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Source:
19 April 2002
NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
            19 April 2002

            Original: English


First Session
New York, 8-19 April 2002

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsH

Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

I. Introduction

1. At its fifty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 56/24 O of 29 November 2001, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to hold the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in New York from 8 to 19 April 2002.

2. Accordingly, the first session of the Preparatory Committee was opened on 8 April 2002 by Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

3. The following States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee at its first session: Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

4. The Preparatory Committee held 19 meetings, of which summary records were provided for the opening meeting (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/SR.1), the general debate (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/SR.1-4 and 6) and the closing meetings (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/SR.18 and 19), in accordance with the Committee’s decision. The summary records are issued separately as annex I to the present report.

5. Mrs. Hannelore Hoppe, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee. Mr. Tariq Rauf, Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, represented the Agency.

II. Substantive and procedural issues

A. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

6. With regard to the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference. All groups were encouraged to propose the representatives for the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and for the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference at their earliest possible convenience.

7. Pursuant to that understanding, Mr. Henrik Salander (Sweden), the representative of the Western Group, was proposed to chair the first session. At its 1st meeting, on 8 April, the Committee unanimously elected Mr. Salander to serve as Chairman of the first session. At its 19th meeting, on 19 April, the Committee also decided that Mr. László Molnár (Hungary), the representative of the Group of Eastern European States, would be the Chairman of its second session. It was further decided that, when not serving as Chairman, the Chairmen of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

8. At its 1st meeting, on 8 April, the Committee adopted the following agenda (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/1):

8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. Organization of the 2005 Review Conference:


10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.

11. Any other matters.

9. In the course of the discussion of agenda item 7 on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee, the following decisions were taken:


At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that it would hold its second session from 28 April to 9 May 2003 in Geneva and that the third session would take place from 26 April to 7 May 2004 in New York. At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2000 Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis. At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that:

Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. Accordingly, the following State not party to the Treaty attended the meetings of the Committee as an observer: Cuba.

Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Accordingly, the following specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at the meetings of the Committee: Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), European Commission, International Committee of the Red Cross, League of Arab States, Organization of African Unity, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and Pacific Islands Forum.

Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the public gallery, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee. Accordingly, representatives of 62 non-governmental organizations attended the meetings of the Committee.

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages. At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that summary records would be provided, at each session, for the Committee’s opening meetings, the general debate and the closing meetings. There would be records of decisions taken at the other meetings.

10. The Committee set aside five meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee, in the course of which 66 statements were made. The statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/SR.1-4 and 6).

11. At its 5th meeting, on 10 April, the Committee heard 14 statements by non-governmental organizations.

12. The Committee held a total of 11 meetings for a substantive discussion under agenda item 6, entitled “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty”.

13. The discussion was structured according to an indicative timetable, which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues. At its 10th meeting, on 12 April, the Committee took note of the indicative timetable as contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/INF.3. In connection with the indicative timetable, the Chairman made the following statement: “Nothing in the indicative timetable of which we have just taken note alters the status of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference”.

14. The Committee considered the following three clusters of issues as contained in annex VIII of the final report of the Preparatory Committee to the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/1):

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security;

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.

15. The Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

(a) Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled “Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs” contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference;

(b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled “Regional issues: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East”, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and

(c) Safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes.

16. During the session, the Committee had before it the following documents:

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/1
Provisional agenda

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/2
Measures taken to institutionalize Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status: report submitted by Mongolia

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3
Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: compilation of reports submitted by Algeria, Australia, Egypt and Jordan

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/Add.1
Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: compilation of reports submitted by Canada, China, Morocco, Sweden and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/Add.2
Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: compilation of reports submitted by Saudi Arabia and Tunisia

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/Add.3 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by the United States of America

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/Add.4
Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: compilation of reports submitted by Japan and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/Add.5
Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: compilation of reports submitted by France and Tunisia

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/Add.6
Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Qatar

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/4
Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “ Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”: report submitted by Poland

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/5
Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “ Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”: report submitted by Thailand

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/5/Add.1
Implementation of additional measures to help promote nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, through the efforts of the Office of the Atomic Energy Agency for Peace: report submitted by Thailand

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/6
Implementation of article VI obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Australia

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/7
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by New Zealand

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/8
Report within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, submitted by Indonesia

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/9
New Agenda Coalition paper, submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda countries

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/10
Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “ Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”: report submitted by Sweden

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/11
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Canada

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/12/Corr.1
Submission by the United States of America (see document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/ Add.3)

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/13
Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “ Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”: report submitted by Germany

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/14
Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”: report submitted by Japan

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/15
Statement made by Myanmar on behalf of the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations on the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/16
Statement made by Spain on 8 April 2002 on behalf of the European Union

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/17
Statement made by Spain on 15 April 2002 on behalf of the European Union

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/18
Implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”: report submitted by Ireland

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/19
Note verbale dated 18 April 2002 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the secretariat of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/20
Report pursuant to the provision of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular to articles VI and VII of the Treaty, submitted by Malaysia

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.1
Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden)

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2
Working paper submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.3
Reporting by States Parties: working paper submitted by Canada

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.4
Attaining a nuclear-weapon-free world: working paper submitted by Germany

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.5 Non-strategic nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by Germany

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.6
Nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war: working paper submitted by China

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.7
Working paper submitted by Japan

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.8
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by China

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.9
The prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Middle East nuclear question: working paper submitted by China

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.10
Working paper submitted by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden)

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.11
Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory Committee on the work of its first session: working paper submitted by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.12
Protection against nuclear terrorism and security of nuclear materials and nuclear installations: working paper submitted by Germany

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.13
Working paper submitted by the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.14
Statement made by Indonesia on 19 April 2002 on behalf of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/CRP.1
Draft report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/INF.1
Information note

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/INF.2
List of non-governmental organizations

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/INF.3
Indicative timetable

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/INF.4
List of participants

17. A list of the delegations to the Preparatory Committee, including States parties, observer States, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, is contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/INF.4.

B. Organization of the 2005 Review Conference

18. The Preparatory Committee, in conformity with its task to prepare for the 2005 Review Conference, considered issues contained in agenda item 9. It took the following actions:

(a) Dates and venue of the Conference

At its 18th meeting, on 18 April 2002, the Committee provisionally agreed, subject to further consultations by the Chairman, that the Review Conference would be held from 2 to 27 May 2005 in New York.

(b) Appointment of the Secretary-General

The Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultations with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2005 Review Conference, a nomination which would later be confirmed by the Conference itself.

(c) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

The Committee decided to request the Secretariat to provide for its second session an estimate of the costs of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its Preparatory Committee.

III. Summary of the results

19. In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, paragraph 7 of the section on “Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty”, the Chairman prepared a factual summary of the Committee’s consideration of the issues, which is contained in annex II to the present report.


Annex I

Summary records of the first session of the Preparatory Committee

[ To be distributed individually as NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/SR.1-4, 6, 18 and 19]


Annex II

Chairman’s factual summary

1. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the current international climate, where security and stability continued to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery, preserving and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty was vital to peace and security.

2. States parties stressed their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus.

3. States parties further stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty was essential. They called upon the four States remaining outside the Treaty — Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan — to accede unconditionally to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those three States that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Concern was expressed about the ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missile programmes in different regions, including those of States not parties to the Treaty.

4. It was stressed that the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was through full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the Treaty.

5. It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had given an even greater sense of urgency to the common efforts of all States in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The view was held that further strengthening and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime was imperative to prevent the use of nuclear materials and technologies for criminal/terrorist purposes. The enhancement of the non-proliferation regimes covering all weapons of mass destruction, including efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was considered to be the most important integral part of combating terrorism.

6. There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope. Strong support was expressed for the enforcement of existing multilateral treaties. The need to seek treaties and other international agreements that meet today’s threats to peace and stability was underlined.

7. The view was expressed that the Treaty should be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and credible progress towards nuclear disarmament. Without the fulfilment of article VI over time, the Treaty, in which non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually interdependent and reinforcing, would lose its true value.

8. The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty’s operation.

9. States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Disappointment was expressed in the progress made in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. It was also noted that the goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps.

10. The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties of their respective measures taken in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, for example, reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and that new nuclear weapons were not being developed.

11. Concern and uncertainty were expressed about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, and the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

12. Strong support was expressed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as reflected in the Final Declaration adopted at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty held from 11 to 13 November 2001. The importance and urgency of the early entry into force of the Treaty was underscored. States which had not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 13 States whose ratification was necessary, and in particular those two remaining nuclear-weapon States whose ratification was a prerequisite, for its entry-into-force, were urged to do so without delay. States reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the international monitoring system.

13. Concern was expressed that the decision by the United States of America to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the development of missile defence systems, could lead to a new arms race, including in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability and international security. Hope was expressed that the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation to create a new strategic framework would further promote international stability.

14. States parties welcomed the announcement in December 2001 that the United States and the Russian Federation had completed reductions in their nuclear arsenals required under START I. They further welcomed the continuing bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic nuclear arms reductions, and many expressed the hope that such efforts would result in a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency.

15. The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized. There were calls for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. It was stressed that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Negotiations should begin on further reductions of those weapons as soon as possible.

16. States parties expressed regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree on a programme of work. States that had not yet done so were called upon to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

17. The importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes was stressed.

18. Several States parties endorsed the work being carried out under the Trilateral Initiative — involving IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States — in developing techniques and methodologies for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA safeguards. States parties were informed that the United States had already placed some of its fissile material under IAEA safeguards and that both the United States and the Russian Federation were working to develop practical measures for the monitoring and inspection of fissile material, including verification by IAEA. Some States parties also noted the safeguards experience of IAEA in verifying nuclear materials and expressed the view that the Agency could play an important role in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

19. The view was held that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at the global and also particularly at the regional level.

20. States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall non-proliferation regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensive information, e.g., in a standardized format. Several States parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States parties.

21. States parties recalled the 2000 Final Document and the request that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

22. Support was expressed for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the nuclear-weapon-free zones had now exceeded 100. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties was stressed. Efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world were welcomed. It was also stressed that assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones should be provided by the nuclear-weapon States. Support was expressed for the efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. States parties noted that no progress had been achieved in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.

23. On the issue of universality, States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. States parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Some States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

24. States parties expressed concern at the increased tension in South Asia and the continuing retention of nuclear weapons programmes and options by India and Pakistan. States parties urged both States to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties noted that both States had declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States parties called upon both States to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States parties noted the willingness expressed by both States to participate in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States parties urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. The importance of the full implementation by both States of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) was emphasized.

25. The importance of full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was stressed. States parties remained concerned that IAEA continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People’ s Republic of Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was urged to come into full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. States parties expressed concern over the lack of implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

26. States parties noted that since the cessation of the IAEA inspections in Iraq in December 1998, the Agency had not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Many States parties expressed grave concern and called for the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1284 (1999), and for the re-establishment of an effective disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq, and hoped that United Nations inspectors would be able as soon as possible to resume their work in Iraq. Iraq reiterated that it was in full compliance with its Treaty obligations and maintained that IAEA had successfully carried out inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Iraq’s Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

27. It was recalled that both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of security assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed. Many States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Many States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. Some States parties were of the view that this could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective Security Council resolutions. Concern was expressed that recent developments might undermine commitments taken under the respective Security Council resolutions. A view was held that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfilment of the Treaty obligations. Several States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first-use policy.

28. Education on disarmament and non-proliferation was considered important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. In that connection, the ongoing work of the group of governmental experts which was expected to submit its report for consideration by the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session during autumn 2002 was commended.

29. States parties recognized IAEA safeguards were a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of IAEA in implementing the safeguards system to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.

30. States parties welcomed the efforts of IAEA in strengthening safeguards and the Agency’s completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. The importance of the Model Additional Protocol was underlined. Some drew attention to the fact that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place for IAEA to be able to provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material. The goal of universality was stressed. States that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA were called upon to do so without delay. Many States parties called upon those that had not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible.

31. It was reiterated that export controls were a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The important work of the existing export control regimes was noted, in particular their function in guiding States parties in setting up their national export control policies. The importance of transparency in export controls was widely recognized. It was reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

32. Many States parties noted both the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and the many instruments available for doing this, including the physical protection of nuclear material and export controls. The IAEA action plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. The Agency’s work in support of States’ efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended.

33. States parties called for the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material, inter alia, through a well-defined amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Many States parties called upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Support was expressed for the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service.

34. The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials was stressed. The efforts of IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects were welcomed. States parties that had not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, were encouraged to do so.

35. States parties emphasized that transportation of radioactive material, including maritime transportation, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international standards established by the relevant international organizations, such as IAEA and the International Maritime Organization. Some States parties called for effective liability arrangements, prior notification and consultation. Some States parties noted the conclusions on safety in IAEA General Conference resolution GC(45)RES/10. The holding of an IAEA conference on safe transport of radioactive materials in July 2003 was welcomed by many.

36. States parties reiterated their strong support for article IV of the Treaty, which provided a framework for cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that context, States parties expressed wide support for the technical cooperation activities of IAEA. It was underlined that technical cooperation played an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including human health, pest eradication, food and agriculture, and the environment. The importance of aligning technical cooperation programmes with development goals and the needs of the country concerned was emphasized. Several States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources for those activities.


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