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President: Mr. Rudecindo ORTEGA (Chile).

AGENDA ITEM 5

Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956 (continued)

1. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): In explaining my delegation's vote at the 563rd meeting in favour of General Assembly resolution 999 (ES-I), I stated that I had apprehended and deplored the attempt and the tendency on the part of the Powers concerned to present the United Nations with a *fait accompli* by the active use of force in order to gain their objectives of power politics and diplomacy. I am afraid my apprehensions have been amply borne out by the events of the last few days. The Powers chiefly responsible for the conflict in the Middle East, having secured their foothold on the soil of Egypt, do not seem inclined to retrace their steps, despite the recommendation of the Assembly that Israel, the United Kingdom and France should immediately withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. That is the reason why my delegation has deemed it fit to sponsor, along with eighteen other nations, the draft resolution under discussion [A/3309].
2. We have learned with a sense of relief that Israel has ordered a cease-fire. But the fact remains that it has not yet withdrawn its forces behind the armistice lines.
3. It is truly unfortunate that two of the permanent members of the Security Council, The United Kingdom and France, have doubly proved themselves defaulters — first, by acting in violation of the United Nations Charter, and secondly, by refusing to implement the recommendations of the Assembly. Therefore, my delegation, in supporting the draft resolution which is already on the table, demands the immediate withdrawal of the Israel forces behind the armistice lines and appeals to the United Kingdom and France — which, as permanent members of the Council, have a great share of the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security — to withdraw their troops from the soil of Egypt immediately.
4. Now that Israel has ordered a cease-fire and the emergency international United Nations Force is in the process of being organized pursuant to General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November, there is nothing to prevent the United Kingdom and France from withdrawing their troops from Egypt. Their

plea that the armed conflict between Egypt and Israel presents a danger to the Suez Canal no longer holds good.

5. My delegation appreciates greatly the promptness with which the Secretary-General has acted in the matter of setting up a United Nations Command for the proposed international police force, and fully associates itself with the tributes that have been paid to his ability, judgment and impartiality earlier in the course of the debate. My delegation is also in general agreement with the seven-Power draft resolution [A/3308], introduced by the representative of Denmark. It hopes that the steps envisaged in respect of the creation of an emergency international force in that draft resolution will go a long way towards producing the desired results in the settlement of the crisis in the Middle East.

6. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) (*translated from Spanish*): The announcement of the cease-fire in Egypt issued by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom is a source of satisfaction to us, because it represents some progress in our efforts to restore peace. There can be no doubt that this is the first positive result of the firm and dispassionate attitude adopted by the United Nations with regard to the deplorable events that are convulsing the world.

7. It is encouraging to note that the moral forces which enhance human dignity still lead to generally accepted, almost unanimous, decisions in this international Organization, decisions which, endorsed by world public opinion, may turn back aggression.

8. The Bolivian delegation, faithful to the principles by which its Government's international and domestic policy is always guided, feels in duty bound to declare that it regards the cease-fire as a preliminary measure to the immediate withdrawal of the foreign forces which are on Egyptian territory, a withdrawal which should begin not within days, still less weeks, but within hours, or, to be precise, within the number of hours which the invading troops needed to be flown from Cyprus to Egypt and to open their parachutes over the soil of Suez.

9. My delegation urgently calls upon the representatives to maintain their forceful and vigilant attitude, in order that our Organization may prevent the cease-fire from becoming the beginning of an occupation which, paradoxically, would be sanctioned by the United Nations.

10. The course which we should follow in order to achieve our objective has been clearly marked out by the various resolutions which we have approved by an overwhelming majority and which could be summarized thus: cease-fire, withdrawal of the invading troops to the lines established by the 1949 Armistice Agreement, and thoroughly constructive and realistic negotiations to bring about a just and stable peace. It should be emphasized that those three measures must be put into effect successively and with dispatch, in order to

avoid any hiatus which might be used by certain colonialist interests to disrupt the peace-making efforts.

11. There is no doubt that those measures will be effective only if they are carried out in quick succession. All three are interdependent and only through their indivisibility can they have a decisive effect. Any one of those measures, if taken in isolation, not only would be useless but might even defeat its own purpose.

12. It is also necessary to emphasize that the order in which they are put into effect cannot be changed. The cease-fire is intended to establish the material conditions essential to a solution of the problem. The withdrawal of the invading forces must immediately follow the cessation of armed conflict, for it would be impossible to negotiate the stable and lasting peace sought by the United Nations under the threat of the armies of occupation.

13. The General Assembly is not obliged to bring about an armistice, and it would be absurd to attribute that character to the cessation of hostilities, because we are not confronted either technically or morally with an international war, but with an aggression committed by three Members of the United Nations against another State also a Member of the United Nations, in flagrant violation of the spirit and the letter of the Charter.

14. Accordingly, if the territory invaded is not immediately evacuated and if such a situation is accepted by the United Nations, this would mean, I repeat, the tacit countenancing of those violations of the Charter. I do not think this will happen in any circumstances.

15. I stress again that the course to be followed has been clearly marked out by the resolutions previously adopted by the Assembly.

16. Confident that this course will be followed, the Bolivian delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/3308 concerning the establishment of the proposed emergency international Force and in favour of the draft resolution of the nineteen African and Asian Powers, in document A/3309.

17. With reference to the former, my delegation declares emphatically that it will give its support on the understanding that paragraph 2 of the operative part refers to all the belligerents without exception.

18. The immediate presence of United Nations forces in Egypt is important for world peace and security. The normal operation of the Suez Canal, as it was operating until the day of the aggression, is of importance to world trade and economy.

19. Egypt, which truly showed its ability to ensure normal transit through that waterway, has sufficient material and human resources to resume its administration.

20. In my opinion, one of the first duties to be discharged by the Command of the emergency international Force is the urgent and inescapable duty of providing Egypt, and not other nations, with all the moral and material safeguards which may be required to ensure the normal operation of the Canal.

21. In this connexion, the Bolivian delegation considers that documents A/3306 and A/3307, which contain communications addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and France, represent a joint manoeuvre designed to present the United Nations with a *fait accompli*, the purpose being to obtain from the United

Nations tacit recognition of the validity of one of the main reasons for the aggression: the intention to return the Canal to the defunct Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company by the use of force.

22. My delegation considers that it is for Egypt, and not for other nations, to put the Suez Canal back into operation and to reopen it to international trade, with the co-operation of the United Nations Command, and, if necessary, with the assistance of certain Members of the United Nations which have ample technical and financial resources, but which are not parties involved in the conflict.

23. Bolivia also hopes that in the future, in the very near future, with all due respect to the economic and political sovereignty of Egypt, the United Nations will assume the role of guaranteeing freedom of transit through that important waterway so that it may no longer be an element of discord and may instead become a factor contributing to harmony and co-operation among all the nations of the world.

24. Mr. JAWAD (Iraq): Six days have elapsed since the first emergency special session of the General Assembly adopted its first resolution [997 (ES-I)] recognizing the existence of acts of war on the part of the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt — six days which have moved world public opinion and centred its attention on this assembly of nations. They have been days of great anxiety and sorrow.

25. It was possible to follow the debates in parliaments and to note how deeply the conscience of enlightened public opinion was perturbed by the risk of a general war. The meetings of the United Kingdom House of Commons revealed beyond any doubt that a large sector of the British people does not support a policy of war and aggression. This "large sector", is understood to represent the majority of the people.

26. The progressive Press all over the world condemned the aggressive acts of the three States and their use of force as an instrument for the settlement of differences between nations. A large number of leaders and statesmen from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America raised their voices in condemnation of the policy of force in settling international differences.

27. There is no doubt that this crisis, which has been fabricated by two of the permanent members of the Security Council — two of the most advanced countries of the world, two of the Powers that had fought in the Second World War to defeat the policy of force — shows how irresponsible these two Powers felt toward the future of the United Nations and toward the future of humanity.

28. Their motives have become clear and evident: to achieve their egotistic goals, irrespective of the grave consequences which those goals might entail and in spite of international pleas and requests.

29. The General Assembly has been informed daily by the Secretary-General of the reaction of the three Powers to resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November and to other resolutions. It has also been informed by the representatives of these States in declarations and statements made here. When all this information is properly examined, it will be clearly shown that these Powers were, on the one hand, employing the tactics of delay, and were, on the other, trying to delude public opinion as to their real intentions. It was essential for them to play for time so as to be able to achieve their objectives, and their twisted declarations of intentions

were used as a means of confusing opinion within and outside the United Nations.

30. I shall illustrate this from the documents which have been circulated and the statements which have been made in the Assembly. The attack by Israel upon Egypt, and its violation of the decisions of the United Nations, were proclaimed to have been undertaken for the purpose of destroying the bases from which the *fedayeen* were supposed to operate. If this were the intention, then some questions ought to be asked. How many bases were there to justify the invasion of the whole Sinai peninsula? Is it justifiable for any State to go to war or to involve itself and others in the grave danger of committing a breach of the peace in order to suppress a few dozen people?

31. Even if it is to be assumed that the *fedayeen* were dangerous, was it not the duty of Israel as a Member of the United Nations and a State which owes its very existence to this Organization, to bring the question to the attention of the United Nations? It is unnecessary to say that this pretence does not stand up to any examination. It is merely the manifestation of an aggressive policy which has been basic in the behaviour of Israel since its establishment.

32. No sooner did Israel attack Egypt than the United Kingdom and France began to move, as if by appointment. Their place of rendezvous was the Suez Canal. They proclaimed that the Canal was in danger and that the combatants must be separated and kept apart at a distance from the Canal. However, they vetoed any action by the United Nations, issued ultimatums to Egypt and imposed their solution by attacking Egypt, thus giving Israel a free hand to occupy Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. They called their armed intervention "a police action". Unfortunately, however, it was directed against the victim of the aggression, not against the aggressor.

33. The United Kingdom and France informed the Secretary-General [A/3269, 3268], in reply to resolution 997 (ES-I), that they continued to maintain their view that the police action must be carried through urgently to stop the hostilities. But the words "police action" could not deceive the world any longer: in the second part of their reply they stated their willingness to stop military action as soon as the following conditions were satisfied: (1) That both the Egyptian and Israel Governments would agree to accept a United Nations force to keep the peace, (2) That the United Nations would decide to constitute and maintain such a force until an Arab-Israel peace settlement was reached and until satisfactory arrangements had been agreed in regard to the Suez Canal, both agreements to be guaranteed by the United Nations, and (3) That, in the meantime, until the United Nations force was constituted, both combatants would agree to accept forthwith limited detachments of Franco-British troops to be stationed between the combatants.

34. There is no need to comment upon these three conditions. They speak for themselves. They mean simply that the United Kingdom and France rejected the resolution of 2 November and were subjugating Egypt to foreign occupation in violation of the principles of the Charter and of international law.

35. While these communications were going back and forth, the Franco-British armed forces were attacking the people of Egypt from the air with a view to achieving their objective, namely the occupation of Egyptian territory. When their forces were able to

land, the United Kingdom representative informed the Assembly [A/3299] that "orders have been given that all bombing should cease". But this was only to mislead the Assembly and public opinion, as the remaining part of the reply stated: "Any other form of air action as opposed to bombing will be confined to the support of any necessary operation in the Canal area."

36. Is there any need to interpret the explicit intention of the British and French forces to occupy the Canal Zone? Does it need much imagination? Despite these official statements, the bombing of towns and civilians has continued up to the present. Again and again news came to confirm the fact that the attacks of the British and French forces were mainly directed at the occupation of key points in the Suez Canal and at exposing the Canal itself to the danger of destruction, and thus refuted in a practical way their anxiety to protect the Canal.

37. The policy of delay and the tactics used to achieve it have not ceased. The representatives of the United Kingdom and France have informed the Secretary-General [A/3306, 3307] that their Governments still require clarification of certain points. What are the points? First, whether the Secretary-General could confirm that the Egyptian and Israel Governments have accepted an unconditional cease-fire, and second, whether the international force to be set up would be competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives set out in the operative part of resolution 997 (ES-I). Yes, if the United Kingdom and France receive a reply to their satisfaction — and that is doubtful — then they will agree to stop further military operations.

38. Such an attitude shows, first, an absence of good will, and secondly, a mistrust of the capacity of the United Nations to set up the necessary military force to handle the situation. There are enough experienced people in the countries Members of this Organization who know about military affairs. There are enough States willing to contribute to the setting up of a United Nations military force, and there are, moreover, the positive replies of Egypt to the effect that it will abide by the decisions reached freely at an international level.

39. But the aggressor did not lose sight of its main objective. The reply of the United Kingdom Government contains another condition: it pointed out that the clearing of the obstructions in the Suez Canal and its approaches was a matter of great urgency and that the Franco-British forces were equipped to tackle this task and should begin the work at once.

40. Here again we are faced with the same aggressive objective. Surely the Egyptian Government is in a position to clear the obstructions, if there are any. What is more obstructive to the operation of the Suez Canal than the military operations which have been undertaken by the United Kingdom and France? These replies were obviously intended to gain time and to achieve the objectives of the "police action", that is, the occupation of the Suez Canal, despite the decisions of the Security Council.

41. The same game of the United Kingdom and French Governments has also been played by the Israelis, who have listened carefully to the voice of their masters. While Israel was at one stage making the acceptance of the cease-fire conditional, its representative declared in the Assembly that the General

Armistice Agreements had become a fiction and had no validity.

42. This reply implied a clear-cut refusal to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 997 (ES-I), which states:

"The General Assembly

"2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements."

43. It may be useful to add that, from the information received today, the Prime Minister of Israel said that his Government will not agree to the stationing of foreign troops on its territory or the territory occupied by it. This confirms Israel's attitude of defiance.

44. I do not want to tire the Assembly with examples from documents which have been circulated to the Assembly or from statements delivered here. There is plenty of evidence to show that the three States in question have tried to defy the Assembly, to delay the undertaking of effective action by it and to sidetrack the main issue for which the Assembly has been called upon to meet in emergency session. It is hardly necessary to point out that our main objective has been to stop the unprovoked imperialistic war before other states become involved in it. All the Arab States in the Middle East also risk becoming the victims of an aggression similar to that committed against Egypt.

45. It is high time for effective action to be taken in order to end the actual state of war and to give a lesson to the aggressors to respect the frontiers of their neighbours and their territorial integrity. Only in this way will the Charter and the United Nations have proved their value to the international community. The delegation of Iraq highly appreciates the element of urgency involved in the setting up of the emergency international force and in the immediate withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of Egypt, as expressed by the representative of the United States.

46. The plan submitted by the Secretary-General regarding the formation and functioning of an emergency international force [A/3302] is conceived in the light of past experience and is based on sound principles. It should, however, be considered in the light of the urgency of the problem and the international situation created, first, by the nature of the conflict, and secondly, by the previous decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council; and it should, above all, be considered as an effective means for the implementation of the resolutions of this first emergency special session of the General Assembly.

47. It is to be particularly emphasized that, in the formation of the international force, efforts should be expended to lay the foundations of a mechanism which will be in a position to enforce, on the one hand, the immediate withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel to the armistice line, both in Egyptian territory proper and in the Gaza section of Palestine and, on the other hand, the withdrawal of the Franco-British forces from Egyptian territory.

48. In view of the fact that the delegation of Iraq is anxious to see the conflict brought to a quick end with the establishment of peace and justice, it will support the action of the General Assembly which will ensure these objectives.

49. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland): The Polish delegation supports the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Ceylon on behalf of nineteen countries [A/3309]. In its opinion, this draft resolution contains the provisions necessary to safeguard the appropriate execution of the previous resolutions adopted by the Assembly.

50. As to the draft resolution submitted on behalf of the seven countries by the representative of Denmark at the 566th meeting [A/3308], I would like to move a slight amendment the adoption of which would enable my delegation to vote for this draft. On closer examination of paragraph 6 of the operative part, it is our opinion that the countries nominated as members of the advisory committee represent all of the important regions of the world except one, namely, Eastern Europe.

51. In our opinion, the action proposed by the draft resolution, namely, the establishment, for the first time, of an emergency international force of the United Nations, constitutes a very important step. This action should be very carefully planned and observed. The advisory committee will have a heavy responsibility. In the circumstances, my delegation feels that the membership of the committee should be justly distributed in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. No political prejudices should influence the establishment of the committee. It must be a balanced one in its composition.

52. For this reason my delegation proposes an amendment to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, namely, the inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the list of members of the advisory committee. I might mention that Czechoslovakia is one of the countries which offered a contribution to the emergency international force, as have most of the countries on the list.

53. I have one more remark to make, which is somewhat legal in character. There is some doubt in my mind with regard to paragraph 9 of this draft resolution, which gives the advisory committee the power to request the convening of the General Assembly. First of all, I am at a loss to know what kind of session of the General Assembly is meant — a regular session, a special session, or an emergency special session? Secondly, I have some doubts concerning not the substance of the matter, but the procedure, namely, whether such a paragraph is in conformity with Article 20 of the Charter and, consequently, with rules 8 and 9 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Perhaps those doubts could be clarified by the Secretariat or by the sponsors of the draft resolution.

54. Mr. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia): At the second meeting of this emergency special session [562nd meeting], on that memorable night of 1-2 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution 997 (ES-I), in which it called upon all parties to agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, to halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area. In the same resolution the Assembly urged Israel promptly to withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines.

55. Four days have elapsed since the adoption of that resolution — four days in which the attack against Egypt has increased in scope and momentum and in which the bombing of Egyptian cities has been relentlessly pursued and the threat of a major conflagration increased by the hour. As a result of these four days of aggression against Egypt, both the Israel and the Franco-British ground forces have occupied parts of

Egyptian territory. Now, four days later, the United Kingdom, France and Israel have agreed, although belatedly to a cease-fire. This in itself is an important achievement. It is a victory for world public opinion and evidence of the moral weight carried by United Nations recommendations.

56. This, however, is not enough. It is not enough to achieve a cease-fire although, of course, a cease-fire is an essential first step. The cease-fire must be followed speedily by the withdrawal of the invading forces from all Egyptian territory. Otherwise, a cease-fire on the lines resulting from the present state of military operations would be little more than a consecration of the aggression. In other words, resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November and the subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly must be implemented in their entirety.

57. Neither Israel nor France nor the United Kingdom has so far indicated a readiness to follow up the cease-fire with a prompt withdrawal of its armed forces from Egyptian territory. The Government of Israel, on the contrary, has made it abundantly clear that it has no intention of relinquishing the part of Egyptian territory which its armed forces now hold. As to France and the United Kingdom, according to the communications addressed yesterday to the Secretary-General [A/3307, 3306], they have confined themselves to a cease-fire—and, I would say, a qualified cease-fire at that. They make no mention of the withdrawal of their forces from Egyptian territory.

58. To ensure the speedy withdrawal of British, French and Israel forces from Egyptian territory is the immediate task now confronting the General Assembly. The draft resolution submitted by the Arab and Asian countries [A/3309] addresses itself to this immediate task in what my delegation considers to be a clear and unequivocal manner. This draft resolution will have the full support of my delegation.

59. I should like now to address myself briefly to the other draft resolution which is before the Assembly [A/3308]. This draft appears to be a natural sequel to the two previous resolutions dealing with the question of the establishment of an emergency international force [998 (ES-I) and 1000 (ES-I)], in accordance with the terms of resolution 997 (ES-I). My delegation voted in favour of the two previous resolutions because it considered that the measures envisaged therein would be helpful in ensuring implementation of resolution 997 (ES-I), which provides for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the invading forces, but, of course, nothing beyond that. My delegation will, therefore, also vote in favour of this draft resolution.

60. It is our hope that both of the draft resolutions before us will be adopted promptly by the Assembly and that they will lead to a prompt withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory and the restoration of peace in that area.

61. With regard to the amendment submitted a few moments ago by the delegation of Poland to the draft resolution in document A/3308—namely, the inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the proposed advisory committee—its adoption would, in my opinion, give the committee a more broadly representative character. My delegation, therefore, will vote in favour of that amendment.

62. Before concluding, I should like to associate my delegation with these other delegations which have paid a well-deserved tribute to our Secretary-General for the devotion and skill which he has shown once

again in discharging his new task on behalf of the United Nations.

63. Mr. AZIZ (Afghanistan) (*translated from French*): We had fervently hoped that the announcement of the cease-fire would be confirmed by a cease-fire in fact. Unfortunately, from what the representative of Egypt told us at the 566th meeting and from the telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt circulated in document A/3312 a few moments ago, it appears that aggression is continuing in Egypt despite the urgent appeals of the United Nations. The blood of Egyptians—men, women and children—is still flowing. The time has come to take decisive action.

64. We urgently request that the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning the cease-fire and, in particular, the withdrawal of the invasion troops be applied immediately. A cease-fire without a withdrawal of troops could not settle the situation and would only sanction the aggression. This is why, along with eighteen other Asian-African countries, we have submitted a draft resolution [A/3309] to reaffirm our previous resolutions, and we ask the General Assembly to adopt it unanimously.

65. My Government's attitude on the tragic events under consideration was clearly expressed in a telegram to the Secretary-General. In order not to take up too much of your time I shall merely quote the final passage:

"It is a time of trial for the United Nations to comply with the recommendations and promises of the Charter and to stop the aggressors from their unlawful and unwarranted action. Afghanistan earnestly hopes that the United Nations and its loyal peace-loving Members will take effective steps against this aggressive act which seriously endangers international peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and demonstrate that liberty and independence of all countries shall be maintained and guaranteed. As a loyal Member of the United Nations Afghanistan will fully and wholeheartedly support all efforts and endeavours of the world Organization to condemn and frustrate this aggression."¹

The telegram was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the Prime Minister.

66. On behalf of my delegation, I wish to thank the Secretary-General for the efforts he is exerting to restore peace in the Middle East.

67. Lastly, at this most tragic hour, I should like to express once again the deep sympathy of my people and my Government for the innocent Egyptian victims.

68. We firmly believe that it is the duty of the United Nations to do its utmost to overcome the effects of the destruction inflicted on Egypt and to undertake as soon as possible reconstruction work worthy of the Organization. The General Assembly must appreciate the terrible damage done to Egypt and consider appropriate measures to remedy the situation.

69. Mr. RIZK (Lebanon): The guns, we have been told, are silent on the unhappy shores of Egypt. The criminal war which the nostalgic colonialists and frustrated militarists of France, the United Kingdom and Israel launched against the hapless towns and hamlets of Egypt, bringing death and destruction, misery and sorrow, in its wake — that butchery, we hope, has

¹ Quoted in English.

temporarily come to a halt. If the guns and the bombs of the aggressors have been silenced, it was primarily due to the heroic defence of the people of Egypt, soldiers and civilians alike, who by their courage and their determination to die, if need be, so that their honour and freedom might be saved, have shown the invaders that their conquest of Egypt was not going to be the promenade Messrs. Eden and Mollet expected it to be.

70. If the thunder of war has subsided in Egypt, it is because the aggressors have had second thoughts about the vulnerability of Arab nationalism, that nationalism which proudly stands as a formidable barrier to imperialist dreams, that nationalism which has proved a deadly weapon against colonial tyranny, that nationalism, finally, which they set out to destroy. If the roar of the aggressors' guns has been silenced, it was by the indignant and mighty uproar of mankind that stood up to aggression, that craves for peace, that believes in human liberty and freedom, that refuses to plunge this unhappy planet of ours into a holocaust of unprecedented magnitude to satisfy the endless ambitions and lust for power of some or the criminal designs of others.

71. In these fateful moments, our thoughts and sympathies go to all those who are suffering, to the wounded, to the bereaved and to all the victims of this senseless adventure, to whichever camp they belong. It is fitting, I believe, to pay a particular tribute to the brave people of Egypt, to the heroic defenders of Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, Alexandria and other martyred towns, for the gallant fight that they have waged against the ruthless invaders, for they too were imbued with the spirit which brought that great American, Patrick Henry, to say "Give me liberty or give me death!"

72. The tragic days through which we have gone, the unanimous voice with which the civilized world has rebelled against the war of aggression perpetrated against Egypt have, I believe, sufficiently established the responsibility. We need not dwell on this matter any further at this time. Nor would it be profitable to attempt to apportion responsibility among the respective invaders for their brutal aggression. I am sure that history will take care of that.

73. We should not sit back in our chairs and delude ourselves that the aggression perpetrated against Egypt has ended and that peace has been restored. The success the Assembly has had so far is very limited indeed and does not go beyond putting an end temporarily to the senseless fighting.

74. A cease-fire is indeed a great achievement in itself. Those who have contributed to its attainment—the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, the statesmen of the world—have done a magnificent job. However, the cease-fire does not bring peace to the victim of aggression, nor does it rectify the wrong inflicted upon Egypt. It therefore becomes incumbent upon the Assembly to pursue and intensify its efforts with one objective in view, namely, that of implementing all the provisions of resolution 997 (ES-I), in particular that which urges the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines — and this refers, of course, to Israel — and that which deals with the withdrawal of all other invading forces.

75. As far as the three aggressors are concerned, official reaction has been received only from Israel to the General Assembly's request that Israel forces should

be withdrawn behind the armistice lines. This reaction was a flat and insolent rejection of the Assembly's request. Since it came from a Government that has impudently and consistently defied the will of the civilized world, expressed in the Assembly's resolutions, it was no surprise that Ben-Gurion should announce to his Knesset this morning that Israel has no intention of relinquishing Egyptian territory which it now holds by conquest. Having gotten away with murder, having grabbed by conquest vast territories to which it has no juridical or moral claim, Israel hopes to get away with this new act of aggression.

76. The test of the Assembly's effectiveness as an instrument of world peace is yet to come. It is not sufficient to obtain a cease-fire. The wrongs inflicted by aggression must be entirely rectified and justice restored. If the present efforts of the General Assembly to restore the peace, so brutally shattered by Franco-British-Israel aggression, are to have any meaning, if these efforts are to prove fruitful, the following facts must be borne in mind.

77. The present war of aggression against Egypt has nothing to do with the Palestine problem. My delegation has said before, and we repeat again here, that the war which was launched against Egypt was a colonial war, a war of conquest, a war to stamp out an Arab nationalism whose interests conflicted with those of the colonial Powers. Israel entered the picture only as a tool, providing the excuse for Franco-British intervention. To claim, as does Ben-Gurion, that the withdrawal if any, of Israel forces behind the armistice lines, as requested by General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I), will have to await the peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem and is contingent upon that settlement, can have only one aim in view: that of torpedoing the Assembly's present efforts and stopping it from bringing them to a successful conclusion.

78. The General Assembly, which has shown firmness in dealing with mightier aggressors, will, I am sure, remain firm in the face of this Zionist rebellion and will use the powers and means provided in the Charter to enforce the rule of law. Whatever territorial advantages may have accrued to Israel as a result of its dastardly attack upon Egypt — a sneak attack, made possible by Egyptian involvement with the United Kingdom and France — cannot and must not be allowed to be used by Israel to enhance its bargaining power in a problem, the Palestine problem, which, I repeat, has nothing to do with the present conflict.

79. If I have dwelt at some length on this point, it is because of Lebanon's ardent desire that the present efforts of the General Assembly should be brought to a happy and successful conclusion. Only one part of the Assembly's request has been met, namely, the cease-fire. Egypt, quite rightly, has accepted the cease-fire on condition that the other part of the Assembly's resolution is implemented — that is, that all the invading forces are withdrawn from Egyptian territory.

80. The draft resolution presented in the name of the Asian-African delegation ([A/3309], which was read out by the representative of Ceylon at the previous meeting, has as an objective precisely to reinforce and facilitate the efforts of those working for a restoration of peace in Egypt. In our view, its adoption is a necessary step which must be taken if the Secretary-General's plan concerning an emergency international United Nations Force, and the draft resolution relative thereto, are to have any meaning at all.

81. In this connexion, I must make clear that my delegation's understanding of the phrase "immediate withdrawal of all forces" is that such withdrawal should take place in the shortest possible time and, in any case, not later than forty-eight hours. The guns in Egypt may or may not be silent; we receive conflicting reports about that matter. But this silence, even if it were true, can only be temporary, and is contingent upon the withdrawal of all the invading forces from Egyptian territory and behind the armistice lines.

82. Inasmuch as the draft resolution embodied in document A/3308 aims at the complete implementation of Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I), particularly its cease-fire and withdrawal provisions — I repeat: and withdrawal provisions — my delegation will vote in favour of it, subject, of course, to the reservations which the representative of Syria made in his able statement at the previous meeting and which I shall not repeat here in view of the general desire in the Assembly to proceed rapidly to the vote on the draft resolutions before it.

83. However, my delegation would be very appreciative if the Secretary-General could, at an appropriate moment, throw light on the status of the General Armistice Agreements in the area and of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Such light, I feel certain, would be of considerable help and would clear up some of the points raised in the Secretary-General's second and final report in document A/3302.

84. Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand): My Government has today reaffirmed its willingness to contribute to the emergency international United Nations Force. Its support for the establishment of a force and its readiness to contribute to that force are based on the assumption that the size, nature and composition of the force will be such as to ensure that it will be able to carry out its intended functions effectively and, in particular, that it will be capable of preserving peace and order in its area of operation. On this understanding, and recognizing the need for speedy action to establish the force, my delegation is prepared to support the seven-Power draft resolution [A/3308].

85. The second draft resolution before us [A/3309] calls, *inter alia*, upon the United Kingdom and France once again "immediately to withdraw" — I stress the word "immediately" — "all their forces from Egyptian territory".

86. In the view of my delegation, the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces must be related to the readiness of an effective and suitably constituted United Nations force to establish itself in the area. An immediate withdrawal — construing the word literally — might make it extremely difficult for a United Nations force to take up its position in the area and perform its intended functions. For this reason alone, my delegation cannot support the draft resolution submitted by the nineteen countries.

87. My delegation is also obliged to note, however, that, considered as a whole, the draft resolution is no more than an unconstructive repetition of resolutions adopted in a situation which differed from that which obtains today. Since the Assembly last met, substantial progress has been made towards restoring peace and order in the Middle East. Any resolution we may now adopt should at the very least take account of events. Let us be realistic.

88. My delegation, therefore, hopes that the nineteen-Power draft resolution will not be pressed to a vote.

It is our feeling, moreover, that the time is rapidly approaching when the Assembly should turn its attention towards constructive efforts for the future. Out of the developments of the past week has come a golden opportunity to bring about a definitive settlement of outstanding problems in the Middle East, an opportunity which is unlikely to recur. It would be disastrous to permit a return to conditions in which a full-scale conflict can break out at any moment. The Suez Canal question must also be promptly settled.

89. While reserving its right to comment at the appropriate time upon the contents of the two United States draft resolutions ([A/3272 and A/3273] of 3 November, my delegation is in general agreement with their purposes. We recognize the reasons why immediate action has not been taken upon them, but that does not mean that we would favour any further substantial delay in taking up the vital matters with which they deal. We shall, therefore, support their consideration either at this emergency session or at a very early stage in the eleventh regular session.

90. U PE KIN (Burma): This is no time for recounting what has taken place, but this much I want to say. When I arrived here last Sunday from my long journey I at once realized that I had entered into a crisis which had been before the United Nations for ten days. Since my arrival I have noticed, also, that many representatives have hardly slept. The task before us goes around the clock—not just seven days a week, but also seven nights. Mr. President, fellow representatives and members of the staff of the United Nations, I salute you for your tenacity, your determination and your uninterrupted devotion to duty. I shall try to conform to your rigid requirements.

91. In a more profound sense, I do not believe that this devotion to duty is really exceptional, for what is at stake is veritably not only what geographers and others call the Middle or Near East, but the world itself. Actually, today, this area is at the very centre of the world. If peace is not restored to the centre, then the peripheries, Europe, the Western Hemisphere and Asia, will be also drawn into whatever tragic fate befalls it.

92. Today, however, we are meeting at a moment in history where, happily, further tragedy may be averted. Lives have already been lost; they cannot be restored. Property has been damaged; it can be, in peace, recovered. Thousands of persons are living in desperation, not knowing where next week's food will come from. Nevertheless, the news we have had today clearly implies that further tragedy can be averted. The cease-fire, for which this solemn Assembly has endlessly striven, appears to be won. As I speak, for the first time in ten days bombs and bullets are not wrecking the lives and fortunes of innocent people. A cease-fire has been accepted by all the participants in this unwarranted use of force and so, in some measure, we are relieved that the United Kingdom, France and Israel are no longer inflicting the evils of war upon the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people.

93. We welcome the fact that some measure of sanity has finally returned to them. But a cease-fire, good as it is, is not enough. We have before us a draft resolution submitted by my Government in conjunction with other Governments. I am referring to the draft resolution contained in document A/3309 and introduced at the previous meeting by the representative of Ceylon. This draft resolution, which representatives have before

them, calls for the withdrawal of all armed forces from Egyptian territory. It calls for, frankly, a return to the *status quo ante* and for scrupulous observation of the Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949. I know that there are some delegations here which feel that this draft resolution does not go far enough, but whatever may be the feelings of some other delegations I earnestly appeal to our friends who seek peace to support this draft resolution.

94. I come now to the other draft resolution [A/3308] which my Government is co-sponsoring with the Governments of Argentina, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden. The delegation of Burma has supported this draft resolution because of its deep belief in peace and its emphatic conviction that peace cannot be obtained as matters stand at present when hostile troops still occupy Egypt. We must put the emergency international United Nations Force into the field immediately. To us "immediately" means without any delay whatever, and it means consequently immediate withdrawal of British, French and Israel troops. I repeat, to us implementation of resolution 998 (ES-I) recommending the creation of an emergency international United Nations Force requires immediate evacuation of the troops which have invaded Egypt. Only this will satisfy us that the cease-fire means what it says.

95. We strongly favour the immediate creation of the advisory committee provided for in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution. I have no doubt that the Assembly will be unanimous in its choice of the chairman of that committee: the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose untiring efforts have brought this international United Nations Force into being. We do not, however, insist that there should be any specific number of countries represented on the committee. For us, the important point is to come to an agreement and adopt the draft resolution, so that the United Nations Force may act rapidly and decisively.

96. Burma is determined that peace should be maintained and will lend all its support to attain that end. Because it so firmly believes this, I am happy to announce to the Assembly that my Government will contribute its share of forces — however small that may be in terms of numbers — to the emergency international United Nations Force.

97. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): The General Assembly has two draft resolutions before it. One, sponsored by seven Powers [A/3308], would approve the setting up of an international force, and proposes certain administrative measures to that end. The other, sponsored by nineteen Powers [A/3309], would call for the immediate withdrawal of British, French and Israel troops from the positions which they have taken up.

98. I do not need to go far back into the past in order to explain the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom towards these draft resolutions. I must, however, repeat that Her Majesty's Government considered that a grave emergency suddenly arose when Israel forces attacked Egypt, and that that emergency had to be dealt with at once. It was with just such emergencies that the United Nations was intended by its founders to deal, but, unfortunately — for reasons with which we are all familiar — the United Nations has not hitherto been equipped with the means necessary for that task. It was in that situation

that Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France regarded it as their duty to step in.

99. Since, however, we have believed from the beginning that this is a situation with which the United Nations should properly deal, we have heartily welcomed the idea of sending a United Nations force to the area to take over the responsibilities which we have felt bound to shoulder. The draft resolution presented by seven Powers contains a proposal for such a force. It goes without saying that we welcome the conception of an international force. It will naturally be understood that further study will be needed of some of the features of so intricate and important a project. Whether the international force should be composed of contingents from the larger or the smaller Powers is not a matter on which we would break our hearts, provided that the force is competent and effective for the purposes specified in the letter which I addressed to the Secretary-General on 3 November [A/3269].

100. It follows from our whole approach that Her Majesty's Government cannot accept that part of the nineteen-Power draft resolution which calls for the immediate withdrawal of British and French forces. If these forces were withdrawn before a United Nations force was able to arrive and take control, the separation of the parties which we have achieved would break down; the risk of hostilities between the parties would revive in an acute form; and the United Nations Force might arrive too late to prevent a new conflagration. There would also be, once again, a serious threat to the security of the Suez Canal. That, in fact, would amount to a return to the dangerous and uncertain conditions which have obtained in the area for many years. We do not believe for a moment that the Assembly wishes to see a return to such conditions. I hope, therefore, that the nineteen-Power draft resolution will not be put to the vote. If it is put to the vote, I shall not be able to support it.

101. One point, however, arises out of the nineteen-Power draft resolution on which I think it would be opportune for me to make my Government's position quite clear. I refer to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Israel attack on Egypt. That policy is to ensure that Israel forces withdraw from Egyptian territory.

102. Reverting to the seven-Power draft resolution, which would approve the setting up of an international force, I should like briefly to elaborate the approach of Her Majesty's Government. As the Assembly is aware, Her Majesty's Government declared yesterday [A/3306] that it would agree to stop further military operations if the Secretary-General could confirm that (a) the Egyptian and Israel Governments had accepted an unconditional cease-fire, and (b) that the international force to be set up would be competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives set out in the operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I). As is well known, Her Majesty's Government has already ordered its forces to cease fire unless attacked. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom have stated that all further military operations would be stopped on receipt of confirmation from the Secretary-General regarding the above-mentioned points (a) and (b). It will, of course, be necessary even then that an effective force should be interpolated as a shield between Israel and Egypt. The idea that such a shield is essential seems to be universally accepted. It is the hope of Her Ma-

jesty's Government that the proposed international force will be set up as quickly as possible to take over this function.

103. Her Majesty's Government stands ready to enter into discussions with the appropriate authorities regarding all questions involved in the transfer of responsibilities to the international Force. It is our belief that this international Force should be authorized to prevent the resumption of hostilities between Israel and Egypt and to secure the withdrawal of Israel forces. It is the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government that the presence of the international Force in the area will help to bring about, among other things, a generally acceptable settlement of the Palestine and Suez Canal problems. In the view of Her Majesty's Government, the international Force should remain in the area until all these problems have been solved, and we think that the logic of events will make this clear.

104. I now turn briefly to another point, a point of practical urgency. The technicians which have been introduced with the Franco-British forces are equipped to tackle the task of clearing the obstructions in the Suez Canal and its approaches. We are prepared to put them forthwith under the command of a United Nations technical officer for this purpose. This, of course, would be in no sense a military operation, but an essential task undertaken by technicians in the interest of world shipping and trade. We in no sense make this a condition of our acceptance of the plan for the international force, but it seems to us only reasonable that we should undertake this task, as no one else at present is in a position to do so.

105. At the same time, we feel that energetic steps should be taken by the United Nations to bring about new and constructive solutions of the basic problems of the Middle East. With this in view, Her Majesty's Government has suggested to the Assembly, as is already known, that an early meeting of the Security Council should be held at the ministerial level in order to work out an international settlement which would be likely to endure, together with the means to enforce it [A/3293].

106. I am glad to announce that with these explanations I am authorized to vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden [A/3308].

107. Mr. DERESSA (Ethiopia): My delegation has the honour to recommend to the General Assembly the draft resolution contained in document A/3308, which is sponsored by seven delegations, including my own. It may be observed, however, that the draft resolution which is before the Assembly for its consideration was introduced by the sponsors with a view to giving practical effect to the final report submitted by the Secretary-General this morning. [A/3302 and Add. 1-4, A/3302 - Add. 4/Rev. 1, A 3302/Add. 5-7].

108. By its resolutions 997 (ES-I) and 1000 (ES-I), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to secure a cessation of hostilities, to supervise the truce and, to that end, to organize a United Nations Command which would act in the capacity of an international police force. The draft resolution in document A/3308, which is now before the General Assembly, gives directives to the Secretary-General regarding the purposes and functions of the police force.

109. It is, however, the understanding of the Ethiopian delegation, as one of the sponsors of this draft resolution, that the police force to be created will have limited functions and duties to perform. These functions have been set out in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report as "to secure the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956". Consequently, my delegation finds itself in complete agreement with the representative of Sweden who said at the 566th meeting that the international force would not be sent to the Middle East to take over the functions which the Franco-British forces had set out to accomplish. I will add further that in my delegation's clear understanding the nature and the duties to be assigned to the international police force shall not exceed the objective of securing the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I), which, of course, includes the supervision of the withdrawal of invading troops from Egyptian territory.

110. With this important point in mind, my delegation has no hesitation in recommending the draft resolution contained in document A/3308 to the General Assembly.

111. Since my delegation is one of the co-sponsors, needless to say it will vote for the draft resolution contained in document A/3309, which was read out to the Assembly this morning by the representative of Ceylon. That draft resolution is part and parcel of the effort that the Assembly has been making to restore peace in the Middle East.

112. Before leaving this rostrum, I should like to pay the homage of my delegation to the Secretary-General for the prompt and efficient manner with which he has performed the difficult task that has been laid upon him. We are grateful to him and to his staff.

113. Mr. WALKER (Australia): We are facing a question that is evolving very rapidly, and today we have before us two draft resolutions regarding which I wish to state the views of my delegation. But first I should like to comment on one aspect of the matter which has been in my mind from time to time and which I hope will not escape the attention of other delegations at this Assembly. I think that we should not for one moment forget that a heavy burden of responsibility rests upon the Soviet Union for the developments which led up to the present situation in the Middle East. Had it not been for the Soviet Union's action in supplying arms to Egypt, thus upsetting the delicate balance of forces in the area, then the United Nations might very well not be facing today the crisis that is upon it.

114. The Assembly has before it two draft resolutions, one proposed by the delegations of Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden, which carries further the decision of the Assembly looking to the early establishment of an international force. It also has before it the nineteen-Power draft resolution which was submitted by the representative of Ceylon. I wish to say a word first about the latter draft resolution although, of course, it follows in time the draft resolution submitted by the seven Powers earlier today.

115. The nineteen-Power draft resolution in many ways is substantially a repetition of the first Asian-African draft resolution [A/3275], a draft which the Australian delegation was not able to support.

116. In this connexion, I must take exception to the references made by some speakers, particularly by the representative of Syria at the preceding meeting, when he asserted that previous Assembly resolutions had been opposed only by—I use his words—“the aggressors and their accomplices”. Such language is not only offensive to the United Kingdom and France, which came here and explained their action, but it is also offensive to my delegation and other delegations, which have seen fit, on very good grounds, to accept the assurances given by the United Kingdom and France and which feel able to understand the objectives that are being pursued by those countries in relation to the conflict in the Middle East.

117. The objections that we previously stated to the first African-Asian draft resolution still stand, and we see little point in the Assembly repeating itself in a swiftly moving crisis of great importance. Moreover, given the attitude of Israel as just stated again today, it seems to us that the present draft resolution, if effect is given to the requirement for the immediate withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces, would ensure an early resumption of the Egyptian-Israel conflict.

118. The draft resolution ignores the offer made previously by the United Kingdom and France, which has been followed up by the introduction of a cease-fire. More than that, the draft would appear to obstruct, in our view, the operation of setting up the international force which has been proposed in the other draft resolution that is before the Assembly.

119. We feel that the essential and urgent thing at the moment is to put first things first, to lay the foundations for a new régime of peace and stability in this troubled area. The Assembly should concentrate its attention upon the urgent establishment of an international force and its early movement into the area of hostilities. The stated objectives of such a force would correspond, I trust, to what the African-Asian draft resolution seeks to accomplish. Therefore, we believe that priority should be given to the seven-Power draft resolution.

120. I should like to express our appreciation of the enormous work which the Secretary-General and those associated with him have put into the elaboration of the detailed proposals that are before the Assembly. I am sure that all representatives are extremely grateful for this devoted application of his great abilities to the task.

121. I should remark, however, that the Australian Government, in considering the documents submitted within the last few hours, has felt some doubts regarding the effectiveness of some of the arrangements proposed and the enduring nature of the international police force which it is proposed to establish. There is some question in our minds as to whether it will remain in the area long enough effectively to secure the Egyptian-Israel situation along the lines that are necessary for the establishment and maintenance of peace and, we hope, a permanent settlement. Nevertheless, despite the sort of doubts that may arise in our minds as we examine some parts of this proposal as set out in the document before us, it is the view of my delegation and of my Government that it is a matter of urgency to proceed with the establishment of an international force and for the force to take up the duties which the Assembly is entrusting to it.

122. If we have one specific criticism to make of the seven-Power draft resolution, it is that this element of urgency is perhaps not sufficiently stressed. For that reason, I should like to propose a very small amendment consisting of the insertion of one additional word in operative paragraph 4. We should like to introduce the word “forthwith” after the word “proceed”, so that the paragraph would read:

“Requests the Chief of Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force;”

123. It is our fervent desire that every assistance should be given, so that this task can be accomplished as rapidly as possible. The Australian delegation therefore supports the draft resolution before us, and moves the small but, I think, important amendment that I have just presented.

124. Mr. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (*translated from French*): The French delegation welcomes the Secretary-General's efforts. Thanks to him, resolution 998 (ES-I), originally submitted by the Canadian delegation, will culminate in the creation of an international United Nations Force. The French Government is especially gratified to see that an idea which was first suggested by France is thus finally materializing. About forty years ago Léon Bourgeois advanced the idea of an international army. In 1919, during the Peace Conference which marked the end of The First World War, the French Government made specific proposals for the establishment of an international force. The time was not yet ripe. We again submitted our proposals to the League of Nations, but our efforts met with complete apathy, and The Second World War extinguished them altogether.

125. In 1945 the United Nations incorporated provisions in its Charter for the organization of an international force. During the first years of the Organization the Military Staff Committee, under the authority of the Security Council, attempted to define the principles in accordance with which the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter might be applied. We all know which permanent member of the Security Council constantly thwarted those efforts.

126. In the case now under consideration France, in complete agreement with the United Kingdom, has again taken the initiative. In fact, the Franco-British declaration of 2 November explicitly envisaged the establishment of a United Nations force to take over the mission undertaken by the Franco-British forces.

127. The French Government, like the vast majority of the Members of the Assembly, will therefore support the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden [A/3308].

128. We should like to see such an international force set up as soon as possible. At this stage, we do not contemplate participation in it. The energy and perspicacity manifested by the Secretary-General, particularly during the past days, are a sure token of success. The problems involved in the establishment of an international force are, of course, exceedingly complex. The definition of its functions and the manner in which it is to be used also raise questions of great importance which must be settled in detail. We should also be careful to see to it that the Security Council retains its competence in all matters pertaining to the application of the meas-

ures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. We are confident, however, that in time all the difficulties involved in the execution of so vast an undertaking will be satisfactorily overcome. We have always made it clear that our forces would leave the Suez Canal zone as soon as international forces were in a position to carry out the vital missions we are performing, and I should like to make the same declaration once again from this rostrum.

129. As regards the draft resolution sponsored by the African-Asian Powers [A/3309], we are not in disagreement with its terms. We hope to be in a position to withdraw our forces promptly. But the realization of our wishes in this respect depends upon the rapidity with which an international force capable of carrying out the tasks described in my letter of 5 November [A/3294] to the Secretary-General is established. I have already pointed out that my Government favoured the establishment of the force and that the Secretary-General could be relied upon to set it up. Hence, we interpret the words "... immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions" in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution in the light of the foregoing remarks. Among the resolutions in question, the one concerned with the organization of the first units of the international force, is specifically mentioned. The objective pursued by the Assembly is thus the same as ours on this point. Indeed it could not be otherwise. It is essential to the maintenance of peace that there should be no vacuum between the Egyptian and Israel forces.

130. Nevertheless, we would abstain on the draft resolution if the Assembly were called upon to vote on it, in the first place because we consider that the problems raised in this text will be settled by the adoption of the draft resolution sponsored by the seven Powers [A/3308] approving the Secretary-General's report, and secondly because we believe that these problems are, by their very nature, within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. These problems have both military and political aspects, the complexity of which we all realize, and they must be settled dispassionately in an atmosphere of undisturbed calm.

131. It is our firm conviction that the Security Council should endeavour to solve them by meeting as soon as possible at the foreign-minister level; and we earnestly hope that its work will produce concrete results.

132. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: In the course of the debate certain requests for clarifications have been directed to me. I felt that at this stage of the discussion it might be useful if I gave a reply.

133. At the 566th meeting, the representative of Syria expressed the fear that in case of non-compliance by Israel with the request for the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice demarcation lines, there would arise, on the basis of the position taken in my report, a situation where Egypt would be presented with a *fait accompli*, as the United Nations Force is not at present established with a view to enforcing the withdrawal of forces. The representative of Syria said that he could not but feel the deepest misgivings concerning this situation.

134. My reply is simple. Were the unfortunate situation envisaged by the representative of Syria to arise, I would consider it my duty to bring it at once to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council for such measures as those two main organs

of the United Nations might decide upon. Egypt would thus not be faced with a *fait accompli* but could resort to the means provided for in the Charter. My position as to the functions of the United Nations Force in no way limits the right in these respects. I consider the definition of those functions in the report to be sound as a basis for this first stage in the setting up of the Force.

135. Another question which has been directed to me concerns the interpretation of the legal situation in respect of withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces other than the Israel forces. In my view, it follows from resolution 997 (ES-I) that all non-Egyptian forces — with the obvious exception of the United Nations Force which will be there with the consent of the Egyptian Government — have to withdraw from Egyptian territory. It goes without saying that "Egyptian territory" in this context must be understood in the sense which follows from international law and the Armistice Agreement.

136. Still another question which I should like to clarify concerns the interpretation of my indication that the United Nations Force will have to operate within a region extending from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation line as established in the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. What I intended to say was entirely directed to the situation with which we are faced. The United Nations Force will have to come in at what is at present the dividing line between the Egyptian and Israel forces. It is at whatever may come to be the dividing line that it will have to function. As the situation is, that means that United Nations activities will have to start close to the Suez Canal, but that after the expected compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly they would end up at the armistice demarcation line.

137. Other points have been raised on which I find it difficult to elaborate what I have said in the report, which to me seems to be self-explanatory. For example, I have been asked for an interpretation of what I have said about the length of the assignment of the Force being determined by the need arising out of the present conflict. I am sure the Members will appreciate that, in the still unclear situation, it would be premature for me to say how the needs might develop after the end of the immediate crisis. However, the Force being under ultimate authority of the General Assembly, I think that this point need not give rise to worries. Likewise, I find that the interpretation of my statement concerning previous decisions, to the effect that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and thereby the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict, should be evident. However, this aspect too will certainly be followed closely by the General Assembly.

138. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): We are gathered here at this meeting of the emergency session of the General Assembly for two purposes: (1) to consider the report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I) [A/3302] and (2) to consider the nineteen-Power draft resolution submitted at the 566th meeting.

139. Before addressing myself to these two specific topics, I want to say, on behalf of my delegation, that at this stage when we hope we are entering into a phase where collective responsibility and the collective will of the world are being brought to bear on the

question for beneficent ends, it is desirable to look back only to the extent essential for the consideration of this problem. We have come to the stage when we must look forward and apply ourselves to the various aspects of this question. My Government desires me to state before the General Assembly—because I have just come from India—its general reaction and attitude toward the present difficulties.

140. Our country, our people and our Government, indeed our whole part of the world, have been shocked by the developments that have taken place in relation to Egypt. We desire to state without any superlatives that we regard the action of Israel as an invasion of Egyptian territory, and the introduction of the forces of the United Kingdom and France as an aggression without any qualification. We have said this from the very beginning.

141. We received this news not only with a sense of shock but also with a great deal of sadness. I say "with a great deal of sadness" for two reasons, first because of the great physical harm that is being inflicted upon the people of Egypt, and secondly because those engaged in a part of this aggression, namely the Franco-British alliance, are countries and peoples with whom we have very close kinship. That is particularly so in the case of the United Kingdom. It is therefore more in sorrow than in anger that we approach this problem. During the last several weeks of great anxiety, we have tried to exercise our influence by way of persuasion to change the course of these developments.

142. I think that I should leave this aspect at this stage, stating the minimum that is required. Later I shall point out why it is necessary to refer to it. I shall come now to the first of the draft resolutions, namely the nineteen-Power draft [A/3309].

143. There is very little that one need say about this draft, except that it is very largely a reiteration of previous resolutions. It was submitted because previous resolutions have not been complied with. However, there are certain new factors, namely, that the call for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian soil has been partly complied with by those countries that are now engaged in the invasion of Egypt. The United Kingdom and France, and Egypt, effected a cease-fire, according to all reports, at 7 p.m. (New York time) yesterday. However, there have been expressions of view in the Assembly that the fighting was continuing. Let us assume, for our purpose, that the cease-fire has been effected and that a beginning has been made in regard to the observance of the General Assembly's resolutions.

144. Two other factors remain, however. One concerns the statement in operative paragraph 2 of that draft, in which Israel is once again called upon to withdraw immediately all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the Armistice Agreement of 24 February 1949. I think that the Assembly will appreciate the importance, not only of reiterating this request, but of taking it very seriously and of going along with the Secretary-General in the observations which he has just made.

145. Repeated calls have been made to Israel to withdraw its invading armies from the territory of Egypt, which are there in violation of the Armistice Agreement, in violation of the provisions of the Charter and in violation of all known standards of international conduct. The problems which we are subsequently going to consider, indeed the problem of terminating the con-

flict and attempting to find the beginning of a solution of the basic problems there, are only possible within the context of this withdrawal.

146. This particular matter is not a question of how much or how little can be done or of whether it can be done in one day or in two days; the withdrawal of Israel forces to their own frontiers as established by the Armistice Agreement is fundamental to any settlement.

147. I am sure that the Assembly is perturbed, as was my delegation, at the recent official statements made by the Government of Israel, statements which have been criticized even by the other two Powers that are now engaged in operations in Egypt. The Prime Minister of Israel has stated that there will be no withdrawal from the advanced positions occupied. However, there has been a communication to the Secretary-General in regard to the cease-fire. That is one of the reasons why this draft resolution has become necessary.

148. My delegation is heartened by the statement just made by the Secretary-General, in which he expressed I am sure, the will and the views of practically the entire representation of this Assembly, namely, that if this request is not complied with, then the Assembly must turn at once to the other provisions and remedies that are open to it under the provisions of the Charter.

149. Operative paragraph 3 of the draft calls upon the United Kingdom and France once again immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory. Perhaps I am not quite correct about this, but there seems to be a technical inaccuracy here, because when we first called upon the United Kingdom and France it was in regard to the introduction of forces into the territory of Egypt. At that time the landings had not taken place. However, the landings took place subsequently and the territory of Egypt was occupied. Now there has been a cease-fire, but the cease-fire is only a beginning and only a part of the request made by the General Assembly. It must be followed by the withdrawal of all forces.

150. Every practical person will realize that the word "immediately", in a political resolution cannot be interpreted in the sense of instant action, because troops have to be moved. What this draft resolution seeks to do is to express the view of its sponsors that it is not possible to think in terms of these Franco-British forces remaining on Egyptian territory contingent upon some other element. It is necessary to state this, because the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has repeatedly said that these forces would so remain. But the history of Egypt is one of occupation by various invading troops throughout the past, even though they sometimes came after stating that it was only for temporary purposes.

151. Operative paragraph 3, therefore, should not present any difficulties to those who agree with the general idea that the aggressive forces must be evacuated. That is what it calls for. Therefore, the removal of these troops must begin forthwith and its termination must take place without delay. That is the meaning of this clause. My delegation is not prepared to set an hour by the clock when this should be done, but the substance of the paragraph is entirely clear.

152. With great respect, I should now like to make some observations in connexion with paragraph 3 which have become necessary as a result of the observations

made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France. They are entirely free to place their own interpretations on these questions, but as far as my delegation is concerned and as far as we understand the substance and purpose of this draft resolution and the report before us, we do not believe that the parties which have committed aggression can lay down the conditions under which they are willing to withdraw. The United Nations has requested them to withdraw as part of the termination of that aggression.

153. We cannot accept the position that the invading forces lay down the conditions, ostensibly in the interest of the invaded party. If we do that, we put ourselves in the position of justifying the invasion itself. And that is a position which my Government is not ready to accept. We are quite prepared to appreciate that there are practical problems involved. Therefore, any reasonable space of time that is required for the physical removal of troops is something that one can understand. But we cannot accept the view that the pursuit of some purposes with which we can be in agreement or which are in conformity with the Charter necessitates these forces remaining on Egyptian soil.

154. With those explanations, I would like to commend this draft resolution to the acceptance of the Assembly and I hope that it will be possible for the United Kingdom and France, which have expressed doubts about it, and for those who have supported them in their positions, to accept this draft so that it can go forward unanimously, and that at this stage, therefore, the aggression would be terminated by common consent.

155. Then I proceed to the second draft resolution, that submitted by Argentina and six other countries [A/3308] and introduced by the representative of Ceylon at the previous meeting. But before I speak about that resolution, I would like to make a statement relative to the second report which the Secretary-General has placed before the Assembly. I should like to join all the speakers before me on this rostrum in paying my tribute to the hard work, the diligence and thoroughness which has entered into the preparation of this report, and I am sure that I am not exaggerating when I say that the Assembly and the world owe a debt of gratitude to the Secretary-General for his applying himself so diligently to this problem.

156. Since we are now embarking on a very serious phase of activity on behalf of the United Nations, and since those countries that would be contributing troops or in other ways contributing to the maintenance of the international police force would be taking on responsibilities, it is essential that clarification should be sought and made and interpretations given.

157. I am directed by my Government to deal with this matter in that way. Two or three days ago, when this question was discussed between the Secretary-General and our Government, he very kindly gave us his view of the context and conditions in which any participation of countries in the international United Nations Force would take place. My delegation has formulated these conditions [A/3302/Add. 4/Rev. 1] and further discussed them with the Secretary-General, and we understand that they represent the accurate set of conditions and circumstances in which such a force would function; and we would like this to be put into the record.

158. The participation of a Member State would be based upon these conditions: first, that the emergency

Force would be set up in the context of the withdrawal of the Franco-British forces from Egypt and on the basis of the call to Israel to withdraw behind the armistice lines; secondly, that that Force would not in any sense be a successor to the invading Franco-British forces or would in any sense take over its functions; thirdly that it would be understood that the Force might have to function through Egyptian territory and, therefore, that the Egyptian Government must consent to its establishment; fourthly that the Force would be a temporary one for the emergency. Its purpose is to separate the combatants, namely, Egypt and Israel, with the latter withdrawing as required by the Assembly resolution. The Force must be of a balanced composition. The agreement that we are now making would be one in principle and we would reserve our position with regard to actual participation until the full plan is before us.

159. I have been instructed by my Government to communicate to the Secretary-General—which I have done—that the Government of India would be willing to participate in the United Nations Force contemplated by his report in the context of the conditions that I stated and would be willing, when the arrangements are made final and the consent of the Assembly received, to send officers immediately to enter into consultations with the Secretary-General in regard to the details. Of course, when we say "immediately", we are taking into account the fact that communications between India and this country have now been somewhat interrupted by the damage done to the airfields in the Middle East.

160. The Government of India has been able to accede to the position that its contribution would be something on the order of a battalion in strength. I am instructed to say that transport facilities, including airlift, would have to be provided through the United Nations, because it is not possible for us to transport this body of troops and equipment on such short notice without outside assistance. It will be possible to implement such agreement as we may make in a very short period, not more than ten days from the day of agreement, although it may be possible to send advance bodies beforehand. I have already made this communication to the Secretary-General [A/3302 Add 4/Rev. 1] and it is among the papers that have been circulated.

161. I want to draw the attention of the Assembly to the Secretary-General's report which is contained in document A/3302. My delegation is glad to note that it is specifically stated in paragraph 4 that the authority of the United Nations Commander would be so defined as to make him fully independent of the policies of any one nation.

162. I would also like to draw the attention of the Assembly to another observation by the Secretary-General in the report, with which my delegation is not only in agreement but which it desires emphasized:

"It may in this context be observed that the Franco-British proposal, to which I have already referred, may imply that the question of the composition of the staff and contingents should be subject to agreement by the parties involved, which it would be difficult to reconcile with the development of the international force along the course already being followed by the General Assembly." [A/3302, para. 6.]

163. The report goes on to say that this Force should be set up on an emergency basis "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms" of the General Assembly resolution. The emphasis should be on the words "all the terms" of the General Assembly resolution. So far we are in clear agreement; we have no difficulties.

164. Now we come to paragraph 8 of the report and I should like the Assembly to look at the last two sentences of paragraph 8. Here the difficulty is not perhaps so much one of substance, but in a matter of this kind, in view of the not always happy experience that my Government has had in dealing with similar problems in Korea and in Indo-China, clarification beforehand is essential in order that work may proceed without impediments, and also so that we may not have difficulties with other participants. Paragraph 8 says the following:

"It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. By the establishment of the Force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956".

165. I confess I am a little perplexed by this statement. I do not know quite what its implications would be. If it means that the United Nations Force is not intended to support the parties in the aggression or to intervene militarily, then I understand it. But if its meaning is that the occupation forces would remain where they are and therefore that their military balance would not be affected then of course it is totally contrary to its purpose. I draw attention to this because as the statement stands it is a little perplexing.

166. The Secretary-General will bear with me. We have had difficulties of this kind — I would not say without number, but quite a number—both in Indo-China and in Korea, of a very serious character. My Government would have grave apprehensions in undertaking military obligations which are subject to the interpretation of foreign office lawyers of different countries afterwards. Therefore, I think that some clarification of this paragraph would greatly relieve our minds.

167. The Secretary-General has told us that this is the second and final report, but I suppose that that is only a procedural description, because it goes on to say, in paragraph 11: "However, the general observations which are possible should at this stage be sufficient." Therefore, my delegation wants to be assured that there is no finality about this report in the sense that it is a kind of army manual in regard to these forces. There, again, it is not because we want to be punctilious, but because we have been once bitten, twice bitten, and are three times shy at the moment.

168. Again, when we come to paragraph 12, which is the most important part, I should like, first, to observe that any interpretation which we make in regard to the draft resolution when we record our vote ought to be bounded by paragraph 12. That is to say, we could not vote on the draft resolution and then go on to think that we can depart from the essential features of paragraph 12 in the Secretary-General's report.

169. I believe that it is permissible to elaborate, in the sense that my delegation has done, by reading out

the context, as we understand it, which we agreed with the Secretary-General. Therefore, when votes are cast, it should be with the definite understanding that this draft resolution urges, in accordance with the terms of resolution 997 (ES-I), that "all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area". This was at the time when the landings had not taken place in Egypt and invasion was only by way of aerial bombardment. But now we have a new situation and, therefore, the sense of that sentence is not merely to halt the movement of military forces but to reverse the movement of military forces and withdraw them. Therefore, I feel sure that the Secretary-General would agree that this is the implication of this paragraph.

170. Paragraph 12 says further:

"These two provisions combined indicate that the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops."

"Non-Egyptian troops" now would mean all non-Egyptian troops since, at the time this resolution was passed, the only non-Egyptian troops in Egypt were the Israel troops, and, therefore, it must be meant to include the others.

171. We turn now to a point on which we wish to lay some emphasis. The last sentence of paragraph 12 reads as follows:

"Its functions can, on this basis, be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines, established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel."

It must be clearly understood that when we say "an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines", it is only in the sense that Egypt will permit the use of its territory by the troops in order to perform their functions, which are to keep the Israel invading armies within their own frontiers. It cannot in any sense at any time be construed that this Force has any occupation function in these areas or will in any way infringe the sovereignty of Egypt, but only that it has the right of way wherever necessary.

172. My Government is not only in agreement, but would stand with the Canadian Government in the view which it has put forward in a *communiqué* just now issued by the Canadian Cabinet, which is referred to in paragraph 14 as follows: "General experience seems to indicate that it is desirable that countries participating in the Force should provide self-contained units in order to avoid the loss of time and efficiency." We subscribe to that, and that is why, when the request was made to us in the report on this matter, the Government of India, although it has a very small army and has its own commitments, agreed to furnish troops of a battalion in strength.

173. Finally, the Secretary-General goes on to say, in paragraph 19, that he is fully aware of the exploratory character of this plan, which means that all the details will have to be worked out.

174. My delegation will support the draft resolution that has been put forward by the delegation of Ceylon on its own behalf and on that of six other delegations [A/3308]. We hope that, in agreeing to the decision to

set up this international police force under the supervision of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General will look into all the legal aspects, and if there are any legal loopholes, will seek to close them; even in performing what we think is a useful action, it is essential that we conform to the spirit and letter of the Charter.

175. There are two other small matters to which I wish to refer while I am at this rostrum, and those are the two communications addressed to the Secretary-General — one from the United Kingdom [A/3306] and the other from France [A/3307]. I would refer particularly to the latter, point 3 of which reads as follows:

“The French Government considers it necessary, in accordance with the suggestion made to you by Mr. Christian Pineau in his letter of 5 November [A/3294], that a meeting of the Security Council should be called at the ministerial level as soon as possible in order to work out the conditions for a final cease-fire and a settlement of the problems of the Middle East.”

176. I regret to say that my delegation is not able to comprehend this paragraph in relation to what we are doing because, while no one can object to its being a very good thing for the Council to meet at the ministerial level — it was so contemplated in the Charter — the final condition of the cease-fire is the operation now contemplated by the draft resolution under discussion, and if we are going to send the question from pillar to post without knowing where the decisions are to be made, I am afraid that the urgency of this matter will not receive attention, and the whole of the arrangement that we are now trying to establish will flounder. Therefore, this paragraph — while the French Government in its wisdom is no doubt entirely free to communicate what it likes and what it thinks is right — cannot be regarded, I think, as a provision of the cease-fire, and the General Assembly cannot be committed in any way to the idea that the cease-fire arrangements must await a meeting of the Security Council for settlement. It is exactly because of the Security Council's inability to perform its duties on account of the French veto, that this matter has come before the Assembly, and if it is to go back to the Security Council, then other conditions will have to prevail. It is not in any sense to give expression to a rivalry between these two bodies, but to take this matter as it stands today — namely, that a country having been invaded without cause, and the security provisions having become inoperative on account of the exercise of the veto — other procedures have been adopted. I should like to say that, in the present case, we have an instance of great suffering and tragedy — tragedy in the sense not only of physical suffering and physical damage, but also of spiritual damage that has been done to the principles of the United Nations.

177. As I said in the beginning, the problem before the Assembly is a matter of great sadness for us because at least one of the parties concerned stands in extremely close relations with us, and our country is seriously concerned as to whether it represents a reversal of the great processes of human emancipation that have been taking place in Asia and Africa during the last half-century, in which the United Kingdom has made very significant contributions. It was a heartbreaking thing for us to see that there was a reversal of this process — I do not want to call it by familiar names — which would have meant the imposition of military power over

a weak nation and an attempt to settle disputes by the arbitrament of arms. It has been of brief duration, and we hope that, as soon as this problem is out of the way, the General Assembly, including those Members which are now not voting for these draft resolutions, will participate in the attempt to bind up the wounds, both physical and otherwise, that have occurred as a result of present developments.

178. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Secretary-General wishes to say a few words in reply to the comments which we have just heard from the representative of India.

179. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I shall speak very briefly. The representative of India has raised a great number of points. On several he has attempted an interpretation of what I intended to say, and I think I can say that on all those points, to the extent that I could fully grasp what the representative said, I can confirm that his interpretation of my intentions is correct.

180. There were two points on which direct questions were addressed to me. The first one was concerning the character of the report which I have called final. The report is final only in the sense that it is the last report I shall issue under the mandate decided upon by the Assembly on the morning of 4 November [563rd meeting] with a forty-eight hour margin. Of course, the Assembly may look forward to further reports on the development of the Force.

181. As to the question of intent — as I expressed it, “no intent . . . to influence . . .” [A/3302, para. 8] — I wanted by that sentence to express only the view that the basic political decisions of the Assembly, of course, constitute the fundamental law of this whole operation.

182. Mr. UROUIA (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): At this stage in the work of the first emergency special session of the General Assembly, my delegation wishes to refer only to the three most important documents which are at present before us. The first of those documents is the second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force [A/3302].

183. My delegation associates itself with the statements of approval made by various representatives with regard to the Secretary-General's final report. My delegation would like, however, to voice some doubts regarding the scope of the functions of emergency United Nations Force, as outlined in paragraph 12 of the report. That paragraph states among other things:

“The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps,” — I wish to emphasize these words: “more than an observers' corps” — “but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly.”

184. It is these last words that cause my delegation some misgivings, because it would seem that the functions of the emergency United Nations Force would be conditional upon the States involved in the conflict, being prepared to take, and in fact taking all the neces-

sary steps to comply with the recommendations made by the General Assembly at this special session.

185. We wonder what would happen if one or more of the parties involved in the conflict failed to take the necessary steps to comply with the recommendations of the Assembly, the fundamental purpose of which is not only the suspension of hostilities, but also the withdrawal of the invading forces from Egyptian territory and the re-establishment of the *status quo* preceding the warlike acts which led to the urgent calling of this special session of the Assembly.

186. My delegation is nevertheless prepared to support the draft resolution proposed by Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden [A/3308], in which, *inter alia*, the Assembly would concur in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated, in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report. We consider that, if the Assembly should so concur, its approval would be provisional and that consequently, if circumstances so required in the future, the Assembly could extend the scope of the emergency Force's functions.

187. We prepared this brief statement, but after hearing the statement of the Secretary-General a few moments ago we see that our predictions were correct: the functions of the emergency Force could be extended later if circumstances so required. We think we have correctly interpreted the Secretary-General's words.

188. My delegation is fully prepared to vote in favour of the draft resolution proposed by the nineteen Member States [A/3309], because it considers that that draft embodies points of undoubted urgency at this stage of the events in Egypt and of the General Assembly's deliberations. Under that draft resolution the Assembly would call upon Israel once again, and with every justification, to withdraw immediately all its forces behind the armistice lines and would also call upon the United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory.

189. In the opinion of my delegation, if Israel, the United Kingdom and France comply with this recommendation of the General Assembly, which is, moreover, but a repetition of previous recommendations, they would show their support of the principles of the Charter and their sincere desire to contribute to the restoration of international order in regard to the disturbance which has broken out in the Middle East. That would strengthen the position of France, the United Kingdom and Israel and of the United Nations in general in regard to the very serious events which are casting a pall over the noble people of Hungary in their anguished struggle for freedom, those people with regard to whom Israel, the United Kingdom and France have adopted an attitude which is supported and applauded by the vast majority of the free peoples of the world.

190. Mr. CARPER (Turkey): I shall be very brief. We interpret the provisions of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution in document A/3309 in the light and context of the second considerandum of the same draft resolution. We believe that it is nobody's interest to create a vacuum, so to speak, even of a temporary nature. It is with this understanding that we shall lend our support to the nineteen-Power draft resolution.

191. We shall also support in its present form the draft resolution presented by Argentina, Burma, Cey-

lon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden, as contained in document A/3308.

192. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) (*translated from French*): I should like to explain very briefly my delegation's position on the two draft resolutions before us.

193. My delegation wholeheartedly supports the draft resolution presented by the delegations of Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden [A/3308] and will vote in favour of it.

194. With regard to paragraph 6 of this draft resolution, while I should like to thank the delegations which nominated Iran as a member of the proposed advisory committee, I would suggest that Ceylon should replace Iran. If my suggestion were accepted, the advisory committee proposed in paragraph 6 would be composed of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan.

195. May I take this opportunity of addressing my warmest thanks to the Secretary-General and of expressing to him my delegation's admiration of the superhuman efforts that he and his assistants have made to submit to us so comprehensive and constructive a report in so short a time.

196. As regards the other draft resolution, the nineteen-Power draft [A/3309], my delegation being one of the sponsors I need hardly say that we shall support it. We hope that the international United Nations Force proposed by the Secretary-General will be set up immediately, so that it may replace the Franco-British forces without delay and may be able to ensure and supervise the cessation of hostilities and perform its other duties.

197. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation will vote for the draft resolution proposed by seven Members of the Assembly [A/3308], which embodies the point of view expressed by the Secretary-General in his final report [A/3302]. Incidentally, I want to compliment Mr. Hammarskjöld and the Secretariat for the splendid work they have done.

198. On the other hand, Brazil will abstain when the vote takes place on the nineteen-Power draft resolution [A/3309]. This draft is perfectly acceptable and reaffirms what the General Assembly has already decided. But paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part call upon Israel, the United Kingdom and France to withdraw immediately from Egypt, whereas this withdrawal would take place as soon as the international Force arrives there — perhaps in one or two days — if the seven-Power draft resolution is adopted. It seems to me that the word "immediately" does not correspond to the reality we are facing.

199. Mr. ABIDIA (Libya): Ten days ago the aggressors — the United Kingdom and Israel — took advantage of the delicate international situation and declared war on Egypt to satisfy colonial and Zionist ambitions. The Security Council twice tried to put an end to that aggression. The first attempt was defeated by the veto of the two Western Powers, the United Kingdom and France, and, in the second case, the Security Council most regretfully refused even to agree to consider the draft resolution sponsored by the delegation of the USSR [S/3713/Rev. I].

200. The General Assembly has now been doing its best for seven days to put an end to this fire set by the United Kingdom, France and Israel in the Middle East, which was about to engulf the whole world, but the Assembly has not yet achieved any firm result.

While its historic resolution, which was approved by sixty-four delegations, representing the great majority of mankind, was accepted by Egypt, the victim, it was ignored by the United Kingdom, France and Israel, the guilty parties.

201. This was a great and savage crime carefully arranged by the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt. The Israel army launched the crime by attacking the northeast part of Egypt, and, when the Egyptian marched to stop the aggressor, the United Kingdom and French Governments seized the opportunity and threw in heavy military forces to destroy Egypt, in the belief that this would be an easy matter and would not take more than a few hours. The battle took place — two big Powers and another aggressive country matched against a small, peaceful nation having nothing but faith in God, courage and the will to freedom. It was a wild and savage war. Thousands of innocent women and children were killed and many of the vital elements of life were destroyed. The aggression continued, and the aggressors, drunk with the dream of victory, started to put forth one condition after another for the surrender of Egypt until their plans foundered on the rock of the courage of the Egyptian people.

202. Let us face the facts, and nothing but the facts. We have heard the United Kingdom, the leader of the allied aggressors, give many reasons to justify the fight against Egypt. First, it was claimed that the purpose of all this was to protect Egypt against Israel. At the same time, the aggressors took advantage of the Israel attack to attempt to occupy the Suez Canal. Later, when the United Nations intervened to stop the aggressors, the United Kingdom laid down conditions such that Egypt would have had to accept a forced settlement for the Palestine and Suez Canal questions. The United Kingdom tried in that way to justify its military action, because that would sound right to many innocent people.

203. Neither a settlement of the Palestine problem nor a settlement of the Suez Canal question was the real reason behind everything that happened in the Middle East, but rather colonialism and Zionism. Egypt and the other Arab States were sincerely seeking a settlement of the aforesaid questions, based on justice and the resolutions of the United Nations and the provisions of the Charter, but not based in any way on force or military action.

204. The history of colonialism and Zionism in the Middle East is a dreadful one, full of troubles, selfishness and bloodshed. Colonialism has always opposed freedom and independence movements out of self-interest and at the expense of poverty, sickness and ignorance in the Middle East. Zionism established its aggressive State on the misery of one million Arab refugees, and is now continuing its aggression against an Arab State to fulfil a part of its Zionist ambitions. When the people of the Arab States decided to lead a peaceful, free life and to put an end to this tragedy, the colonial and Zionist Powers joined together against them, in particular, and against all young, independent, free countries everywhere in general.

205. The situation is still dangerous in the Middle East. The United Kingdom, France and Israel did not comply with the United Nations resolution calling upon them immediately to withdraw their aggressive forces from Egyptian territory. Moreover, they are now trying to take advantage of the emergency international police

force to involve that body in the battle against Egypt and so realize for them the colonial dream of occupying the Suez Canal and enforcing a settlement of the Palestine problem at the expense of the Arab States. And if they fail — and I hope they are going to fail — in the same way they will, after a period of rest, try again to finish Egypt, that brave country.

206. My Government believes that the first and most urgent action which must take place now is the withdrawal of all the aggressor troops from Egyptian soil, including the Gaza strip, the Sinai desert and Port Said, without any conditions. Secondly, the duty of the emergency international police force must be limited to safeguarding the demarcation line between Egypt and Israel established by the Armistice Agreement of 1949. Thirdly, the aggressors, the United Kingdom, France and Israel, should be considered entirely responsible for all the loss of life and damage they committed against Egypt as a result of their aggression.

207. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The representative of India has asked for permission to intervene again in this discussion, and I call upon him to do so.

208. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I am thankful to the President for his indulgence in allowing me to speak again. I come back to the rostrum for two reasons. First, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation to our colleagues from Canada for their initiative with regard to the problem that the Assembly is now considering. It has been the privilege of my delegation to work closely with the Canadian delegation on this question, and the Assembly owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, for all the work he has put into this question and for the very great persistence with which he has pursued his difficult task.

209. Secondly, I come here because, after I had left the rostrum, there came into my hands a memorandum that had been issued to press correspondents, presumably at United Nations Headquarters. It reads:

“United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld today received a cablegram from Major General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, stating that Israel military units this morning were expected to make ‘a raid’ on the Truce Supervision Organization Headquarters in Gaza. General Burns reported that Colonel R. F. Bayard, Chairman of the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission, had sent messages stating that the Israelis were reported intending to seize his radio transmitter but leave the receiver and to restrict all observers and jeeps to the Mixed Armistice Commission compound; also, that food purchases may be restricted.

“General Burns reported that the last transmission received from Colonel Bayard indicated that he did not expect to be able to re-establish connexions. He added that it is presumed that the Israelis forced their way into the Mixed Armistice Commission House to accomplish their mission. He did not expect UNTSO personnel would be harmed. When this information was conveyed to the foreign press, General Burns reported that it was held up by the Israel censor.

“Secretary-General Hammarskjöld made an immediate strong *démarche* to the representative of Israel for prompt transmittal to his Government.

"Previously, on 3 November, the Israel Government requested the withdrawal of the personnel of UNTSO from Gaza and Beersheba."

The memorandum goes on to say:

"In a reply of 4 November, the Israel Foreign Ministry referred to the statement by the Israel representative before the General Assembly . . . to the effect that the General Armistice Agreement had become a fiction and was no longer valid . . .

"On 6 November, Colonel Nursella of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed General Burns that the Government of Israel 'required' the withdrawal of UNTSO personnel from the Gaza and Beersheba areas and that instructions to this effect had been issued to the army commanders concerned. When General Burns asked for clarification of these statements, Colonel Nursella replied that Israel had not intended to imply that force would be used relative to the withdrawal of UNTSO personnel from Gaza and Beersheba. Colonel Nursella added that the UNTSO would have to abide by the regulations of the Israel military governor and would be asked not to use the United Nations radio station", and so on.

210. I think that in the context of what the Assembly is considering — namely, the withdrawal of the invading forces behind the armistice lines — a statement of this character, coming at the present time and reported not by any party but by the very United Nations official who is in charge of these matters, represents a very serious development. And, as will be noticed, this is not a private document: it has been published, and it could have serious reactions on the other parties concerned with this matter. I would, therefore, urge the Assembly to take this new development into consideration and recognize, in the light of it, the importance of obtaining implementation of the Assembly's decision to bring about the withdrawal of all invading forces behind the armistice lines. The territory to which reference was made is on the Egyptian side of the armistice lines, and, what is more, if the Truce Supervision Organization is to suffer this kind of treatment, what is its relation with and bearing upon the international force itself, which is, in a sense, no more than a supervisory organization?

211. This is not a matter on which my delegation wishes to create alarmist feelings, but I think that, coming at this time, and in the context of all the discussions that are going on here and in the midst of the Assembly's efforts to establish institutions and procedures whereby conflicts would be terminated, it seems to be a very untoward development.

212. Perhaps the Secretary-General will have something to tell us — whether this is a matter which we must now take into consideration at this session, or whether it will go before the Security Council or any other organ.

213. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Secretary-General wishes to make a brief statement on the point just raised by the representative of India.

214. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The matter raised by the representative of India is not one which I would like to put before the Assembly. The text to which he refers is a news release which is based on an official report from General Burns, but I think that the matter is better handled in regular diplomatic and administrative forms. I have just this minute received

a further cable referring to the same matter which, to my satisfaction, clarifies the situation in one important respect, and with the President's permission I should like to refer briefly to what I find in this new report, as follows:

"The representative of the Israel Government called and tendered apologies on behalf of the Government for the action taken in the forcible closing of the radio station at Gaza. He stated that, through a misunderstanding of his instructions, the officer in Gaza had exceeded his authority and taken action which was not intended. The forcible closing of the radio station in Gaza was never the intention of the military authorities. He informed me that orders had been given by General Dayan that the radio transmitter will be replaced at once, and that the station can continue to be used."

215. Mr. NUÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) (*translated from Spanish*): At this stage in the debate, my delegation would like very briefly to give its opinion on the draft resolutions before us, but first of all, it wishes to express to the Secretary-General and to all members of the Secretariat its appreciation for the way in which they have handled the momentous problem now under discussion by the United Nations General Assembly at this emergency special session.

216. The Cuban delegation has voted for all the draft resolutions which have been proposed on this question: Those contained in documents A/3256, A/3275, A/3276 and A/3290. It will also vote in favour of the draft resolution proposed by Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden [A/3308].

217. We cannot, of course, vote for the amendment proposed by the representative of Poland [*para. 52 above*], because we feel that the present membership of the proposed advisory committee will enable it to function more efficiently.

218. My delegation will also support the draft resolution contained in document A/3309, because it considers that the immediate withdrawal of all troops from Egypt is something which is possible, logical and in accordance with the resolutions previously adopted. That is to say, inasmuch as the Canadian delegation proposed, and the General Assembly approved, the establishment of an international force to prevent the continuation of the conflict between Israel and Egypt, it is logical to expect that, before the occupying forces have entirely withdrawn, this United Nations Force will reach the area, surely within not more than four or five days.

219. My delegation has accordingly defined its position, but it wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that in the question of Egypt, happily, through the efforts of the United Nations, a cease-fire has been brought about, the slaughter is over, and there will be no more casualties.

220. The United Nations General Assembly must now also try to bring about a cease-fire in Hungary and put a stop to the slaughter there, because if the Assembly fails in its duty, there will not, in view of the way in which the persecution is being carried out by the forces of the Soviet Union, be any Hungarians left alive in Hungary by the time the Assembly arrives at an agreement.

221. I would therefore ask of the President and of the Secretary-General that, as soon as we have taken a vote on the question now before us, we should give

immediate attention to the question of Hungary. Let it not be that the Latin-American countries here represented alone show compassion and vote when the question of Egypt and Israel is being discussed, whereas other Member States neglect the very serious problem of Hungary, which affects not only the prestige of the United Nations, but civilization itself.

222. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation will vote for both the draft resolution proposed by the group of Asian and African countries [A/3309] and that proposed by the seven Powers [A/3308], two of which are sister countries of my own.

223. The first draft resolution is merely a reaffirmation of one of the essential provisions contained in the recommendations approved on 2 and 4 November, but it does not fix a strict time-limit for the Secretary-General to report on the execution of the resolution as was the case with a preliminary draft released yesterday to the Press.

224. My delegation will also vote for the second draft resolution, that proposed by the seven Powers, because we believe that it conforms generally with the purposes expressed in resolution 998 (ES-I), originally sponsored by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and adopted by the Assembly on 4 November.

225. I should now like to draw the General Assembly's attention to the need to study with the greatest care the implications of the highly significant second and final report presented by the Secretary-General [A/3302] and, in particular those of paragraphs 8, 9 and 12.

226. My delegation thinks that the Assembly should clarify and elucidate as may be appropriate the scope of the corresponding paragraphs of the draft resolution, taking into account, of course, the very important statements made at this meeting by the Secretary-General himself.

227. I feel that the foregoing observations are all the more pertinent in that the statements of the Governments directly concerned raise further problems and doubts concerning the emergency international United Nations Force and the powers and functions of the Command.

228. Furthermore, in voting for the two draft resolutions, my delegation will be doing so because it believes that they are irrevocably linked together, for we do not think that it would be practicable for a Force such as that proposed to be sent to the area of hostilities unless all the parties are prepared to respect the recommendations which the Assembly has made.

229. I should like, in conclusion to add a few words of congratulations and thanks to our Secretary-General and his efficient aides for their zealous efforts to comply speedily with the various demands made upon them by the General Assembly.

230. Mr. TSIANG (China): My statement is in the nature of an explanation of vote. My delegation will vote for both draft resolutions.

231. The draft resolution sponsored by the seven Powers [A/3308] is in implementation of the original idea of an international force. I think that idea is in fact a turning point in all our efforts. Today, although we have not yet reached it, we have our final objective in sight, thanks to that creative idea first propounded to us by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada and efficiently matured by our Secretary-

General. I prefer that draft resolution as it stands, as amended.

232. The other draft resolution [A/3309] calls for the withdrawal of the troops of Israel, the United Kingdom and France. I shall vote for that draft. In fact, when these questions were debated in the Security Council I favoured a cease-fire and withdrawal. In my first speech here [561st meeting], I also favoured a cease-fire and withdrawal. There has been some question or doubt with regard to the word "immediately". If we are not careful, that word "immediately" may cause us trouble. If we all act in good faith, that word will not create trouble. If any party should not conduct itself in good faith, then no text can save us from future trouble. That, in fact, is the crux of the matter. Perhaps some other phrase would have been better, but I think that, as the situation is now, all parties are acting in good faith. In that case, when the President announces that the resolution is passed, nobody will pull out a watch and say whether the troops are on the march or not. It is not that kind of operation. If any conflicts or divergencies arise out of the word, my delegation will certainly judge them by the nature of the delays or the trouble. The main basis of the judgment would be whether or not the parties were acting in good faith.

233. Mr. GARIN (Portugal): My delegation is in agreement with the general terms of the draft resolution which has been submitted to implement the suggestions made by the Secretary-General in his most valuable report [A/3302]. We have previously stated the agreement of the Portuguese Government with the principle of an international force. We shall, therefore, cast our vote in favour of that draft resolution [A/3308].

234. With regard to the nineteen-Power draft resolution [A/3309], we believe that as matters stand serious risks might be incurred if a dangerous situation of emptiness was created in the area just before the arrival of the international force. The Portuguese delegation will abstain on that particular draft resolution.

235. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): My statement will be in the nature of an explanation of vote.

236. We have before us three documents: the second and final report of the Secretary-General, and two draft resolutions.

237. The purpose of the Secretary-General's report is to give full effect to the proposal made by Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Pearson on his initiative.

238. After listening to the explanations given by the Secretary-General in connexion with the views and doubts expressed by various representatives, my delegation considers itself bound to state its general agreement with the contents of this report and at the same time to express to the Secretary-General its most sincere appreciation for the manner in which he is discharging the delicate mission entrusted to him by the General Assembly.

239. After the initial proposal by Canada and the adoption at the 565th meeting of the resolution constituting the second stage in this process, it was only logical to expect a draft resolution such as that of Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethio-

pia and Sweden, which would embody the more significant sections of the Secretary-General's report and lead to the establishment of an international police force.

240. The Peruvian delegation will give that draft resolution its firm support, but at the same time wishes to state that it does not consider the amendment proposed by the Polish delegation appropriate.

241. We also have before us the nineteen-Power draft resolution which is designed to reiterate the resolutions which have preceded it and to meet any emergency that might arise and may require a decision by the General Assembly on the basis of the measures already adopted.

242. There is clearly a close link between these two draft resolutions, so that one cannot be conceived of without the other. In my delegation's view they do not represent different, even if parallel, courses of action but converge towards the same goal of bringing about speedy compliance with the first General Assembly resolution on a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops [997 (ES-I)]. My delegation therefore thinks that, irrespective of the comments made concerning the wording of paragraph 3 of the nineteen-Power draft resolution, it must be interpreted in the sense that it implies the execution, and the faithful execution, of the original resolution.

243. As I have said, the Assembly cannot make arrangements or adopt resolutions that are incompatible. As the delegation of Peru considers that the two draft resolutions constitute one complete whole and should be interpreted one in the light of the other or, to be more precise, one as a function of the other, it will also give its support to this draft resolution.

244. Mr. ESKELUND (Denmark): I shall be extremely brief. I have a very few comments on the statements made by two representatives during the debate.

245. The representative of Australia suggested an amendment to operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution contained in document A/3308. He suggested that after the word "proceed" the word "forthwith" should be inserted, so that the paragraph would read: "*Requests* the Chief of Command . . . to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force".

246. I personally consider this an improvement. I have been able to contact all of the sponsors except one, and I think I can say on behalf of all of them that they are prepared to accept this amendment.

247. The representative of Poland asked what was meant in operative paragraph 9 by the words, "the Advisory Committee . . . shall be empowered to request the convening of the General Assembly . . .". He wanted to know whether this meant an ordinary session, a special session or an emergency special session. The idea in this wording was that the session could be of any kind, according to the relevant rules of procedure. If the representative of Poland would consider it satisfactory to insert the words "through the usual procedures" after the words "shall be empowered to request", I do not think any of the sponsors would object.

248. Finally, in explanation of my delegation's vote concerning the draft resolution of the nineteen Powers in document A/3309, I would underline the words stated by a speaker here a few moments ago, namely, that we have to act on the assumption of good faith. I

very much agree. After the interpretation given by the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, that in fact "immediately" means the same as "promptly", my delegation will be able to vote in favour of this draft resolution.

249. Mr. GUNWARDENE (Ceylon): The only provocation for my appearing again is the remark made by my esteemed friends from Cuba and Brazil on the subject of the interpretation of the word "immediately". As the Assembly knows, the nineteen-Power draft resolution flows from resolution 997 (ES-I), adopted on 2 November. The requirements of certain parts of that resolution have been carried out, but some portions remain unfulfilled. We are therefore repeating the request, and we are asking the Israel, British and French forces to leave the territory of Egypt.

250. By the word "immediately" we do not necessarily mean that a very rigid interpretation should be made. What we mean is without delay, promptly. All we want to convey is that Israel, British or French troops have no legal or moral right to remain on the territory of Egypt. The Assembly, by its resolution, rejected in unmistakable terms the explanation that their action was a "police action"; it was an invasion, a military operation conducted against Egypt. In those circumstances, they have no legal or moral right to remain there, and there is no reason why they should lay down as a condition that they would remain until the United Nations emergency police force took over. Our position is that they are in the position of intruders, that they are unlawfully there, and that therefore they should leave as quickly as possible. Nobody appointed them policemen. That was their own unilateral action.

251. The question is now before the United Nations. If a problem arises as a result of a resumption of hostilities, the responsibility for settling it rests on this august Assembly; it is not for one nation or another to say, "We are there as policemen until you come in." Such a position is unthinkable. I would therefore ask these troops to comply with the ordinary decent requirements of the Assembly's resolution that they make arrangements to leave the territory of Egypt as quickly as possible, without delay. That is the explanation I have to offer.

252. Mr. VITETTI (Italy): The position of the Italian delegation on the question which forms the subject of our debate has been clear and consistent since the beginning of the debate. We supported the draft resolution submitted at the 562nd meeting by the United States delegation [A/3256] and we voted for it. We gave our consent to the draft resolution presented by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon and other States [A/3275] at the 563rd meeting. We accepted and welcomed the draft resolution introduced by Canada [A/3276] at the same meeting, and gave our full consent to the creation of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of resolution 997 (ES-I) adopted by the Assembly on 2 November.

253. The next day, on 4 November [565th meeting], we approved the draft resolution introduced by Canada, Colombia and Norway [A/3290] concerning the implementation of the resolution previously approved for the creation of a United Nations force.

254. We now have two more draft resolutions. The draft presented by Argentina, Burma, Ceylon and others

[A/3308] seems to me to be a reasonable document, which is intended to implement resolution 1000 (ES-I). However, with respect to operative paragraph 8 of the draft, I am not sure what is meant by the words "under the present and other relevant resolutions". I understand that this draft resolution concerns this subject, the international force, not related subjects. I really do not see the necessity for the words "other relevant resolutions". They reaffirm things which have already been said. As has been very well explained by the representative of Peru, this text has to be interpreted in the light of the others, and, among others, of this very draft resolution contained in document A/3308, which is before the Assembly tonight. I shall, however, vote for it. I do not see the necessity for those words, but because I voted for the others, I shall vote for this draft tonight.

255. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) (*translated from Spanish*): At the request of the Ambassador of Colombia and with the consent of all the representatives of the Latin American Republics, I am going to read out the decision taken today by the Council of the Organization of American States concerning the questions before the Assembly at this session. It is as follows:

"The Council of the Organization of American States,

"Whereas:

"1. In accordance with Article 1 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency,

"2. Pursuant to Article 53 (e) of the Charter, it is the duty of the Council to promote and facilitate collaboration between the Organization of American States and the United Nations,

"3. In view of the serious events in Egypt and Hungary, the United Nations has adopted important resolutions designed to maintain the peace and the juridical order consecrated in the Charter of the world organization, and

"4. All the member States of the Organization of American States, as Members of the United Nations, have stated their concurrence with those resolutions.

"Resolves:

"1. To declare its firm adherence to the above-mentioned action of the United Nations;

"2. To reaffirm once again the traditional solidarity that unites the American States."

256. All the representatives of the Latin American Republics accredited to the United Nations wished to have this resolution which has been adopted by the regional organization made known to all so as to show that the entire continent is united in support of the cause of peace, justice and law.

257. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): I merely wish to explain the precise position of my Government as a co-sponsor with eighteen other countries of the draft resolution contained in document A/3309, and to raise a point of order with respect to the draft resolution contained in document A/3308.

258. With reference to the former draft resolution, my Government wishes it to be understood that in sponsoring it with eighteen other countries, operative para-

graphs 2 and 3 thereof are understood to be within the context of the second paragraph of the preamble of this draft resolution, and that the purport of the whole draft should be brought into harmonious relation with the operation of the draft resolution in document A/3308.

259. With respect to the latter draft resolution, I would ask for a separate vote on operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 6.

260. Mr. PEARSON (Canada): I merely wish to speak for a minute in order to explain the vote of my delegation on the draft resolution in document A/3309. In this connexion, my delegation supports the view which has been expressed by the representative of Peru and others as to the interconnexion and the close relationship between the two draft resolutions which are before us and the impossibility of separating the implementation of one from that of the other. In that sense we give the same interpretation to the word "immediately" that has been given by others, that is "as quickly as possible". In our minds, there is a relationship, implicit in the word "immediately", between the withdrawal of the forces referred to in the resolution and the arrival and the functioning of the United Nations Force.

261. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): There are no more speakers on the list. The Assembly will accordingly proceed to a vote.

262. We shall vote first on the draft resolution proposed jointly by seven Member States and appearing in document A/3308. Four amendments have been proposed to this draft. The first, proposed by Australia, has been accepted by the sponsors and has consequently been incorporated in the text of the draft resolution.

263. We shall now vote on the amendment proposed by Poland to the effect that Czechoslovakia should be included as a member of the advisory committee whose establishment is proposed in the draft resolution.

The amendment was rejected by 31 votes to 23, with 14 abstentions.

264. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We also have an amendment by Denmark which I shall ask Mr. Cordier to explain, as the Secretariat has not had time to issue it as a document.

265. Mr. CORDIER (Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General): In paragraph 9, after the words "to request" add the words "through the usual procedures".

266. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now vote on the Danish amendment.

The amendment was adopted by 53 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

267. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The representative of Iran has requested that, in paragraph 6, the name of Iran should be replaced by the name of Ceylon. If there are no objections, I shall consider the amendment adopted.

It was so decided.

268. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now proceed to a separate vote on certain paragraphs of the draft resolution, as requested by the representative of the Philippines. This request refers to the operative paragraphs 1, 3 and 6.

Paragraph 1 was adopted by 59 votes to none, with 14 abstentions.

Paragraph 3 was adopted by 61 votes to none, with 12 abstentions.

Paragraph 6, as amended, was adopted by 61 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

269. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We now have to vote on the joint draft resolution as a whole with the amendments proposed by Australia, Iran and Denmark, all of which have been adopted. A request has been made for a roll-call vote.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Australia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania.

The draft resolution as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 64 votes to none, with 12 abstentions.

270. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): Several delegations have expressed a desire to explain their votes as soon as we have finished voting on the two draft resolutions, but the delegation of Pakistan wishes to explain its vote on the nineteen-Power draft resolution [A/3309] before we proceed to the next vote. If there are no objections, I will give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

271. Mr. MIR KHAN (Pakistan): I shall be very brief in explaining my vote on the draft resolution that we have co-sponsored, because the views of the Pakistan delegation on the whole question are known well enough. Some questions have been raised about the withdrawal of the British and the French forces from Egypt on the ground that this step would remove the shield between the Israel and the Egyptian forces. The view of my delegation is that this draft emphasizes the urgency and speed with which the emergency international Force is to be set up and brought to the scene of recent hostilities. I am fully aware of the enormous burden which our Secretary-General has been carrying on his shoulders and I have no desire to add to the strain on him. He is doing a magnificent job in discharging the functions assigned to him by the General Assembly in its various resolutions and I am sure that he has the drive and the dedication to get the emergency United Nations Force ready without any avoidable delay.

272. At any rate, we should concentrate our efforts on getting the international Force ready and operating as quickly as possible. The idea of such a force has

been accepted by the Members of the Assembly, including the parties concerned. The arrival of this Force on the scene without loss of time is essential.

273. My Government's view on the matter of withdrawal of foreign forces is that the presence of the United Nations Force there at once is necessary for the immediate withdrawal, so that the withdrawal and the manner of withdrawal may not produce circumstances to the disadvantage of Egypt. This is what we mean by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the nineteen-Power draft resolution, which is based on resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November and which appears to have unanimous support.

274. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The representatives of Brazil and Norway have asked for the floor for the same purpose as the representative of Pakistan.

275. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil): About an hour ago I indicated that I was going to abstain on the nineteen-Power draft resolution [A/3309] on account of the word "immediately". It was linked with the withdrawal of troops of Israel, the United Kingdom and France. But since explanations have been given to the effect that the word "immediately" means as soon as the international force will be there, I have no further reason to abstain and I will vote in favour of that draft.

276. Mr. ENGEN (Norway): I wish to say just two words in explanation of the vote which my delegation will cast on the draft resolution. My Government has on various occasions supported the call to the parties to withdraw their forces from Egypt promptly. We are contributing modestly to facilitate such prompt withdrawal in accordance with the plans worked out by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly, and adopted by the General Assembly a moment ago.

277. In this connexion, I take note of the statements made by the representatives of India and the Philippines and other sponsors of this draft resolution, and in particular I would take note of the explanation of vote which was given by the representative of Canada a while ago, a statement with which I associate myself fully. I would like to have this statement and my explanation included in the record of this meeting. With that understanding of all these points in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution, my delegation will vote in favour of it.

278. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We now have to vote on the nineteen-Power draft resolution appearing in document A/3309. The vote will be taken by roll-call.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Liberia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El

Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon.

Against: Israel.

Abstaining: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Belgium, France, Laos.

The draft resolution was adopted by 65 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.

279. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation wishes to make a few comments in connexion with its vote.

280. Despite the fact that, as long ago as 2 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution 997 (ES-I) calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the United Nations has been unable, in the considerable space of time since that date, to put an end to the aggression undertaken by the United Kingdom, France and Israel against Egypt, and has proved helpless to prevent the occupation by the aggressors of a large area of Egyptian territory.

281. As we see from the telegram received today from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, war is still going on on Egyptian soil, although many hours have already passed since the time fixed for the cease-fire. In his telegram the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs says:

“... the French and British armed forces are continuing their hostile military action and are firing at both military and civilians at Port Said. They have furthermore encircled the city and severed its communication from the rest of the country...”.
[A/3312].

282. We cannot in this connexion disregard the fact that it was not until they had inflicted heavy damage on the Egyptian people, perpetrated a mass slaughter of the civilian population, seized a large part of the country's territory that the aggressors consented to halt their military operations.

283. And now the aggressors, in their cease-fire conditions, have put forward new demands, indicating that they propose to install themselves in the Suez Canal zone for a long time to come and lord it over the zone. Thus in the United Kingdom representative's letter dated 6 November addressed to the Secretary-General [A/3306] — with which, as the Secretary-General has informed us, France has also associated itself — the proposal is made that the technicians accompanying the Franco-British force should remain in the Suez Canal region indefinitely to clear the Canal of sunken vessels and open it for navigation.

284. It is also plain from that letter that the United Kingdom and France actually wish to make the presence of their forces in Egypt dependent on whether or not the international force to be sent to Egypt will be competent, in their opinion, to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives set out in General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November.

285. And all this is now being presented to us as a success on the part of the United Nations in calling a halt to hostilities and protecting Egypt, the victim of aggression.

286. Once hostilities have ceased, the primary task of the United Nations will be to secure the immediate

withdrawal of all Franco-British and Israel troops from Egyptian territory, as General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) requires.

287. The Soviet delegation voted for the nineteen-Power draft resolution which calls upon the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Israel immediately to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. In so doing, the Soviet delegation took the view that the immediate withdrawal of Franco-British forces from Egyptian territory and the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel behind the demarcation line would create the necessary conditions for the restoration of peace in the area.

288. In the Soviet delegation's opinion, however, the resolution would be more likely to achieve its purpose if it set a definite time-limit for the withdrawal of Israel forces to their own territory and the removal of United Kingdom and French forces from Egypt.

289. The General Assembly has adopted a proposal to set up an international force. It follows from the text of the resolution and the Secretary-General's report on the matter that the United Nations is in effect accepting the United Kingdom and French condition that the armed forces of the two countries should remain on the Egyptian territory they have seized until the United Nations has constituted its own armed force and stationed it at localities designated with Egypt's consent.

290. Surely, there can be no doubt that the draft resolution, providing as it does for the transfer of control over the Suez Canal to an international force, is an undisguised attempt to bring about a settlement of the Suez Canal question favourable to the United Kingdom and France and to endow such a settlement with the authority of the United Nations.

291. The Soviet Union regards the presence of the aggressors' armed forces in the sovereign State of Egypt as inadmissible. As regards the creation and stationing on Egyptian territory of an international police force, the Soviet delegation is obliged to point out that this Force is being created in violation of the United Nations Charter.

292. The General Assembly resolution on the basis of which it is now proposed to form this Force is inconsistent with the Charter. Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council, and the Security Council only, not the General Assembly, to set up an international armed force and to take such action as it may deem necessary, including the use of such a force, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

293. The resolution on the creation of an international armed force is also inconsistent with the purposes for which the United Nations Charter permits the creation and use of an international force. The Charter envisages the use of such a force to help a State victim of aggression to repel the aggressor and to defend such a State against the aggressor.

294. But the resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 and the plan for its implementation, which is contained in the resolution just adopted provide for the use of an international force for quite another purpose than that of repelling aggression against Egypt. The plan provides for the introduction of the international force into Egyptian territory and the transfer of a large part of that territory, including the Suez Canal zone, to its control.

295. No one can fail to see that the occupation of the Suez Canal zone by an international force really

means removing the Canal from Egyptian administration — and that, as we all know, was one of the purposes of the United Kingdom and France in launching aggressive operations against Egypt.

296. For these reasons, the Soviet delegation regards the proposal for the establishment by the General Assembly of an international force to be stationed on Egyptian territory, a proposal which by-passes the Security Council, as contrary to the United Nations Charter.

297. However, in view of the fact that in this instance the victim of aggression has been compelled to agree to the introduction of the international force, in the hope that this may prevent any further extension of the aggression, the Soviet delegation did not vote against the draft resolution, but abstained.

298. The General Assembly must address all its attention and its efforts to solving what is now the main question — the immediate withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Egyptian territory.

299. The Soviet Union is prepared to make its own contribution towards putting an end to the aggression against Egypt in the briefest possible space of time, towards a settlement of the Suez problem based on due regard for the interests of Egypt, a sovereign and independent State, and towards ensuring freedom of navigation for all prospective users of the Canal. Such a settlement of the Suez question would also serve the cause of world peace.

300. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (*translated from French*): I should like to explain in a few words the Belgian delegation's vote on the draft resolution in document A/3309.

301. The withdrawal of the foreign forces which are now in Egyptian territory is already implied in the resolutions previously adopted by the Assembly. The nineteen-Power draft resolution adds nothing new in this respect.

302. Moreover, the Assembly, by adopting the draft resolution in document A/3308, has approved the functions of the United Nations Force as they are defined in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report [A/3302]. Now it is clear from this paragraph that the withdrawal must be co-ordinated with the stationing of the United Nations Force. The word "immediately" in the nineteen-Power draft resolution [A/3309] can have no other meaning. Accordingly, this draft constitutes an unnecessary repetition; that is why the Belgian delegation abstained in the vote.

303. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I come to the rostrum just to say how gratified the United States is that the resolutions before the Assembly have now been adopted and that the United Nations Force is about to come into being. I wish also to make one brief announcement on behalf of the United States Government.

304. I have just informed the Secretary-General that the United States is ready, subject to his wishes and wherever possible, to transport first contingents of the United Nations Force on their way from their bases to Egypt immediately.

305. But we also say this. We understand that the withdrawal will be phased with the speedy arrival of the international United Nations Force. We hope that

this phased operation, as contemplated by the resolution, will begin as soon as possible, and the sooner the better.

306. Mr. ASHA (Syria): I should like briefly to explain the vote which my delegation has just cast. We voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden on the understanding that the words "and other relevant resolutions" contained in paragraph 8 of the said resolution mean the other relevant resolutions adopted so far by the General Assembly during the present emergency special session.

307. We voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the nineteen Powers, with the understanding that the word "immediately" means "promptly". In this connexion we must state that we do not accept the interpretation given to the word by the representative of Canada, because we believe that the withdrawal of forces has nothing to do with the emergency international United Nations Force. The interpretation given by the representative of Brazil is equally irrelevant. We believe that the withdrawal must take place immediately without regard to the organization, composition or despatch of such a force to the area or any other consideration.

308. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): We abstained on operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution in document A/3308 because that paragraph approved in its entirety the exposition of principles contained in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report. While we are in full agreement with those principles, we cannot subscribe to a sentence contained therein, in so far as it relates to the possibility of using this international police force for collective action under Chapter VII of the Charter. We feel that to open the door to that possibility is rather dangerous and may create serious apprehensions in the minds of contributing Governments.

309. We also abstained on operative paragraph 3 of the same draft, because the reference to a "balanced composition" of the international Force is ambiguous. Since the sponsors of the draft have not sought to clarify that phrase, and since it is fraught with unhappy possibilities, not only as to an undesirable preponderance with respect to numerical strength of a force contributed by one nation but also as to an undesirable preponderance of strength with respect to groups of nations contributing, we are unable to accept the provisions in its present form.

310. We also abstained on operative paragraph 6, because we feel that the Advisory Committee should not only concern itself with a study of the planning and operation of this international police force, but should include within the scope of its studies the functions of this police force. We have stated that, in the performance of its functions, this international police force may come to grips with political problems, and thorough study by the advisory committee is therefore required.

311. However, we voted in favour of the whole draft resolution because, subject to the reservations we have stated, we believe it is a major step toward the prompt implementation of the resolution calling for the creation of an international police force.

312. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): If no other representative wishes to explain his vote, I shall call on the Secretary-General.

313. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Before this meeting is adjourned, I should like to inform the Assembly that, despite the responsibilities which the Middle Eastern question has placed upon me and my staff, we are giving serious consideration to our responsibilities under resolution 1004 (ES-II) on the question of Hungary, adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November. That resolution has been formally called to

the attention of the two Governments most directly concerned. I shall shortly be in a position to report on further steps that will be taken in implementation of the resolution. In the meantime, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is working with other welfare agencies to meet the need for food, medicine and similar supplies.

The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.