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Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard
Israel remains the occupying Power in Gaza despite its claim that Gaza is a “hostile territory”. This means that its actions must be measured against the standards of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Judged by these standards Israel is in serious violation of its legal obligations. The collective punishment of Gaza by Israel is expressly prohibited by international humanitarian law and has resulted in a serious humanitarian crisis.
The human rights situation in the West Bank has worsened, despite expectations that it would improve following the removal of Hamas from the Government of the West Bank. Settlements expand, the construction of the wall continues, and checkpoints increase in number. Military incursions and arrests have intensified, 779 Palestinian prisoners have been released but some 11,000 remain in Israeli jails.
The right of self-determination of the Palestinian people is seriously threatened by the separation of Gaza and the West Bank resulting from the seizure of power by Hamas in Gaza in June 2007. Every effort must be made by the international community to restore Palestinian unity.
On 27 November a new peace process was initiated at a meeting in Annapolis. This process must take place within a normative framework that respects international law, international humanitarian law and human rights. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 1. is an essential feature of this framework and cannot be overlooked by the Annapolis peace process, the Israeli and Palestinian authorities, the Quartet and the United Nations. The Secretary-General as the representative of the United Nations must ensure that the Advisory Opinion, which represents the law of the United Nations, is respected by all parties engaged in the Annapolis process.
5. A further comment on terrorism is called for. In the present international climate it is easy for a State to justify its repressive measures as a response to terrorism - and to expect a sympathetic hearing. Israel exploits the present international fear of terrorism to the full. But this will not solve the Palestinian problem. Israel must address the occupation and the violation of human rights and international humanitarian law it engenders, and not invoke the justification of terrorism as a distraction, as a pretext for failure to confront the root cause of Palestinian violence - the occupation.
8. Israel has been for 40 years and remains in military occupation of the OPT. This was reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , when it held that the Palestinian territories (including East Jerusalem) “remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to have the status of occupying Power”. The consequence of this, in the opinion of the International Court, is that the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as do the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.4 Furthermore, Israel’s obligations have not diminished as a result of the prolonged nature of the occupation.5 On the contrary, they have increased as a result of it. It is now argued that Israel’s occupation has become unlawful as a result of the numerous violations of international law that have occurred during the occupation.6
10. On 19 September 2007 Israel seemed to give a new status to Gaza when its Security Cabinet declared Gaza to be “hostile territory” - a characterization that was shortly afterwards approved by the United States Secretary of State. Although the legal implications that Israel intends to attach to this “status” remain unclear, the political purpose of this declaration was immediately made known - namely the reduction of the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza.
11. The test for determining whether a territory is occupied under international law is effective control,8 and not the permanent physical presence of the occupying Power’s military forces in the territory in question. Judged by this test it is clear that Israel remains the occupying Power as technological developments have made it possible for Israel to assert control over the people of Gaza without a permanent military presence.9 Israel’s effective control is demonstrated by the following factors:
(a) (a) Substantial control of Gaza’s six land crossings: the Erez crossing is effectively closed to Palestinians wishing to cross to Israel or the West Bank. The Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza, which is regulated by the Agreement on Movement and Access entered into between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on 15 November 2005 (brokered by the United States, the European Union and the international community’s envoy for the Israeli disengagement from Gaza), has been closed by Israel for lengthy periods since June 2006. The main crossing for goods at Karni is strictly controlled by Israel and since June 2006 this crossing too has been largely closed, with disastrous consequences for the Palestinian economy;
(b) Control through military incursions, rocket attacks and sonic booms: sections of Gaza have been declared “no-go” zones in which residents will be shot if they enter;
(c) Complete control of Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters;
(d) Control of the Palestinian Population Registry: the definition of who is “Palestinian” and who is a resident of Gaza and the West Bank is controlled by the Israeli military. Even when the Rafah crossing is open, only holders of Palestinian identity cards can enter Gaza through the crossing; therefore control over the Palestinian Population Registry is also control over who may enter and leave Gaza. Since 2000, with few exceptions, Israel has not permitted additions to the Palestinian Population Registry.
The fact that Gaza remains occupied territory means that Israel’s actions towards Gaza must be measured against the standards of international humanitarian law.
14. In the past two years 668 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli security forces in Gaza. Over half - 359 people - were not involved in hostilities at the time they were killed. Of those killed 126 were minors; 361 were killed by missiles fired from helicopters; and 29 of those killed were targeted for assassination. During the same period, Palestinians fired some 2,800 Qassam rockets and mortar shells into Israel from the Gaza Strip. Four Israeli civilians were killed by Qassam rockets and hundreds were injured. Four members of the Israeli security forces were killed in attacks originating from Gaza.10
21. Poverty in Gaza is rife. Over 80 per cent of the population live below the official poverty line.
26. Israel’s siege of Gaza violates a whole range of obligations under both human rights law and humanitarian law. The provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that state that everyone has the right to “an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing”, freedom from hunger and the right to food (art. 11) and that everyone has the right to health, have been seriously infringed. Above all, the Government of Israel has violated the prohibition on collective punishment of an occupied people contained in article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The indiscriminate and excessive use of force against civilians and civilian objects, the destruction of electricity and water supplies, the bombardment of public buildings, the restrictions on freedom of movement, the closure of crossings and the consequences that these actions have upon public health, food, family life and the psychological well-being of the Palestinian people constitute a gross form of collective punishment.
27. Gaza is no ordinary State upon which other States may freely impose economic sanctions in order to create a humanitarian crisis or take disproportionate military action that endangers the civilian population in the name of self-defence. It is an occupied territory in whose well-being all States have an interest and whose welfare all States are required to promote. According to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have the obligation “to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention”. Israel has violated obligations of an erga omnes character that are the concern of all States and that all States are required to bring to an end. In the first instance, Israel, the occupying Power, is obliged to cease its violations of international humanitarian law. But other States that are a party to the siege of Gaza are likewise in violation of international humanitarian law and obliged to cease their unlawful actions.
31. In a statement to the Third Committee in October 2007 the Israeli delegate, Ms. Ady Schonmann, stated that the Special Rapporteur had failed to indicate that the Israeli NGO, Peace Now, had retracted a report of October 200614 which showed that nearly 40 per cent of the land held by Israeli settlements in the West Bank is privately owned by Palestinians. The Special Rapporteur has had contact with Peace Now which has indicated that while it made some corrections to its report in response to representations from the Israeli Government, it has not retracted its finding that 40 per cent of land occupied by settlements in the West Bank is privately owned by Palestinians.
32. Settlements are illegal under international law as they violate article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This illegality has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall, by the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention in a declaration published in 2001, and by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Furthermore settlements constitute a form of colonialism which is contrary to international law.14
33. Israel’s contempt for international law and opinion is illustrated by recent Government decisions. First, in December shortly after the Annapolis meeting, the Israeli Government announced plans to build 307 new apartments in the settlement of Har Homa. Secondly, in October it announced that it would proceed with plans for the development of E1, a planned new settlement which will have 3,500 apartments, 10 hotels and an industrial park, to accommodate 14,500 settlers, situated adjacent to Maale Adumim. At present Israel has built a police station on E1 (visited by the Special Rapporteur on 25 September) but is prevented from proceeding with its plans to start construction on E1 by the presence of the main road from East Jerusalem to Jericho, which is used by Palestinians. Israel has now confiscated Palestinian land in Abu Dis, Sawareh, Nabi Moussa and al-Khan al-Ahmar to enable it to build an alternate road for Palestinians to Jericho which will free the area for E1. The road is part of Israel’s broader plan to replace territorial contiguity with “transportational contiguity” by artificially connecting Palestinian population centres through an elaborate network of alternate roads and tunnels and creating segregated road networks, one for Palestinians and another for Israeli settlers, in the West Bank.
35. Palestinians are subjected to numerous prohibitions on travel and to requirements for permits for travel within the West Bank and to East Jerusalem. Checkpoints ensure compliance with the permit regime. These restrictions violate article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which has been held to be binding on Israel in the OPT by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall. Israel’s argument that these restrictions are justified as security measures is difficult to accept. Many of the checkpoints and roadblocks are distant from the border of Israel, which is in any event protected by the wall. More likely explanations are to be found in the need to serve the convenience of settlers, to facilitate the travel of settlers through the West Bank and to impress upon the Palestinian people the power and presence of the occupier. According to a report in Yedioth Ahronoth, one quarter of all IDF soldiers who have served at roadblocks in the West Bank reported having witnessed or taken part in an act of abuse against a Palestinian civilian. Checkpoints serve to humiliate Palestinians and to create feelings of deep hostility towards Israel. In this respect they resemble the “pass laws” of apartheid South Africa, which required black South Africans to demonstrate permission to travel or reside anywhere in South Africa.16 These laws generated widespread humiliation and anger, and were the cause of regular protest action. Israel would do well to consider the South African experience. Restrictions on freedom of movement of the kind applied by Israel do more to create insecurity than to achieve security.
37. The wall is planned to extend for 721 kilometres. At present 59 per cent of the wall has been completed and 200 kilometres have been constructed since the International Court of Justice handed down its Advisory Opinion declaring the wall to be illegal. When the wall is finished, an estimated 60,000 West Bank Palestinians living in 42 villages and towns will reside in the closed zone between the wall and the Green Line. This area will constitute 10.2 per cent of Palestinian land in the West Bank. There are, however, suggestions that the route of the wall will be revised to include additional Palestinian lands in the south-eastern West Bank near to the Dead Sea. If this plan is implemented some 13 per cent of Palestinian land will be seized by the wall. The closed zone includes many of the West Bank’s valuable water resources and its richest agricultural lands.
38. The wall has serious humanitarian consequences for Palestinians living within the closed zone. They are cut off from places of employment, schools, universities and specialized medical care, and community life is seriously fragmented. Moreover, they do not have 24-hour access to emergency health services. Over 100 persons residing in the closed zone have not received permits to leave the area. Palestinians who live on the eastern side of the wall but whose land lies in the closed zone face serious economic hardship, as they are not able to reach their land to harvest crops or to graze their animals without permits. Permits are not easily granted and the bureaucratic procedures for obtaining them are humiliating and obstructive. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has estimated that only about 18 per cent of those who used to work land in the closed zone before the construction of the wall receive permits to visit the closed zone today. The opening and closing of the gates leading to the closed zone are regulated in a highly restrictive manner: in 2007 OCHA carried out a survey in 67 communities located close to the wall which showed that only 19 of the 67 gates in the wall were open to Palestinians for use all the year round on a daily basis. To aggravate matters Palestinians coming into and out of the closed zone are frequently subjected to abuse and humiliation at the gates by the IDF. Hardships experienced by Palestinians living within the closed zone and in the precincts of the wall have already resulted in the displacement of some 15,000 persons.
39. The plight of the village of Jayyus, visited by the Special Rapporteur on 30 September 2007, illustrates the hardships faced by communities living near to the wall, but in the West Bank. The 3,200 residents of Jayyus are separated by the wall from their farmland; 68 per cent of the village’s agricultural land and its six agricultural wells lie in the closed zone between the wall and the Green Line and are off limits to those without a visitor’s permit. Scores of greenhouses are situated in the closed zone, producing tomatoes, cucumbers and sweet peppers, which require daily irrigation. Only about 40 per cent of the residents of Jayyus are granted permits to access farms, and gate opening times are both limited and arbitrary. By August 2004, one year after the construction of the wall, local production had fallen from 7 to 4 million kilograms of fruit and vegetables. The situation has further deteriorated over the past three years.
40. The section of the wall within the Jerusalem Governorate measures 168 kilometres in length. Only 5 kilometres of its completed length runs along the Green Line. The route of the wall runs deep into the West Bank to encircle the settlements of Maale Adumim. In contrast, many Palestinian villages which are currently in the Jerusalem municipality are placed outside the wall and thus separated from Jerusalem. In some places, such as Abu Dis, the wall runs through Palestinian communities, separating neighbours and families. About 25 per cent of the 253,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have been cut off from the city by the wall. This means they can only enter Jerusalem through checkpoints, which makes it difficult to access hospitals, schools, universities, work and holy sites - particularly the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.
42. In both East Jerusalem and that part of the West Bank categorized as Area C (60 per cent of the West Bank, comprising villages and rural districts), houses and structures may not be built without permits. The bureaucratic procedures for obtaining permits are cumbersome and in practice permits are rarely granted. As a result, Palestinians are frequently compelled to build homes without permits. In East Jerusalem house demolitions are implemented in a discriminatory manner:18 Arab homes are destroyed but not Jewish houses. In Area C the IDF has demolished or designated for demolition homes, schools, clinics and mosques on the ground that permits have not been obtained. Between May 2005 and May 2007, 354 Palestinian structures were destroyed by the IDF in Area C. Many Bedouin communities have had their structures demolished. In September 2007 the Special Rapporteur visited Al Hadidiya in the Jordan Valley where the structures of a Bedouin community of some 200 families, comprising 6,000 people, living near to the Jewish settlement of Roi, were demolished by the IDF. This brou ght back memories of the practice in apartheid South Africa of destroying black villages (termed “black spots”) that were too close to white residents. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of personal property “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”. According to B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, the destruction of homes in the Naqar neighbourhood of Qalqiliya failed to meet this test. The demolition of homes for administrative reasons can likewise not be justified. Both East Jerusalem and Area C are occupied territory, in respect of which the prohibition contained in article 53 applies.
48. The role of medical doctors in detention centres and prisons requires attention. These doctors witness the result of inhuman treatment - wounds, swollen hands, signs of violence - but remain silent, acting as if they do not know that torture is taking place. This raises ethical questions that in similar circumstances in South Africa were, after years of silence, addressed by the South African Medical Association and international medical bodies. Why, one must ask, has the responsibility of Israeli medical doctors who examine detainees and prisoners not been questioned by the relevant Israeli and international medical professional bodies?
(a) The Palestinian people have the right to self-determination24 and the exercise of this right is violated by the construction of the wall;25
(b) Israel is under a legal obligation to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention in the OPT26 - a unanimous finding;27
(c) Settlements are illegal as they violate article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention28 - a unanimous finding;29
(d) Israel is bound by international human rights conventions in the OPT30 - a unanimous finding31 - and consequently its conduct is to be measured against both international human rights conventions and the Fourth Geneva Convention;
(e) The regime in force in the closed zone between the wall and Green Line violates the right to freedom of movement contained in article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights32 and the right to work, health, education and an adequate standard of living contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;33
(f) The destruction of property for the construction of the wall violates article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and cannot be justified on grounds of military necessity or national security;34
(g) The wall cannot be justified as an exercise in self-defence;35
(h) The annexation of East Jerusalem is illegal;36
(i) The construction of the wall by Israel in the OPT, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime are contrary to international law; and Israel is obliged in law to cease the construction of the wall, to dismantle it and to make reparation for the construction of the wall;37
(j) All States are under a legal obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the wall and to ensure compliance by Israel with the Fourth Geneva Convention;38
(k) The United Nations, especially the General Assembly and Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring an end to the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and associated regime, “taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion”.39
51. On 20 July 2004 the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/15 which called for Israel to comply with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. This resolution was adopted by 150 votes to 6 (Australia, Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau, United States) with 10 abstentions. The Russian Federation and member States of the European Union voted in favour of the resolution.
52. Since 2004, the Advisory Opinion has been ignored by the Security Council. While the General Assembly40and Human Rights Council41 have passed several resolutions reaffirming the Opinion, no attempt has been made by the Security Council to compel Israel to comply with the Opinion or to remind States of their obligation to ensure compliance by Israel with the Fourth Geneva Convention. The reason for this is not hard to find. The Security Council is prevented from giving its backing to the Opinion by the United States which has refused to accept it. Similarly the United States prevents the Quartet from taking steps to implement the Opinion. No statement issued by the Quartet has ever acknowledged the Opinion.42
53. Although the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice is an authoritative statement of the applicable law and is designed to contribute to the framework for peace in the Middle East, it is not legally binding on States. In law, the United States is well within its right to refuse to accept the Opinion in the Quartet. The same applies to the Russian Federation and the European Union - although both have compromised themselves by giving approval to the Opinion by supporting General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 and subsequent resolutions. The position of the United Nations is, however, very different. The International Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the United Nations. Moreover the General Assembly has by an overwhelming majority repeatedly given its approval to the Opinion. This means that it is now part of the law of the United Nations. As such the representative of the United Nations in the Quartet - the Secretary-General or his representative - is in law obliged to be guided by the Opinion and to endeavour in good faith to do his or her best to ensure compliance with the Opinion. If the Secretary-General (or his representative) is politically unable to do so he has two choices: either to withdraw from the Quartet or to explain to his constituency - “we the peoples of the United Nations” in the language of the Charter - why he is unable to do so and how he justifies remaining in the Quartet in the light of its refusal to be guided by the law of the United Nations. The first course is possibly unwise at this time as this would deprive the United Nations of a role in the peace process. This makes the second course essential.
54. For 40 years the political organs of the United Nations, States and individuals have accused Israel of consistent, systematic and gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the OPT. In 2004 the judicial organ of the United Nations, in its Advisory Opinion, affirmed that Israel’s actions in the OPT do indeed violate fundamental norms of human rights and humanitarian law and cannot be justified on grounds of self-defence or necessity. If the United Nations is serious about human rights it cannot afford to ignore this Opinion in the deliberations of the Quartet, as it is an authoritative affirmation that Israel is in serious breach of its international commitments. Failure to attempt to implement, or even to acknowledge, an advisory opinion dealing with international humanitarian law and human rights law, brings the very commitment of the United Nations to human rights into question.
56. The Oslo Accords have been criticized for failing to consider normative aspects of the Palestinian issue. In particular they failed to pay adequate attention to international law and to the human rights dimension. It is important that the Annapolis process does not make the same mistake. Unfortunately the first indications suggest that this is a serious possibility as the joint statement of 27 November agreed to by the parties as a starting point for the negotiations is premised on the proposals contained in the Quartet road map of 2003 rather than on the legal norms proclaimed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the construction of the wall. Indeed the joint statement makes no mention of the Advisory Opinion at all. The Secretary-General in his statement at Annapolis also invoked the road map but made no mention of the Advisory Opinion. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, the road map is an inappropriate and unhelpful framework for negotiations for the following reasons. First, it is outdated as it takes no account of the Advisory Opinion, Palestinian democratic elections, Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the June 2007 separation of Gaza from the West Bank. Second, Israel attached 14 reservations to the road map in May 2003, which makes Israel’s commitment to it unclear. Third, it is, in its own language, “a performance-based and goal driven roadmap” which takes little account of the normative aspect.
57. It must be recalled that article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that persons in an occupied territory shall not be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territory and the occupying Power, or by the annexation by the occupying Power of part of the occupied territory. This means that any agreement between the Palestinian authorities and the Israeli Government that recognizes settlements within the occupied Palestinian territory, or accepts the annexation by Israel of Palestinian land within the wall, will violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. This is but one example of the dangers of a peace process between unequals which has no regard to the normative framework of international law. In its approach to previous peace negotiations, the Israeli Government has insisted on negotiations being restricted to the agreed framework.43 The Annapolis joint statement which refers only to the road map suggests that Israel does not see itself as being bound by the normative framework accepted by the United Nations.
58. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur negotiations should take place within a normative framework, with the guiding norms to be found in international law, particularly international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, and Security Council resolutions. Negotiations on issues such as boundaries, settlements, East Jerusalem, the return of refugees and the isolation of Gaza should be informed by such norms and not by political horse-trading. In this respect parties might learn from the experience of the negotiations that led to a democratic South Africa in the mid-1990s, which took place within the framework of accepted democratic principles, the rule of law and international law (with special reference to human rights law).
59. The creation of a Palestinian State will not heal the wounds of 60 years of conflict. If real peace and security is to be achieved every effort should be made to achieve reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis. To do this it will be necessary for both people to address the events, actions and sufferings of the past. Consideration should therefore be given to the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to hear the stories of the sufferings of both peoples. Without truth-telling of this kind tensions between Palestinians and Israelis will remain to threaten peace between the two nations.
2 See the criticisms raised by Israel and the United States in the Third Committee in October 2007 (A/C.3/62/SR.23, paras. 5-7 and 22-26) in response to the report of the Special Rapporteur (A/62/275).
3 See J. Dugard, International Law. A South African Perspective, 3rd ed. (Juta & Co. Ltd., Cape Town, 2005) pp. 166-169.
4 A/ES-10/273, paras. 101, 111 and 112.
5 See Adam Roberts, “Prolonged military occupation: the Israeli occupied territories since 1967”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 84 (1990), pp. 55-57 and 95.
6 O. Ben-Naftali, A.M. Gross and K. Michaeli, “Illegal occupation: framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. 23, No. 3 (2005), pp. 551-614.
7 A/ES-10/273, para. 101.
8 See United States of America v. Wilhelm List et al. (The Hostages case) United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. III, 1949, p. 56; Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, International Court of Justice, 2005, paras. 173 and 174.
9 See further on this subject, Sari Bashi and Kenneth Mann, “Disengaged Occupiers: the Legal Status of Gaza”, Gisha: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, January 2007.
10 These statistics, provided by B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, cover the period 1 September 2005 to 25 July 2007.
11 “Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and Development”, Report for the Pledging Conference, World Bank, December 2007, para. 13.
12 Palestinian Monitoring Group, Monthly Summary, November 2007.
13 See generally, “The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in the West Bank”, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), July 2007, available at http://www.ochaopt.org/?module=displaysection§ion_id=103&format=html.
14 Breaking the Law in the West Bank - One Violation Leads to Another: Israeli Settlement Building on Private Palestinian Property, Peace Now, October 2006.
15 See General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV): Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.
16 On these laws, see J. Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978).
17 See B’Tselem, “Demolition for Alleged Military Purposes”.
18 Meir Margalit, Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy City (Jerusalem, Al Manar Modern Press, 2006).
19 Absolute Prohibition: The Torture and Ill-Treatment of Palestinian Detainees, Hamoked and B’Tselem, May 2007.
20 “Ticking Bombs” Testimonies of Torture Victims in Israel, Public Committee against Torture in Israel, May 2007.
21 Semi-Annual Report 2007, Defence for Children International (Palestine Section).
22 Resolution ES-10/14.
23 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ, 2004.
24 Ibid., para. 118.
25 Ibid., para. 122.
26 Ibid., paras. 90-101.
27 Ibid., declaration of Judge Buergenthal, para. 2.
28 Ibid., paras. 120-121.
29 Ibid., dissenting opinion of Judge Buergenthal, para. 9.
30 Ibid., paras. 102-121.
31 Ibid., dissenting opinion of Judge Buergenthal, para. 2.
32 Ibid., paras. 133, 134 and 136.
33 Ibid., paras. 134, 136 and 137.
34 Ibid., paras. 132, 135 and 137.
35 Ibid., paras. 138-139.
36 Ibid., paras. 75 and 122.
37 Ibid., para. 163.
38 Ibid., para. 163.
39 Ibid., para. 163.
40 See, for example, the draft text in A/62/L.21/Rev.1 adopted on 10 December 2007 which calls on Israel to comply with the Advisory Opinion and on all States to comply with the legal obligations mentioned in the Opinion.
41 HRC resolution 2/4 of 27 November 2006.
42 See, for example, the statement of the Quartet of 23 September 2007.
43 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process.