of the world that does not pass through Israel,. Since June 2010 following the ‘Flotilla incident’, the crossing had been opened five days per week for limited categories of people, including patients referred to medical treatment in Egypt; the number of the latter has increased significantly since that time to an average of 500 per month. Rafah’s closure meant that hundreds of patients were unable to access needed treatment. The Crossing reopened for the movement of people in both directions on 23 February.15
Despite the partial easing of Israel’s blockade in June 2010, the tunnels have continued to be the main channel for the import of construction materials (which remains restricted through Israel) and fuel (which is significantly cheaper than that imported from Israel). Clashes were reported between Bedouin residents and Egyptian security forces in the Sinai, and movement throughout the Sinai Peninsula was largely disrupted. This all but halted tunnel operations for nearly ten days. As a result, there were petrol shortages, and long queues of cars were seen at many of Gaza’s petrol stations, although the price of fuel was capped by the local.16 The limited amount of fuel that did enter was distributed on a rotation system throughout the Strip to ensure coverage of the entire area, with priority given to essential services such as for backup generators at hospitals, and water and waste water facilities.
Although the fuel supply for the Gaza power plant was interrupted, due to contingency stocks at the plant (enough for 2-3 weeks), electricity production was not affected.17 There was also no disruption to the electricity supply from Egypt.
Prior to the unrest, about one quarter of the daily wheat needs (100 MT daily) was obtained through the tunnels, leading to concern over the level of stock and hence the production of bread. However, bread production was not affected as a limited amount of grain continued to enter from Israel through the Karni Crossing while tunnel operation was disrupted.
East Jerusalem: Hundreds of Palestinians at Immediate risk of Displacement on Grounds of Lack of Residency
This month, the Israeli Ministry of Interior (MoI) indicated that it had rejected 364 permit applications submitted by Palestinian West Bank ID holders to ‘legalize’ their current residence in East Jerusalem. Those affected are currently at risk of displacement. The information was released following a petition filed by the human rights NGO HaMoked under the Freedom of Information Act to the Jerusalem District Court. This followed unsuccessful attempts to obtain the information from the MoI.
In October 2007, the Israeli Government declared that Palestinians born or residing in East Jerusalem for long periods of time, who hold West Bank ID cards, are not eligible for a Jerusalem ID (i.e. permanent residency).18 Instead, people in such circumstances were given until 30 April 2008 to submit applications for a temporary (renewable) military permit that would allow them to remain legally in Jerusalem. Information obtained by HaMoked from the MoI also indicates that such permits do not provide their bearers with freedom of movement within Jerusalem (let alone any social rights) but rather confine them to “the vicinity of their neighborhood”.
The burden of proof set in the decision was extremely rigorous. Applicants must provide documentation proving continuous residence within Jerusalem for each of the previous 20 years, including, but not limited to, rental contracts, receipts of payment of municipal taxes, and an aerial picture certified by the Israel Mapping Center, indicating the precise place of residence.19
According to the MoI response, less than 4 percent (31 applications) of a total of 841 submitted applications were accepted, nearly 43 percent were rejected (364), and the rest (446) are still being processed. Those rejected were informed that they must leave Jerusalem and “return to their place of residence in the West Bank.”
The MoI decisions on these cases come in the context of a widespread risk of displacement from East Jerusalem on grounds of lack of residency rights, which affects also Palestinians with Jerusalem IDs. The latter provide holders with ‘permanent residency’ in Israel, rather than citizenship, a status that can be revoked under various circumstances, including seven years of residence outside the Israeli-defined boundaries of Jerusalem and the acquisition of residency or citizenship in another country. Approximately 14,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians had their residency revoked between 1967 and mid-2010 (not including dependent children) on those grounds, with over 4,500 revoked in 2008 alone.20 In addition, a permanent resident who marries a non-resident must submit, on behalf of the spouse, a request for family unification, and residency is not passed on to the holder’s children ‘by right’; children can only receive permanent residence under certain conditions.
In the same vein, there are some 1,600 Palestinians that the Barrier has placed on the Jerusalem side who are in a similarly precarious situation; these include some 500 Palestinians living within the Israeli-defined municipal area and some 1,100 living in Area C but on the Jerusalem side of the Barrier. Those who live in Area C either have seam zone permits and require coordination to cross through the nearest checkpoint to access the remainder of the West Bank. This means they face great difficulty accessing services in services in Jerusalem, including health and education facilities. Among those who live within the municipal areas, some have coordination or permits to cross through the nearest Barrier checkpoint whilst others (around 110) are left in a legal limbo and informed that they need to apply for residency in Jerusalem at the MoI if they are to stay in their homes.
Humanitarian Organizations Face Rising Costs Due to Israeli Access Restrictions
Annual Costs Estimated at USD 4.5 million
The Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA), representing more than 80 INGOs operational in the oPt, carried out a survey of its member organizations in January and February. The survey found that the cost for international NGOs of dealing with movement restrictions on staff and goods is at least 4.5 million dollars per year.The study highlighted the access restrictions faced by international NGOs, and the negative impact they have on the quality, reach and sustainability of the programs that agencies are trying to deliver. As a result, there are additional costs due to the extra staffing, time and infrastructure required to deal with the restrictions placed on the movements of staff and goods, and from the resulting delays and wasted resources.
The biggest single problem identified in the study is the system of permits restricting the movement of staff, especially in and out of Gaza. Of those surveyed, 25 percent indicated that permits for international staff to enter Gaza are often denied or put on hold. For national staff, this figure is worse: 92 percent of AIDA members indicated that permits for Gaza staff to travel to the West Bank are often denied or put on hold, and 88 percent indicated the same for permits for West Bank staff travelling to Gaza.
To cope with the restrictions, many organizations have been forced to hire additional personnel: often finance, administration, security or technical posts are created in both Gaza and West Bank offices, where previously one post could manage all locations. In addition, 32 percent of AIDA member organizations have had to hire additional international staff, as they can more easily travel than their Palestinian counterparts. 31 percent have hired extra staff to cope with the additional workload of applying for permits and visas.
AIDA members are requesting that the international community give diplomatic support to NGOs carrying out essential humanitarian and development work in the OPT, and that Israel provides a clear system to facilitate impartial, rapid, and predictable movement of personnel in, and between, all areas of the oPt for work purposes, regardless of their nationality.
Food Security Projections, Second Half of 2010 – February 2011
During the first half of 2010, 22 percent of households in the West Bank and 52 percent of households in the Gaza Strip were food insecure. This represents a country-wide decrease in the prevalence of food insecurity of 3 percent between 2009 and 2010. However in January 2011, world food prices hit a new historic record as the FAO Food Price Index (FFPI) surged above the peak in June 2008. In the oPt, the food consumer price index (FCPI) generally trended upward, with a slight decrease witnessed in January 2011. However, the trend is expected to continue to surge upwards and further depreciate households’ purchasing power.
These trends are worrying, as they indicate the potential for a continuing rise in food insecurity with an additional 2.5 and 3.2 percent increase in the prevalence of food insecurity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively, compared with the first half of 2010. This means that between the second half of 2010 to the end of February 2011, 75,000 more people in the West Bank and 71,000 more people in the Gaza Strip were projected to be food insecure (a total of 146,248 people).21 The share of food expenditure was as high as 52 percent among households throughout the oPt.
In the West Bank, food expenditure represented 48 percent of total cash expenditure of households. For food-insecure households in the West Bank, food expenditure was higher at 52 percent. In the Gaza Strip, the share of food expenditure represented 61 percent of total cash expenditures. This share increased to 63 percent for food insecure households.
While the food consumption patterns in the oPt are generally adaptive, the primary coping mechanisms include reductions in household spending on the quality and quantity of food consumed. As the cost of food increases, the strain on households’ purchasing power skews the dietary patterns of households who are already food insecure towards a high energy-dense diet (e.g. bread and sweets) that is low in nutrients (e.g. dairy, vegetables and meats).
1The construction and expansion of Israeli settlements runs contrary to international humanitarian law, which prohibits the transfer of civilians from the territory of the occupying power into occupied territory. See Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
2Figures for arrested children from DCI/PS and YMCA. Beit Sahour.
3In addition to land expropriated for the establishment of the settlement in the 1970s, there are approximately 3,000 dunums of land owned by Palestinian farmers from the villages of An Nabi Saleh and Deir Nidham, which settlers have taken over by planting them with various crops and preventing Palestinian farmers from accessing them.
4Between early December 2010 and mid-January 2011, the Israeli military carried out a series of raids, all after 1am, during which soldiers photographed residents and record information about household members. During the period, most, if not all, of the villages houses were mapped. According to residents, night raids and house-to-house searches of the village increased in frequency in February, to an average of 2-3 per week.
5The boy was arrested with five other children and one adult and two Israeli journalists were arrested while they were trying to take photographs of the children while they were being arrested.
6On 29 January 2011, DCI-PS submitted 40 cases to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (and others) for further investigation. Percentages quoted herein are based on the report, which covers a six month period between July and December 2010. DCI/PS, “In their own Words: A report on the situation facing Palestinian children detained in the Israeli military court system,” January 2011. Available at: http://www.dci-pal.org. Recent reports by both DCI/PS and the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem have also raised serious concerns regarding the treatment of children from East Jerusalem processed through Israel’s domestic legal system. See for example, B’Tselem, “Caution: Children Ahead, The Illegal Behavior of the Police toward Minors in Silwan Suspected of Stone Throwing,” December 2010.
7“Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva,” (18 June 2010), A/HRC/14/26/Add.1 - paragraphs 543 to 635.
8Testimony given to OCHA on 24 February 2011.
9Testimony given to OCHA on 24 February 2011.
10Source: YMCA Rehabilitation Program in Beit Sahour, which works with released child prisoners and their families to ease their re-integration into society.
11These incidents are recorded by the UNICEF-led Working Group on grave violations against children in Israel and the oPt. In 2010, there was also one attack against an Israeli educational institution as a result of the armed conflict.
12Article 50, 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and Article 13 of International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
13Article 53, Fourth Geneva Convention
14Article 52 of the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
15Rafah crossing was partially opened on 18 February to allow people to enter into Gaza, but remained closed for those exiting until 23 February.
16Prior to this approximately 200,000 litres of petrol and 600,000 litres of diesel (including for the power plant) entered Gaza through the tunnels each day.
17Since 5 January 2011, the Gaza Power Plant has not ordered any industrial fuel from Israel, buying instead cheaper diesel from Egypt.
18Government Decision No. 2492
19In its correspondence with the MoI, HaMoked objected the government decision arguing that it was based on an improper demographic purpose, however the objection was rejected.
21This analysis is based on simulations using the Socio-Economic and Food Security 2010 data set. It is based on inducing the increase in Food Consumer Price Index into household’s expenditures and incomes, assuming everything else constant.
Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables
Conflict-related casualties and violence1
Search and Arrest
Demolition of Structures
Number of Palestinian Children Killed - Direct Conflict
Truckloads of Goods Entering Gaza from Israel
Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): CAP 2010 and 2011
funding status as of 17 March 2011
Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications
Israeli Settler-related Violence
4. Incidents resulting in casualties: includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. Incidents resulting in property damage/losses: ibid.
Search and Arrest
6. Palestinians in Israeli custody: includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. Administrative detainees: Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.
8. Structures demolished: includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. People displaced due to demolitions: includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. People affected by demolitions: includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.
Access West Bank
11. Permanently staffed checkpoints: staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. Partially staffed checkpoints: checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. Unstaffed obstacles: includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. ‘Flying’ or random checkpoints: checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.
Access to Health
15. Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez: includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. Delayed applications: includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.
Movement of Humanitarian Staff
17. Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint: includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.
Imports to Gaza
18. Truckloads by type: for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.
19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause. the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.