

Humanitarian Bulletin

occupied Palestinian territory

NOVEMBER 2016



HIGHLIGHTS

- Only 16 per cent of the 11,000 homes totally destroyed in 2014 have been rebuilt.
- Low-lying areas in Gaza face risk of flooding, which could affect up to 500,000 people, as well as 64 schools and 10 health centers.
- Denial rate for permit applications by UN national staff to enter or leave Gaza increased dramatically during 2016.
- The de facto expansion of Asfar settlement (Hebron) has had a negative impact on the living conditions of Palestinian families in nearby communities, and exacerbated the risk of displacement of two communities.



© Photo by OCHA
Caravans housing families displaced during the 2014 conflict, Johar ad Dik, Gaza, November 2016.

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Overview

In his 23 November briefing to the Security Council, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Stephen O'Brien, warned of the increasing challenges facing the humanitarian community and its ability to deliver assistance to Palestinians in need. This month's Humanitarian Bulletin highlights some of the challenges in blockaded Gaza Strip. These include additional Israeli restrictions imposed in recent months on the entry of basic building materials it classifies as having a "dual civilian and military purpose", cement in particular. The restrictions have slowed down the rate of reconstruction of 17,800 homes destroyed or damaged during the 2014 conflict, prolonging the vulnerability of more than 10,000 families who are still displaced, and whose living conditions are expected to worsen as seasonal rains approach.

Israeli-imposed restrictions on the import of "dual use" materials also apply to items such as mobile pumps needed for flood prevention and response. The Under-Secretary General warned that "urgent projects which aim to reduce the risk of flooding that threatens nearly 500,000 people as winter approaches have been on hold for 10 months awaiting clearance of equipment."

Aid workers have been also affected. The denial rate for permit applications for national staff of UN agencies to enter or exit Gaza had increased from four per cent in 2015 to 40 per cent in the third quarter of 2016. The Under-Secretary General observed that in October, "more than half of our UN applicants were turned-away, with some advised not to apply for 12 months. No explanation other than 'security' is cited, leaving us at a loss as to how to respond and a growing morale problem." Mr. O'Brien concluded his review of Gaza's restrictions by observing: "Ultimately, real progress in Gaza requires a full lifting of the blockade by Israel, in line with the resolutions of this Council and the General Assembly. Until that happens, Israel must ensure that items needed for reconstruction, relief and emergency preparedness are allowed entry. And that aid workers are able to move about to do their vital work."


NOVEMBER FIGURES

Palestinian killed (direct conflict)	4
Palestinian injured (direct conflict)	97
Israelis killed (direct conflict)	0
Israelis injured (direct conflict)	7
Structures demolished in the West Bank	68
People displaced in the West Bank	70

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 2016

571 million
requested (US\$)

47% funded



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Israeli settlements are a key driver of humanitarian vulnerability for Palestinians in the West Bank. This month's Bulletin presents the first in a series of articles on de facto expansion of settlements and its humanitarian impact on Palestinian communities, featuring the settlement of Asfar in the Hebron governorate. The official municipal area of this settlement, where Palestinian entry is banned by military order, encompasses 7,800 dunums, or over 50 times the size of the settlement's built up area. Additionally, settlers have taken de facto control over some 2,300 dunums outside the official boundaries and have largely eliminated Palestinian access to their land in this area. These practices are carried out with the acquiescence of, the Israeli authorities. The official and de facto expansion of Asfar has severely impacted the livelihoods of farmers and herders from two nearby towns (Sai'r and Ash-Shuyukh), and contributed to a coercive environment putting the existence of another two smaller herding/farming communities (Al Ganoub and Jurat Al Kheil) at risk of forcible transfer.

O'Brien concluded his briefing to the Security Council with a clear call for action: "We look to you to ensure greater respect for obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law and to enhance the protection of civilians. We look to you to safeguard the operational space aid workers require to provide assistance to those most in need. And we look to you to address the underlying driver of Palestine's protection crisis through a political resolve to end the occupation, now approaching its 50th anniversary."

This article is based on contributions by UNSCO and the Shelter Cluster.


Intensified restrictions on the entry of building materials delay the completion of housing projects in Gaza

Additional restrictions imposed by Israel from April 2016 on the entry of building materials into the Gaza Strip, have slowed the pace of reconstruction of homes destroyed or damaged during the 2014 conflict, and prolong the vulnerability of more than 10,000 families who are still displaced.

Between 3 April and 22 May 2016, Israel suspended imports of cement for the private sector following the alleged diversion of cement from the intended beneficiaries and the discovery of a tunnel from Gaza to Israel. Although imports of cement have resumed, the number of trucks entering via the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) has been limited to 90 per day. Prior to April 2016, the number of trucks varied, with up to 120 entering daily.¹

There is currently a backlog demand of 577,000 tons of cement. This estimate is based only on approved beneficiaries and excludes future approved cases. Based on current stocks and the rate of cement imports (approx. 65,000 tons per month), it will take nine months to clear the backlog. If demand for additional cement continues at the same rate as in 2016, it will take more than nine years for the supply to catch up. For housing construction and repair alone, there are currently 33,000 families approved to purchase cement through the GRM, but only four per cent of the cement that they need is currently available.

Cement through Kerem Shalom Crossing (in thousands of tons)




Source: www.shelterpalestine.org

By November 2016, 39 per cent of the 17,800 housing units destroyed or severely damaged in the 2014 conflict had been rebuilt.² Of the 11,000 homes that were totally destroyed, only 16 per cent have been completed, another 26 per cent are under reconstruction, and 36 per cent have received no funding.³ As a result of the slow pace of reconstruction, 10,248 families, constituting about 53,300 IDPs, remain displaced. Overcrowding, lack of privacy, exposure to weather extremes, persistent uncertainties as to their future and precariousness are some of the challenges facing these vulnerable IDPs.⁴ Funding gaps threaten to end the assistance currently provided by humanitarian agencies to IDPs who live in rented properties, and who constitute the majority of IDPs. As of 7 November, approximately 6,500 eligible displaced refugee families were still waiting to receive transitional shelter cash assistance (TSCA) from UNRWA for the fourth quarter of 2016. About 300 families (1,560 IDPs) live in increasingly dilapidated caravans and endure a range of protection concerns.⁵

Since May 2016, Israel limited the number of trucks entering Gaza to about 90 per day.

Progress in reconstruction of 17,800 homes destroyed or severely damaged during 2014 conflict



Source: www.shelterpalestine.org

GRM and flow of "dual-use" materials

In the blockade imposed following the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007, Israel placed significant restrictions on the import of goods into the Gaza Strip, citing security concerns. Since 2010, these restrictions have mainly prohibited the entry of materials considered by Israel to have "dual" civilian-military use ⁶. The list of banned items includes basic construction materials such as cement, gravel and steel bars, as well as equipment critical for the provision of basic services.

In the aftermath of the 2014 conflict, Israel and the State of Palestine, with UN facilitation, agreed to establish the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) as a temporary mechanism to enable the controlled entry of construction materials for reconstruction of the large-scale damage in Gaza. Since then, the Israeli authorities have removed some key materials (e.g. gravel) from the restricted list, but have added others such as wood on the grounds that they have allegedly been used for the construction of tunnels into Israel by Palestinian armed groups.

Since its establishment, the GRM has facilitated imports of 1.65 million tons of construction materials, including one million tons of cement. In comparison with the total of 250,000 tons of cement allowed in between 2010 and 2014 ⁷, the GRM has increased the flow eight-fold.⁸ GRM allocations are organized around four types of construction activity or 'streams'. Those designated for infrastructural and large-scale projects (project stream); for individual beneficiaries who seek to repair, reconstruct or build new homes destroyed in 2014 (shelter and residential streams); or to complete the construction of properties started before 2014 (finishing stream).⁹

At current imports rates, it would take nine months to clear the backlog of cement, and nine years for supply to catch up with demand.



© Photo by OCHA

Empty warehouse of a cement mixing factory in eastern Gaza City, Nov 2014.

Preparedness for potential floods in Gaza undermined by import restrictions

Thousands of families at risk

As the rainy season approaches, thousands of families in the Gaza Strip will once again be at risk of temporary displacement and the destruction of assets due to flooding. The winter weather conditions are expected to exacerbate the already fragile living conditions and livelihoods of large segments of the Palestinian population. The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster and its partners have identified flood risk areas throughout the Gaza Strip, potentially affecting nearly 500,000 people, as well as 64 schools and 10 health centres.

Over the past decade, the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) and other WASH partners have sought to implement infrastructural projects to address high-risk areas. These include interventions to separate storm and wastewater networks; extend storm water drainage networks and infiltration ponds; provide spare parts, maintenance and fuel for pumping equipment in low-lying areas; clear existing drainage channels; and provide support for service providers in prevention and response activities. These activities have been undermined due to limited funding and restrictions on the import of materials, particularly those designated by the Israeli authorities as “dual” military-civilian use, as well as the internal Palestinian divide.

Currently, the CMWU is seeking to implement two projects aimed at reducing the risk of flooding in low-lying areas in Khan Yunis and Rafah, which serve approximately 220,000 residents. These projects have been delayed due to Israeli import restrictions, with some materials awaiting clearance for 10 months. The restrictions also apply to mobile and high-pressure jetting pumps, and to other equipment requested by the CMWU for flood prevention and response activities to pump storm and wastewater from low-lying areas to treatment plants, infiltration ponds or to the sea.

unicef 

*This article was
contributed by UNICEF on
behalf of the WASH Cluster.*

*Materials for two flood
prevention projects in
Khan Yunis and Rafah
have been awaiting
clearance for 10 months.*



Although several WASH partners, including local and international NGOs, UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), hold resources and plans for flood prevention and response activities in support of service providers, these remain limited in the face of the overall risks. Proposals have been submitted to the Humanitarian Fund for the oPt to cover the highest priority prevention and response needs as identified by service providers and WASH cluster partners.

Five additional projects are planned for 2017 to improve storm water infrastructure, ensure support to service providers, and to reinforce the preparedness and response planning of municipalities in high-risk flood areas. While these projects will provide the capacity for an immediate response, larger and longer-term projects from development actors are needed to advance the storm water master plans developed by the CMWU and WASH partners.

Access obstacles include lengthy interrogations of national staff and instances of permit cancelation and confiscation at Erez crossing.


Serious deterioration in access of humanitarian staff to and from Gaza

Israeli restrictions on the entry of national staff of aid organizations to and from the Gaza Strip have intensified during 2016. The denial rate for permit applications by national staff of UN agencies surged from four per cent in 2015 to 40 per cent in the third quarter of 2016 (see table). Available information indicates that the rate of denial for national staff of other humanitarian agencies has also risen.

The average time for processing permit applications increased from 21 days in 2015 to 26 so far this year. Some 60 UN national staff, half of whom had previously travelled frequently to and from Gaza, have recently been denied and also prohibited from applying for a permit for a further 12 months. Additional access obstacles include lengthy interrogations of national staff and instances of permit cancellation and confiscation at Erez crossing. While the number of such incidents remains consistent with previous years, the total hours lost due to interrogation has more than doubled since 2015.

In July 2015, the Israeli authorities announced a formal ban on entry into Gaza for Israeli passport or East Jerusalem ID card holders. The ban on the latter category was partially lifted in November 2015, with entry permitted on an “urgent/exceptional basis”. In June 2016, the authorities introduced a procedure which limited permit applications by Gaza ID holders to four per year, and for a maximum duration of one month (previously

UN Permit Applications – Rates of Denial for National Staff



unlimited permit applications were allowed and were valid for up to three months). This restrictive policy of permit denial is characterized by arbitrariness and a lack of transparency, with no explanation given other than “security reasons.”

Access restrictions on national staff may gradually hinder the ability of organizations to operate and to respond to the needs of vulnerable populations. Staff have reported that lack of access has hampered their ability to carry out their functions, particularly those requiring coordination with staff based in the West Bank. This could increase the costs of humanitarian and development operations.

The humanitarian impact of de facto settlement expansion: the case of Asfar

New research to enhance humanitarian response and preparedness

Since 1967, about 250 Israeli settlements and settlement outposts have been established across the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This violates Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits the transfer by the occupying power of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.¹⁰ Some settlement practices, including many of those highlighted here, also violate domestic Israeli legislation.

The establishment and continuous expansion of settlements is a key driver of humanitarian vulnerability. It deprives Palestinians of their property and sources of livelihood, restricts their access to services, and creates a range of protection threats that, in turn, have triggered demand for assistance and protection measures from the humanitarian community.¹¹

Research and monitoring of settlement expansion has mostly focused on the construction of residential areas and has neglected, to some extent, other forms of expansion. These include the development of road networks, agriculture and touristic sites, mostly on privately-owned Palestinian land, without formal permit from, but with the acquiescence of, the Israeli authorities (hereafter: de facto expansion). Although settlement-related issues such as settler violence and access restrictions to protect settlements are regularly monitored, their relationship to the phenomenon of settlement expansion is often overlooked.

To enhance the humanitarian community's understanding of these patterns and its ability to respond, OCHA has collected and analysed data on various affected areas in the West Bank.¹² The following case study of Asfar settlement in Hebron governorate is the first in a series of Humanitarian Bulletin articles presenting the findings of this research.


The establishment and continuous expansion of settlements is a key driver of humanitarian vulnerability.

Asfar (also known as Metzad) was established in 1983 as a military outpost (“nahal”) on privately-owned and cultivated Palestinian land, which was requisitioned under a military order citing ‘security needs’.¹³ A year later, the army handed the outpost over to an Ultra-Orthodox Jewish group for the establishment of a civilian settlement. Nearly 600 Israeli settlers currently live in Asfar and its nearby outpost.

Soon after Asfar’s establishment, the authorities transferred thousands of dunums of land previously declared as ‘state land’ to the Asfar municipal boundaries, now comprising nearly 7,800 dunums.¹⁴ This is more than 50 times the size of the current built-up area (about 150 dunums).

Due to its hilly topography and size, settlers have not made use or otherwise established a presence over most of this huge municipal area. Instead, they have expanded their

Asfar’s municipal boundaries (7,800 dunums) are more than 50 times the size of its built-up area (about 150 dunums).



control over the more accessible areas in the immediate vicinity of the residential core, outside the municipal boundaries, including more than 2,300 dunums of land, nearly half of which, owned primarily by Palestinians, according to official Israeli records.¹⁵

The establishment and gradual expansion of the settlement has had a severe impact on specific Palestinian landowners, on the general population of two adjacent towns, Sai'r and Ash-Shuyukh (over 33,000 people), and on two small herding and farming communities: Al Ganoub and Jurat Al Kheil (approx. 200 people).

Expansion of a permanent settler presence

In 1992, without the building permits or official authorization required from the Israeli authorities, Asfar settlers established a residential outpost (Asfar B) on a nearby hilltop, partially located on the land previously requisitioned for 'security needs'. The outpost was gradually abandoned in subsequent years. In 2000, it was repopulated by a different group of settlers and was renamed Pnei Kedem. By early 2015, the Israeli authorities had issued 60 demolition orders against most of the structures erected in the outpost; none of these demolition orders have been enforced.¹⁶

Settlers have begun to cultivate olive trees and vines on more than 300 dunums of mostly privately-owned Palestinian land. These 'farming activities' benefit from the financial support of the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization, a body whose budget is entirely funded by the Israeli government.¹⁷

The de-facto expansion of the settlement has been facilitated by the development of an extensive road network, largely banned for Palestinian use. Extending over some 18 kilometres, this network includes two connections to the main road leading northwards (to Jerusalem), and a series of internal dirt roads connecting the various sections of the settlement-controlled area to each other. All of the dirt roads (8 kilometres) encroach onto private Palestinian land and were built without permits.

The de-facto expansion of the settlement has been facilitated by the development of an extensive road network, largely banned for Palestinian use.



The loss of income from the farming and grazing activities in areas now controlled by Asfar settlement had a significant impact on the living conditions of the expanded Abu Shanab family

The case of the Abu Shanab family

Ahmad Abu Shanab (53), from Sa'ir, together with his ten brothers and six sisters, inherited 320 dunums of land within the area now controlled by Asfar. In the 1970s, the family planted fruit trees (almonds, peaches and apricots) which, together with seasonal crops (tomatoes, beans, corn, wheat and barley), became the main source of income for 12 nuclear families.

Access constraints began soon after the establishment of Asfar in 1983, but the situation deteriorated dramatically following the second Intifada in 2000, when an armed settler started to prevent access to the area. "The last time I tried to reach the land in 2000, I was physically assaulted and badly injured by a group of armed settlers, who also damaged my car. I thought I was going to die. Later, I filed a complaint with the Israeli police but never heard back", Mr Abu Shanab said.

The loss of income from the farming and grazing activities had a significant impact on the living conditions of the expanded family. "Some food items that were previously produced in-house, including some seasonal vegetables and fruits, as well as meat, milk and eggs, became more infrequent on our table," Mr Abu Shanab said.

In September 2014, following nearly a decade and a half of lack of access, the Abu Shanab family planted 1,800 olive saplings and 500 almond trees on part of their land within the settlement-controlled area, at a total cost of some NIS 20,000 (approx. US \$5,300). An Israeli human rights organization representing the family informed the Israeli authorities in advance of the planting activities. However, all the saplings and trees were uprooted by settlers in three separate incidents between February and May 2015. Complaints filed with the Israeli police after these attacks have not led to the indictment of perpetrators. In February 2016, the family made an additional attempt and planted 800 saplings that have remained in situ and have been tended a number of times without impediment.



Ahmad Abu Shanab looking at his land near Pnei Kedem outpost, Nov 2014.

Discouraging Palestinian access

In a series of group discussions conducted by OCHA, residents of the affected Palestinian communities reported that the regular presence of armed settlers in the area has played a critical role in intimidating and discouraging them from accessing their land in the settlement-controlled area. This intimidation comes primarily from the security coordinators and guards of the settlement and outpost. These coordinators have been officially granted policing powers, such as carrying weapons and detaining suspects.¹⁸ Soldiers stationed in a military base within the settlement-controlled area are responsible for staffing the access points and supporting the security coordinators.

The intimidation has been fueled by sporadic attacks against farmers and their property over the years. In the group discussions, people indicated that the intensity of attacks peaked during the second Intifada (2000-2005), but detailed documentation is not available for this period. Since 2006 when OCHA began documenting settler violence, 18 attacks resulting in Palestinian injuries (five incidents) or property damage (13 incidents) have been recorded around Asfar. This figure excludes the more frequent incidents of harassment, access prevention, or the expulsion of farmers and herders from their land. In at least seven of the incidents resulting in casualties or damage, complaints were filed with the Israeli police, but no suspects in any case have been indicted.

Palestinian access is impeded by physical and administrative means. Part of the main road leading to the settlement, which previously linked the Al Ganoub herding community to Sa'ir town, has been entirely closed to Palestinian use since the beginning of the second Intifada (September 2000) on security grounds, although no written order was issued to that effect. Additionally, in 2005 the army installed a roadblock on another key road running next to the settlement (Wadi Sai'r road), effectively preventing Palestinian use. These restrictions, jointly enforced by the army and the settlement security forces, have contributed to reducing the Palestinian presence and facilitating the takeover of land.


Despite all the impediments and risks, and following repeated unsuccessful attempts, members of one Palestinian family (see case below) managed in April 2016 to gain access to part of its land within the settlement-controlled area and planted a few hundred saplings.

The municipal area of Asfar is classified as a 'closed military area', and is off-limits for Palestinian use.

The entire municipal area of Asfar is declared 'closed military area', making it off-limits for Palestinian use. This classification applies to the municipal areas of all settlements (excluding those in East Jerusalem).¹⁹

Shrinking space, reduced livelihoods and risk of forcible displacement

The practices highlighted above have had a pervasive impact on the Palestinian communities surrounding Asfar. In Al Ganoub and Jurat Al Kheil, both located in Area C, these practices, combined with the discriminatory planning processes, have created a coercive environment that pressurizes people to leave.



Road gate blocking access to Al Ganoub, May 2015.

The Israeli authorities fail to provide these communities with any sort of planning and residents are unable to obtain building permits. In four incidents during the past year alone (November 2015–October 2016), the authorities demolished or requisitioned 28 homes and livelihood-related structures in the two communities, including four structures previously provided as humanitarian aid. Lack of planning also prevents either community from connecting to the water or electricity networks, rendering residents dependent on expensive water tankering (up to ten times the price of piped water) and unreliable solar panels to meet their basic needs. Settler attacks and intimidation compound the water shortage, limit access to traditional grazing areas and severely undermine the community's main sources of livelihood.

Vehicular access from Al Ganoub to its main service center in Sa'ir is dependent on access to the road leading to Asfar. Between 2000 and 2007, this road was permanently blocked.

Vehicular access from Al Ganoub to its main service center in Sa'ir is dependent on access to the road leading to Asfar. Between 2000 and 2007, this road was permanently blocked. It was closed again between December 2015 and January 2016. When the junction is blocked, the road can only be accessed on foot or by donkey, from where alternative transportation can then be sought.

For Sai'r and Ash-Shuyukh, the main impact is the loss of potential income from farming activities. Statistics on land cultivation outside built-up areas in Hebron governorate show an estimated 8,000 dunums of cultivable land within the official and de facto area of Asfar. Cultivation of this area by Palestinians, based on irrigation, variety of crop and the rate of return in the rest of the governorate, would generate an output of approximately \$ 2.1 million a year.²⁰ This is a conservative estimate based on existing limited levels of irrigation and excluding other significant income-generation activities such as herding.

Both villages face a fragile socio-economic situation:

- Unemployment is estimated by the Sai'r and Ash-Shuyukh village councils at 20–25 per cent, above the 19 per cent for Hebron as a whole;
- 350 families (approx. 1,700 people) are classified as 'hardship cases', and are entitled to cash assistance from the Palestinian Ministry of Social Development (MoSD);²¹
- 749 households (approx. 3,700 individuals) not covered by the MoSD are dependent on food assistance (food rations or vouchers) provided by UNRWA and the UN World Food Programme (WFP).



The restoration of full access and security for Palestinians to their land in the settlement-controlled areas would generate much-needed livelihood and employment opportunities, alleviating the hardship of families affected by unemployment and food insecurity. This would also generate an economic 'spillover effect' with the additional income spent on local goods and services, multiplying the impact of the initial growth.

Endnotes

1. Despite these restrictions, the volume of imports in 2016 was the largest since the imposition of the blockade in 2007.
2. The 17,800 housing units rendered uninhabitable comprise 11,000 units completely destroyed and another 6,800 severely damaged.
3. The reconstruction of completely destroyed housing units only began in June 2015, ten months after the ceasefire, due to a dispute between Israel and the Palestinian Authority over the amount of construction materials required to rebuild these units.
4. See OCHA In the Spotlight: Gaza Internally Displaced Persons, April 2016 <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-internally-displaced-persons-april-2016>
5. See 'Winter weather threatens living conditions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) residing in caravan sites in Gaza,' *October Humanitarian Bulletin* 2016: <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/monthly-humanitarian-bulletin-october-2016>.
6. Between 2007 and 2010, Israel prevented the entry of all supplies apart from food and medical goods, and a limited list of other essential materials.
7. See GISHA: <http://gisha.org/graph/2395>
8. Between 2010 and 2013, the equivalent of around 5-6,000 truckloads of supplies, at least half of which comprised construction materials, entered Gaza via the tunnels every month - roughly 90,000 tons per month.
9. In the Shelter Stream, 102,000 households have so far purchased materials to repair their homes. As a result, repair works have either been completed or are ongoing on 65% of the 153,200 homes partially damaged in 2014. In the Residential Stream, 4,400 households have so far purchased materials to rebuild destroyed homes and another 6,400 have purchased materials to build new homes. Reconstruction has either been completed or is ongoing on 40% of the 11,000 homes totally destroyed in 2014. In the Project Stream which facilitates infrastructure projects such as roads, hospitals, schools, large residential complexes, water facilities and new businesses, more than 1,100 projects have been created under the GRM, of which 57% are private sector projects. To date, 182 projects have been completed, 476 are active and another 100 have been fully confirmed.
10. This has been confirmed numerous times, among others, by the International Court of Justice (Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of 9 July 2004); the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention (Declaration of 5 December 2001); the United Nations Security Council (Resolution 471); and the United Nations General Assembly (Resolutions 3092 (XXVIII), 47/172 and 66/225).
11. For an overview of the humanitarian responses to settlement activities proposed by humanitarian agencies operating in the occupied Palestinian territory for 2016, see the Humanitarian Country Team, Strategic Response Plan 2016, available at: <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/2016-humanitarian-response-plan-occupied-palestinian-territory>.
12. Cases were selected to represent different geographical areas across the West Bank and the extent to which settlement activities in each of the pre-selected cases has received attention from humanitarian actors.
13. Requisition order 8/83. The residential area of Asfar was established contrary to common practice as this order does not contain an expiration date and has apparently never been renewed.
14. Military Order 783 Regarding Regional Councils - Asfar, 21 January 1998. The size of the municipal area referred to in the text excludes a large section (over 4,000 dunums) which was turned into Area A following the issuance of the order and is no longer part of the settlement, although the order itself was not updated.
15. Calculation based on a GIS layer obtained from the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) marking the status of the land in the affected area as either privately-owned or public (also known as 'state') land.
16. GIS layer provided by the ICA to Dror Etkes following an information request under the Freedom of Information Act.

17. <http://www.pneikedem.org/81938/חקלאות>. This page was recently removed and is no longer available.
18. While the IDF is formally responsible for arming, training and supervising the settlement security coordinators, the coordinators are also accountable to the municipal bodies of the settlement that appoint them and pay their salaries, often creating a conflict of interests. For further background on the issue see: Yesh Din, The Lawless Zone, June 2014.
19. See: Declaration regarding the Closure of an Area [Israeli Localities] [Judea and Samaria] 2002, of 6 June 2002.
20. The economic potential of agriculture was estimated by FAO based on data provided by OCHA on the size of the areas affected and on cultivation patterns in Nablus governorate provided by PCBS (2007/8).
21. Payments range from NIS 750-1,800 every three months depending on the severity of the case.