

# HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT

JANUARY 2014



## HIGHLIGHTS

- Up to 30,000 people whose employment is directly related to construction activities in the Gaza Strip may have lost their jobs since mid-2013 due to the restrictions on the import of construction materials.
- 160 people displaced due to demolitions in Bedouin communities located in "firing zones" along the Jordan Valley; temporary easing of access restrictions in another "firing zone" in southern Hebron.
- The Humanitarian Country Team for the oPt began implementing its 2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan (SRP), addressing the most urgent humanitarian and protection needs of 1.9 million vulnerable Palestinians in Gaza, Area C of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Seam Zone.

## Overview

The first month of 2014 provided a reminder about the pivotal role of access restrictions in generating humanitarian vulnerability among large parts of the population in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt).

During January, the border crossing with Egypt opened for only six out of 31 days, severely impairing the access of people to services, both within and outside Gaza, health in particular. By the end of the month, there were some 1,200 registered patients waiting to travel to Egypt for specialized medical treatments, which in many cases are not available in Gaza. The erratic

opening of the crossing also halted the shipment of medical aid, which up until July 2013 had accounted for 30 per cent of the medicines supplied to the Ministry of Health, as well as the entry of medical missions.

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
## JANUARY FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	6
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	219
Structures demolished in the West Bank	106
People displaced in the West Bank	183

## STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN 2014

390 million  
requested (US\$)

4.5% funded



Children of a herding community with belongings after Israeli authorities demolished their structures in Ein al Hilwa (Tubas Governorate) in the Jordan Valley on 30 January 2014.

Photo by OCHA

[www.ochaopt.org](http://www.ochaopt.org)

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory  
P. O. Box 38712 East Jerusalem 91386 | tel +972 (0)2 582 9962 | fax +972 (0)2 582 5841 | [ochaopt@un.org](mailto:ochaopt@un.org) | [facebook.com/ochaopt](https://www.facebook.com/ochaopt)

Coordination Saves Lives



The almost total halt in the smuggling of building materials through the tunnels since July 2013, together with the Israeli total ban on the import of these materials for the private sector, has led to a gradual depletion of the stocks available in the market and to the freezing of most construction activities. Consequently, it is estimated that over the past few months about 30,000 workers have lost their jobs bringing the unemployment rate by the end of 2013 to 41.5 per cent, the highest in over three years.

January also witnessed a worrying rise in incidents of live fire by Israeli forces at civilians in the access restricted areas (ARA) along Gaza's fence with Israel, resulting in the killing of two civilians, including a boy, and the injury of another 22. This contrasts with the dramatic drop in civilian casualties observed in the ARA during 2013 (the lowest since 2000). The use of live fire to enforce access restrictions not only puts civilian lives at risk while the restrictions undermine already fragile agricultural livelihoods.

Access restrictions and security threats have been impacting agricultural livelihoods in some areas of the West Bank as well. A number of incidents this month highlighted the systematic nature of Israeli settler violence around two specific settlement areas in Nablus Governorate: Yitzhar and Bracha, and the Shilo settlement outposts. Of particular concern is the fact that one of the main measures adopted by the Israeli army to address settler violence in these areas has been the closure of private Palestinian land by military order, requiring farmers to apply for "prior coordination" to cultivate their land.

In the West Bank, access restrictions (movement and use) are also a main driver of displacement, particularly in areas designated as "firing zones". These areas encompass nearly 30 per cent of Area C and are home to 6,200 people and source of livelihood (mainly grazing) of additional 12,000. This month the Israeli authorities demolished 92 structures in such areas along the Jordan Valley, displacing 160 people. The Humanitarian Coordinator for the oPt, James Rawley, expressed concern about these demolitions, as well as about the obstruction to the delivery of assistance to those displaced.

On the other hand, during January, the Israeli authorities declared a temporary lull in demolitions and an easing of access restrictions in another "firing zone" in southern Hebron, where a mediation process between the residents and the authorities is currently taking place.

Alleviating the impact of access restrictions, particularly on food security and access to services, is one of the main goals of the Strategic Response Plan (SRP), which began to be implemented this month by the humanitarian community in the oPt, appealing for US\$390 million in 2014. While the SRP can mitigate some of this hardship, addressing its root causes requires policy changes, primarily the removal of current access restrictions, including relating to land and resources, to the fullest extent possible.

January's incidents follow a trend of increasing friction in the ARA on land and at sea in the second half of December 2013, during which incidents of live fire by Israeli forces at Palestinian civilians were recorded on an almost daily basis.

## INCREASING FRICTION IN GAZA'S ACCESS RESTRICTED AREAS

### Sharp decline in casualties on land during 2013

During the month, two Palestinian civilians, including a 16-year-old boy, were killed by Israeli forces in the access restricted areas (ARA) near the fence with Israel, and 22 other civilians were injured (16 by live ammunition and 6 due to tear gas inhalation). According to investigations by human rights groups, both fatalities were shot without prior warning in two separate incidents, while walking towards the fence, reportedly within the ARA. Nearly two thirds of this month's injuries (14 of 22) occurred in two separate demonstrations east of Jabaliya protesting Israeli access restrictions and involving stone throwing at Israeli forces. Also this month, there were at least four land leveling incursions by Israeli forces to different sections of the ARA.<sup>2</sup>

By contrast, no incident resulting in casualties has been recorded during the month in the ARA at sea, although shooting incidents involving live fire by Israeli forces continued to be reported. Three fishermen were detained by Israeli forces at sea in January, reportedly all within the permitted fishing zone.

January's incidents follow a trend of increasing friction in the ARA on land and at sea in the second half of December 2013, during which incidents of live fire by Israeli forces at Palestinian civilians were recorded on an almost daily basis. This contrasts with the trend observed during 2013, which shows a significant decrease in civilian casualties in the ARA on land compared to 2012 (5 vs. 13 deaths and 66 vs. 187 injuries, respectively), even when excluding the period of the escalation of hostilities in November 2012.

At sea, during 2013, the number of shooting incidents by Israeli forces increased and 10 injuries were reported (compared to none in 2012). The number of incidents involving destruction, damage or confiscation of fishing equipment also increased (20 vs. 6). However, there was a decrease in the number of fishermen detained compared to 2012 (22 vs. 84).

Similarly to this month, during 2013, only 6 per cent of all civilian casualties (three injuries and one death) recorded in the ARA along the fence were farmers, while the rest were demonstrators, workers trying to cross the fence to Israel, recreational visitors, and scrap metal collectors. All 10 civilian injuries recorded at sea in 2013 (no deaths recorded) were fishermen.

Following the ceasefire understanding of 21 November 2012 that ended the Israeli military operation and escalation of hostilities in Gaza and southern Israel, there has been some easing of the access restrictions imposed by the Israeli military on land and at sea.<sup>3</sup> On land, many people have been able to access areas up to 300 metres from the fence for the first time in years, although this access remains precarious due to ongoing shooting incidents and uncertain messaging from Israeli officials. Prior to November

*This section draws upon the Protection Cluster Update on the Access Restricted Areas in Gaza, covering the period of 1 July to 31 December 2013<sup>1</sup>*

*On the sea, despite the improvement in access, fishermen are still denied access to the most profitable fishing areas off the Gaza coast. The current limit is less than one third of the fishing areas agreed under the Oslo Accords - 20 NM.*



2012, Israeli authorities stated that Palestinian access was prohibited within 300 metres of the fence, however in practice, a “no-go zone” was enforced up to 500 metres from the fence, with a “high risk zone” extending sometimes up to 1,500 metres from the fence.

Additionally, following the ceasefire agreement, the accessible fishing zone was extended from three to six NM from the coast, except for a period between March and May 2013, when Israel re-imposed the three NM limit in response to the launching of rockets by Palestinian armed groups.

Due to a number of impeding factors, in particular the limited and precarious nature of the increased access, there has only been limited positive impact on agricultural and fishing livelihoods. One of the factors on land has been the uncertainty regarding the new policy, including the extent of the new limit.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, safe access to newly accessible areas on land is only possible during daylight hours (generally 7 a. m. to 3 p.m.), while those attempting to work outside of these hours have reported receiving warning shots. Farmers who began cultivation of the newly accessible areas often opt for wheat or other rain-fed crops that require less investment and care than irrigated crops but generate only limited income.<sup>5</sup>

*Farmers who began cultivation of the newly accessible areas often opt for wheat or other rain-fed crops that require less investment and care than irrigated crops but generate only limited income.*

On the sea, despite the improvement in access, fishermen are still denied access to the most profitable fishing areas off the Gaza coast. The current limit is less than one third of the fishing areas agreed under the Oslo Accords - 20 NM. According to the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the majority of high value fish are found at a distance beyond 8-12 nautical miles from shore. Fishermen fear that further restrictions may be re-imposed at any time, and many are unable or unwilling to invest financially in order to make the best use of increased access, knowing that their investments may be lost.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, since July 2013, fishermen have been negatively impacted by the shortage of affordable fuel, forcing them to reduce the frequency of sailings, as well as by tightened security measures imposed by the Egyptian navy, which prevent access to Egyptian waters. It is estimated that some 95 per cent of households depending on the fishing industry receive humanitarian assistance and are exposed to debt, poverty and vulnerability.

The shooting incidents in the ARA on land have also affected the access of people to services, as well as the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide assistance. There are 13 schools located up to 1,000 meters from the fence, serving some 5,000 children, who face risks while en route to or from these schools. An Oxfam survey among international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in or near the ARA on land revealed that while respondents considered that working in these areas was important, the perceived risk to staff was a major obstacle to more programming, followed by risk to beneficiaries and to investments.<sup>7</sup>

The Israeli army’s practice of using live fire against civilians, as well as destruction, damage and confiscation of property to enforce access restrictions, remains of concern. Under international law, in enforcing the ARA the use of force and firearms by Israeli security forces must be proportional and in conformity with international standards,

i.e. only in extreme circumstances, such as self-defence or defence of others from death or serious injury, and only when all other less serious measures are insufficient.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, any restrictions on access to land and sea must be proportional to a specific security threat, and must not have a disproportionate effect on the lives, livelihoods and property of Palestinian civilians.

## **LARGE SCALE FORCIBLE DISPLACEMENTS IN “FIRING ZONES” ALONG THE JORDAN VALLEY**

### Temporary lull in demolitions in a “firing zone” in southern Hebron

This month witnessed mixed developments affecting Bedouin and herding communities located in areas designated as closed military zones for training or “firing zones”, across Area C of the West Bank: on the one hand, the Israeli authorities declared a temporary lull in demolitions and an easing of access restrictions in one such area in southern Hebron (Massafer Yatta, or Firing Zone 918); on the other hand 160 people were forcibly displaced from other “firing zones” along the Jordan Valley.

Approximately 18 per cent of the West Bank, or 30 per cent of Area C, has been designated since the beginning of the occupation as “firing zones”. At present there are 38 Bedouin and herding communities, with a population of 6,200, located within these areas, and another 50 communities with over 12,000 residents in their immediate vicinity. Due to the ban on access and residence stemming from the designation of their residential or grazing areas as “firing zones”, these communities face significant humanitarian needs and are highly vulnerable to displacement. (See box herein for more on “firing zones”.)

The largest incident, which took place on 30 January in a section of the Ein al Hilwa Bedouin community (Tubas Governorate) located in a “firing zone”, displaced 66 people, including 36 children. About 100 other residential and livelihood structures here, some of which were funded by international donors, have pending demolition orders.

Another eviction incident, on 8 January, targeted the Abu al ‘Ajaj area of Al Jiftlik town (Jericho Governorate), involving the demolition of 13 residential structures and animal shelters, and resulting in the displacement of three families (26 people). A few days later, the Israeli authorities also demolished and confiscated six tents that had been provided to the families by an international organization as emergency shelters. An appeal from the community to the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) against a previously-issued order calling for their eviction from the area was overturned in December 2013. Finally, on 22 January, the Israeli authorities demolished another 19 structures in the community of Khirbet Yarza (Tubas Governorate), which is entirely located in a “firing zone”, displacing 14 people. Generally in such cases, the displaced families stay with relatives and neighbours until they receive emergency shelter tents.

These demolitions occurred in the context of a significant rise in demolitions and displacement in the Jordan Valley during the past year: the number of Palestinian-owned structures demolished during 2013 more than doubled compared to 2012 (390 and 172 respectively) as did the number of people displaced (590 and 279), alongside a

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**FROM THE STATEMENT THE UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR, JAMES W. RAWLEY, 31 JANUARY, FOLLOWING THE DEMOLITIONS IN EIN AL HILWE:**

*"I am deeply concerned about the ongoing displacement and dispossession of Palestinians in Area C, particularly along the Jordan Valley where the number of structures demolished more than doubled in the last year. This activity not only deprives Palestinians of access to shelter and basic services, it also runs counter to international law. The destruction of Palestinian-owned property and forced eviction of Palestinians must be brought to an immediate halt until Palestinians have access to a fair planning and zoning regime that meets their needs."*

Humanitarian partners are providing the necessary emergency assistance to families that are currently without shelter and suffering impaired livelihoods. Humanitarian agencies are facing increasing difficulties responding to emergency needs in Area C of the Jordan Valley due to restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities. In several cases, humanitarian assistance has been seized, confiscated or destroyed.

decrease in other parts of Area C. Overall during January, over 100 Palestinian homes and livelihood structures were demolished across Area C and East Jerusalem due to lack of Israeli issued permits (which these communities find almost impossible to obtain), with some 90 per cent located in the Jordan Valley.

By contrast, there has been a positive development concerning 14 communities (1,200 people) in southern Hebron (Masafer Yatta area) located in "firing zone" 918. Since the late 1990's, these communities have been involved in protracted litigation at the Israeli HCJ challenging the Israeli authorities' intention to evict them from their homes.<sup>9</sup> As part of a mediation process, in which both sides engaged in the context of the litigation, this month they reached an agreement aimed at "promoting mutual trust". According to the agreement, it will be in force until mid-May 2014:

- 1 The residents will be allowed to rehabilitate eight structures and several roads damaged during the Winter Storm Alexa in December 2013;
- 2 all pending demolition orders will be temporarily frozen;
- 3 access to the area on foot will be generally allowed, unless there is a concrete suspicion of an intended "illegal" act;
- 4 Palestinian Authority's officials and aid workers will be allowed to enter with vehicles;
- 5 entry of construction materials and equipment without a permit is prohibited.

While the agreement provides some relief to the communities in this area, given its short term duration and the prohibition of of construction materials, its impact will remain limited and will not remove the threat of displacement.

According to the Israeli authorities, Palestinians residing in "firing zones" are trespassers and they are regularly removed from the area for their own safety. However, as highlighted by the UN Secretary General, the removal of communities from the "firing zone" in southern Hebron "would appear to amount to individual and mass forcible

On 30 January in the Ein al Hilwa Bedouin community (Tubas Governorate) located in a "firing zone", 66 people, including 36 children, were displaced. About 100 other residential and livelihood structures here, have pending demolition orders.


## FROM THE VULNERABILITY PROFILING PROJECT: FIRING ZONES

Most communities in the “firing zones” have existed for decades, many of them before the designation of these areas as such. According to data collected in 2013 as part of the Area C Vulnerability Profiling Project (VPP),<sup>10</sup> over half of the 88 communities located within or next to “firing zones” are in the Jordan Valley area, and the vast majority (77 communities) depend on herding and farming as their main source of income. These communities are unable to plan and develop, and 60 per cent of them have experienced demolitions since 2000. Community representatives reported that more than 1,200 of their existing structures have outstanding stop-work and demolition orders, including 330 structures funded by donors and provided as humanitarian assistance. At least seven schools (four elementary and three secondary) have pending demolition orders, while children in 57 of the 88 communities have to walk over five km to reach a secondary school.

Over 80 per cent of the communities reported a decrease in their number of livestock during the last two years due to a number of Israeli measures, including restrictive planning and zoning, settler violence and military activities. There are 10 Israeli settlement outposts located either partially or completely in firing zones.

The humanitarian community in the oPt has identified these communities as among the most vulnerable and as such there is an effort to ensure specific area-based interventions to meet identified needs. These interventions included numerous projects in the field of shelter, food, agriculture, health, water and sanitation (WASH), education and Cash for Work (CFW).

### Number of communities targeted with interventions



transfer, contrary to Israel’s obligations under international humanitarian law. It also appears to amount to forced evictions contrary to Israel’s obligations under international human rights law”.<sup>10</sup>

## GAZA: ONGOING HALT IN CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES DUE TO IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

Some 30,000 households lost their source of income

Since July 2013, the Gaza Strip has been experiencing a severe shortage of construction materials, which has undermined the ability of people to address urgent housing and infrastructure needs and denied tens of thousands of families of an income. The immediate trigger to the current situation was the closure of the illegal tunnels under the border with Egypt, in the context of measures taken by the Egyptian authorities, addressing the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula. Due to the longstanding import restrictions imposed by Israel through the official crossings, these tunnels have been used in recent years as the main channel for the smuggling of building materials.


### Trends on the import of materials from Egypt and Israel

This section is based on inputs provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council

*The last seven months witnessed a significant reduction in the volume of construction materials entering the Gaza Strip through Israel (Kerem Shalom crossing), which compounded the shortage generated by the halt in smuggling via the tunnels.*

The import of basic construction materials (mainly cement, gravel and steel bars) to Gaza has been severely restricted since the imposition of the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip in June 2007, following the Hamas takeover of power. Since 2010, as part of the easing of the blockade, international organizations have been allowed to import those materials after obtaining Israeli approval for their projects. Additionally, since 2011, the Egyptian authorities have authorized limited imports through Rafah crossing for projects funded by the Government of Qatar.

In this context, the last seven months witnessed a significant reduction in the volume of construction materials entering the Gaza Strip through Israel (Kerem Shalom crossing), which compounded the shortage generated by the halt in smuggling via the tunnels. While between January and July of 2013 a monthly average of approximately 92,000 tons of basic construction materials entered Gaza via Israel, the equivalent figure between August 2013 and January 2014 was less than 30,000 tons, i.e. nearly a 70 per cent decline. On the other hand, despite some fluctuations, the average volume of materials imported through Rafah crossing for the Qatari projects remained around 23,000 tons across 2013.



In late December 2012, as part of the ceasefire understanding with Hamas, Israel began authorizing the entry of 20 truckloads of aggregates (gravel) per day through Kerem Shalom crossing for the private sector, and expanded this quantity in September 2013 to 70 truckloads per day (including 40 of aggregates, 20 of cement and 10 of steel bars). Despite that, these numbers remain well below needs. On 13 October 2013, following the discovery of a tunnel leading from the Gaza Strip into Israel, the Israeli authorities halted the entry of all construction materials, citing concerns that such materials could be used for military purposes. In December 2013, the Israeli authorities eased the restrictions on imports for international projects, while maintaining the total ban for the private sector.

#### **Most infrastructure and housing projects frozen**

The gradual depletion of the stocks of building materials available in the market since July 2013, following the halt in the supply of these materials through the tunnels, resulted in the freeze of most construction projects. The small quantities left are sold at exorbitant prices, with a ton of cement available at NIS 2,000 (US\$ 570), 400 per cent above the July 2013 price.



According to the Palestinian Contractors' Union, all 27 concrete factories and over 90 per cent of the contracting companies in Gaza have shut down.<sup>12</sup> As a result, 75 large housing and infrastructure projects have been stopped, alongside most construction by individual households. The latter include over 500 families engaged in one of several self-help programs run by UN agencies and NGOs, which entail financial assistance to carry out reconstruction or repair of homes destroyed or damaged during the November 2012 hostilities.

Current construction activities are therefore limited to several projects implemented or funded by international organizations and governments. Yet, despite the easing of the import restrictions through Kerem Shalom crossing since December 2013, only a minority of projects have been authorized to resume the import of materials.

As of the end of January 2014, UNRWA has been unable to receive materials for 20 out of 32 projects already approved by the Israeli authorities in the areas of housing, education and water and sanitation. UNDP is currently implementing only two housing projects for families displaced in the context of hostilities. Only the Qatari housing and infrastructure projects have continued to operate at normal levels in the past few months as their supply of materials through Rafah crossing has been largely unaffected.

#### **Tens of thousands jobs lost or affected**

This halt in construction activities has led to massive layoffs. According to the latest figures issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the fourth quarter (October-December) of 2013 there were 11,000 fewer people employed in the construction sector, than in the second quarter of the year (April-June), prior to the start of the current crisis. The manufacturing and transportation sectors, parts of which are tied to construction activities lost 4,700 and 3,900 jobs respectively.<sup>13</sup>

*Between August 2013 and January 2014, less than 30,000 tons of basic construction materials entered Gaza via Israel on average per month, or 70 per cent below the equivalent figure between January and July of 2013.*

Mohammed Ribhy AL-Za'neen, 27, married and father of two, lives in Beit Hanoun. While he obtained a diploma in accounting, he was unable to find a job in this field and since 2008 started to work in construction activities. For the first three years he was employed in projects implemented by UNRWA and UNDP, until completion of those projects.



*"I was without a job for six months. After that, I started working with an independent contractor who relied on construction materials from the tunnels. I used to make 40-70 NIS (US\$ 11.4-20) per day and my situation started to improve. This continued until June 2013, when the tunnels began to close and the price of materials increased. I lost my job and haven't worked since then. I have no money and a family of four to feed. When I pass by the market, I wish I could buy fruits. I couldn't buy winter clothes and affording diapers, milk, and medications for my children became a huge challenge. I hope the siege will be removed, the crossings opened, and construction materials will enter again to Gaza."*

The Palestinian Contractors Union estimates that by the end of January 2014, up to 30,000 whose employment is directly related to construction activities may have lost their jobs, and another 40,000, primarily in related activities (carpentries, blacksmith and aluminum workshops, tiles factories, transportation, heavy machinery, etc), have been severely affected.

According to PCBS, the unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip during the fourth quarter of the year reached 41.5 per cent of the workforce, or 180,500 people,<sup>14</sup> one of the highest unemployment rates in the world and the highest recorded in Gaza in over three years. It is believed that this development has pushed many families into food insecurity, which in 2012 affected 57 per cent of the households in Gaza, up from 44 per cent in 2011.

## CONCERN OVER SETTLER VIOLENCE AROUND TWO SETTLEMENT AREAS IN NABLUS GOVERNORATE


Increasing use of closure orders undermines agricultural livelihoods

*Of particular concern is the high level of violence around two specific settlement areas: Yitzhar and Bracha, south of Nablus City, and the settlement outposts to the east of Shilo settlement, in the southeastern corner of the governorate.*

January witnessed a total of 29 Israeli settler attacks resulting in either Palestinian injuries or damage to their property, slightly below the monthly average of such attacks during 2013 (33). These occurred alongside numerous other incidents involving intimidation, access prevention and trespass of private property. Overall, eight Palestinians were injured by settlers during the month and nearly 1,000 trees and 18 vehicles were vandalized, among other damage. Also this month, OCHA recorded eight attacks carried out by Palestinians which resulted in at least nine injuries among settlers and other Israelis.

Of this month's incidents resulting in Palestinian injuries or damage, eight took place across Nablus Governorate, which during 2013 recorded the largest number of such attacks compared to other governorates (see chart). Of particular concern is the high level of violence around two specific settlement areas: Yitzhar and Bracha, south of Nablus City, and the settlement outposts to the east of Shilo settlement, in the southeastern corner of the governorate.

**Chart 3: Settler attacks resulting in injuries or damage, by governorate (2013)**





Israeli forces evacuate settlers from Qusra village, 7 January 2014.

One of the most significant incidents in the latter area took place on 7 January, when a group of unarmed settlers from the Esh Kodesh settlement outpost raided the neighbouring village of Qusra, uprooted 27 olive seedlings and physically assaulted a Palestinian family whilst working on their land. The attack was reportedly carried out in retaliation of an incident earlier on the same day, where the Israeli army uprooted trees planted by settlers on a plot of land owned by a Palestinian farmer from the nearby village of Jalud (a so-called “price tag” attack).

Residents of Qusra and neighbouring villages, who expected the attack, clashed with the assailants, apprehended and physically assaulted them, injuring at least 10 settlers. Subsequently, a group of village elders succeeded in halting the assault on the settlers and contacted the Palestinian District Coordination Office and the Nablus Governorate office, which in return informed the Israeli military, who arrived at the site and took the settlers out of the village. The incident triggered a series of settler retaliations in the northern West Bank, including the burning and damaging of 12 vehicles and the attempt of putting a mosque on fire in Deir Istiya village, Salfit Governorate.

The incident in Qusra took place in the context of an ongoing expansion of six settlement outposts in this area – all illegal under both international and Israeli law – primarily through the takeover and subsequent cultivation of land owned by farmers from Qusra and Jalud villages (est. pop. 5,500).<sup>15</sup> In this context, the above-mentioned evacuation of the plot of land taken over by settlers constituted a rare exception. As a rule, rather than evacuating the outposts themselves or the areas taken over and cultivated by settlers, one of the main measures adopted by the army has been the closure of land cultivated by Palestinians by military orders. Consequently, Palestinian farmers are required to apply for “prior coordination” to access their own land with military escort, which takes place on a limited number of occasions during the year.<sup>16</sup>

*The incident in Qusra took place in the context of an ongoing expansion of six settlement outposts in this area primarily through the takeover and subsequent cultivation of land*



A similar encroachment into agricultural land, alongside the closure of areas by the military and the restriction of Palestinian access through a “prior coordination” regime, has been taking place around Yitzhar and Bracha settlements (est. pop. 2,900); 11 Palestinian villages (est. pop. 31,400) in their vicinity are directly impacted .

This month, on 14 January, settler from Bracha settlement raided an agricultural area located in Area B, next to Burin village, where a group of Palestinian workers were rehabilitating an agricultural road, as part of a project implemented by an international NGO (Première Urgence), and clashed with the workers. In response, the Israeli army declared the area as a “closed military zone”, resulting in the suspension of the project until further notice.

Also this month and in the same area, on 6 January a group of masked settlers, who are believed to be from Yitzhar settlement, raided the site of a water project funded by an international donor in the nearby village of ‘Urif and damaged a water reservoir under construction. Subsequently, they stoned the village’s secondary boys’ school, located in the vicinity of the project site, triggering clashes with the students. Video footage of the incident published by the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem shows Israeli soldiers watching the settler attack without intervening, and then shooting tear gas canisters at the Palestinian students.<sup>17</sup>

This month’s incidents around the above-mentioned settlement areas in Nablus Governorate highlight the longstanding failure of the Israeli authorities to enforce of rule of law on Israeli settlers. The incident in ‘Urif showed once again that, despite formal orders, the notion that soldiers are responsible to protect Palestinians and enforce the law of settlers has not been properly transmitted and absorbed by forces on the ground. Additionally, while the prior coordination regime implemented in the affected areas has contributed to reduce settler attacks, it puts the onus to adapt to the restrictions on the Palestinian farmers instead of enforcing the law on violent settlers. Of the 938 files opened by the Israeli police between 2005 and 2013 into complaints of settler violence submitted by Palestinians and followed up by the Israeli organization Yesh Din, only 8.5 per cent resulted in indictments.<sup>18</sup>

The law enforcement gaps by the Israeli authorities and the resulting high levels of settler violence have not only eroded the agricultural livelihoods of Palestinian farmers, but are also impeding the ability of aid organizations to support the affected populations.

## RESTRICTIONS AT RAFAH CROSSING FURTHER UNDERMINE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE

75 per cent decline in the number of patients who have left to Egypt since July 2013


During January, Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt was open on six days only, allowing only 2,335 people to leave (only 88 were registered patients along with 82 companions) and another 2,123 to enter Gaza. Rafah crossing has been closed to all but exceptional humanitarian cases since July 2013 and has further limited the people’s

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This section was provided by the  
UN World Health Organization



freedom of movement, raising particular concerns regarding the impact of this situation on access of patients to specialized medical services. The Palestinian Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Gaza stopped registering new cases on 10 January, after reaching 3,000 individuals, including patients, needing to cross into Egypt from Gaza.



Between mid-2010 and mid-2013, Rafah crossing opened on a daily basis, functioning as the primary exit and entry point to the Gaza Strip. The current limited opening policy by the Egyptian authorities, implemented since July 2013, is in the context of measures, addressing insecurity in the Sinai. As part of this, during the second half of 2013 the crossing was closed for a total of 98 days, compared to only 15 days in the previous half of the year. Consequently, the average of passengers in both directions declined 75 per cent<sup>19</sup>, while the average number of patients leaving Gaza for health care dropped 93 per cent.<sup>20</sup>


While there has been no policy change regarding the admission of Palestinian patients at hospitals in Egypt, the unpredictability of the crossing's opening, compounded by the security situation in the Sinai, have discouraged patients from traveling to Egypt. Egyptian hospitals receive Palestinian patients without scheduled appointments, provided that they have their Ministry of Health (MoH) financial coverage document stamped by the Palestinian embassy in Cairo, or if they pay the cost of their treatment themselves. However, self-funded patients without official medical documents from a Gaza hospital are not eligible as "humanitarian case" according to the MoI criteria.

Additionally, while urgent medical cases and cancer patients travelling by ambulance have been given priority for crossing, their access is being impeded by the limited hours of the crossing on days that it is open; these have been shortened from an average of 8 hours to 5 hours (9 a.m. to 2 p.m.) since July 2013, although occasionally the buses (accommodating 50 travelers each) have crossed after 2 p.m. with special coordination by border officials on both sides. The Palestinian MoH has asked that patients be given priority over other travelers through a quota system. Due to the continuous growth of the waiting list, the MoI in Gaza has recently requested already registered passengers to renew their registration, to better prioritize urgent cases during the brief openings. As of the end of January, there were 600 patients registered with the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) needing to travel across the border and they had stopped registering new requests.

As a result of these constraints, more patients are requesting the MoH in Gaza to change the destination of their referral to the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Israel.

*Rafah crossing has been closed, but for exceptional humanitarian cases, since July 2013, raising particular concerns regarding the impact of this situation on access of patients to specialized medical services.*

## Patients leaving Gaza to Egypt out of all travellers in 2013



Referrals to Egypt fell by half after July 2013 and increased by 22 per cent to destinations requiring access through Erez (see chart “Patients leaving Gaza to Egypt out of all travellers in 2013”). This has been reflected in the number of applications for permits to leave Gaza via Erez crossing submitted to the Israeli authorities by patients and their companions: patient permit applications during the second half of 2013 increased by 28.7 per cent compared to the first half of the year. Eighty-eight per cent of these applications during 2013 were approved, 11.7 per cent delayed and 0.3 per cent denied.

The restrictions at Rafah have also practically halted shipments of medical aid, which had accounted for 30 per cent of medicines used by the MoH. According to the Palestinian terminal authority in Rafah, there were no shipments of drugs in the second half of 2013 except for a single delivery comprising four truckloads in November, donated by the

*Referrals to Egypt fell by half after July 2013 and increased by 22 per cent to destinations requiring access through Erez.*

### IMPEDED TRAVEL FOR PATIENTS

**M.S.:** A 30-year-old patient in hospital with end-stage kidney disease, a father of five children, was referred to Egypt on 14 November 2013, for an urgent kidney transplant, with his brother a matching donor. He was registered as an urgent ambulance case and was informed two months later, on 21 January 2014, that he was approved for travel. However, Egyptian authorities returned him from the border, asking him to change his passport photo. After the patient renewed his passport, he was informed by the EMS that he lost his registration to travel and could not be registered again due to the long waiting list.

**F.R.:** A 63-year-old woman with heart disease and diabetes, treated in the intensive care unit (ICU) of Kamal Adwan hospital for dizziness and breathing difficulties, was referred to Egypt (where she has been treated on 13 previous occasions) for reprogramming of her pacemaker on 5 February. She and her son were taken by ambulance on the same day but were not able to pass. They failed to cross the following day as well and she returned to the ICU due to her critical condition.

**A.G.:** A 29-year-old woman surgically treated in 2012 for adrenocortical cancer requires reevaluation every three-six months. Her latest CT showed a return of the cancer and was referred by MoH RAD to Egypt on 26 January 2014. When her husband went to register her travel with the Ambulance services, they refused due to the long waiting list.

**A.A.:** A 55 years-old patient previously operated on for vocal cord polyps was biopsied in Gaza in July 2013 and diagnosed with laryngeal cancer. He was referred to Augusta Victoria hospital in Jerusalem for an advanced surgical treatment, but was informed on booking that the treatment was not available there. The MoH RAD then referred him to Egypt on 29 January 2014, but he was unable to exit. His family is now exploring alternative treatment in the West Bank.



Union of Arab Physicians in Egypt.


Likewise, there have been no medical missions entering Gaza through Rafah since July 2013, while there were 63 medical delegates who travelled in the first half of the year and more than 120 in 2012. Some delegations also bring with them needed medicines, medical supplies and sometimes equipment as donations. This drop in medication missions has compounded the already poor supply of drugs by the MoH in Ramallah to Gaza, resulting in 23.5 per cent of the items on the critical drug list and 52 per cent of medical disposables being out of stock at the Central Drug Store in Gaza in January.

## STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN IDENTIFIES 1.9 MILLION PALESTINIANS IN NEED OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As a new year starts, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) for the oPt approved

*The SRP focuses on two strategic objectives, which includes enhancing the protective environment, including the provision of equitable access to essential services, and improving food security.*

### Requested requirements for SRP 2014 by cluster/sector (in US \$ million) Total requested funds: US\$390 million



and began implementing its 2014-2016 Strategic Response Plan (SRP). The plan will be officially presented to all stakeholders in a public event to be held in March 2014.

The SRP articulates the three-year strategy of the humanitarian community to address the most urgent humanitarian and protection needs of 1.9 million vulnerable Palestinians, largely in Gaza, Area C of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Seam Zone. The strategy takes into account and is aligned to the cycle of longer-term development strategies, particularly the Palestinian National Development Plan, which in turn is supported by the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2014-16.

The SRP focuses on two strategic objectives, which includes enhancing the protective environment, including the provision of equitable access to essential services, and improving food security.

The most affected groups identified across the oPt are the refugees, those who are food insecure, the displaced and at risk of displacement, children, people with disabilities and the elderly. In the Gaza Strip, the specific vulnerable groups are farmers, fishermen, people residing in and around the ARA near the fence and the unemployed youth and those who are chronically poor. In the West Bank, people in need are herders and Bedouin in Area C, farmers with land located between the Barrier and the Green Line, and residents in the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron (H2).

The SRP presents a strategy budgeted at US\$390 million to implement 150 projects; 19 from local NGOs, 82 from international NGOs, 45 from UN agencies, and 4 jointly by UN agencies with INGOs. The Food Security Sector is the largest and is appealing for 71 per cent of overall requirements (\$275 million), followed by Protection (\$44 million) and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (\$25 million).

*The Food Security Sector is the largest and is appealing for 71 per cent of overall requirements (\$275 million).*



# End notes

1. Available at [http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field\\_protection\\_clusters/Occupied\\_Palestinian/files/oPt\\_PC\\_ARA\\_Update\\_July-December\\_2013\\_EN.pdf](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Occupied_Palestinian/files/oPt_PC_ARA_Update_July-December_2013_EN.pdf).
2. Throughout 2013, some 80 incursions, mainly to level land, were reported.
3. See Protection Cluster Update on the Access Restricted Areas in Gaza (1 January to 30 June 2013), [http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field\\_protection\\_clusters/Occupied\\_Palestinian/files/oPt\\_PC\\_ARA\\_Update\\_January-June\\_2013\\_EN.pdf](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Occupied_Palestinian/files/oPt_PC_ARA_Update_January-June_2013_EN.pdf).
4. See Protection Cluster Analytical Update on the ARA in Gaza (May 2013): Following the ceasefire, **Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories** (COGAT) informed the humanitarian community on several occasions that farmers would be permitted to access on foot areas up to 100 metres from the fence. This information was published on COGAT's website on 25 February 2013, but later removed. However, on 10 March 2013, in response to their requests for information, the Israeli human rights organization GISHA, received a letter from the Israeli military spokesperson stating that Palestinians are prohibited from accessing areas within 300 meters from the fence.
5. Farmers have reported that they opt for such crops for the following reasons: (i) they require less ongoing work (reducing physical risk in accessing cultivated areas), (ii) they require less investment (reducing financial risk if crops are destroyed), (iii) they are less prone to be levelled (as crops growing higher are at higher risk), (iv) they are less affected by infrastructure limitations such as lack of adequate water networks, and (v) they require less use of equipment (as access with tractors and other equipment is limited). The lack of access to water resources is also reported as a major obstacle to supporting farmers to cultivate agricultural areas near the ARA (see Protection Cluster Update on the ARA in Gaza, 1 July to 31 December 2013).
6. See Protection Cluster Update on the Access Restricted Areas in Gaza (1 January to 30 June 2013), [http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field\\_protection\\_clusters/Occupied\\_Palestinian/files/oPt\\_PC\\_ARA\\_Update\\_January-June\\_2013\\_EN.pdf](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Occupied_Palestinian/files/oPt_PC_ARA_Update_January-June_2013_EN.pdf), and OCHA Case Study, Restricted Livelihood: Gaza's Fishermen, July 2013. [http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_gaza\\_fishermen\\_case\\_study\\_2013\\_07\\_11\\_english.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_fishermen_case_study_2013_07_11_english.pdf)
7. See Protection Cluster Update on the ARA in Gaza, 1 July to 31 December 2013.
8. Ibid.
9. In 1999, the Israeli military evicted most of the residents from the area and destroyed or confiscated most of their homes and property. A few months later, the Israeli High Court of Justice, in a response to a petition from the residents, issued an interim injunction order allowing some of the people to temporarily return, pending a final court decision. For further information see, OCHA, *The Masafer Yatta Communities – Case Study*, May 2013.
10. Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, August 2013
11. Refer to VPP article in HB October
12. Interview with Nabeel Abu Mualiq, Head of Palestinian Contractors Union in the Gaza Strip, on 2/2/2014.
13. PCBS, Labor Force Survey, Quarter 4, 2013.
14. Relaxed definition, which included people who reported interests in working but are no longer actively seeking a job, due to lack of opportunities ("discouraged workers"), PCBS, Ibid.
15. Kerem Navot. Israeli settlers' agriculture as a means of land takeover in the West Bank. August 2013.
16. OCHA, West Bank Movement and Access Update, September 2012, p. 27-30.
17. Available at: [http://www.btselem.org/press\\_releases/20140108\\_settler\\_attack\\_in\\_urif](http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20140108_settler_attack_in_urif)
18. Yesh Din Monitoring Update, data sheet, *Law enforcement on Israeli citizens in the West Bank*, July 2013. p.2
19. From 20,577 monthly between January and June 2013.
20. 5,251 monthly between July and December and from 4,146 monthly to 305.

# Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

## Conflict-related casualties and violence<sup>1</sup>

### Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties

Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties	2011	2012	2013												2014	
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan
Palestinian deaths																
Gaza	108	264	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	2	11	4
West Bank	17	8	4	0*	2	2	0	0	1	5	0	3	6	3	27	2
Total	125	272	6	3	2	3	0	0	1	6	1	4	9	5	38	6
Of whom are civilians <sup>2</sup>	62	136	6	3	2	2	0	0	1	6	1	2	6	5	32	5
Of whom are female	3	23	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

### Palestinian injuries

Gaza		468	1834	13	10	5	4	1	2	2	7	5	1	5	28	83	41
West Bank		1647	3175	250	756	488	652	428	122	136	130	369	104	315	131	3881	178
Total		2115	5009	263	766	493	656	429	124	138	137	374	105	320	159	3964	219
Of whom are civilians		2054	n/a	263	766	492	655	429	124	138	137	373	104	320	158	3959	216
Of whom are female		151	n/a	8	13	14	10	40	8	12	4	10	4	15	20	158	4

### Israeli deaths

Israel, Gaza and West Bank		11	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	4	0
Of whom are civilians		11	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
Of whom are female		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Israeli injuries

Israel, Gaza and West Bank		122	345	6	24	21	17	33	1	11	5	9	15	5	4	151	9
Of whom are civilians		56	60	3	11	13	4	15	1	8	0	5	9	2	3	74	8
Of whom are female		3	7	0	1	1	2	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	10	1

\*Two Palestinians died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005

\*\* Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November)

\*\*\* Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

\*\*\*\* The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

### Tunnel-related casualties<sup>3</sup>

Tunnel-related casualties <sup>3</sup>	2011	2012	2013												2014	
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan
Deaths	36	11	6	2	2	1	3	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	17	0
Injuries	54	18	6	0	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0

### Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage

Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage	2011	2012	2013													2014
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties <sup>4</sup>	120	98	7	8	11	17	10	7	6	4	8	9	4	3	94	8
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	268	17	19	24	38	45	29	23	16	29	36	24	6	306	21
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	411	366	24	27	35	55	55	36	29	20	37	45	27	9	399	29
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	35	2	1	9	4	5	1	2	0	4	4	3	3	38	8
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages <sup>5</sup>	13	15	2	0	0	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	3	12	0
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	36	50	4	1	9	5	5	4	2	2	4	4	4	6	50	8

### Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza

Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza		2011	2012	2013												2014	
		Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan
Adult	Injured	7	12	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
	Killed	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Child	Injured	17	19	5	5	6	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0
	Killed	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0
Grand Total		27	34	7	6	6	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	26	0

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## Child Protection

### Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012	2013													2014
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan
West Bank	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4	0
Gaza Strip	11	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

### Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

West Bank	308	427	36	146	162	289	188	34	22	35	130	25	132	33	1232	39
Gaza Strip	125	105	3	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	10	4

### Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

oPt	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

oPt	0	3	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0
Israel	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	198 monthly average	219	236	236	238	223	193	195	180	179	159	173	154	199 monthly average	NA
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### Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

West Bank, inc EJ	618	474	157	23	5	38	41	58	17	46	53	19	29	75	558	114
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### Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools<sup>19</sup>

oPt	na	321	1	7	4	8	5	4	1	2	15	NA	NA	NA	47	NA
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Source: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

## Access

### Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012	2013													2014
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing <sup>15</sup>	872	777	796	907	882	1155	1117	1165	1299	1023	1303	1420	1347	1362	1378	NA
of which approved	721	719	738	836	762	957	900	985	1106	932	1182	1314	1227	1181	1212	NA
of which denied	19	7	2	2	1	0	1	0	7	3	5	11	5	4	4	NA
of which delayed <sup>16</sup>	83	17	56	69	119	198	216	180	186	88	116	95	115	177	162	NA

Source: WHO

### Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012	2013													Jan
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WVB checkpoint <sup>17</sup>	38	37.5	34	69	51	24	51	30	33	34	45	30	23	17	40.1	11
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	18	52	33	10	32	15	12	19	22	10	8	5	22.3	1
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	8	29	17	6	16	4	8	24	60	13	13	3	18.5	2.5

Source: OCHA

## Search and Arrest

	2011	2012	2013													2014
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	<b>338</b>	313	287	282	338	370	461	242	333	252	281	435	250	<b>316</b>	434
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	<b>283</b>	296	411	421	367	459	472	298	341	416	314	529	262	<b>380</b>	491

Source: OCHA

### Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)<sup>6</sup>

	2011	2012	2013													2014
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan
Total as of the end of the month	5326	<b>4,451</b>	4593	4713	4764	4748	4801	4827	4828	4762	4806	4753	4785	4,768	<b>4760</b>	4,881
of whom are women	26	<b>7</b>	10	10	11	14	16	14	11	12	12	12	12	15	<b>12</b>	14
of whom are administrative detainees <sup>7</sup>	240	<b>245</b>	159	169	164	155	147	137	134	134	135	143	143	150	<b>148</b>	175
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	<b>897</b>	1069	1118	1196	1216	1194	1150	1219	1295	1299	1301	1301	1,351	<b>1188</b>	1,376

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

## Demolition of Structures

### Structures demolished<sup>8</sup>

	2011	2012	2013													2014
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan
of which in Area C	571	<b>540</b>	120	11	2	40	58	69	32	20	93	13	19	88	<b>565</b>	101
of which in East Jerusalem	42	<b>64</b>	21	3	1	6	11	3	1	36	2	8	6	0	<b>98</b>	5
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>613</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>663</b>	<b>106</b>


\*22 are in Area B (2009-2012)

### People Displaced due to demolitions or evictions<sup>9</sup>

	2011	2012	2013													2014
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	<b>815</b>	247	6	0	40	32	101	48	33	108	7	43	140	<b>805</b>	160
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	<b>71</b>	14	40	10	24	59	30	0	63	6	34	18	0	<b>298</b>	23
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1094</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>1103</b>	<b>183</b>









## Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

\* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

## Strategic Response Plan(SRP) 2014:

Cluster	SRP 2014	
	Total request in million \$	% of funds received
 Coordination and Support Services	18,588,100	41.4%
 Education	18,251,234	0%
 Food Security	275,200,035	0%
 Health and Nutrition	9,581,909	0%
 Protection	43,577,185	2.5%
 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	25,140,361	2.9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>390,338,824</b>	<b>4.5%</b>

# Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

## Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

## Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

## Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

## Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

## Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

## Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

## Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

## Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

## Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.