

CONCLUSION PROPOSED BY MR. MEDINA

CONCLUSIONS

All of the facts above-mentioned support unequivocally the two main conclusions stated at the beginning of this Report, namely:

1. There is a concerted and deliberate effort on the part of powerful Arab interests not only to defy the resolution of the General Assembly but actually to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein, within the meaning of sub-paragraph (e) of the Preamble, which requests that the Security Council "determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;"...
2. There is urgent need for assistance from the Security Council in the form of an adequate armed force if the Commission is to be enabled to implement the resolution and maintain law and order in Palestine when authority is transferred to it, and in this connection, sub-paragraph (a) of the resolution's Preamble also requests that the Security Council "take the necessary measures as provided for in the Plan for its implementation;"

The Commission realizes that time is a factor of utmost importance in its endeavour to fulfil the mandate given to it by the General Assembly. The Commission, therefore, must emphasize the compelling need for prompt action. This urgent need for action is to avert great bloodshed and human suffering in Palestine and not alone to assist the implementation of the resolution, which the Commission, notwithstanding all difficulties, is exerting every effort to carry out.

In the view of the Commission, a basic issue of international order and morality is involved. A dangerous and tragic precedent will have been

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established if force, or the threat of the use of force, is to prove an effective deterrent to the will of the United Nations.

It is the considered view of the Commission that the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the general direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, wide-spread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of international concern for that territory.

The Commission submits this report with a profound appreciation of its duty to the United Nations. The sole motivation of the Commission is to obtain from the Security Council that effective assistance without which, it is firmly convinced, it cannot hope to discharge the great responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

In its First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council (Section 13) the Commission had informed the Security Council that "it was devoting most serious attention to the various aspects of the security problem, with particular reference to the possible need for an international force" and that this problem would be the subject of a subsequent special report.

The Commission has appraised the security situation in Palestine on the basis of a considerable volume of information, official and unofficial, available to it from a diversity of sources. These sources have included official reports and appraisals from the Mandatory Power; reports and comments from the Jewish Agency for Palestine; statements by the Arab Higher Committee and dispatches from the Press of the world. These reports have persuaded the Commission that:

I. There is a concerted and deliberate effort on the part of powerful Arab interests not only to defy the resolution of the General Assembly but actually to alter by force the settlement envisaged there.

II. There is urgent need for assistance from the Security Council in the form of an adequate armed force if the Commission is to be enabled to implement the resolution and maintain law and order in Palestine when authority is transferred to it.

The question of providing an international force to assist the Commission in the maintenance of law and order in Palestine during the transitional period repeatedly arose in the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly and its Subcommittee 1 which elaborated the plan of partition with economic union. It was generally considered that the matter fell within the competence of the Security Council which would subsequently take such action in the matter as circumstances might

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dictate. It was on the proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee that the General Assembly addressed to the Security Council the requests set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly.

Although the security aspects of the problem are referred to the Security Council by this report, the Commission intends to continue with such of the vast amount of preparatory work essential to the implementation of the recommendations as can be undertaken without the assistance from the Security Council sought herein.