HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT

🛞 OCHA

FEBRUARY 2014


HIGHLIGHTS

- •UNRWA and WFP face critical funding shortfalls that may force them to reduce food rations or cut the number of beneficiaries in the Gaza Strip by as early as July 2014.
- The frequency of Palestinian rocket firing on Israel and Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip increased sharply in the first two months of 2014 compared with previous months.
- The International Committee of the Red Cross announced the suspension of the distribution of tents in the Jordan Valley to families affected by the demolition of their homes due to Israeli obstructions.

FEBRUARY FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	3
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	221
Structures demolished in the West Bank	26
People displaced in the West Bank	58

STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN 2014



Overview

Between 11 and 13 March, the Gaza Strip and southern Israel witnessed the most serious escalation in hostilities since the Pillar of Defense operation in November 2012. Tension has also been exacerbated by multiple demonstrations in the restricted areas along Gaza's perimeter fence, triggering live shooting by Israeli forces. Overall, five Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in the first two months of the year and another 79 injured, compared to 11 and 76 respectively in the whole of 2013. While Palestinian armed groups appear to have deliberately targeted Israeli civilians in southern Israel, no casualties have been reported as a result.

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Coordination Saves Lives

Analysts assess that this escalation is a result of the 'pressure-cooker' environment prevailing in the Gaza Strip. Key indicators confirm that the humanitarian situation in Gaza has deteriorated severely in recent months despite 2013 being the calmest year since 2000. The halt in the smuggling of goods from Egypt via the tunnels and the erratic opening of the Rafah crossing since mid-2013 have compounded the already fragile situation created by the longstanding Israeli blockade. Combined, these factors have further reduced access to basic services and sources of livelihood. This is reflected in the growth in unemployment, which in the last quarter of 2013 reached a three-year high (41.5 per cent). The number of food insecure households, estimated at 57 per cent in 2012, is expected to increase significantly in 2014.

While these circumstances would normally require an expansion of assistance to newly vulnerable families, humanitarian agencies are facing critical funding shortfalls that may force them to reduce their programs. This is the case for UNRWA and the UN World Food Programme, which provide food assistance to nearly 1.1 million people in Gaza. Tackling food insecurity is one of two priorities under the inter-agency Strategic Response Plan for 2014 (formerly known as the Consolidated Appeal or CAP). In total, UN agencies and NGOs working to improve food security and access to livelihoods in Gaza and the West Bank are appealing for \$275 million for their 2014 interventions.

The immediate lifting of some of Israel's longstanding access restrictions to and from Gaza, particularly on the entry of building materials and the marketing of Gazan goods in the West Bank and Israel, is essential to alleviate the current crisis and prevent further deterioration in conditions. It is equally important to ensure that when hostilities do occur, both sides distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and take all necessary precautions to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. The use of excessive force in the enforcement of access restrictions along the fence should be strictly avoided.

UN AGENCIES FACE FINANCIAL SHORTFALLS FOR FOOD ASSISTANCE IN THE GAZA STRIP

Deteriorating conditions since mid-2013 may have increased food insecurity

The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the World Food Programme (WFP) face critical funding shortfalls that may force them to reduce food rations or cut the number of beneficiaries in the Gaza Strip by as early as July 2014. Currently, additional funding is urgently needed to purchase food in advance of programme delivery. In 2013, UNRWA supported over 800,000 refugees with food aid, while WFP reached more than 290,000 non-refugees with in-kind and voucher food assistance, covering nearly two thirds of Gaza's population. A reduction in these critical humanitarian programmes would have a considerable impact at a time when deteriorating conditions require assistance to be expanded.

Tackling food insecurity among the most vulnerable Palestinians is one of two priorities under the 2014 inter-agency Strategic Response Plan (SRP), formerly known as the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Together, UN agencies' and NGOs' critical work to improve food security and access to livelihoods in Gaza and the West Bank require a

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This section was contributed by UNRWA and WFP



total amount of \$275 million.

Since the SRP does not address all the needs of refugees in Gaza, UNRWA has issued an additional complementary Emergency Appeal for \$254 million, of which, \$122 million will sustain key emergency interventions, including general food distribution. For 2014, UNRWA expects a minimum \$28 million funding shortfall.¹


WFP is facing critical funding shortfalls for all its food assistance programmes in Gaza, including for general food distribution, which aims to reach 177,000 food insecure people each month and voucher assistance to 60,000 people per month. WFP requires an additional \$13 million to cover the costs of the programmes up to June 2014.

According to the most recent socio-economic survey,² the percentage of food insecure households surged from 44 per cent in 2011 to 57 percent in 2012. Food insecurity in Gaza grew fastest amongst refugees and in refugee camps. The continuing blockade, in combination with the halt of the illegal tunnel trade between Gaza and Egypt since mid-2013, is believed to have had an impact on the food security situation of households in Gaza, with an anticipated significant increase in food insecurity levels in 2014.

The halt to the entry of goods via the illegal tunnels has caused significant inflation in the price of fuel and food, further reducing households' purchasing power. Food prices increased by 20 per cent (for staple items according to UNRWA data), including vegetable oil and sugar (10 per cent), rice (77 per cent) and bread (11 per cent). Only Israeli imported fuel at about 7 NIS per litre is available at fuel stations in Gaza, which is more than twice the price of subsidized Egyptian fuel smuggled previously through the tunnels.

In the last quarter of 2013, the unemployment rate hit a three-year high of 41.5 per cent (relaxed definition)³. Between 2006 and 2012, daily wages fell by 25 per cent while prices rose by 24 per cent. Soaring unemployment and falling purchasing power are further compounded by unemployment volatility. Taken as a stand-alone entity, the Gaza Strip

Additional funding is urgently needed to purchase food in advance of programme delivery.



People employed in the construction sector in the Gaza strip against unemployment rate

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has become one of the most unstable economies in the world.

The blockade destroyed Gaza's previously dynamic and trade-oriented productive economy and its capacity to create jobs. This has pushed the vast majority of the population into food insecurity and reliance on assistance. Until the blockade is lifted and access to Gaza's traditional markets – the West Bank and Israel – is secured, sustainable recovery of the local economy will remain elusive and the cycle of unemployment, food insecurity and aid dependency will continue.

GAZA: CONCERN OVER ESCALATION IN VIOLENCE

More airstrikes launched in the first two months of 2014 than in the whole of 2013

The frequency of Palestinian rocket firing on Israel and Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip increased sharply in first two months of 2014 compared with previous months. There was also an increase in demonstrations by Palestinians, as well as incidents of shootings by Israeli forces at demonstrators and at scrap collectors and herders in the Access Restricted Areas (ARA) along Gaza's perimeter fence. This trend can be traced back to an incident on 24 December 2013, when a Palestinian sniper shot and killed an Israeli man carrying out repair work along the fence: this was followed by a series of Israeli airstrikes and tank and artillery shots.⁴

Many rockets fired by Palestinian armed groups on Israel since December 2013 landed within Gaza itself, while the rest were either intercepted in the air or fell in open areas, resulting in no Israeli casualties. Israeli attacks and shootings caused several deaths and injuries among Palestinian civilians, as well as some property damage.

The escalation trend is clearly reflected in the number of Israeli airstrikes recorded in January and February 2014 (23), which exceeds the figure during all of 2013 (22). The majority of this year's airstrikes were conducted in the northern part of the Gaza strip (including Gaza city, Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia). While most, if not all of them, appear

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE

During hostilities, all parties to the conflict must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and take all necessary precautions to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. In particular:

- Israeli forces should refrain from launching attacks if it is anticipated that they will cause loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
- Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip must refrain from the indiscriminate firing of rockets and other projectiles at Israel, must refrain from targeting civilian areas and must ensure that civilian areas in Gaza are not used to launch attacks or to shield military forces or installations.


In enforcing the ARA, the use of force and firearms by Israeli security forces must be proportional and in conformity with international standards, i.e. firearms are to be used only in extreme circumstances, such as self-defence or defence of others from death or serious injury, and only when all other less serious measures are insufficient.

to have targeted military sites and members of armed groups, they resulted in the killing of one Palestinian civilian, and the injury of 20 others, including four children and three women. This represents a significant rise in injuries compared to airstrikes in 2013, which resulted in one civilian fatality and eight injuries.

This period also saw the resumption of so-called "targeted killing" operations (also in the form of airstrikes) against alleged members of armed groups, with three such incidents reported since the beginning of 2014. This type of airstrike puts the lives of civilian bystanders at risk. The three such operations conducted in January and February resulted in the killing of a civilian bystander, and the injury of three civilians, including an 11 year-old boy, in addition to the killing of one alleged member of an armed group and the injury of another two alleged members of an armed group.

Some of the airstrikes also resulted in loss of livestock and damage to civilian property. For example, a series of airstrikes conducted on 31 January killed approximately 1,200 different farm animals, including 150 cattle, 400 rabbits, 600 pigeons and 60 hens, in Many rockets fired by Palestinian armed groups landed within Gaza itself while the rest were either intercepted in the air or fell in open areas, resulting in no Israeli casualties.

The period since the beginning of 2014 saw the resumption of the socalled "targeted killing" operations (also in the form of airstrikes), a practice that puts the lives of civilian bystanders at risk.



Civilian deaths and injuries in the Gaza Strip in first two months of 2014 vs. whole 2013


HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN FEBRUARY 2014 addition to damaging five homes, two schools, an educational center and an office building, mostly in Beit Lahiya. The airstrikes were conducted in response to Palestinian rocket fire on Israel and reportedly targeted various buildings across Gaza used for the production or storage of rockets.

Additionally, since the beginning of 2014, four Palestinian civilians were shot and killed by Israeli forces in the ARA along the fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel and another 62 civilians were injured. Most of the injuries were the result of the response of Israeli forces to the weekly demonstrations organized by unarmed Palestinian activists, mainly involving stone-throwing at Israeli patrols in protest against the ARA. The four fatalities were, reportedly, civilians working or accessing the ARA in other circumstances, including a 16 year-old boy and a mentally ill woman. Monitoring by human rights organizations suggests that none of those killed or injured posed a threat that would justify the use of lethal force.

EMERGENCY SHELTER ASSISTANCE TO AREA C RESIDENTS DISRUPTED

ICRC partially halts operations in the Jordan Valley

This month, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced the suspension of "the distribution of tents in the relief kits it provides in the Jordan Valley to families affected by the demolition of their homes". However, it will continue to provide kitchen sets, hygiene kits, blankets and mattresses.⁵



Prior to its announcement, ICRC concluded a temporary bilateral agreement with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) for the provision of emergency shelters in the Jordan Valley until the resumption of ICRC operations.

This decision was a response to the Israeli authorities' recurrent obstruction of ICRC distributions, including the confiscation or destruction of emergency items on the grounds that they lacked building permits. These Israeli practices undermine the work of a range of organizations and donors who address the humanitarian needs of Area C residents, some of whom have suffered from the demolition of their homes and sources of livelihood, as well as damage from natural events. In the first two months of 2014, a total of 27 donor-funded structures were demolished and 20 others received stop-work or demolition orders.

The latter included stop-work orders issued in February against 18 residential structures funded by international donors in the Bedouin community of Jabal al Baba (Jerusalem), which is possibly at risk of forcible transfer due to an official "relocation plan" advanced by the Israeli authorities.⁶ This area has been allocated for the expansion of Israeli

The ICRC decision to suspend distribution of tents it provides in the Jordan Valley was in response to the Israeli authorities' recurrent obstruction of ICRC distributions, including the confiscation or destruction of emergency items. settlements, including as part of the E1 plan, which entails the construction of thousands of settlement housing and commercial units to create a continuous built-up area between the Ma'ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem.⁷

Emergency shelter assistance by ICRC to people whose homes are demolished is part of a broader response mechanism implemented by the humanitarian community in the oPt. The mechanism is triggered by an alert delivered to all operational organizations when an incident occurs. In response, an initial verification and needs assessment is carried out by OCHA or UNRWA field teams, alongside the delivery of emergency shelters. Based on this initial assessment and its findings, the relevant specialized agencies conduct a more detailed needs assessment to guide the provision of further assistance during the following 90 days as a medium-term response. The third phase of the response starts after three months and is meant to ensure systematic monitoring of the responses undertaken by the relevant agencies and identify any possible outstanding gaps.

The impediments posed by the Israeli authorities to humanitarian operations in Area C increase the costs of delivering assistance, decrease the effectiveness and sustainability of aid operations, and most significantly, deny the most vulnerable and affected populations access to the aid they so desperately require.

Under international humanitarian law, Israel, as the occupying power, has the primary obligation to protect the Palestinian civilian population and ensure that their basic needs are met. As such, it is required to facilitate the rapid, unimpeded and impartial delivery of relief to civilians in need. While the occupying power can exert certain measures of control over humanitarian operations, humanitarian assistance must not be refused on arbitrary or unlawful grounds.⁸

CONCERNS ABOUT SETTLEMENT EXPANSION IN HEBRON'S OLD CITY

Settlers attempt to take over four new buildings


The Protection Cluster has raised new concerns about increasing settler encroachment and efforts to occupy properties in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron city (H2).

Information collected by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) indicates that since late 2013, Israeli settlers appear to have been taking initial steps to occupy four properties in the immediate vicinity of the Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of Patriarchs (see map). Israeli settlers were seen in recent months moving furniture and books inside the buildings and changing the locks on doors.

All of these properties are currently uninhabited. In at least two of the cases, Israeli settlers claim to have bought the properties or otherwise acquired usage rights. Palestinians have denied these claims and, in all four cases, initiated legal proceedings aimed at preventing the takeover of the buildings. These developments compound existing concerns regarding efforts by settlers to take over two other properties in Hebron city (Al Rajabi house and Abu Rajab house), which are currently the subject of legal proceedings.

This section was contributed by OHCHR

Israeli settlers appear to have been taking initial steps to occupy four properties in the immediate vicinity of the Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of Patriarchs in Hebron's Old city.



AL RAJABI HOUSE: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 11 March 2014, the Israeli Supreme Court issued its final decision on the ownership of Al Rajabi house. The court rejected an appeal submitted by Palestinians against a previous ruling and confirmed the contractual validity of the purchase of the Rajabi house building by Israeli settlers. The court ruled that the purchase agreement would be declared valid, provided that the settlers pay the Palestinian appellants all outstanding payments within 30 days. However, the settlers cannot register ownership of the property and move in to the building without the approval of the Israeli Minister of Defence. This paves the way for the establishment of a fifth Israeli settlement in the H2 area of Hebron city (and the first new settlement in Hebron since the 1980s) with a capacity of at least 20 families. The building was occupied by Israeli settlers in March 2007, but the Israeli authorities evacuated it in December 2008 following complaints about a forged transaction. During the 18 months when the property was occupied by settlers, there were increased reports of settler violence and harassment in the surrounding area.

Additionally, in the Tel Rumeida neighbourhood on the outskirts of the old city, archaeological excavations were initiated recently by Ariel University and the Israeli Ministry of Antiquities, with support from the Israeli Civil Administration and the Israeli Ministry of Culture and Sports. The project is expected to last until the end of the year at a cost estimated at NIS 7 million. Based on previous experience with other settlements across the West Bank, Palestinian residents have expressed fears that the current archaeological activities will lead to an expansion of the existing residential settlement in the neighbourhood.⁹

At present there are four residential Israeli settlements in the H2 area of Hebron city with a combined population of a few hundred settlers.¹⁰ There are over 120 physical obstacles, deployed by the Israeli military around the settlement areas to segregate them from the rest of the city, including 18 permanently staffed checkpoints. Several streets that lead to the settlements are prohibited to Palestinian traffic, and some also to Palestinian pedestrians. The Israeli authorities justify these restrictions as protecting the Israeli settlers and other Israeli visitors and to allow settlers to lead a normal life. Over the years, access restrictions and systematic harassment by Israeli settlers have resulted in the displacement of thousands of Palestinians from these areas of the city, while the living conditions of those who have stayed (currently estimated at over 6,000) have deteriorated.

The recent developments in the old city of Hebron raise serious concerns about heightened settler violence and harassment, as well as further restrictions on movement, including access to religious sites and access to education.

In past years, access restrictions and systematic harassment by Israeli settlers have resulted in the displacement of thousands Palestinians of from Hebron's Old City, while the living conditions of those who have stayed have deteriorated.

Some inputs in this section were contributed by the UN Food and Agriculture organization (FAO)

In total, there were 81 gates designated for agricultural access, the majority 63, only open during the olive season, an approximate 45day period annually.

APPROACHING THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ICJ ADVISORY OPINION: IMPACT OF THE BARRIER ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK

On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The ICJ recognized that Israel 'has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian population' and that it 'has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens. [However], the measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable international law.'

The ICJ stated that the sections of the Barrier route which ran inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, violated Israel's obligations under international law. The ICJ called on Israel to cease construction of the Barrier 'including in and around East Jerusalem'; dismantle the sections already completed; and 'repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto'.

In the lead up to the tenth anniversary of the ICJ advisory opinion in July 2014, OCHA will issue a series of articles in the Humanitarian Bulletin to highlight the continuing humanitarian impact of the Barrier.

The Permit and Gate Regime

Since 2004 in the northern West Bank, Palestinians have been obliged to obtain permits from the Israeli authorities to access land between the Barrier and the Green Line: the 'Seam Zone.'11 To apply for or renew a permit, applicants must satisfy the security considerations necessary for all Israeli-issued permits and also submit valid ownership or land taxation documents to prove a 'connection to the land'.¹² Although reliable data are difficult to obtain, the approval rate for Barrier permits for the whole of 2013 varied from approximately 33 per cent in Salfit governorate (590 out of 1,809 applications); 46 per cent in Tulkarm governorate (4,915 out of 10,630 applications); to 66 per cent in Qalqiliya governorate (9,935 out of 14,914 applications). These data are consistent with figures collected by OCHA over the last three years which show an approximately 50 percent rate of permit approval/rejection in the northern West Bank.13



"There are complicated procedures at the gates regarding the kind of agriculture materials and equipment we are allowed to take to our land behind the Barrier and this directly affects the quality and type of work that we can carry out. Many times, the soldiers at the gate refused to let me pass with my tractor when I needed it to work on our land; the same with agricultural tools, such as saws, which I need to prune my trees. They told me to go to the Palestinian DCO to coordinate to allow these materials to cross. When I wanted to carry fertilizer across, the soldiers told me to drop it on the ground for a security check and many times they refused to let it pass. Even saplings and plants need coordination before they are allowed to cross."

Tayseer 'Amarneh, farmer, Akkaba, Tulkarm

For those farmers granted access to their land behind the Barrier, passage is channelled through a designated gate. Most Barrier crossings only open during the annual olive harvest and only for a limited amount of time during those days, prohibiting year-round access and cultivation. In total, there were 81 gates designated for agricultural access, as monitored, during the 2013 olive harvest. However, of these, only nine open daily; an additional nine open for some day(s) during the week; and the majority, 63, open during the olive season, an approximate 45-day period annually. In addition, there are restrictions on the vehicles and materials that farmers are allowed to take into the 'Seam Zone.' The limited opening hours also penalise the employed and 'part time' farmers who might otherwise assist in cultivating family holdings after work.

Impact on Cultivation

The limited allocation of permits and restricted number and opening times of the Barrier gates deprive farmers of making optimal use of the full agricultural cycle. This affects olive production in particular, which accounts for 25 per cent of the agricultural income of the oPt.¹⁴ Many essential practices are related to the weather, the life cycle of trees, and outbreaks of pests and disease. Maintenance needs to be carried out at specific times of year, as illustrated in the accompanying table from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) based on a standard distribution of 12-16 trees per dunum. All of

Calendar of major agricultural practices related to olive production

(based on an average holding of 10 dunums with 16 olive trees per dunum)¹⁵

Activities	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	# of work days per holding
Land cleaning	-	-6	-									-6	5
Terrace repairs	1	-6	-6										10
Fertilizing	-	-										-	4
Ploughing		-	-	-						-	-		10
Weed control		-	-	-	-6	-							10
Olive fly control						-	-	-	-				3
Peacock eye spot control	-	-0									-6	-0	2
Harvesting										-6	-	-0	60
Pruning	-0										-	-0	5
Supplementary irrigation						-6	-	-6					24
Total work days per	year p	er gi	rove	rnora	ate								133

Olive trees in the 'Seam Zone' have between 40 and 60 per cent reduction in yield compared to equivalent trees on the 'Palestinian' side of the Barrier, where the essential activities can be carried out on a regular and planned basis.

60ne person alone needs 133 days on average to perform allyear round work in an olive grove.

FAO



6Our land and trees have been badly affected by the Barrier and olive and olive oil productivity is decreasing year by year. This has affected my livelihood and our family's financial situation. My children are good at school and I was planning to send them to university, but due to the decrease in earnings from our land, it will be difficult to make these dreams come true.

Mohammed Saed Khatib, farmer Qaffin, Tulkarm the practices play an important role in ensuring a high quality, profitable and relatively constant yield; delays or prevention of any of the activities may have an adverse impact on olive productivity and value.¹⁶

Data collected by OCHA in the northern West Bank since 2010 show that olive trees in the 'Seam Zone' have between 40 and 60 per cent reduction in yield compared to equivalent trees on the 'Palestinian' side of the Barrier, where the essential activities detailed by FAO can be carried out on a regular and planned basis. The study analyzed four comparable plots of land on both sides of the Barrier and measured their productivity in terms of both olive and olive oil output. The four olive tree plots located on the 'Palestinian' side of the Barrier were freely accessible to farmers throughout the year. However, farmers were only able to access the groves located in the 'Seam Zone' during the olive harvest in the case of Az Zawiya, and an additional two to three times a week in the other locations, provided that they had obtained a permit and subject to the conditions and constraints outlined above.

Locality	# Trees compared on each side	Location of trees	Olive productivity (KG)	Productivity differential (%)	Olive oil productivity (KG)	Productivity differential (%)
Akkaba		Seam Zone	36	()	6	21
	16	'Palestinian Side'	100	-64	27	-21
- <i>(</i> ''	05	Seam Zone	375	50	75	50
Qaffin	25	'Palestinian Side'	Side' 100 Seam 375 Zone 375 estinian 750 Seam 175	-50	150	-50
	05	Seam Zone	175		58	10
Zeita	25	'Palestinian Side'	450	-61	112	-48
Az	10	Seam Zone	150	10	34	(0)
Zawiya	10	'Palestinian Side'	Seam Zone36Palestinian Side'100Seam Zone375Palestinian Side'750Seam Zone175Palestinian Side'450Seam Zone150Palestinian Zone250	-40	85	-60

Average productivity differential between trees on both sides of the Barrier (2013 season)

Note: the selection of the trees compared in the study relied on the following criteria:

- The same farmer owns olive groves on both sides of the Barrier.
- Plots were comparable in terms of topography and soil variety and were planted with the same variety of olive.
- The olive trees were approximately 50 years in age.

End notes

- 1. The need for a separate Emergency Appeal is widely accepted and recognized by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The SRP and the UNRWA Emergency Appeal are complementary.
- These two surveys were released in mid-2013: 1. The 2012 Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec) – joint report by UNRWA, WFP, FAO and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
 2. The ECHO-funded Household Economy Approach (HEA) carried out by Oxfam, Italy.
- 3. The relaxed definition of unemployment includes "discouraged workers", i.e. people who indicated their interest to work but stopped actively seeking a job. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Labor Force Survey.
- 4. One of the tank shells hit a civilian house adjacent to the Gaza perimeter fence in Al Maghazi refugee camp, killing a three-year-old girl who was playing in the yard of the family home and injuring three unaffiliated family members.
- 5. The International Committee of the Red Cross. Information Bulletin No. 1/2014. 4 February 2014.
- Report by the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, A/67/372, 14 September 2012, para. 37
- 7. For further details on this plan see, B'tselem and Bimkom, The Hidden Agenda: The Establishment and Expansion Plans of Ma'ale Adummim and their Human Rights Ramifications, December 2009.
- Arts. 59 and 60, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) (Fourth Geneva Convention). Rule 55 Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL). See also General Comment 3 on the nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2 (1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
- 9. Archaeological excavations have been used in the establishment or expansion of the settlements of Suseya (Hebron), Shilo (Ramallah), Ma'ale Adumim (Jerusalem) and Ir David (East Jerusalem).
- 10. For further details see OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlements in Hebron City, November 2013.
- 11. For the purposes of this report, the northern West Bank comprises the Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya and Salfit governorates. Of the 39 agricultural gates in the Barrier in these governorates, 35 are accessible by permits and four by 'prior coordination' with the Israeli District Coordination Liaison (DCL) Office.
- 12. This requirement is particularly onerous given that only thirty-three percent of land in the West Bank has been formally registered and ownership is passed on by traditional methods which do not require formal inheritance documentation. See 'Land Registration in the West Bank' OCHA, Five Years after the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, p. 21. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_barrier_report_july_2009_english_low_res.pdf
- 13. Farmers consistently complain that the distribution is irregular: some families have more than one permit holder, others have a single successful applicant not necessarily the most able-bodied or appropriate, and many families receive no permit at all; traditionally, extended families participate in planting, harvesting and maintaining the land throughout the year. In addition, those who experience repeated refusal are discouraged from re-applying. The short validity of permits also results in farmers' enforced inactivity in the period between the expiry of a current permit and its renewal or rejection.
- 14. This includes the value of picked olives and processed olive oil (PCBS data, 2003-2010 averages).
- 15. FAO, Overview of the Olive Sector in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 13 October 2013.
- 16. Ibid. According to FAO, there are 40,000 dunums of olive trees belonging to 135 communities in the 'Seam Zone'.

Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables Conflict-related casualties and violence¹

Direct Israeli-Palestinian	2011	2012		20) 3											γ <u>2</u> 0) 4
conflict related casualties	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
Palestinian deaths																	
Gaza	108	264	2	0	0	Ι	0	0	0	I	I	I	3	2	11	4	2
West Bank	17	8	4	0*	2	2	0	0	I	5	0	3	6	3	27	2	I
Total	125	272	6	3	2	3	0	0	I	6	I	4	9	5	38	6	3
Of whom are civilians ²	62	136	6	3	2	2	0	0	I	6	I	2	6	5	32	5	3
Of whom are female	3	23	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	0	I
Palestinian injuries																	
Gaza	468	1485	13	10	5	4	I	2	2	7	5	I	5	28	83	41	40
West Bank	1647	3175	250	756	488	652	428	122	136	130	369	104	315	131	3881	178	181
Total	2115	4660	263	766	493	656	429	124	138	137	374	105	320	159	3964	219	221
Of whom are civilians	2054	n/a	263	766	492	655	429	124	138	137	373	104	320	158	3959	216	219
Of whom are female	151	n/a	8	13	14	10	40	8	12	4	10	4	15	20	158	4	2
Israeli deaths																	
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	7	0	0	0	Ι	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	I	4	0	0
Of whom are civilians		3	0	0	0	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	2	0	0
Of whom are female	0	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israeli injuries																	
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	345	6	24	21	17	33	I	11	5	9	15	5	4	151	9	6
Of whom are civilians	56	60	3		13	4	15		8	0	5	9	2	3	74	8	5
Of whom are female	3	7	0			2	4	0	0	0	0		0		10		0

*Two Palestinians died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005 ** Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November) *** Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs **** The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

	2011	2012							2013							20	014
Tunnel-related casualties ³	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
Deaths	36	11	6	2	2	Ι	3	0	I	0	I	Ι	0	0	17	0	0
Injuries	54	18	6	0	6	Ι	Ι	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	0

Israeli-settler related	2011	2012	\int						2013							20) 4
incidents resulting in casualties or property damage	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties⁴	120	98	7	8	11	17	10	7	6	4	8	9	4	3	94	8	6
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	268	17	19	24	38	45	29	23	16	29	36	24	6	306	21	17
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	411	366	24	27	35	55	55	36	29	20	37	45	27	9	399	29	23
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	35	2	I	9	4	5	I	2	0	4	4	3	3	38	8	3
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages ⁵	13	15	2	0	0	I	0	3	0	2	0	0	I	3	12	0	I
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	36	50	4	I	9	5	5	4	2	2	4	4	4	6	50	8	4

Civilian Palestin	ians killed	2011	2012	ſ						2013							20	14
or injured by u ordnance in Gaz		Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
Adult	Injured	7	12	I	0	0	I	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
Addit	Killed	I	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Injured	17	19	5	5	6	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	0
Child	Killed	2	I	I	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	0	3	0	0
Grand Total		27	34	7	6	6	I	5	0	0	0	0	0	I	0	26	0	0

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Child Protection

Number of Palestinian	2011	2012	(2013						Ì	20) 4
children killed - direct conflict	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
West Bank	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	0	0	0	I	4	0	0
Gaza Strip	11	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	I	Ι	0
Number of Palestinian ch	nildren inj	ured - d	direct	conf	lict												
West Bank	308	427	36	146	162	289	188	34	22	35	130	25	132	33	1232	39	46
Gaza Strip	125	105	3	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	10	4	7
Number of Israeli childre	n killed -	direct o	onfli	ct													
oPt	I	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	I	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Israeli childre	en injured	- direc	t con	flict													
oPt	0	3	I	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	1
Israel	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Palestinian ch Israeli authorities	nildren he	ld in de	tenti	on by	,				·			• •					
In Israel and oPt	I92 monthly average	198 monthly average	219	236	236	238	223	193	195	180	179	159	173	154	199 monthly average	183	NA
NUMBER OF A STREET	hildren di	splaced	by de	emoli	tions												
Number of Palestinian ch			1	23	5	38	41	58	17	46	53	19	29	75	558	114	28
West Bank, inc EJ	618	474	157	_	5	1.00							·				
				_													

Souce: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children Inernational, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violatons affecting children in armed conflict

Access

	2011	2012							2013							20) 4
Access to healthcare - Gaza	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing ¹⁵	872	777	796	907	882	1155	1117	1165	1299	1023	1303	1420	1347	1362	1148	1538	1,485
of which approved	721	719	738	836	762	957	900	985	1106	932	1182	1314	1227	1181	1010	1350	1,289
of which denied	19	7	2	2	I	0	I	0	7	3	5	11	5	4	3	37	50
of which delayed ¹⁶	83	17	56	69	119	198	216	180	186	88	116	95	115	177	135	151	146

Source:WHO

Maurantaf	2011	2012							2013							20	14
Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint ¹⁷	38	37.5	34	69	51	24	51	30	33	34	45	30	23	17	40.1	11	31
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	18	52	33	10	32	15	12	19	22	10	8	5	22.3	I	9
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	8	29	17	6	16	4	8	24	60	13	13	3	18.5	2.5	26

Source: OCHA

Search and Arrest

	2011	2012		1		1	1		2013	1	1		1			20)14
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	338	313	287	282	338	370	461	242	333	252	281	435	250	316	434	236
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	283	296	411	421	367	459	472	298	341	416	314	529	262	380	491	295

Source: OCHA

Palestinians under	2011	2012	\int	~				-	2013							2014	
Israeli custody (occupation related) ⁶	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4,451	4593	4713	4764	4748	4801	4827	4828	4762	4806	4753	4785	4,768	4760	4,881	NA
of whom are women	26	7	10	10	11	14	16	14	11	12	12	12	12	15	12	14	NA
of whom are administrative detainees ⁷	240	245	159	169	164	155	147	137	134	134	135	143	143	150	148	175	NA
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	897	1069	1118	1196	1216	1194	1150	1219	1295	1299	1301	1301	1,351	1188	1,376	NA

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

Demolition of Structures


Structures demolished⁸

	2011 2012						2013										
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
of which in Area C	571	540	120	11	2	40	58	69	32	20	93	13	19	88	565	101	17
of which in East Jerusalem	42	64	21	3	I	6	11	3	I	36	2	8	6	0	98	5	9
Grand Total	613	604	141	14	3	46	69	72	33	56	95	21	25	88	663	106	26

*22 are in Area B (2009-2012)

People Displaced due	2011	Y2012	2013												2014		
to demolitions or evictions ⁹	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	815	247	6	0	40	32	101	48	33	108	7	43	140	805	160	24
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	71	14	40	10	24	59	30	0	63	6	34	18	0	298	23	34
Grand Total	1094	886	261	46	10	64	91	131	48	96	114	41	61	140	1103	183	58

Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

Strategic Response Plan(SRP) 2014:

		SRP 2014									
	Cluster	Total request in million \$	% of funds received								
à	Coordination and Support Services	18,588,100	113.8%								
	Education	18,251,234	5.4%								
	Food Security	275,200,035	5.7%								
*	Health and Nutrition	9,581,909	4.6%								
\	Protection	43,577,185	19.7%								
-	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	25,140,361	2.9%								
	Total	390,338,824	16.2%								

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

- 1. Conflict-related casualties: includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
- 2. Civilians: includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a "continuous combatant function" as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
- **3.** Tunnel related casualties: figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

- 4. Incidents resulting in casualties: includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
- 5. Incidents resulting in property damage/losses: ibid.

Search and Arrest

- 6. Palestinians in Israeli custody: includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a "security detainee/prisoner". Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a "regular" criminal offense.
- 7. Administrative detainees: Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

- 8. Structures demolished: includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
- 9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
- **10. People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

- **11. Permanently staffed checkpoints**: staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and 'agricultural gates' along the Barrier.
- 12. Partially staffed checkpoints: checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
- **13.** Unstaffed obstacles: includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
- 14. 'Flying' or random checkpoints: checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

Access to health

- **15.** Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez: includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
- **16. Delayed applications**: includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint: includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. Truckloads by type: for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.