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        Security Council
29 February 1984

Thirty-ninth year
Official Records

2519th Meeting
Held in New York on Wednesday, 29 February 1984, at 3 p.m.


Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2519) 1

Adoption of the agenda 1

The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 14 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16339) 1


Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/...) are normally published in quarterly Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

President: Mr. S. Shah NAWAZ (Pakistan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2519)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the Middle East:
Letter dated 14 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16339)

The meeting was called to order at 4.00 p.m.
Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:
Letter dated 14 February 1984 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16339)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [2514th and 2416th meetings], I invite the representative of Lebanon to take a place at the Council table, and the representatives of Italy and Senegal to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Fakhoury (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table, and Mr. Jannuzzi (Italy) and Mr. Sarre (Senegal) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them document S/16351/Rev.2, which contains the text of the revised draft resolution submitted by France.

3. Mr. de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France) [interpretation from French]: I asked to speak once again merely to introduce draft resolution S/16351/Rev.2, submitted by the French delegation, on which we shall be voting this afternoon.

4. Need I recall the tragic character of the situation prevailing in Lebanon, and in particular in the Beirut area? The sufferings of the civilian populations and the constant threat to peace and security in that region posed by the violence make it necessary for the international community to shoulder its responsibilities.

5. As everyone here knows, France has always worked in favour of international action on this matter. We have always wanted the United Nations to take its proper place and to play its proper role in helping to bring peace and reconciliation to that troubled country. That was the case when the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created-a force in which my country was the first to take part and is today its main troop contributor. That was also the case when we officially made known, in responding to the request of the Lebanese Government to take part in the multinational force, that we should have preferred a United Nations force. Subsequently, on several occasions the French authorities entered into bilateral and multilateral contacts in an attempt to replace the multinational force with a United Nations presence.

6. Today the conditions that prevailed when that force was established have drastically changed, and the situation in the Beirut area has further worsened. That is why France now proposes to the Council that it should assume its responsibilities by deciding to substitute a United Nations presence for the multinational force.

7. The draft resolution before the Council is the outcome of painstaking, determined efforts. It takes into account to the fullest extent possible the concerns expressed on all sides. Although France is submitting the draft text, it is, as everyone knows, principally the outcome of long work carried out in the main jointly with all those in the Council who believe, as we do, in the paramount role that the United Nations must play in achieving an end to violence and a decrease of tension, in order to help bring about reconciliation and peace. I do not hesitate to say that the draft resolution is just as much their work as it is ours.

8. We are aware that the adoption of that draft resolution would be merely one stage in carrying out the task that we must assume to achieve peace and reconciliation, but it is a necessary step.

9. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) [interpretation from Russian]: Although it is the last day of February, allow me, Sir, to welcome you to the lofty post of President, of the Council. Your diplomatic abilities and skill are helping us to solve the problems that the Council has been considering this month.

10. I also pay a tribute to your predecessor, the representative of Nicaragua, Mr. Chamorro Mora, for the very tactful and competent guidance he provided for the Council's work in January.

11. Once again the Council's agenda has on it the question of the situation in Lebanon. Those of us who were here during the tragic events which took place in the summer of 1982 as a result of the massive Israeli aggression against that small country remember what deprivations and trials were suffered by the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. Many people still have fresh in their minds the pictures of death and destruction brought by war to Lebanese territory, the massive bombardments and artillery sieges that the occupiers systematically carried out against the besieged capital of Lebanon and the barbaric massacre of the defenceless refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps.

12. Literally from the very first hours of that aggression, the Council clearly and quite unambiguously demanded that Israel put an end to it. In resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), both of which the Council adopted unanimously, the substantial basis was laid for a subsequent settlement in Lebanon through the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from that country of Israeli forces and the ending of military actions on Lebanese territory.

13. For well-known reasons, those resolutions were not implemented. Under cover of a strategic alliance with Washington, Tel Aviv brazenly ignored the demands of the Council, and, by the way, it thereby unceremoniously trampled upon its own direct obligations under the Charter. The ink on those Council resolutions had not yet dried when Israel, and right after it the United States, competed with each other in affirming that those fundamental documents were obsolete, that they had been overtaken by events and that therefore, so to speak, they had become inappropriate.

14. A year and a half has passed since then, but the situation in Lebanon continues to be extremely complicated and tense. The Israeli occupiers continue to dominate the southern part of the country, where, by all accounts, they intend to dig in for a long time. Israeli aircraft are again bombing Lebanese cities and towns.

15. Some people in Washington then found it propitious to set up operations in Lebanon and to include it within the "sphere of vital interests" of the United States. That precisely was the long-term calculation that dictated the decision to deploy on Lebanese territory the so-called multinational force whose back-bone was the United States Marines supported by an entire armada of ships from the United States Sixth Fleet. Sparing no efforts, Washington sent untold numbers of emissaries to the Middle East, who, to the accompaniment of loud statements about progress towards peace in concert with their Israeli protegés, imposed upon the Lebanese a servile agreement that: essentially would have turned Lebanon into an American-Israeli protectorate.

16. From the very outset the Soviet Union vigorously warned of the dangerous consequences of interference from overseas, and especially of deployment of a multinational force in Lebanon. That prediction turned out to be true. The presence of the multinational force in Lebanese territory not only did not help normalize the situation in Lebanon, as Washington had self-confidently affirmed in the past; but, on the contrary, it further worsened the danger facing the Lebanese people and Government.

17. Events in recent months could not better serve to illustrate that fact. Having dropped the pretence of being peacemakers, the United States Marines and the ships of the Sixth Fleet dropped on Lebanon hundreds of tons of bombs and shells in an attempt to dictate to the Lebanese how they should arrange their own internal affairs. According to the American press, starting on 8 September, American ships in Lebanon fired more than 300 shells from 16-inch guns and more than 1300 shells from 5-inch guns. They also dropped high-explosive and cluster bombs from aircraft. One can imagine how many victims there were among the peaceful civilian population as a result.

18. Quite rightly, the American-Israeli intervention was decisively rebuffed by Lebanese patriots and by other national patriotic forces in the Arab world: Thanks primarily to their firmness and courage, Washington's efforts to carry out a "rescue mission" and to put a breach in the Arab ranks clearly failed.

19. In connection with the recent statements of official United States representatives to the effect that the United States has supposedly always advocated the sending of United Nations forces to Lebanon, and virtually against its will went ahead with the emplacement of the multinational force in that country, I should like to recall the following facts.

20. As long ago as July 1982-that is, at the peak of Israeli aggression against Lebanon-the Soviet Union put forward a proposal that the use of UNIFIL contingents in the region of the Lebanese capital be considered. The United States did not respond to that proposal. In September 1982, after a barbaric massacre of defenceless Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila camps, almost all the members of the Council, including the Soviet Union, were prepared to take a decision on the immediate sending of United Nations forces to Beirut. Nevertheless, such a decision was frustrated precisely by the United States, which preferred to send to Lebanon Marines and military contingents of their partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In subsequent months, highly placed representatives of the United States Administration, including the Secretary of State, repeatedly made statements to the effect that they saw no possible role for the United Nations in Lebanon.

21. Those are the facts that today some would prefer to forget, and they now are vigorously showing their renewed loyalty to the United Nations.

22. Now great efforts are needed to clear away the obstruction caused by Israeli aggression and foreign intervention in Lebanon so that the Lebanese can themselves solve their internal problems without interference from outside. In that regard, what is mainly necessary is to ensure implementation of the fundamental resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and to bring about an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory. No one has cancelled those resolutions; they must be implemented. It is also necessary that the United States end its crude military blackmail of Lebanon, its barbaric firing from the ships of the Sixth fleet. Its ships and the other foreign military fleets should be removed from the Lebanese coast.

23. But the opposite is happening. Even now, after the so-called redeployment of American Marines to their ships, almost not a day goes by when the United States fails to continue strikes against Lebanon-and, by the way, the United States does not even make much effort to come up with pretexts. Things have reached the point where the President of the United States, at his press conference on 22 February of this year, stated for all to hear that it is enough for one shell to fall-perhaps even accidentally, perhaps a shell fired by some unknown person from some unknown place against any American institution in Beirut for the large-calibre artillery of the battleship New Jersey to again be brought into action. If we were to follow the logic of this doctrine, if I may call it that, then after the explosions on the grounds of the residence at the Soviet Mission here, the United States Administration should have acknowledged that the Soviet Union had a right to bombard New York. The absurdity of such an approach is quite obvious. As was stated on 27 February by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko: "No objective observer would believe that one could blast one's way out of this impasse with the artillery of United States battleships or the military interference of the Marines."

24. Today, we again confirm that the real settlement for the situation in Lebanon should be achieved not by separate deals and arm-twisting but, rather, on the basis of a strict and unswerving implementation of the relevant United Nations decisions, for which the United States representative also voted in the Security Council. That is precisely the approach which was dictated by the position of the Soviet delegation in the Council when we considered the proposal to send United Nations forces to Beirut. From the very outset of the consultations on that question we clearly stated that we were prepared for a constructive discussion of this proposal, on the understanding that the important and necessary conditions be established so as to have the operation take place. Among such conditions, over and above withdrawal from Beirut of the multinational force, are of course the need to withdraw foreign warships from the Lebanese coast and to have guarantees that there would be no resumption of artillery fire, air strikes or any other interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon by the multinational force.

25. In spite of the Soviet delegation's great demonstrated flexibility and the statement that we were ready to seek a mutually acceptable solution to the key questions, during the course of the work on the draft resolution it became quite clear that some members of the Council did not wish to assume the responsibility not to resume interference in Lebanon. The draft resolution contains other unacceptable or ambiguous wording -for example, that relating to the mandate of the United Nations forces in Beirut and so on. And, although we favoured continuing consultations on this, it was finally introduced in the Council without any further consideration of our position in order to force a vote. Thus the work in the Council on this draft resolution to which many members have contributed was broken off owing to the unseemly manoeuvres of Western delegations, which bear full responsibility for this.

26. The Soviet delegation expresses its regret at such an outcome to the consideration of this question in the Council. There was an opportunity to achieve a positive outcome. In its present form, owing to the reasons that I have mentioned, this draft resolution is unacceptable, and the Soviet delegation will vote against it.

27. In conclusion, we should like to emphasize that we have great sympathy for the Lebanese, whose fate has included such harsh sufferings and deprivations. We support the constructive efforts to bring about a quick completion of the dialogue and national reconciliation among the various Lebanese groups and express our firm hope that those efforts will lead to the restoration of the unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, which as a full-fledged member of the international community will make its contribution to the strengthening of peace and security in the Middle East and throughout the entire world.

28. The PRESIDENT: It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the revised draft resolution submitted by France [S/16351/Rev.2]. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put it to the vote now.

29. First, I shall call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

30. Mr. KHALIL (Egypt) [interpretation from Arabic]: Egypt has supported the French initiative from its very inception and since France has proposed the replacement of the multinational force with United Nations forces in Lebanon. This idea has now been crystallized in a draft resolution, introduced in the Council moments ago by the representative of France. As a matter of fact, our support is based on a number of important considerations.

31. First, the international community has a clear responsibility to avoid a dangerous vacuum in Lebanon following the total withdrawal of the Multinational Force-a vacuum which on the humanitarian level may lead to more tragedies for the Lebanese people, especially the defenceless civilians, and for the refugees, including the Palestinian refugee camps, which are insufficiently protected following the withdrawal of the Italian forces.

32. Secondly, the draft resolution also stresses the importance of preserving the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. That is a basic principle to which Egypt adheres, advocates and will always defend.

33. Thirdly, the draft resolution also calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. That is a principle which the Council cannot but support. At the same time, we would have preferred a clearer and stronger wording on this point in the draft resolution, especially requesting the unconditional, immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory, as the Council has previously requested. Despite the fact that the paragraph on this point does not mention that clearly, that is our understanding of the paragraph concerned.

34. Fourthly, despite the fact that today we are not discussing the whole Lebanese issue, at the same time the draft resolution does not ignore the very important necessity of initiating the national reconciliation dialogue among all the Lebanese factions. The positive result of such a dialogue is an indispensable basis for Lebanon's peace and security. There is no doubt that we all hope for a sincere response to the Council's appeal to cease hostilities and achieve a cease-fire not only in Beirut but also in all of Lebanon.

35. The situation in which Lebanon exists today -with all which that implies in dangerous threats that may have repercussions on peace and security in the region, as well as a threat to Lebanon and its territorial integrity-is the strongest justification for a United Nations presence and support for the role which could be played by the Organization in Lebanon.

36. As a non-aligned Arab country, Egypt, which is linked to Lebanon with the best possible relations, has, like other States, participated objectively in the rather difficult consultations on this draft resolution. We have played our part and we are proud of it, despite the disappointment we may feel in a few minutes.

37. Given all these elements I have put before the Council, and stemming from Egypt's strong belief in the constructive role the United Nations and the Security Council, in particular, must play, Egypt will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by France.

38. Mr. KI (Upper Volta) [interpretation from French]: When we began work in the Council on the situation in the Beirut area a few weeks ago, my delegation had the firm and strong conviction that the Council could and had to contribute to the restoration of peace not only in the capital of Lebanon, which had been so shaken and sorely tried and tested, but also throughout the entire country. As we see it, the Council is seized of a sensitive and complex problem whose sole lasting and realistic solution must be sought in the more comprehensive context of Lebanon as a whole. Otherwise we would be seeking to put out a fire without concern for its source; we would be applying partial solutions whose sole merit would be to delay more serious explosions that would affect the peace and security of the region.

39. Also, we are not losing sight of the fact that the situation in Beirut is but one component in the broader problem in the Middle East, the centrepiece of which remains the Palestinian problem. We are convinced that, as long as the Palestinian people, which has so long been without a country, is not given its right to self-determination and to a homeland, and continues to be tossed about at the whim of various Powers, that part of the world will not enjoy peace.

40. As far as we are concerned, the difficulties at present existing in Lebanon stem also directly from outside interference and the will of outside Powers to control that country. We believe that the Lebanese people knows where its interests lay and must be the sole judge of its own destiny. It is a mature people which is able to settle its problems without any outside interference. Therefore we deem inadmissible the pres­ence on Lebanese soil of Israeli occupation troops in the south, as well as of the so-called multinational force in Beirut and Lebanese territorial waters. Hence, all foreign troops, whatever they may be, must withdraw from that country. We continue to believe that only the immediate withdrawal of those forces and strict respect for the territorial integrity, unity, national sovereignty and independence of Lebanon can create conditions favourable to reconciliation of all the people of the country, something that is indeed necessary. And for us, it is the duty of the Council to hasten the restoration of peace in Lebanon and to help alleviate the suffering of its civilian population, including the Palestinian refugees.

41. Throughout the consultations we said that for our part we were ready to go along with any initiative that might lead us to that goal. This is why we viewed favourably the French proposal designed to ask the Council to send to Lebanon a United Nations force entrusted with the maintenance of peace.

42. The draft resolution before us is the outcome of serious and earnest negotiations. We ourselves made a contribution to those negotiations within the non-aligned group. Some of the views that we expressed in private consultations along with other members of the Council have been taken into consideration. We would, of course, have wanted other points, such as the withdrawal of all foreign troops and agreement by all parties concerned, to be better spelled out. But, in an effort at conciliation and in order to act quickly for the benefit of the Lebanese population and the Palestinian refugees, my delegation is ready to accept this text, and we shall therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution.

43. Mr. KRISHNAN (India): I have already had occasion to felicitate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I should only like to reiterate my appreciation for the patience and skill with which you have guided our consultations.

44. The Council is once again debating the serious and explosive situation in Lebanon, this time the sharp escalation in violence and bloodshed that has engulfed the Beirut area. It is indeed appropriate that the Security Council, entrusted under the Charter with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should take upon itself the task of finding ways and means of alleviating this serious situation, which could have wider repercussions for peace and stability in the region as a whole.

45. The Council has in the past adopted various resolutions seeking to bring about an immediate end to the fighting in this war-torn hapless country and demanding that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon. Unfortunately, those resolutions have remained unimplemented.

46. The continuing conflict in the Middle East remains the most serious threat to peace. The tragedy in Lebanon is but one symptom of the malaise that has caused untold suffering for thousands of innocent people of that country. Any solution of the problem of Lebanon cannot be divorced from our search for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East which must be based on the exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national and human rights.

47. In June 1982, the international community was pained and shocked by the blatant Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the brutal atrocities committed by Israel against the civilian population. The invasion was undertaken on the alleged ground of self-preservation and security. Under the pretext of protecting its own civilians, a large number of innocent men, women and children in Lebanon were mercilessly killed. The invasion was obviously a part of Israel's calculated policy to achieve a systematic decimation of the Palestinian people and a complete erosion of the independence and sovereignty of the neighbouring State of Lebanon. For these acts of Israel, the innocent people of Lebanon have paid a heavy price.

48. The Government and people of India have been profoundly anguished over these tragic events. The Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, has given utterance to our sorrow and concern on a number of occasions in our Parliament as well as elsewhere, including in the General Assembly when she addressed it in the autumn of last year. 1/

49. Recent developments have resulted in a sharp escalation of tension and conflict in Lebanon. The cur-rent crisis in Beirut beginning early this month was the culmination of this deepening tragedy.

50. This is not the occasion nor the time to dwell on the circumstances in which the multinational force came to find itself in Lebanon. However, events have demonstrated beyond any doubt that the position of the multinational force was untenable and that its continued presence could only further aggravate tension and conflict. It became necessary therefore for the Council to consider the action to be taken by the United Nations to fill the vacuum in the Beirut area following the withdrawal of the multinational force and to bring a healing touch to the area.

51. Against this background we have viewed with great sympathy the current efforts in the Council initiated at the request of France, whose initiative we welcomed, to establish a United Nations presence in Lebanon, upon the withdrawal of the multinational force. In our consultations with the French delegation, as well as with other delegations, we have insisted that while concentrating on the current crisis in Beirut we should nevertheless bear in mind the larger perspective of the problem of Lebanon as a whole, as well as the continuing impasse in the Middle East. We were also anxious to ensure that the objective of the United Nations force should be clear and that its mandate should be precisely defined before it was deployed. It was also essential, in our judgement, to see some evidence of a genuine process of national reconciliation in Lebanon. The people of Lebanon, who have suffered so much for so long, should have the opportunity to find harmony, peace and stability, free from all foreign interference.

52. Throughout our deliberations-lasting, I believe, over nearly three weeks-we have endeavoured, along with other non-aligned countries members of the Council, to contribute towards evolving a draft resolution that would be acceptable to all, or at least have the acquiescence of all, members of the Council. Clearly, any draft resolution to be meaningful and effective must have the concurrence of all members of the Council and the parties concerned.

53. With a view to contributing towards a positive outcome of our efforts, my delegation, together with a number of non-aligned countries members of the Council, made several suggestions to improve the original text put forward by France. It is a matter of deep satisfaction to us that the delegation of France has shown a spirit of co-operation and displayed flexibility and has incorporated most of those suggestions. I should like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the representative of France for this.

54. We would have wished that the Council had had a little more time to resolve some remaining problems. We are aware of the urgency of the situation and the necessity for early Council action. Even so, a few more hours spent in an effort to solve these remaining problems would not have been time ill spent. My delegation regrets that, unfortunately, this has not been possible.

55. Notwithstanding what I have just said, in our judgement the revised text has been substantially improved and is sufficiently balanced to meet most -though not all, as was abundantly clear from an earlier statement that we heard in the Council-of the concerns which have been expressed in the course of our consultations. For example, as far as India is concerned, my delegation would have strongly preferred the inclusion of a preambular paragraph reiterating the demand for the withdrawal of Israeli forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon in implementation of resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982). We believe the omission of such a preambular paragraph is a serious lacuna in the draft text.

56. My delegation is aware of the concerns which are not fully met by the present draft resolution. None the less, it is our belief that it represents a sufficiently broad and acceptable framework of essential elements and provides a reasonable basis for the Council to take the initial step towards the constitution of a United Nations force. Naturally, when the report of the Secretary-General is received, as required under operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution-that is, if the draft resolution is adopted-remaining ambiguities should be cleared before the Council takes action to authorize the deployment of the force.

57. Guided by the considerations that I have just stated, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.

58. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): Sir, I suppose it cannot occur too often for a President to be congratulated on the last day of February in a leap year. I sincerely congratulate you, Sir, today, in great recognition of your sterling service in this prolonged and rather troubled month.

59. We are all aware of the tragic events which are taking place in Lebanon and there is no need for me to repeat our own concern in detail on this occasion. We have been asked today to vote on a draft resolution which attempts resolutely and effectively to address that tragic situation and which, if adopted, would constitute a necessary step towards restoring in that country the peace and stability that are so necessary to augment the prospects for a positive outcome to the current dialogue of national reconciliation.

60. From the very beginning of this exercise, the overriding concern of my delegation has been to produce a text which would be adopted by consensus or at least without a negative vote. The road has been long and arduous, thus necessarily slow; we are happy to note, however, that the present draft resolution takes into account most of the concerns expressed by my delegation. In consequence, our thanks go to the French delegation, and in particular to Mr. Luc de La Bane de Nanteuil, for the patience and understanding shown throughout the whole process.

61. I must say, however, that we would have liked to have had a little more time to see if we could have achieved an even more comprehensive text. We firmly believe that we were moving in the right direction and that the target was in fact well in sight. We believe, in particular, that we would have benefited further from a more accurate knowledge of the high-level talks taking place at Damascus today on an important element very relevant to this subject.

62. Having said that, and in the present circumstances, we still feel that we should support the draft resolution, looking less at the tragic past and more to the future.

63. At the same time, even if the exercise is interrupted today, we wish to make a public appeal to all concerned eventually to respond positively and to extend full respect and support to the task being contemplated for United Nations personnel, whatever its final outcome, so that if and when they undertake their assignment full safeguards will be given to those persons dedicated to the preservation of peace, to the ideals of the United Nations and to ensuring the re-emergence of Lebanon as a free, independent nation at peace within itself and with all its neighbours. This in itself would be a step towards restoring a broader peace in the Middle East after the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people have finally been recognized by all, so many agonizing years after they have appealed to the United Nations for assistance in a peaceful approach. The complexity of these tasks should not daunt us. Our collective efforts must continue and intensify in the future.

64. Mr. ICAZA GALLARD (Nicaragua) [interpretation from Spanish]: We have before us a draft resolution which is the result of arduous work by the members of the Council. From the outset we welcomed the French initiative with interest, and many of the suggestions made by the non-aligned countries were designed to ensure that this initiative had all the guarantees necessary for useful and effective participation by the United Nations in regard to this problem. We acknowledge the efforts made by the French delegation to meet these concerns.

65. We cannot forget that Lebanon continues to be under fire and bombardment and that part of its sovereign territory remains under the occupation of Israeli forces. We are also aware that with some additional effort it might have been possible to obtain a better outcome for this draft resolution. Nevertheless, we feel that the efforts we have made have not been in vain, for we have been guided solely by the interests of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, to which we belong, the interests of peace in that tormented region of the world and our belief in the ability of the United Nations and the Security Council to carry out their work.

66. The results as expressed in the draft resolution before us are not perfect, but we feel that they could contribute to an improvement of the situation in Lebanon. For that reason, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

67. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): The United States wishes to affirm in this public meeting our high regard for the careful manner in which you, Sir, have conducted the affairs of the Council during this month of your presidency, and also our respect for the manner in which the French representative has pursued, with both patience and skill, the effort to achieve a draft resolution today that might provide a new element of peace in the tragic Lebanese situation.

68. The United States will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us, and will do so as part of a long-standing, continuing effort to help to re-establish and reinforce the peace necessary for the restoration of the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. We shall vote in favour of the draft resolution because we hoped that it would contribute to ending the violence that maims and kills, without regard to age, role, religion or social condition, its Lebanese targets. The United States will vote in favour of the draft resolution because we hoped and expected that it might contribute to the protection of Lebanon's civilian population: Palestinian, Druse, Shiite, Sunni; Muslims and Christians of all varieties-that is, of all Lebanese people. These have been the goals of United States policy and they remain the goals of United States policy.

69. We have understood from the beginning of the whole tragic series of problems in Lebanon that international co-operation would be necessary to the restoration of peace and sovereignty in that country. To that end, the United States has encouraged and participated in international efforts to reinforce peace and self-government in Lebanon. We have worked in the United Nations and outside it, joining in successive resolutions, supporting existing deployments and advocating much broader deployments of United Nations observers, seeking an enhanced United Nations role, for many months. We have worked outside the United Nations, alone and with others, to assist the Government of Lebanon to reinforce its peace and consolidate its authority to exercise its sovereign control over its own territory. To these ends, we have participated in the multinational force, which was created because of the unavailability at the time of a United Nations force for that purpose.

70. The United States has paid a high price for its efforts on behalf of Lebanon. Our Embassy was bombed; many Americans and others were killed in that bombing. Nearly 300 young American Marines, in Lebanon precisely for purposes of peace-keeping, were murdered as they slept.

71. Major obstacles have been placed in the way of Lebanon's unity, sovereignty and peace. It is unfortunate to learn today that more obstacles will now be placed in the way of serious efforts to reinforce and enhance Lebanon's unity, sovereignty and peace. There has been less clarity than desired in much of the public discussion about the nature of these obstacles. Again and again one reads and hears that the terrible violence in Lebanon of the past weeks is the nearly inevitable consequence of Lebanon's tribal and confessional heterogeneity, of the tradition of rivalry and hostility among Lebanon's traditionally warring groups. We have read and heard here today a great deal more about the internecine tribal, confessional conflicts and about the presence of Israeli troops in the south than we have read and heard about the more than 50,000 Syrian troops and Palestinian and Iranian and other associates in Lebanon. We have heard much less about the systematic use of violence-violence systematically encouraged from outside Lebanon for the purpose precisely of preventing unity, sovereignty, and peace in Lebanon.

72. Turning now to the draft resolution, the United States would like to comment that the establishment of a peace-keeping force of the sort foreseen in it would, if it were to be constituted, stand in a long and distinguished record of United Nations peace-keeping efforts. Beginning in 1948 with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Military Observers in Kashmir, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, in 1958, and the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United Nations Operation in the Congo, United Nations peace-keeping forces have proven to be an important adjunct to carrying out the primary purposes of the Charter. It is never untimely to remind ourselves of those primary purposes of the Charter. They are, of course, the maintenance of international peace and security, the maintenance of national sovereignty and independence, the maintenance of territorial integrity of Member States and the alleviation of massive suffering and the protection of fundamental human rights of civilian populations.

73. Those are noble purposes. The Organization was created to serve them. It has served them well with its peace-keeping efforts. Those peace-keeping efforts have not ever proved inconsistent with the protection of the inherent rights of nations to individual or collective self-defence, which rights also exist under the Charter. The United Nations peace-keeping efforts, indeed, have not proved themselves inconsistent with the rights of any nations or any peoples. It therefore becomes particularly unfortunate that no new peace-keeping effort is to be permitted the Council this day.

74. If the United Nations were to be permitted to undertake an enhanced peace-keeping role today in Lebanon we would have, on behalf of the United States, further and more detailed commentary about the precise terms of the draft resolution. Since, unfortunately, our Soviet colleague has told us of his intention to veto, I see no useful point to be served by any more explicit commentary on the text of the draft resolution.

75. I would simply say in commenting on this unfortunate situation and its unfortunate outcome that the Soviet representative has spoken today sowing hate, watering it with lies and harvesting violence, refusing to co-operate and attacking others precisely for refusing co-operation. The United States is sick of these calumnies addressed against us. We are sick of the habit of accusing others-and us quite particularly-for actions and policies which do not characterize our Government's actions and policies but precisely those of the ones who address the charges. The United States regrets these tactics on behalf of our Soviet colleagues. We hope they will abandon these tactics. We hope they will even reconsider their opposition to a new and constructive peace-keeping role for the United Nations in Lebanon for the purpose of enhancing the peace, sovereignty and security of those people who have suffered so long.

76. The PRESIDENT: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Pakistan.

77. Lebanon is passing through a most critical and agonizing period of its history. In the recent past, and particularly since the Israeli invasion of 1982, large parts of its territory have suffered the ravages of foreign occupation, and what remains of the country is torn by seemingly endless confrontation between its many warring groups.

78. The deepening human tragedy in Lebanon is matched by growing anarchy on the political scene. The primary victim of this intolerable situation is the population of Lebanon, which is living under the tenor of a civil war compounded by foreign intervention. It would be naive to assume that the crisis in Lebanon, with all its complications, could lend itself to easy solutions. Such an assumption proved to be a costly miscalculation on the part of those who took it upon themselves to give Lebanon the direction of their, choice. Yet a process thus began which could help in bringing to an end the pervasive violence and bloodshed and in creating conditions which could promote reconciliation and the political equilibrium essential for the preservation of the unity, independence and territorial integrity of the country.

79. Clearly the trend towards the political fragmentation of Lebanon cannot be reversed by efforts serving the interest of one party or the other. The situation calls for initiatives which allay rather than provoke partisan suspicious and which are aimed at reconciliation among the Lebanese factions, whose co-operation is indispensable for the unity and cohesion of that country.

80. The United Nations has an important role to play towards redressing the fast-deteriorating situation in Lebanon which would supplement the efforts in this direction by responsible Governments in the region itself. The French initiative to activate the Security Council fits admirably in this context and has earned our appreciation. I wish to pay a special tribute to Mr. Luc de La Bane de Nanteuil for the untiring efforts he has exerted in this context. In our view the proposal for introducing a United Nations force in Beirut, which did not find acceptance in the Council in the past, is equally relevant today. The presence of a United Nations force in the area of Beirut could prove critical in mitigating violence and ensuring a cease-fire, which would provide Lebanon a breathing space in which efforts for national reconciliation could be sustained to produce tangible results.

81. It is noteworthy that none of the parties in Lebanon or outside it has opposed the proposal for a United Nations force in the country, even though these parties have set out conditions for its introduction. In practical terms the revised draft which proposes the establishment of a United Nations force, has gone a long way towards meeting these conditions. A case in point is the question of the departure of the multinational force, which was the focus of attention during prolonged consultations on the French proposal for the establishment of a United Nations force. Opposition to the multinational force from political groups representing large sections of the Lebanese population has removed its purported raison d'etre. The provisions of the draft resolution reinforce our assessment that its adoption could have been followed forthwith by the exit, of the multinational force from Lebanon.

82. The draft resolution clearly envisaged that the United Nations force would take up positions when all elements of the multinational force had left Lebanese territory and territorial waters. The mandate of the United Nations force, which was the subject of delicate negotiations, provided for monitoring the cease-fire and extending help in protecting civilian life, including the Palestinian refugee camps. Pakistan feels particularly concerned over the safety of the Palestinian refugee camps and demands that every step be taken against the repetition of the barbarous crimes against the Palestinian refugees, such as those perpetrated in Sabra and Shatila in 1982.

83. Admittedly, the stipulated Council action is not a remedy for all the problems besetting Lebanon, the foremost of which is the continuing presence of Israeli forces in its territory. The introduction of a United Nations force in Beirut is being proposed, however, with a limited objective, and is not meant to represent a comprehensive remedy for the Lebanese crisis. Yet we do not rule out the possibility that the presence of such a force could have become a prelude to a process which could eventually restore the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

84. Our faith in the usefulness of a United Nations presence remains based on the consideration that only the United Nations has the capacity to meet the need for an impartial presence which could bring tranquility in Beirut and provide a respite for the Lebanese leaders to intensify their efforts for national reconciliation.

85. In view of these considerations, Pakistan will support the draft resolution before us.

86. I now resume my functions as PRESIDENT of the Council.

87. I shall now put to the vote the revised draft resolution submitted by France, contained in document S/16351/Rev.2.

88. The PRESIDENT: The Secretary-General wishes to make a statement, and I now call upon him.

89. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I wish to make a brief statement in regard to the vote just taken by the Council, which has shown that at the present time disagreement among members of the Council prevents the United Nations from playing an expanded role in the tragic situation in Lebanon.

90. The United Nations has been involved in the Lebanese situation in one way or another for more than 35 years. Lebanon is a founding Member of the Organization. Quite apart from important humanitarian activities, we have at the moment some 6,000 peace-keeping personnel on the soil of Lebanon. As a matter of principle, the United Nations has, and must have, a profound concern for the fate of a Member State, especially when that fate is linked to important external factors and to the wider peace in the region.

91. Despite today's vote, I would appeal to the Council to continue to consider the situation in Lebanon with the closest attention and with a sense of urgency. The Council should, in my opinion, do this with the intent that in the near future ways will be found for the United Nations to expand its role in Lebanon, not only for the benefit of Lebanon itself, but also for the cause of international peace and security.

92. For my part, I shall continue to do all that I can to promote a constructive United Nations role in this tragic situation.

93. The PRESIDENT: I shall now on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

94. Mr. MEESMAN (Netherlands): From the outset my Government has expressed its support for France's valuable efforts to arrive at a Council decision which would enable the United Nations to make a more meaningful contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the Beirut area, a decision that in our view is already long overdue. We felt that the draft resolution upon which we have just voted, which was the fruit of prolonged and intensive consultations, went a long way to doing just that. We had therefore hoped that today the Council would have been able to act in accordance with its responsibilities. Alas, this was not to be.

95. My Government has followed developments in Lebanon, and lately in particular those in and around Beirut, with growing concern. We continue to hope that it will be possible to break the vicious circle of violence so that there will be no further loss of life. Moreover, an effective cease-fire might pave the way for further steps on the road to national reconciliation so that at the end of the day all unauthorized foreign forces will have been withdrawn from Lebanon and the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of that country will no longer be in doubt: Regrettably, today the Organization has again been prevented, by the negative vote of one of the Council's permanent members, from making even the modest contribution to the enhancement of this process which the draft resolution calls for.

96. Article 24 of the Charter provides that the Members of the United Nations confer on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and we, the members of that Council, are collectively and individually responsible for the implementation of that important mandate. My Government is sorry to note that, not-withstanding the seriousness of the situation with which we are dealing here today, the Council has failed to live up to the hopes and expectations of the peoples of the world. Obviously, the outcome of today's vote is a major disappointment to my delegation, in particular because it again puts a major obstacle in the way of the ability of the United Nations to make that contribution to an improvement of the situation in Lebanon which the world is entitled to expect of the Organization.

97. Things being what they are, however, I can only add that the Netherlands will continue to look for opportunities to enhance the process of peace and reconciliation in Lebanon. We fully associate ourselves with the draft resolution where it expresses the need for a positive outcome of the dialogue of national reconciliation, which, in the words of the fourth preambular paragraph, is "an indispensable basis for peace and security in Lebanon". At an earlier meeting of the Council, on 16 February, we already urged

98. I should like to reiterate here once again that my Government continues to be of the opinion that there can be no territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon unless and until all unau­thorized foreign forces have left that country.

99. The present setback notwithstanding, we continue to hope that the moment is not far off when the Organization will be allowed to play in the area the meaningful role to which so many of us have been looking forward for so long. It would seem to us that such a United Nations force should be a peace-keeping force rather than one which will have to enforce peace, with the risks of getting itself involved in the fighting and thus of intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon. A stable and effective cease-fire in the Beirut area would in our view therefore continue to be an essential prerequisite for a United Nations force to be able to carry out its proposed mandate in the area effectively.

100. I think it was appropriate for me to make these observations although, regrettably, they cannot be of direct relevance to the situation as of this moment, for, should the question of a United Nations peace effort in Beirut or Lebanon come up again, the Council may wish to reflect upon some of these considerations, which in our view continue to be of relevance for an operation of this nature.

101. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): The situation in Lebanon is grave. It has serious implications for its neighbours, for the Middle East in general and for international relations as a whole. It is therefore right that the Security Council should consider the situation and act upon it.

102. We have as a Council been intensely involved, especially over the last three weeks or so. Today we came to the moment for action on part at least of the problem. It is a grave disappointment to my delegation that the action has amounted to inaction.

103. We find it impossible to understand that anything that has been said this afternoon justifies a veto on limited action by the United Nations at the request of the Government concerned, the Government of Lebanon. We believe that many small, non-aligned countries will view with great concern this demonstration of how easy it is to block the Security Council from doing its duty under the Charter. It has implications for the security of all those who depend upon the United Nations.

104. The Council has devoted much effort to the elaboration of the draft resolution on which it has just voted. France had the distinction of initiating and sponsoring it. However, as the French representative has rightly said, the whole Council, including those delegations that have just voted against it, contributed to refining its wording. We all compromised in the hope of achieving consensus.

105. We have failed, for the time being. One aspect in particular of this failure puzzles my delegation. The deliberations of the Council in the last three weeks have been focused on the situation in and around Beirut, and no one was more insistent on restricting our discussion on the draft resolution to the smallest geographical area possible than the delegation which has just explained its negative vote with statements relating to Lebanon as a whole, or to parts of Lebanon other than Beirut. That delegation constantly told us that we must restrict ourselves to the city of Beirut only, not even to the Beirut area. It expressed suspicion regarding operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution which speaks of the United Nations force having

It appeared to think that the task was too wide. Yet, when it spoke this afternoon, its objections to the draft resolution seemed to be concerned with actions far outside the city of Beirut.

106. As I have already said, we have spent the last three weeks focusing on the situation in and around Beirut. But I would join with the delegation T have just criticized and with others in affirming that the problem of Lebanon is much wider than Beirut. We must bear in mind that in the draft resolution we have been looking at we have not been trying to deal with the whole problem.

There are many things which, if we had been trying to deal with the whole problem, my Government would have liked to see incorporated in the draft resolution but which, in a spirit of compromise, we were prepared to omit for the sake of getting agreement on limited action dealing with the most urgent problem. For example, we would have liked to refer to Council resolutions 520 (1982) and 521 (1982); we would have liked a clearer statement about the early withdrawal of all external forces; we would also have preferred to insert the word "initially" in the second sentence of operative paragraph 3 to make it clear that the United Nations force could begin with a relatively small task, broadening later, if it was successful, to a larger task.

107. I must stress that my Government believes that all countries should respect the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries, as the draft resolution stipulates.

108. My Government earnestly hopes for a resumption of the dialogue of national reconciliation. We trust this will lead to a situation in which a new Government of Lebanon, the former one having already resigned, will come into office with national acclaim and will assert its authority through the Lebanese army and security forces throughout the country. In order to achieve this it will of course be necessary for those external forces that now exercise authority in one part or another of Lebanon to leave.

109. We are encouraged by the clear statements made by all Governments which have forces in Lebanon that they do not intend to keep them there. We recognize that there are difficulties in removing these forces. Among such difficulties might be a deterioration in the internal security position in parts of Lebanon. These and other difficulties have to be taken into account. We think that the United Nations may be able to play a constructive part in resolving them, whether through discussion here or through the provision of forces at the request of the Lebanese Government.

110. My Government is deeply convinced, and has repeatedly said, that there should be an expanded role for the United Nations in Lebanon. Some people talk loosely about the failure of the United Nations activities in Lebanon. They are wrong. Not all that we, the United Nations, have put our hands to in Lebanon has prospered and succeeded in full measure, but we should not therefore leap to the opposite conclusion. Over the years, the United Nations has done well in Lebanon. I note particularly that when United Nations observers have been allowed to monitor a cease-fire they have done so with courage and competence. Their work has undoubtedly helped to preserve peace and reduce misunderstanding. Similarly, when UNIFIL has been allowed to function in accordance with its mandate, it has been effective. Recently the United Nations played a modest role in connection with the evacuation of Mr. Arafat and his followers from Tripoli. Underlying all this, and over a period of many years, the United Nations has shown great concern for the plight of the Palestinian refugees. In short, the United Nations has achieved a good deal. It is the belief and hope of my Government that it can do a good deal more, and that it should be allowed to do so.

111. I have already said that the situation in Lebanon is grave: the authority of the duly constituted Lebanese Government is called into question, there is factional strife, and the security of ordinary men and women is in doubt. Our sympathy goes to all those ordinary men and women and to all those who are constructively trying to bring about reconciliation, peace and security.

112. My Government strongly believes that the Lebanese have the same right as all the rest of us to choose their own Government and to adjust their internal affairs without external interference. This is a right provided for in the Charter, and we trust that all States Members will strive to ensure that the Lebanese enjoy it freely.

113. It is against the background of all these efforts and all these hopes and all these beliefs in what the United Nations can do that I now come to the vote we have just held.

114. My Government's vote in favour of the draft resolution is, I submit, entirely in line with the Charter, with what I have just said and with the needs of the situation. The vote of two delegations measured against these criteria is a grave disappointment. My delegation does not understand how these two delegations can justify their position to the international community. My delegation does not understand how these two delegations can square their own consciences before the suffering and despair of the Lebanese people. My delegation does not understand how these two delegations can expect us to believe that they are operating in accordance with the best interests of the Arab nation, or indeed the wider interests of us all, in security and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Are they not encouraging and prolonging a situation of chaos?

115. Despite the gloomy conclusions which we are obliged to draw from the vote we have just had, my delegation undertakes to continue with its efforts to bring about at least some degree of understanding and some degree of improvement in the context of the Lebanese problem. We welcome the brief statement which the Secretary-General has just made. We will apply our closest attention and proceed with a sense of urgency. We will not give up. We will go on trying to use the Security Council and the United Nations to do the job which they were intended to do.

116. Mr. LING Qing (China) [interpretation from Chinese]: Of late we have seen the continuous deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and a chain of armed conflicts in the Beirut area which have once again inflicted heavy losses of life and property on the Lebanese people. The Chinese Government and people are extremely concerned about the situation and deeply sympathize with the miserable plight of the Lebanese people.

117. It is the view of the Chinese delegation that the Security Council should play a positive role in the question of Lebanon. It should implement in earnest its previous relevant resolutions. In the meantime, it should also give consideration to other steps that are practical in the light of the present situation. Our principled stand is that any action taken by the Council regarding Lebanon should be genuinely conducive to the safeguarding of Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; to the elimination of foreign aggression and interference; and to the promotion of national reconciliation in Lebanon.

118. Proceeding from this principled stand and taking into consideration the fact that the United Nations force called for in the French draft resolution has a mandate with some positive elements-such as helping to protect the civilian populations, including in the Palestinian refugee camps, and without intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon for the benefit of any party whatever-the Chinese delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution.

119. On the other hand, since the crisis in the Beirut area is only part of the Lebanese crisis and the root cause of the grave situation in Lebanon today lies in Israel's invasion and occupation of that country, we cannot but stress that the key to the solution of the Lebanese question is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, It is our opinion that in the meantime the foreign warships in the vicinity of Lebanese waters should not carry out any armed intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon under any pretext.

120. We sincerely hope that Lebanon's various political factions will solve their problems independently, through consultations, and free from foreign interference, so that peace can be restored in Lebanon at an early date.

121. Mr. KRAVETS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) [interpretation from Russian]: The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was unable to support the draft resolution for the following reasons.

122. Sharing the deep concern over the tragedy of the Lebanese people, we fully agree that urgent effective measures should be taken which would lead to peace and stability in Lebanon. To that end, what is most necessary is the elimination of everything that hinders normalization of the situation in that country. Unfortunately, the draft resolution submitted to the Council does not contain provisions which would achieve the goals that the Council is pursuing.

123. The main cause of the Lebanese tragedy is the uninterrupted imperialist intervention in Lebanon's affairs. The culmination of that interference was the massive armed invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces in the summer of 1982.

124. In spite of the fact that the Council, in its resolution 509 (1982), demanded that Israel withdraw its armed forces from Lebanon forthwith and unconditionally, the aggressor continues to occupy one third of Lebanon's territory and is carrying out devastating bomb strikes in other regions of the country. Israel and the United States imposed upon Lebanon a servile agreement transforming that country into an American-Israeli protectorate-and that, naturally, could not fail to elicit legitimate protest and resistance from the national patriotic forces of Lebanon; in fact it predetermined that there would be increased, deeper tension in that country.

125. New woes and suffering for the Lebanese resulted from the arrival on Lebanese territory of the so-called multinational force. At that time, United States Marines, warships and aircraft began carrying out their "peace-making" mission with the help of bombs and ships' guns. Moreover, as is clear from the statements of the United States President and Secretary of Defense, they are not renouncing possible further strikes against Lebanon. The only thing that the United States turned out to be prepared to do was to remove its Marines to the ships of the Sixth Fleet, that is, to redeploy them two to three miles to the west. It is quite clear that the aforesaid measure did not in the slightest remove the threat to Lebanon. The Israeli occupiers and the United States fleet, aircraft and Marines participating in military actions against the patriotic forces of Lebanon have carried out a broad campaign of threats and military provocations against Syria, and that is fraught with far-reaching consequences for international peace and security.

126. The interests of normalizing the difficult situation in Lebanon demand a complete cessation of interference in the affairs of that country and the unconditional and complete withdrawal from Lebanon of the interventionist forces of Israel and the so-called multinational force, the removal of the warships of the countries participating in the multinational force from the shores of Lebanon and an immediate end to air and artillery bombardments, which should not be renewed in the future.

127. These are the main conditions for normalizing the situation in Lebanon and protecting its civilian population. Without the implementation of these necessary conditions, the question of giving assistance to Lebanon on behalf of the United Nations loses any real basis. One cannot seriously suppose that a United Nations force established by the Security Council could effectively carry out its mission if it was under the observation of the United States fleet cruising along the shores of Lebanon with Marines aboard.

128. The refusal to include in the draft resolution the relevant provisions and guarantees, including indications that the agreement of all directly involved parties was necessary, as well as the absence of a number of other important provisions would make the mission of a United Nations force for all practical purposes unrealizable.

129. In the light of all this, we cannot consider the manoeuvres with the draft resolution as anything other than an attempt, on the one hand, to justify interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon and, on the other hand, to do so in the name of the United Nations.

130. Mr. ARIAS STELLA (Peru) [interpretation from Spanish]: First of all, Sir, since this is the last day that you will be exercising the functions of President of the Council, may I be permitted to offer you again our most sincere congratulations on the skilful, diligent and measured way in which you have conducted our work during the month that is coming to an end today. I express the hope that the great wisdom you have demonstrated may shed some light for those who will follow you in your very delicate functions.

131. Our vote today was an expression of Peru's full agreement about the need for vigorous, effective and just action by the United Nations to help overcome the grievous situation prevailing today in Lebanon. It was also an expression of gratitude by our delegation for the efforts made by the representative of France and his delegation to advance an initiative designed to achieve peace for a part of the world on which the attention of the international community is focused today.

132. A group of countries with varying degrees of development and common positions in the quest for international peace and justice has worked with impartiality, the best of intentions and everything we had to offer to achieve a convergence of positions among the countries members of the Council. Almost all the suggestions that were submitted by this group to the delegation of France were accepted, and for this we once again thank that delegation.

133. Since significant progress had been achieved in the quest by this international community for positions that would ensure harmony with respect to the task before us, the delegation of Peru would have liked to be able to continue this effort a little longer, but we understand the reasons for putting the draft resolution to the vote at today's meeting. Nevertheless, we believe that this outcome is not the end of the responsibilities of the members of the Council. As was so accurately pointed out by the Secretary-General, it is the job of the Council to keep this matter under scrutiny and to seek progress in the quest for peace in Lebanon. Therefore, on behalf of the delegation of Peru, I should like to stress that all our efforts and capabilities will continue to be available to contribute to any initiative aimed at achieving the unity of views which we have not attained today but which we are confident will be attained in the near future.

134. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who -wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

135. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): The United States strenuously objects to the false charges and unfair attacks of the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. We object stren­uously because those attacks absolutely distort and misrepresent our purposes and our policies in Lebanon.

136. The United States Government, in voting for the draft resolution before the Council today-a draft resolution which we believe to be a very. imperfect, in many ways an unsatisfactory, draft resolution-was expressing in as clear a fashion as possible our strongly held commitment to the view that peace in Lebanon should be brought about by the Lebanese people; that all foreign forces whatsoever should be withdrawn from Lebanon; and that the Lebanese population-Christian, Muslim, whatever-should be left, without outside interference from any quarter, to seek a civilized agreement that would respect the rights and preserve the freedom of all.

137. Lebanon, we believe, has been and can be an independent, democratic State. As an independent, democratic State, under Article 51 of the Charter, Lebanon exercised its right to self-defence and to request others to assist in that self-defence for the purpose of reinforcing and maintaining its sovereignty and independence. The United States responded, as did others in the multinational force, to the request of the legitimate Government of Lebanon. We have had no purpose there except to assist in the restoration of the peace, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, and any suggestion to the contrary is at best profoundly misinformed.

138. Mr. KRAVETS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) [interpretation from Russian]: The representative of the United States did not specify what the distortion made by the Ukrainian SSR with regard to the United States position was. That frees me from having to make a statement in exercise of the right of reply.

139. Mr. de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France) [interpretation from French]: The Council has been unable to adopt the proposal we submitted to it. This is clearly an unfortunate outcome, particularly in the light of all the efforts made by several countries in the Council and by us.

140. It is an outcome which is not good for the United Nations. The Security Council is not fulfilling the mission entrusted to it under the Charter if it cannot reach a decision in these kinds of circumstances. It is precisely why we believed-and with us, the great majority of the Council-in a possible role for the United Nations that we submitted the proposal.

141. It is an outcome that is not good for Lebanon. I shall not refer again to the situation in Beirut, which is in the minds of all at the present time. I should merely like to say that our draft resolution was not intended to settle all the problems of peace in this region. Above all it was, in our eyes, a first step, a peace-making gesture intended to promote the emergence of a climate of reconciliation in Lebanon.

142. I should now like to thank all those delegations in this Council with which we have worked particularly closely these past three weeks. I thank the countries they represent, because those countries, like us, show faith in and make efforts towards the role the United Nations can play in helping achieve reconciliation and peace. I thank their representatives personally for their constant co-operation and I appreciated the qualities of clarity, courage, thoughtfulness, imagination and constancy that they demonstrated, a constancy which, with great rigour and dignity, they maintained throughout.

143. I thank all those who were kind enough to show their appreciation for my country's efforts and, naturally, I thank them also for the very kind words spoken about me and which touched me deeply.

144. My gratitude and that of my country finally, of course, go to all those who were kind enough to vote in favour of our proposal. It is encouraging for my country to have found such broad support for its proposal. It proves to us that the efforts we made were on the right track, even if they were not successful.

145. Certainly, my thoughts, our thoughts go to Lebanon, to that friendly country that is suffering, to those suffering people who have undergone indescribable trials and continue to do so. It is a country with which, everyone knows, we have traditional relations of friendships. We love Lebanon; we love its whole population; we love all who live there; and we rule out no one on the basis of religious persuasion or party. We are a friend to all the Lebanese, and we have been thinking about all the Lebanese and we continue to do so. They are the ones we were thinking about when we undertook this initiative; they are the ones we are thinking about and we shall always continue to think about.

146. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Lebanon has asked to make a statement, and I call on him.

147. Mr. FAKHOURY. (Lebanon) [interpretation from Arabic]: Mr. President, the delegation of Lebanon, while appreciating the efforts made by you personally and by the representative of France and other representatives, regrets that for the second time in a few months the Council has been unable to take a decision that could play a part, albeit a partial and a limited one, in putting an end to a situation that all the Council members have recognized as being very serious, indeed tragic. That tragedy has befallen Lebanon, one of the founding Members of the United Nations. The international community, through the Council, has a great responsibility, not only vis-a-vis the Lebanese people but also vis-a-vis the peoples of the world: that of the guarantor of international peace and security. It is indeed a bitter disappointment for all those peoples who, at the most dire moments of their history, look towards effective assistance and help from the Council in overcoming the crises confronting them.

148. Despite our disappointment and regret, the delegation of Lebanon in turn appeals to the Council to ponder the positions taken today. We appeal to the Council to give consideration and respond positively without fail, and as soon as possible, to any new initiative which is in keeping with the seriousness of the situation throughout Lebanon and by means of which the Council may be able to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it under the Charter.

149. The PRESIDENT: There are no further names inscribed on the list of speakers for this meeting. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th meeting.

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