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UNITED
NATIONS
S

        Security Council
S/PV.1324
21 November 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1324)
1
Adoption of the agenda
1
The Palestine question:
Letter dated 15 November 1966 from the Permanent
Representative of Jordan to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/7587)
1
THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held in New York, on Monday, 21 November 1966, at 11.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Arthur J. GOLDBERG
(United States of America)

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Bulgaria, China, France, Japan, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay.
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1324)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The Palestine question:

Letter dates 15 November 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7587).

Adoption of the agenda.

The agenda was adopted.
The Palestine question

Letter dated 15 November 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7587)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken previously [1320th meeting], I shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representative of Israel, Mr. Comay, to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. Comay (Israel) took a place at the Council table.

2. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I should like to express, on behalf of my Government, our gratitude to all members who supported our just complaint and who condemned the outrageous and wanton Israel act of aggression against Jordan.

3. We pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his prompt action in putting before the Council, in document S/7593, the first official United Nations figures of our casualties and damage resulting from the Israel aggression of 13 November 1966.

4. It is unfortunate that, even after the crime had been committed, the Israel representative intervened in an attempt to belittle the attack and minimize the gravity of the cold-blooded act of terrorism and, consequently, the importance of our deliberations. Mr. Comay has presented the Council with an in-accurate picture of the volume of the Israel operations. He sought to cast doubt on the accuracy of the United Nations reports and the integrity of the international staff, both at Headquarters and in the area. Now that the report is before the members of the Council, I leave it to them to see how much authenticity can be attached to Israel claims.

5. At the very outset we said that the facts we have presented to the Council were based on a preliminary report and therefore demonstrated that we take our obligations responsibly. It is not difficult to follow the Israel example and resort to falsehoods. We chose not to deviate from the truth. Subsequent inspection carried out by United Nations observers has shown that our preliminary estimates were under-estimated.

6. Mr. Comay referred to the equipment used as “a relatively small and mobile task force” [1320th meeting, para. 65]. He also said “... the size and nature of the forces involved should not be given inflated dimensions ... they were not of brigade strength but... a relatively small mobile force of tanks and personnel carriers” [1321st meeting, paras. 25 and 26].

7. Mr. Comay is entitled to present any argument he wants, but I regret to say what Mr. Comay said was not supported by any evidence and there is, therefore, a clear attempt to mislead this Council. Mr. Comay cannot say that the strength of the force was not brigade strength, when his own Government, and his own military spokesman, announced openly that the raid “has been in brigade strength”. What I have just quoted is a dispatch of the Associated Press which reached New York a few hours after the attach.

8. It was alleged that the number of houses destroyed was only thirty. Paragraph 10 of the United Nations official report [S/7593] states that in As Samu alone “... the investigating United Nations military observers saw that 125 houses, the village medical clinic, a 6-classroom school and a workshop had been completely demolished. In addition, one mosque and 28 houses had been damaged. Twenty Jordanian army trucks, two Jordanian army jeeps and one civilian bus were totally demolished.”

9. Paragraph 15 of the report states that in Kh Jinba “15 stone huts had been totally destroyed, 7 damaged and one water well had been destroyed by demolition.” Paragraph 16 states that “the police post of Rujm el Madfa’a was almost totally destroyed.” These are the official figures of the United Nations. Need I say any more?

10. I have pictures showing some of these houses, showing the damaged house of worship, showing scenes of animals brutally gunned. I can make these pictures available to members of the Security Council. These pictures recall to my mind, with painful accuracy, the pictures of the villages of Deir Yassin, Nahhalin, Qibya, Qalqillyah, Shuqba, Bani Soubaila and Rafaat, all of which were subjected to the same Israel brutalities and outrageous acts of aggression.

11. Mr. Comay described the crime committed by his authority as defensive action, limited local action. What he referred to as defensive action, however, is nothing but a pre-planned, preconceived and premeditated act of aggression. The weapons used were offensive weapons.

12. Those who were watching television in New York the other day sway the whole crime proudly presented by the Israelis on the screen for the American public to see. Even these films were taken by the Israelis, to be presented without shame, for the whole world to see. Yet Mr. Comay keeps mentioning that that was limited local defense action.

13. The report of the Secretary-General shows that the casualties were: 3 civilians killed, including 1 woman; 15 military personnel killed, including 1 major and 1 pilot; 37 military personnel wounded, as well as many civilians. These are the figures of the official United Nations report. I need not say any more.

14. Mr. Comay said, in reference to the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission on the question of Tel el Arba’in, where, on 29 and 30 April this year, Israel military forces crossed the armistice demarcation line into Jordan and launched a major, unprovoked and premeditated attack against the village of Tel el Arba’in, killing eleven persons, including a twenty-year-old girl, and wounding many others and destroying over ten houses, that I quoted strong language from that decision, and that I omitted to tell the Council that the language was inserted into the decision by Jordan, and that the Chairman dissociated himself from the strong language used. He said that it would be advisable, in these matters, if decisions are quoted, to put all the facts before the Council.

15. It has not been the practice when quoting a decision of any United Nations organ to refer to the explanation of vote, or the debates preceding the adoption of the decision. I did not choose a particular language in the decision. I simply quoted the operative paragraphs of that resolution. But even if Mr. Comay does not like the language adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission, is he in a position, right here and now, to challenge the fact that the Israel army committed the crime, that the Commission found that that attach was not justified or provoked, and all elements of the present act of aggression now before the Council, with one exception? The exception is that the present operation was more offensive, used more armored equipment, more tanks, the air force, and involved more death and destruction.

16. I sincerely hope that Mr. Comay will discontinue his tactics of distortion and misleading which do not fit the high esteem which he owes this body. I never thought it possible that any Member of the United Nations could manifest such contempt for international authority. Only the Israelis, it seems, are capable of that. They have learned well the Nazi techniques of the big lie and have become masters of the game. However, conditions have changed in the world and repetitious falsehoods can now be easily exposed. They have certainly been in this case.

17. We have come to the Security Council for speedy action, and for the adoption of firm, adequate and effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Delay does not serve any fruitful purpose. Any resolution similar to those adopted in the past would not ease the explosive situation in the area. We have to go a step further. The question which the Council has to answer is very clear and simple. Will the Council take effective action? Would the Council help Jordan ease tension in the area? Or does the Council want the Government of Jordan to turn to its people and say that because of certain considerations, better known to some members here, the Security Council is not prepared to go beyond statements and resolutions which have already proved futile, not once or twice, but on several occasions.

18. I call on this Council to face up to its responsibilities. I call on the Security Council not to embark on action that has proved ineffective. I call upon it not to repeat resolutions which have been proved absolutely futile. In such a horrible case, it is imperative that we should move one step further. This is the very least that the Council can do to discourage aggression and potential aggression, not only in the Middle East, but in other regions of the world. Unless we do that, we will undermine the authority of the United Nations and shake confidence in it. Any failure of the Council to go just one step beyond action that has yielded negative results would serve clear notice on the victims of aggression that from now on they are entirely on their own.

19. In this case, there is no need for Jordan to appear as the complainant before the Council since statements of regret and sympathy do not heal the injured, bring life to the dead or prevent further Israel brutality and massacres. What is before the Council is indeed a challenge. Our people are patient and peace-loving, but their patience should not be misunderstood; their faith and courage should not be underestimated.

20. Jordan will not be alone because all peace-loving peoples will support it since its action will be the legitimate action of self-defense, reflecting world conscience. All our people are waiting with hope to see what action will be taken by the Security Council to remedy the situation.

21. Determined as we are not to be taken by treachery and surprise attack, we still believe in and have faith in this august body and in the world Organization, and we hope that the Council’s reaction to the crime which it has been considering and which, in fact, has been condemned and deplored unanimously, will reinforce that faith and that belief.

22. We refuse to accept any draft resolution which attempts to place the victim of aggression and the aggressor on an equal footing. We shall refuse any resolution which embodies any irrelevant references to any question not before the Council. We say this because it is Israel which has attacked us. It is Israel which has waged war against us. It is Israel which has violated peace in the area. Yet, the attitudes of some members of the Council convey the impression that the Council should condemn Israel action and ask Jordan to maintain peace, something which is most illogical and, indeed, unfair and not in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. In this connection, I must say that I am in complete agreement with the representative of the United States when he stated here in the Council, during its consideration of another complaint, that we live by the law of the Charter. We also share his view that the case at hand should be dealt with.

23. Why avoid the immediate issue? Has there or has there not been an attack on Jordan? This is the case at hand which must be dealt with. This is the question for which we requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council and which it is investigating. Any attempt to placate the aggressor by injecting issues which are not directly and immediately related to the case will be vigorously and very strongly opposed by the delegation of Jordan. Considerations of a domestic nature should not be allowed to influence our course of action or prevent us from taking effective measures to prevent further acts of lawlessness and breach of peace in the area. Any resolution which falls short of effective measures will further aggravate the situation. The authors of our Charter have envisaged cases of this nature and prescribed the remedy in Chapter VII. We should not allow ourselves to be misled by Israel statements which are designed to destroy the identity of the case by linking it to a number of other issues which are not directly involved.

24. I must say that acceptance of Mr. Comay’s suggestions, and reference to all or any of them in a resolution, would not only amount to condoning an act of war, but would also constitute an encouragement for the criminal to persist in his crimes, lawless behavior and contempt of international authority. The reference in Chapter VII should be very definite in the resolution so as to carry some weight, the more so since there is no disagreement as to the facts of the case.

25. Last Friday, at this 1323rd meeting, we requested invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, that is, sanctions. Even as this request was being made, according to The New York Times of last Saturday, 19 November;

“Highly placed sources [in Washington] insist that the United
States’ policy toward Israel remains one of friendship, aid and protection – as it has been since Israel’s birth 18 years ago.”

26. Now, what does this insistence of friendship, aid and protection by highly placed sources in Washington, at this very stage of our deliberations, mean? Is it made to help members of the Council form an opinion on, or an estimate of the position of one of the permanent members of the Security Council, or was it intended to calm the nerves of the aggressor, facing certain condemnations and requests for sanctions? And, if the answer to our request for sanctions is reassuring Israel of friendship, aid and protection, is the Council in a position to adopt any measures which would deter aggression?

27. What I have already stated is the deduction of any reasonable man from the article itself, and the quotation attributed to “highly placed sources”, as well as other circumstances not unknown to members of this Council.

28. If you will permit me, Mr. President, I will address you as the representative of the United States of America. If this appraisal is a mistaken one, it would give me and my delegation pleasure to be corrected, because I must stress the point that these statements have been of grave concern to my Government, and other Arab Governments, since they may reflect on the position to be taken by the United States on the question before the Council, and on the Palestine question as a whole.

29. We cannot ignore the fact that forty-six of the tanks that invaded Jordan were American Patton tanks, which were delivered to Israel recently by the United States to be used for defensive purposes. They were used for invasion-for invading Jordan-which Mr. Comay, to meet United States requirements, chose to call a “defensive operation”. They, too, were delivered in conformity with the policy of friendship, aid and protection-but used for murder and destruction.

30. Having explained the complaint of Jordan and put all the facts before this honorable body, it remains for me to state specifically what measures we think the Council, in its wisdom, should take to prevent any further aggression in the future.

31. First the Security Council should condemn Israel for the wanton and outrageous attack of 13 November 1966, which was carried out by its regular military forces against the territory of Jordan and its people. Secondly, it should express its grave concern at the failure of Israel to comply with its obligations. Thirdly, it should decide that the said act is a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan. 1/ Fourthly, it should further decide that the said armed attack constitutes aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter. Fifthly, it should call upon Members of the United Nations to adopt the necessary measures for applying economic sanctions against Israel.

32. In taking these measures to deter Israel aggression, the United States and, indeed, all Members, would show friendship to justice, aid-moral aid-to the victims, and protection to the rule of law; not “friendship, aid and protection” to the aggressor.

33. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Jordan for his comments. With the permission of the Council, since he has addressed any inquiry to me, I shall make a very brief statement as the representative of the UNITED STATES, in the exercise of the right of reply.

34. United States policy on the matter before this Council has been set forth here in clear terms. I do not believe it needs to be deduced from the columns of a newspaper, I would refer the representative of Jordan to the statement I made on 16 November of this year [1320th meeting] before this body. It was not a personal statement; it was a statement of United States policy and represented the considered view of my Government. That statement, of course, referred to the particular complaint before the Council.

35. With respect to our policy in the Middle East generally, I would refer to the statement I made on 28 October 1966, from which I quote:

“As stated on many occasions before the Security Council, in dealing with various aspects of this matter, United States policy respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, Member States of the United Nations, as the United States is required to do under the Charter. United States policy firmly supports the maintenance of a peaceful situation in the Middle East ...” [1310th meeting, para. 74.]

36. Mr. BERRO (Uruguay) (translated from Spanish): Once again we have before us the question of Palestine. This endless series of incidents between Arabs and Israelis is a real challenge to the authority and prestige of the United Nations. There can be no countenancing this perpetual flouting of the purposes and principles of the international community, which offends both the legal and moral conscience of the world and the pacific spirit which the Charter demands as a prerequisite for membership of the Organization founded at San Francisco.

37. Where there is no peace and no desire for peace, where the possibility of war is always presented, where minds are filled with hate, it seems somewhat foolish to invoke the aims and purposes set forth in the instrument which was signed twenty years ago to light the way to a better world.

38. This is the third time since I took my seat in the Council that I have had to address myself, sadly and pessimistically, to the Palestine problem and its record of sabotage and illicit incursions of open and deplorable acts of reprisal. It is always the same: men who fear each other, who hate each other, who approach each other only to fight; men who turn their backs on the efforts of a world which is seeking solidarity and co-operation; in short, men whose conduct sullies the sacred land in which they live and whose intentions dim the radiance of their long history, whose noble responsibilities should compel them to behave in a manner compatible with the illustrious civilizations they have inherited.

39. The prim purpose of the Security Council is to ensure peace. This being so, it is reasonable to ask; what has the Council done about the conflicts in Palestine? Has it really performed its duty? Has it taken the necessary steps to safeguard peace and prevent the Member States in that important part of the world from continually flouting its resolutions and creating a standing threat to collective security, without incurring the relevant provisions of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter, in so far as they apply?

40. Before answering these questions, I must point out that on two earlier occasions [1293rd and 1308th meetings], I confined myself in my statements to considering the complaints of Syria against Israel and of Israel against Syria from a legal point of view, in an endeavor to reach conclusions which might enable the Council to take effective and constructive measures to prevent a recurrence of the incidents, but without a specific attribution of blame which would have necessitated a statement of condemnation, in the belief that to treat the matter in that way would promote understanding, conciliation and peace between the stubborn antagonists in the Middle East.

41. In developing this thesis I did not, of course, overlook the fact that, under law, each party was to blame, to a greater or lesser degree, against the background of hostility and hate which has prevailed in the area since 1947, as the records of the United Nations show, I did not disregard the acts of sabotage against Israel, nor did I hide my disapproval of the reprisals against Syria. I applied the Roman maxim suum cuique tribere (to render to everyone his own). Instead of calling for condemnation, I thought it more in keeping with my duty that I should seek ways of preserving peace and preventing further incidents. I therefore tried to avoid provoking hostile reactions in minds blinded by passion and consequently unlikely to respond to punishment, however well deserved it might be in law and in justice.

42. At the time of the last incident, I summarized my position on the events of July 1966. My conclusions then were:

(a) If the air attack on Syria of 14 July is considered in isolation it undoubtedly constitutes an illegal aggressive act; (b) if that attack is linked to the repeated acts of sabotage by Syria on 12 and 13 July, the responsibility of the State of Israel is considerably mitigated in the light of a number of attenuating circumstances (such as emotional reaction, patriotic fury at the nation’s injury, claim to be exercising a legitimate right, reaction against recent acts of aggression and other unjust acts, injury to compatriots’ persons and property), especially if both the Syrian and Israel incidents are viewed against the background of hostility and hate which has prevailed in that region ...;
(c) it is obvious that reprisals cannot in any circumstances be recognized as a lawful instrument in international relations and that the illegal use of force constitutes a violation of the positive international law created in San Francisco. These reprisals are condemned in modern criminal law as ‘taking the law into one’s own hands’. They can be explained by the extenuating circumstances to which I referred previously, but they cannot be justified, for there are international organs empowered to intervene in the case of acts such as those which provoke the reaction of 14 July.” [1308th meeting, para.84]

43. This related to the July incidents. I then turned to the October complaints and analyzed certain statements by Syrian leaders, the gravity of which impressed me, as a man of law and as a member of the supreme body for the maintenance of collective peace and security. I spoke with some apprehension of those statements, which taken as a whole seemed to be the expression of a fully developed doctrine that advocated opposition to law and peace and preached the principle of the unlimited sovereignty of the State vis-a-vis the organs and instruments of the international community. However, I did not take a condemnatory attitude. I maintained the same realistic and humane position I had taken in connection with the mutual complaints in July. I appealed to the ambassadors of Syria and Israel, repeating the same words that had previously fallen on deaf ears. Overcoming my disappointment, I again spoke hopefully, saying to the obstinate contenders of Palestine that, instead of condemnation and punishment, the application of which might create a new source of dissidence, I should prefer the debate in the Council to be treated as a binding admonition to the parties to comply with the provisions of the Charter in their future conduct. Finally, I emphasized that both States must observe the Armistice Agreement of July 1949 and I gave a detailed commentary on its provisions, pointing out the repeated breaches of their duties and obligations under it. I did not, however, advocate any penalties. I simply addressed the representatives of Syria and Israel in the following terms:

“... it only remains for your Governments to fulfill the commitments which they undertook seventeen years ago in July 1949. There is no need for any new instrument; it would be superfluous. All that is needed is a new attitude to the fulfillment of old obligations. All that is necessary is a change in the minds of men, not further agreements, resolutions and judgements which would add nothing to the commitments already incurred. Even if such new instruments were adopted, they would remain a dead letter while those responsible for implementing them continued to be motivated by them continued to be motivated by the same spirit which has led them to leave their previous commitments unfulfilled. The latter have the same legal force and are just as relevant as in those distant days of 1949.” {Ibid., para. 104.]

44. The debate was followed by lengthy, arduous, trying and complex negotiations with a view to achieving a solution by consensus.

45. The valiant efforts of the representatives of Nigeria and Uganda, to whom I pay tribute, steadfastly overcame obstacle after obstacle, until the final stage was reached; and then, when success seemed certain, came frustration and failure.

46. I had the honor of taking an active part in those negotiations and of joining the other non-permanent members of the Council in the search for an impartial and constructive solution. In the face of certain counter-proposals which were unacceptable in terms of a consensus, I strongly advocated the formula of justice which reflected our approach. I remember having opposed certain amendments on the ground that they destroyed the balance on which the ideological and moral structure of a consensus depended. I was striving for a balanced text which would be the expression of an intellectual exercise, based on reason, logic, moderation and equity, and would take into account the moral values and realism expected of a body whose essential function is to preserve peace. I did not want a purely formal and insubstantial balance, amounting to no more than an exhibition of political gymnastics or dexterity akin to that displayed by circus acrobats on the slack wire while the audience applauds the artists’ fleeting cleverness, which yields no useful or practical result by the transient pleasure of an idle entertainment.

47. However, the Charter requirement that any solution must have the support of the five permanent members, as well as the non-permanent members, foundered the consensus, and on 3 November 1966 a draft resolution [S/7575/Rev.1] had to be submitted which, although it commanded a majority of ten votes, could likewise not be adopted because of the same provision of the Charter giving the great Powers a so-called veto. Accordingly, no resolution was adopted. The same occurred in August: lengthy debates, eloquent speeches, consultations with Governments, talks between permanent and non-permanent members, negotiations on a consensus, draft resolutions, expectation in the Council Chamber, expectation among the public, expectation throughout the world, and in the end: “Much ado about nothing”, like the eloquent title of Shakespeare’s comedy.

48. Are we following the right course? Are we fulfilling the duties imposed on us by the Charter as preservers of collective peace and security?

49. When I spoke in the General Assembly a few days ago on the question of South West Africa, contemplating the infuriating continuation of South Africa’s failure to comply with the mandate, the intolerable apartheid system and the passivity of the United Nations, I voiced some thoughts which come into my mind today when I see the impunity with which serious incidents constantly recur in Palestine. In reply to certain legal reservations, which were in any event quite without foundation, I said:

“Someone said that certain juridical aspects are lacking for the clarification of this point. In our view nothing is lacking. We are concerned, yes, with the possibility of perpetuating an omission or negligence by not acting immediately in legitimate defense of the interests of the international community.

“We are concerned about our passivity, when we ought to be active. We are concerned that the responsibilities inseparable from the work we are doing should be accepted. This is the only juridical and moral problem that we must solve without delay. We have waited over twenty years. Let us hope that moderation will not become the vice of weakness

“...“What is happening? The shadows of Geneva are looming over New York. Have we no faith in the effectiveness of the United Nations? Is prudence killing the concept of our own responsibility? Have we lost faith in ourselves?” 2/

50. The serious complaint by Jordan which we are considering raises those same painful issues that confronted us in our discussion of the case of South West Africa. Basically, of course, the answers must unanimous concurrence is no decision can be made, however hard we non-permanent members try. As Oppenheim says:

“The constitution of the Security Council, as shown in it composition, its competence and its voting procedure, is more than any other aspect of the Charter expressive of the present character of the United Nations as an agency for preserving peace rather than a comprehensive instrument for the government of the world. The basic political assumption-which must remain a subject of controversy-of the satisfactory working of the Security Council as constituted by the Charter is the continuing unity of action and purpose among the Great Powers who compose the permanent membership of the Council.” 3/

51. The report of the Committee of the Uruguayan Senate, in recommending parliamentary ratification of the San Francisco Charter, says of its Purposes:

“The Charter declares that the first and fundamental purpose of the organized community is to maintain international peace and security (Article 1, paragraph 1). This is the dominant and vital aim of the entire system: peace and security at any-or almost any-price. The whole document shows that, in fulfillment of that purpose, the Security Council is unquestionably the organization with power to maintain peace and security above all... The arrangements made for the Council show that the real problem of security decisively dominated the legal question of international community. The object was to create security through organized force...”

The parliamentary report goes on to say:

“Has the problem of security as a legal theory of power truly been solved? Will this unified power, in the form of organized force, prove effective in maintaining security? Our answer must be that genuine security is not security through force but security through law, not material security but legal security. States, like men, feel secure when they feel protected by law, not when they feel coerced by force. There is something else, however: within this framework of necessity and security, the five victorious Powers must act; indeed, they bear the responsibility for unity. If this unity is breached, the Organization collapses. Will unity be maintained? Unity will inevitably be the result of a combination of the world’s prudence with the political wisdom of the leaders of the Organization, since unity has to be maintained among five Powers of different geographical extent, with different interests and with different social structures. Of course, the Charter makes the fate of the Organization dependent on the unity of the five Powers before the five great Powers have achieved unity among themselves on the settlement of great conflicts of influence which are the legacy of war in a devastated world. Attlee has said: ‘Failure of the great Powers to understand one another and act together will mean the destruction of the Organization’.”

52. Professor Le Fur, of the University of Paris, speaking on the same subject, justifies the need for the unanimous vote of the five great Powers in these words:

“After all, let us bear in mind that if a decision had to be implemented, the great Powers would have to bear the brunt of the fighting. As they have greater obligations, it is natural that they should have special rights.”

53. Mr. Juan Andres Ramfrez, the eminent professor of constitutional law at the University of Montevideo, in his opinion on the San Francisco Charter which had been requested by the Senate, referred to the composition of the Security Council in the following terms:

“I accept as a fail accompli the predominant influence of the great Powers within the international community. It is a fact-a fact which we must accept, because otherwise, any effort to establish peace and law firmly throughout the world would fail. I may add that there is some justice in this situation, inasmuch as those who made the greatest expenditure of life and property for the freedom of all and who will also have to bear the greatest responsibility and the greatest sacrifice, should the ideal of peace based on law which is the supreme aspiration of mankind at this decisive moment of its history fail once again, undoubtedly have some right to be accepted, no, of course, as masters, but as leaders of the international community.”

54. These opinions, expressed in 1945, are clearly and strongly relevant to current events and show plainly that the international community founded at San Francisco undoubtedly wanted to be governed by principles of law but that, in view of the overriding political realities, it inevitably had to be erected on the old principle of the balance of power, as had happened in 16488 with the Peace of Westphalia, in 1713 with the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1815 with the Treaty of Vienna and in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles.

55. It is nevertheless true that the right of veto granted to the great Powers, which leaves the fate of the world to be settled, in the last resort, by force, was felt to be not a privilege but a sacred responsibility jointly assumed by the great Powers towards all the peoples of the earth.

56. It was so understood by the great mean of Latin America from the very beginning of United Nations operations.

57. Victor Andres Balaunde, a great jurist and a great man, described the tragic history of the liberum veto which led to the disintegration of Poland and vitiated the work of the League of Nations in many instances. Speaking for the Americas, he said:

“Being forced to choose between a Charter with the veto and failure of the Conference, between an Organization with defects and no Organization at all, the Peruvian delegation, following the scholastic maxim, could not but choose the lesser evil.”

He continued:

“The struggles and the debates had not been in vain. They gave the words in which the right of veto was expressed a deeper meaning. The great Powers had contracted a solemn moral obligation concerning its exercise. The smaller Powers interpreted what they had confessed, not as a privilege, but as a responsibility. The Peruvian delegation stated in Commission III that the historic debate had given the Article which was adopted moral significance. Thereafter one could not speak of a right of veto, but only of the obligation of unanimity. This is not a casuistical distinction. A veto may be imposed at the beginning of a debate, without taking account of the arguments, whereas the obligation to seek unanimity requires objective consideration of a problem, discussion of it in good faith, appraisal of proposals and a striving for reconciliation.” 4/

58. Peace in Palestine, the subject of the Council’s discussion, therefore depends primarily on the unanimous combined vote of the five great Powers in favor of a solution which also has the support of at least three non-permanent members. The efforts, arguments, energy and eloquence of fourteen members of the Council will be of no avail if their votes in support of a resolution do not include the votes of those Powers which bear on their shoulders the responsibility of maintaining and preserving equilibrium and peace in the new world that came into being after the Second World War.

59. We are once again confronted with a serious upheaval in the Middle East, the latest in the endless series of bloody conflicts which, since they cannot be ended by voluntary decision of the parties, place and important part of the world in serious peril.

60. Of course, we non-permanent members have our responsibility, and we are prepared to shoulder it with all the determination and energy which they circumstances require, but whatever we do will be doomed to frustration unless the unanimous support of the five permanent members is assured in advance.

61. My delegation holds that at this point the Council must state its position clearly and unequivocally, discharging its responsibilities under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter and fitting its action to the circumstances and characteristics of the case.

62. The fact that there was no resolution in connection with the last two incidents involving Palestine damaged the authority of the Council and had a definite bearing on the recurrence of the conflicts between Arabs and Israelis, who could act with impunity while the organ that should have restrained them remained inexplicably silent.

63. Two weeks ago, when voting on draft resolution S/757/Rev.1, I said that, although it did not embody all our views, it was the only positive measure likely to win the Council’s support, and I also said that failure to take a decision would be prejudicial to the prestige of the United Nations and could have deleterious

“We would have preferred a different text, but we cannot remain inert. We would not want to throw away our vote by supporting a draft resolution doomed to failure or by abstaining. We wish to make some contribution to the solution of this serious problem, even though that contribution may not perfectly reflect our thinking, and we make it in the higher interests of co-operation and harmony.”[1316th meeting, para. 77.]

64. We are prompted by the same motives today in considering the serious complaint which has been submitted by Jordan and amply confirmed by the report of the Armistice Commission read out by the Secretary-General [1320th meeting].

65. The facts speak for themselves: violation of Jordanian territory, tanks and military aircraft in a combined action, destruction of villages, homes in ruins, many lives lost, both civilian and military, and considerable material damage. What is the legal name for these events? I am not going to improvise any concepts. The tradition of Uruguay is very rich in this field. Even if we wanted to, we could not turn our backs on our country’s undeviating international conduct at congresses and conferences from 1889 until the San Francisco Charter, and including the Treaty of Versailles.

66. In the circumstances, it is very relevant to recall the position taken by Uruguay in September 1923 after the bombardment and occupation of the island of Corfu by Mussolini’s forces as an act of armed reprisal against Greece for the murder of members of an Italian military mission. The matter was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which decided to refer it to a special Commission of Jurists, under Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Covenant. 5/

67. Amid the vacillations of the legal doctrine of the time, Uruguay spoke through the person of the former professor of the University of Montevideo and President of the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations, Mr. Alberto Guani, who opposed Italy’s argument that armed reprisals were compatible with the provisions of the Covenant and proclaimed the clear and irrefutable principle, now prevailing in public international law, that any act of violence for the settlement of any dispute between States is juridically prescribed-the only correct interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles. To the argument that “reprisals carried out by a State in defense of its vital interests, as a way of putting a stop to unjust actions against it, are legitimate and justified by the supreme duty of all countries to ensure their national defense speedily”, the Uruguayan international lawyer, Mr. Guani, replied:

“None of the drafters or signers of the Covenant had any idea that the slightest possibility of the use of violence to settle disputes between peoples might be left open in the future. All the drafts on which the discussion of the Covenant was based are perfectly clear in that regard. President Wilson’s draft stated: ‘The signatory Powers will in no case resort to armed force.’ The draft of the French Ministerial Commission was no less explicit: ‘The League of Nations has as its aim to maintain peace by substituting Right for Might as the arbiter of disputes. It will thus guarantee to all States alike, whether small or great, the exercise of their sovereignty.’ The Italian delegation, in turn, proposed this wording: ‘Every action or attempted action constituting a curtailment of or menace to the political independence or territorial integrity of a State contradicts the principles upon which the League is founded. The Contradicting States undertake to abstain from every coercive act, one against the other’.” 6/

68. My compatriot, with his knowledge of the law of treaties, concludes by stating that, except in the circumstances provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant, the use of force must be considered abolished in contemporary international law, as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. In accordance with Article 16, war would be possible and legitimate only when waged “to protect the covenants” of the League itself. Article 12 of the Covenant imposes on Members a strict obligation to submit to a judicial procedure (judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council) all disputes, whether legal or political.

69. Uruguay has consistently conducted its relations with other States in keeping with these principles, which form the basis of our juridical culture.

70. In fact, long before the Covenant was drafted, Uruguay had a distinct international policy of favoring comprehensive arbitration for the settlement of disputes between States. This position, which was reflected in arbitration treaties concluded with Paraguay and El Salvador in 1883, was given added force early in the present century. Examples can be found in the following works: Sentido internacional del Uruguay, pp.40 and 45; Baltasar Brum, La doctrina de arbitraje amplio, 1945; Aureliano Rodriguez Larreta, Orientacion de la polftica internacional en America latina, vol.2, p. 106; Hector Gros Espiell, El Uruguay y la preservacion de la paz, p. 15. It is noteworthy, also, that at The Hague Conference of 1907 the Uruguayan statesman Jose Batlle y Ordonez proposed the preparation of an agreement which would impose arbitration as a necessary recourse in the settlement of international disputes.

71. Consistent with that policy, Uruguay concluded with Italy in 1914 the most comprehensive and radical treaty of arbitration ever signed until then. The message to Parliament concerning ratification of the treaty stated that “war must not be declared for any reason unless an offer of arbitration has first been made.” 7/

72. Thus, the repudiation of reprisals and the recognition of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes are incontrovertible principles of Uruguayan public law and a vital element of the culture of Uruguayans as a civilized, peace-loving and law-abiding people. This was our stand long before it was decided at San Francisco to condemn reprisals and abolish violence as a means of settling differences or disputes between States Members of the international community.

73. Our country’s position on such matters as aggression, violence and reprisals was not worked out today to fit the circumstances of today. It has a long history and stems from deep-rooted, firm convictions. As Professor Gros Espiell states in his book, El Uruguay y la preservacion de la paz:

“Perhaps in a few matters as in this-the affirmation of the principle of peace-is there such complete concordance between the conduct demanded by the constitutional system and the actual fact of a virtually undeviating tradition of international policy which moreover is upheld unanimously by public opinion.”

74. I should like lastly to refer to a paragraph in the Uruguayan Government’s reply of 27 February 1964, to a letter from Mr. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, which requires no comment. It reads:

“Anything that serves to reaffirm so basic a principle as the prohibition of the use of unlawful violence is of very special interest to those countries which, because of their size and their capabilities, rely on the prevalence of legal norms and of peaceful negotiation in the settlement of disputes and to those which, like Uruguay, have a long tradition of peaceful relations as called for in article 6 of its Constitution and in many treaties against war signed during the last forty years.”

75. A may be seen, a long, firm and unvarying line of conduct marks our position. We are inviting no new theories about acts which Uruguay has always condemned, no matter where they occur or who is responsible for them. Uruguay would be untrue to itself if it were to abandon this attitude. It would be like a man who had suddenly lost his memory and was slipping into incoherence, mental confusion or loss of self-control.

76. To abandon this position would also mean disregarding the obligations imposed by the Charter. Article 2 states:

“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

“All Member shall refrain in their international relations from the treat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence or any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.

“All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

“The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

77. An as we all know-although it may be well to recall it once again-the first paragraph of the Chapter on the Purposes and Principles of the Charter by which we are governed states:

“The Purposes of the United Nations are:

“1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”

78. Anyone who employs violence of any kind, anyone who does not use peaceful means, anyone who does not submit international disputes or situations in which he is involved to the competent organs of the United Nations is deliberately, by his own actions, placing himself outside the laws which govern the international community.

79. My delegation is not overlooking the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense which is allowed under Article 51 of the Charter if an attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. It is also aware of the authority which the Security Council has in such cases. However, the clear difference between a mere act of reprisal and the exercise of the right of self-defense is equally a part of its juridical understanding.

80. To sum up, the events of which Jordan complains are unlawful acts of aggression falling within the familiar concept of reprisals and, as such, repudiated by positive public international law. It s regrettable that a country like Israel, influenced possibly by the events which have been occurring in the area for some time, should have committed acts so grave as to place it outside the bound of international law.

81. The items are serious. Danger knocks at our door. We cannot fold our arms. Statutory obligations written into the United Nations Charter and contractual obligations sealed in the Armistice Agreements clearly lay down the duties of the Governments concerned.

82. Inaction on the part of the Council would be fatal to the future of the region involved and perhaps to world peace. The time has come for action. Upon the great Powers rests the essential responsibility of achieving unanimity among themselves.

83. Within the framework I have described, we shall support any just solution that may be reached with the indispensable concurrence of five votes required under Article 27 of the Charter. Mindful of our duty, we shall vote in favor of a proposal for peace under law which will promote the tranquillity and well-being of the Middle East while unequivocally condemning acts of reprisal, in accordance with the steadfast line of international conduct followed by my country. Without underestimating the deterrent effect of a sentence according to the theory of criminal law, we shall endeavor not to confine ourselves simply to an academic statement on the definition of the acts referred to in Jordan’s complaint, but shall go on to the study and elaboration of constructive proposals for strengthening, as far as necessary, the means, the powers and the resources of the United Nations agencies working at the very scene of the events, including the creation, if necessary, of other bodies with broader scope that might effectively perform the important functions for which ultimate responsibility rests with this Council, to which the international community has entrusted the supreme and sacred task of safeguarding world peace.

84. It is unnecessary to dwell on the authority of the Council. It has clear juridical duties, of course, but its prime and essential obligation is to maintain international peace and security. Article 23 and succeeding Articles of the Charter makes our duties and responsibilities perfectly clear. Any omission or negligence in that sphere could seriously jeopardize the very survival of the human race. The causes contributing to almost all major conflagrations have tended to lack focus, even when fed from below by old and deep-seated passions, vanities, interests and ambitions which come suddenly and unexpectedly to the surface. In the case of Palestine, the evil is apparent. It is our duty to extirpate it. No useful purpose would be served by a solemn judgement of condemnation unless it was accompanied by rational and practical solutions designed to eliminate the sources of unrest and tragedy in that part of the world.

85. In conclusion, I would quote a maxim of Sallust; Omnis homies, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira, atque misericodia vacuos esse decet (it is proper that all men who deliberate on contentious matters should be unswayed by hatred, friendship, anger and pity). I have tried to deal with Jordan’s complaint in this spirit of objectivity and impartiality, following the same line that I took on the Palestine question in the two previous cases. This did not, and does not, prevent me from viewing with great sympathy the Arab and Jewish peoples, to whom I now appeal, through their representatives, to set aside their animosities and ponder the wise counsel of Cicero in his Letters to Atticus: Vel iniquissimam pacem justissimo bellow anteferrem (I should prefer the most iniquitous peace to the most just war).

86. Since we have the United Nations, a body created to ensure peace among men despite ideological, racial, religious and other differences, it is no longer necessary to resort to the just war of which Cicero spoke, much less to unjust acts of violence which endanger collective peace and security.

87. Under the auspices of the United Nations, Arabs and Israelis must once and for all decide to tackle and resolve the real and deep-seated causes of their differences, co-operatively and constructively. We all know these causes, and they know them better than we.

88. The course is clear. It need only be taken. Do so, and you will receive the world’s help and God’s blessing.

89. Mr. COMAY (Israel): The representative of Jordan presumed to lecture me this morning about the way I present my Government’s views to this Council. Some of the interventions which the Council has heard in these weeks and months have been in deplorable taste and lacking in those standards of debate which this Council is entitled to expect. It is not my delegation which has been at fault in this regard. We have always tried to address the Council with dignity, restraint and factual integrity. Mr. El-Farra’s remarks are not presented to the right address.

90. Before proceeding any further, Mr. President, I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the letter which I presented to you this morning as President of the Council and which has been circulated as document S/7594. That letter makes certain factual observations on the report by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, which is attached to the Secretary-General’s report. I quote from it and may I say, before doing so, that it is not true that my delegation questions in any way the integrity of the United Nations staff in this matter.

“It appears from General Bull’s report that the account of the Israel action given in it is based on hearsay-namely, statements made after the event to the United Nations military observers, by Jordanian witnesses. These statements are for the most part exaggerated and inaccurate, either deliberately so or because f the confusion and embellishment which is natural under the circumstances. In order to dispel inflated and unreliable accounts regarding the nature and scope of the Israel action, my Government has authorized me to put the following facts on record:

“First, the sole objective of the Israel action was to demolish a limited number of empty houses, after their occupants had been evacuated. This was done as a warning against aiding and harboring saboteur and terrorist groups that had been carrying out a number of raids into Israel in that sector of the border. The number of houses demolished was far less than the number stated in the report.

“Secondly, the Israel troops were given strict instructions to take every precaution for the avoidance of casualties. The total civilian casualties, as confirmed by the Chief of Staff’s corrected report, were 3 killed and 17 injured. Of the latter, 20 suffered minor injuries, requiring only first aid, and returned home the same day. (Unfortunately, in the report as first distributed, the civilian casualty figure was given as 3 killed and 97 injured, owing to an error in transmission. This erroneous figure gained wide publicity.) It is not stated how or at what stage of the incident these casualties were caused, and at least part of them may have resulted from the military clash. Their number confirms that empty houses were demolished after their occupants had first been evacuated. It may be noted that according to the report the village had a population of 5,000, and 1,200 houses.”

I would merely like to interpolate here that if, in fact, we had been bombing, shelling and demolishing an occupied village, there would have been many hundreds of casualties, and not these figures.

“The main casualties occurred in an unexpected clash between the Israel task force and a Jordanian unit which rushed to the scene in fifteen to twenty trucks, and launched an attack. The Israel force disengaged itself and withdrew as soon as possible. The military casualties were 15 killed and 37 wounded (29 lightly) on the Jordan side, and 1 killed and 10 wounded on the Israel side. My Government deeply regrets all loss of life and injury that may have caused either to military personnel or to civilians.

“Thirdly, the number of Israel tanks used in the area of the incident was ten. None of them were Patton tanks.

“Fourthly, the total number of personnel involved was under 100.”-That is roughly 10 per cent, maybe, of a brigade group.-“Most of these men were needed to ensure evacuation of houses and prevention of casualties.

“Fifthly, there was no bombardment or strafing from the air. The sole intervention by Israel aircraft was by four planes that intercepted four Jordanian planes attempting to attack the Israel ground force. One of the Jordanian planes was shot down. No Israel plane fired at any ground target.

“Lastly, there was no artillery shelling.

“It is essential for the Security Council to have a correct factual appreciation of the 13 November action.

“My Government earnestly hopes that there may now be an end to violence and bloodshed of any kind. It appeals to the Governments of neighboring States to co-operate to this end in order to ensure a peaceful and undisturbed existence for the population on both sides of the border.”

91. I should now like to make some comments on the statement made this morning by the representative of Jordan, and on the kind of decision he wants. He calls for a harsh, one-sided and threatening resolution by this Council; such a resolution would be out of place and lacking in any sense of proportion or equity. The Israel action, whether members of the Council deplore it or not, did not take place in any vacuum. The Council is familiar with the background, especially the long sequence of armed raids into Israel from the territory of neighboring States causing serious loss of life, injury to persons, damage to property, dynamiting of homes, mining of roads, derailing of trains, disruption of normal civilian life and conditions of great danger and insecurity for the peaceful inhabitants of our exposed border villages.

92. Behind these attacks is the contention of Arab Governments that they are in a state of war with Israel-a Member State of this Organization. That policy is expressed in open threats to our independence and territorial integrity, in open military preparations, in blockades and boycotts, and in armed attack upon our civilian population in pursuance of what is called “a people’s war”. This is the cause of the tension in the area, and goes to the root of the situation facing the Council. That situation involves three converging responsibilities: that of the Arab Governments, that of Israel, and that of the United Nations. First, there is the responsibility of Arab Governments, including Jordan, to prevent their territory from being used for armed attack against a neighboring State; that responsibility is derived from the Charter and specified in clear terms in the Armistice Agreements. None of the Governments concerned can evade that responsibility, and to it my Government must firmly hold the Government of Jordan and the other Governments concerned. We regard this as a commitment not only to the United Nations, but a direct commitment to Israel contained in formal instruments signed by the Governments concerned. Secondly, there is the responsibility of the Government of Israel to defend its citizens, its territory and its borders against armed attack. That responsibility too is inescapable, and not less so in the case of a small Member State which had lived for eighteen years in a state of siege, with all its land frontiers cut off by hostile and threatening neighbors that deny its right to exist. NO United Nations machinery is a substitute for the right and duty of a nation to defend itself against attack and aggression. And, thirdly, there is the responsibility of the United Nations itself, and especially of the organ charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. Israel looks to this Council to be even-handed and analytical in the discharge of its burdensome responsibilities. My countrymen cannot but note with a heavy heart that no Arab Government was ever condemned for the war against use in 1948 and 1949-a war which the Arab leaders declare to be unfinished business today. This Council has not reacted to the open threat against our independence and integrity. On those occasions when the majority of the Council wished to take some action on an Israel complaint, such action was killed by a veto. For fifteen years, no single resolution unacceptable to the Arab party has been permitted to pass through this Council. I know these facts are distressing to many peace-loving Governments and sincere men who have served and now serve on this Council; but they are facts, they are not irrelevant or diversionary matter and they form the background and the perspective for this present debate.

93. For what is the Council now being pressed to do by the representative of Jordan? It is told to condemn harshly an action by a Government, but to shut its eyes to the reasons for the action. It is told to deal with an incident, but not with the situation of which that incident is a symptom. It is told to address itself to one party in the dispute, in terms of condemnation and treat, without recognizing that the party in the over-all picture is the target of aggressive policies and not its source, and is actually under physical attack from its neighbors. The Council must ask itself whether this is really the way to preserve peace and to reduce tension in the troubled Middle East. Of course, that is the way advocated by the representative of Jordan, and I do not blame him; he speaks not as a Council member, but as a party to a dispute before the Council. In fact, he is required by Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter to abstain from voting in this matter. But what about those other members of the Council who are deeply conscious of their responsibility for peace and who are less interested in judgements than in stability? They have made clear that they do not condone the Israel action of 13 November; but does that bind them to wipe out of their minds what they know about the attacks on Israel? Does it commit them to refuse to note the underlying causes of tension-to reject all elements of restraint or balance in the formulation of a draft resolution? Such an attitude by the Council would be inconceivable to the people of Israel and to their elected Government which must ensure their safety.

94. Such approach would not stabilize the situation in the region. It would not reduce tension. It would not promote that degree of co-operation which is essential to peace-loving.

95. My delegation craves the indulgence of the Council in putting before it, in such candid terms, the position of my Government and the way in which my people now see this matter. What is involved in this discussion is extremely serious by all accounts. What we seek above all is a chance to live in freedom from fear of attack. It is out earnest hope that any action the Council may take will be related to the situation as a whole and as it is, and that such action will have a calming effect. We believe that Jordan and Israel have a fundamental common interest in keeping our border areas peaceful and unmolested, and the way should be left clear for progress in this direction with the help and encouragement of the Security Council and of all peace-loving Governments represented on this Council.

96. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I realize that the hour is late, and I will not oblige my friends and colleagues around this table to sit here and listen to my answer. I shall have time to answer this afternoon. I should simply like to make a request. I request formally that a map showing the topography of the area be circulated in this Council. I shall demonstrate that the question is not one of a village being the base for certain activities-but on this I shall have more to say later-because the report gives all the information but this information, standing alone, is not helpful unless we have this map. That is my first point.

97. Mr. Comay spoke about dignity and restraint. I do not think he is qualified even to mention these. I do not think the United Nations charge of committing acts of lawlessness entitled him to use these terms in this respectable body. He referred to hearsay evidence, but most of the information and facts upon which we rely are facts embodied in the report based on things which the observers did see. I will just cite one example. Look at paragraph 10, which tells us that the investigating United Nations military observers saw “125 houses, the village medical clinic, a 6-classroom school and a workshop had been completely demolished”. This is not hearsay. They did go to the area. They did see the area. They did examine the houses. They did report to the Council concerning these houses. Is this hearsay evidence? I shall have more to day on this question later on.

98. The other question raised is the question of the Jordan Army rushing to the attack, when actually they were defending their helpless civilian citizens. Is he entitled to refer to this as an attack? I leave it to the wisdom of the Council to evaluate the statement that the Council has just heard.

99. As I have said, the hour is late. It is not my intention to detain my colleagues here. I shall speak later.

100. The PRESIDENT: Mr. El-Farra has requested that a topographical map be made available, and if there is no objection o that part of the members of the Council we will ask the Secretary-General if such a map is available, and if it is we shall have it here for the consideration of the Council.

It was so decided.

101. My list of speakers for this meeting is not exhausted, but in view of the hour, and of the fact that our colleague from Bulgaria, who was scheduled to speak even earlier, has kindly agreed to defer his statement until this afternoon in the interest of our convenience. I have consulted the members of the Council and, if there is no objection, we shall now adjourn and reconvene at 4.30 this afternoon.
The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1446th meeting, paras. 12888, 129 and 137.

3/ Oppenheim, International Law-A Treatise, 88th ed. (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), vol.1

4/ Veinte Anos de Nsciones Unidos, (Madrid, Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1966), p. 16.
repercussions in the area concerned. In concluding, I said:

5/ See Charles de Visscher, Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, (Paris, A. Pedone, 1924), Series 3, vol.5, pp.213

6/ See Revue generale de droit international public, (Paris, A. Pedone, 1924), vol. XXXI, p.290.

6/ See Revue generale de droit international public, (Paris, A. Pedone, 1924), vol. XXXI, p.290.

7/ Roberto B. Giudice por Efrain Gonzalez Conzi, Battle y el Batllismo, (Montevideo, Editorial Medina, 1959), p.341



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