

# HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT

FEBRUARY 2015



## Highlights

- In the Gaza Strip, 58,000 people have so far bought restricted building materials for repairs, but almost none of them are IDPs whose homes were destroyed or severely damaged.
- Israel eases access restrictions in and out of Gaza, including a rise in the quota of exit permits for Palestinian merchants and approval for the transfer of textiles and furniture to the West Bank.
- Infrastructure works launched in one of the sites designated for the "relocation" of Bedouins in Area C of the West Bank, alongside the issuance of multiple stop-work orders against donor-funded structures in Bedouin communities at risk.


## FEBRUARY FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	1
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	167
Structures demolished in the West Bank	17
People displaced in the West Bank	0

## STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN 2015

705 million  
requested (US\$)

22% funded



## Overview

**Six months after the end of hostilities, reconstruction of homes is yet to start.**

During February, Israel extended the withholding of the tax revenues it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA) for the third successive month in retaliation for Palestinian accession to the International Criminal Court. The potential destabilizing effect of this decision is a major concern since these revenues constitute some 70 per cent of the PA's budget.

To date the PA has been forced to partially suspend the payment of salaries for public employees in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and cut expenditure on services, with its ability to maintain law and order being undermined. Moreover, the cuts in salaries and expenditures are having a direct and indirect impact on the Palestinian economy, which has contracted in 2014 for the first time since 2006, further threatening the livelihoods of the most vulnerable.

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
Woman living in debris of her destroyed house in east Khan Younis. February 2015.

[www.ochaopt.org](http://www.ochaopt.org)

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory

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Coordination Saves Lives



In the Gaza Strip, the frustration generated by the salary crisis is exacerbated by the lack of any visible progress in the reconstruction of homes destroyed or severely damaged during the summer hostilities. Around 100,000 displaced people are still living in very precarious conditions. Although approximately 58,000 families have so far purchased restricted building materials through the temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), virtually all of these cases involved homes requiring repairs rather than complete reconstruction. As of the end of February, no housing reconstruction project has yet been implemented on the ground, primarily due to the slow pace of disbursement of pledges by donors made during the Cairo Conference in October 2014, and compounded by delays in the clearance of projects.

Underfunding of humanitarian programmes is also worrying. As of the end of February, only one fifth of the humanitarian appeal for 2015 was funded, with over 60 per cent of the funds received destined for UNRWA. This funding pattern generates potential discrepancies in the scope of assistance provided to refugees as opposed to non-refugees. Humanitarian assistance, including transitional shelter for those displaced during hostilities, is a much-needed stabilizing element in Gaza.

Additionally, February saw the start of infrastructure works in a section of Al Jabal, in the Jerusalem periphery - one of three sites designated for the “relocation” of Palestinian Bedouins in the central West Bank, which can accommodate approximately 50 families. The UN Secretary-General has warned that this “relocation” plan would amount to forcible transfer under international humanitarian law if implemented.

On a positive note, Israel announced a series of measures aimed at easing access restrictions in and out of Gaza, including a rise in the quota of exit permits for Palestinian merchants and approval, in principle, for the transfer of textiles and furniture to the West Bank for commercial purposes. This follows similar measures announced in October 2014. While these easings are welcome, the exit of goods from Gaza remains severely restricted and the majority of people are ineligible to apply for travel permits.

For those who are eligible in principle, such as medical patients referred for treatment outside Gaza, an exit permit is not guaranteed. In the past two years, the number of patients referred to West Bank hospitals, including in East Jerusalem, has risen, particularly due to the frequent closures of Gaza’s border with Egypt. However, the percentage of permit applications denied or delayed has also increased to nearly 20 per cent of all applications so far in 2015.

February marked six months since the end of last summer’s escalation of hostilities. The UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs noted in his briefing to the Security Council this month that, in Gaza, “the combination of the failure to rectify the persistent governance and security issues and the slow pace of reconstruction has created an increasingly toxic environment”. Regarding the ongoing withholding of revenues, he emphasized, “Israel’s action is a violation of its obligations under the Paris Protocol of the Oslo Accords and we, again, call for an immediate reversal of this decision”. Unless

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*February marks six months since the end of last summer’s escalation of hostilities in Gaza. Around 100,000 people remain displaced and are still living in very precarious conditions.*

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significant progress is made towards addressing the root causes of the conflict and ending the occupation, the risk of a new round of hostilities remains present.

## RECONSTRUCTION OF HOMES DESTROYED DURING HOSTILITIES YET TO BEGIN

Lack of funds pledged in donor conference main impediment

The situation of the approximately 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of the July-August hostilities remains precarious and uncertain. Approximately 8,800 of them currently reside in 14 UNRWA Collective Centres, 1,700 in prefabricated housing units, and the rest in rented accommodation, with host families or in makeshift shelters in the rubble of their damaged or destroyed homes.

In order to assist the largest number of people in the shortest possible time, shelter actors have prioritized cash assistance for rent, supporting IDPs with homes destroyed or severely damaged, and cash assistance for repairs, for those whose houses sustained partial damage.


The full reconstruction of homes is a highly complex endeavor, which requires various planning stages, including entire neighborhoods and their related infrastructure, and is extremely costly. Therefore, the bulk of this caseload is to be addressed through reconstruction projects implemented by UN agencies and governmental bodies, with only a small portion being “self help” projects, where individuals carry out the reconstruction.

However, due to the slow pace of disbursement of pledges made by donors during the Cairo Conference in October 2014, compounded by delays in the assessment and clearance of projects through the temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), as of the end of February 2015 only two housing projects were approved and none has started on the ground. The GRM allows for the controlled entry of building materials designated by the Israeli authorities as “dual use items” (mainly cement, gravel and metal bars).<sup>1</sup>


Of the approximately 58,000 individuals (usually one individual per family) who have purchased restricted building materials (cement, gravel and metal bars) through the

*Shelter actors in the Gaza Strip have prioritized cash assistance for rent, supporting IDPs with homes destroyed or severely damaged, and cash assistance for repairs, for those whose houses sustained partial damage.*

Temporary solutions to IDPs by area



**Individuals cleared to purchase materials via the GRM  
as of 12 March 2015**



GRM, virtually none are IDPs whose homes were destroyed or severely damaged. The latter are among the nearly 14,500 cases who have been cleared by the GRM, but have not yet purchased any materials. Of those that have accessed building materials through the GRM, less than 60 per cent have purchased the full quantity of materials allocated to them in the damage assessments, while the rest bought only part of their respective allocations, presumably due to the lack of financial resources.

The lack of visible progress and uncertainty regarding a durable solution for the IDPs is prolonging the hardship of affected families and adding to the general frustration in the population caused by the longstanding movement restrictions, the salary crisis and the lack of employment opportunities.<sup>2</sup>

#### **Rubble removal**

A critical precondition to the start of reconstruction is the removal of rubble from the targeted sites. UNDP estimates that around two million tons of rubble were generated during the summer's hostilities, three times more than during the Cast Lead offensive in 2008-9.

The Palestinian Ministry of Public Works and Housing is overseeing and coordinating rubble removal activities within Gaza by a range of actors, including UNDP. The latter aims to remove and sort approximately one million tons of rubble over a period of two years, half of which, will be crushed and reused for road construction projects.

Once complete, the removal of rubble will enable more than one million people in affected areas to access basic services, particularly through the reconnection of households to water and sanitation infrastructure, and will reduce the risk of collapsing buildings and the threat of explosive remnants of war (ERW).

As of early March 2015, UNDP had removed 95,000 tons of rubble, or nearly ten per cent of its final target, and transferred it to crushing sites. Rubble removal has been made possible with funding from Sweden, Japan and USAID. However, a funding gap of nearly \$8 million remains for the crushing and reuse of rubble.

*The removal of rubble will enable more than one million people in affected areas to access basic services, and will reduce the risk of collapsing buildings and the threat of explosive remnants of war.*



### **Transitional shelter cash assistance**

Transitional shelter cash assistance (TSCA) is being provided to families whose homes were severely damaged or totally destroyed based on damage assessments carried out by UNRWA for the refugee population, and UNDP and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) for the non-refugee population.

Due to a critical shortage of funds, on 27 January 2015, UNRWA was forced to partially suspend its cash assistance programme supporting repairs and rental subsidies. However, through reallocation of existing funds and savings, supplemented by the receipt of pledges, since then UNRWA has distributed cash to some 12,600 families for a total of \$ 16.5 million. Germany, together with Saudi Arabia are the key donors to UNRWA's shelter cash assistance program in Gaza. UNRWA continues to face a \$ 545 million shortfall to support refugee families with minor damage to repair their homes and to continue the provision of TSCA.

As of early March, UNDP had provided TSCA to a total of 2,633 non-refugee families with severely or totally damaged housing units for a period of up to six months, slightly more than half the total number of families found eligible (4,994). UNDP's vulnerability criteria for prioritizing families for assistance were IDPs residing in UNRWA shelters, female-headed households and large-size families. Funding for TSCA is limited and 74 per cent of the overall needs remain unfunded; more than \$23.2 million still needed to cover TSCA for non-refugee families and \$1.8 million for refugee families.

### **Protection strategy**

A strategy was developed by humanitarian partners to guide the work of humanitarian actors in protecting the human rights of IDPs for the duration of their displacement. This strategy was subsequently endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team. The key priorities identified in the strategy include:

- **Profiling and tracking of IDPs:** To ensure an appropriate and targeted response.<sup>3</sup>
- **Regular and systematic monitoring of the protection situation of IDPs:** Many IDPs

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*Through reallocation of existing funds and savings, supplemented by the receipt of new pledges, during February UNRWA distributed cash to some 12,600 families for a total of \$ 16.5 million.*

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## IDP GIRLS AND WOMEN – A HIGHLY VULNERABLE GROUP

A study carried out by UN Gender Based Violence sub-working group and led by UNFPA immediately after the ceasefire of August 2014,<sup>4</sup> illustrates how the conflict has had a deep impact on women and girls. Increased cases of violence have been reported against them in emergency shelters, host family situations and other places of refuge. Women were subjected to many types and varying degrees of violence and often responded with silence or by directing violence towards their children, especially girls. Some girls and women also reported discrimination in receipt of aid and services in emergency shelters or with host families.

The following are illustrative quotes from women who participated in focus group discussions during the study:

*(...) “My father-in-law was beating me and humiliating me during the war. Sometimes, I was driven away from their home to the street. Nobody supported me.”*

*“I slept in my jilbab (gown). There was only one toilet in the home where we sheltered. I was ashamed to enter the toilet in the presence of my brothers-in-law, so I waited until they went out.”*

*“I do not inform anybody about my problems and keep them to myself. This is because I have one brother who is ill and I fear that he may die if he knows I am not well. Also I cannot tell my husband what my brothers-in-law and father-in-law do to me because he is also ill. I don’t want to increase his concerns; he is a cancer patient.”*

*Most vulnerable groups among IDPs include women, children, households where the main breadwinner is disabled, and persons at risk of exposure to explosive remnants of war.*

have suffered either physical or psychological harm as a result of the conflict and continue to live in overcrowded conditions that offer little privacy. The resulting stress has increased tensions within families and communities, reflected in domestic violence, legal concerns associated with inheritance rights, guardianship rights, and girls and women being at risk of early or forced marriage.

- **Targeting humanitarian response based on need:** While all displaced households require assistance, some families and individuals are more vulnerable than others. It is imperative that those who are most vulnerable or who have special needs are prioritized. Particularly vulnerable groups include women; children; households where the main breadwinner is disabled or whose livelihood was affected; persons who are elderly or frail; and persons at risk of exposure to ERWs.
- **Access to legal support:** UN agencies and civil society organizations who monitor protection and document human rights violations should provide advice on accessing appropriate legal support, on legal documents and pursuing justice mechanisms for accountability and compensation for losses.





# "I HAVE LOST MY HOME, I HAVE LOST EVERYTHING".

Masa'ad Attallah Abu Gaddaieen, from Beit Lahia, 46, is currently unemployed, but years of hard work in the agricultural sector enabled him to save some money that he invested in the construction of his home.

*"In Gaza you are not safe at home. My family and I have been displaced twice in two years. The first time was during the Israeli military operation in November 2012, and the second time as a result of the recent conflict."*

In July 2014, the Israeli army began massive bombardment of the area where the family home is located, but they stayed at home for ten days despite the bombardments. When the Israeli military ground operation began, the family left their home and took shelter in one of the UNRWA schools. The situation inside the shelter was very difficult and conditions were crowded.

*"We managed to visit our home during the temporary ceasefire 25 days into the hostilities. We found our home and around 95 other homes in the area completely destroyed by Israeli bulldozers. We were shocked and helpless; it was all gone, everything we had struggled to build. I have worked all my life to have a house of my own, and then the Israeli bulldozers came and destroyed it in seconds."*

After the end of the hostilities, Masa'ad and his family had to relocate to another UNRWA shelter in Al Remal area, where they stayed for 15 days before moving to a shelter in Beach camp, where some of the family still live.

*"The long stay and situation inside the shelter has become a great strain on my family and I have no money to rent an apartment. The economic situation is very difficult. We erected a makeshift shelter from plastic and fabric near our destroyed home."* Currently, some members of the family feel more comfortable staying in the makeshift shelter despite the winter season and the exposure to harsh weather conditions.

*"We are waiting for UNRWA assistance to be able to rent an apartment temporarily, but we have heard that UNRWA has no money to help us. All I hope for is that our home will be reconstructed very soon so we can return to a life of dignity."*

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*"In Gaza you are not safe at home. My family and I have been displaced twice in two years."*

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## FURTHER EASING OF CRITERIA AND QUOTAS FOR ISRAELI PERMITS TO EXIT GAZA

Commercial crossing to be upgraded to increase the volume of imports/exports

On 17 February the Israeli Ministry of Defense announced a series of measures aimed at easing access restrictions in and out of Gaza, to improve the humanitarian conditions of the population.<sup>5</sup> These include a rise in the quota of exit permits for Palestinian merchants from 3,000 to 5,000 a month, an increase in the daily number of exits from 400 to 800 per day, and allowing textiles and furniture to be transferred to the West Bank for commercial purposes.<sup>6</sup> These measures are expected to facilitate employment generation within Gaza, although their precise impact depends on a range of additional factors.

This follows a similar package of measures announced in October 2014, following the summer hostilities, for the import of construction materials classified by Israel as “dual use items” as part of the temporary Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), the resumption of commercial transfers of agricultural produce from Gaza to the West Bank, and the relaxation of criteria for the issuance of exit permits. The latter included a limited number of permits for people to visit family members held in Israeli prisons, non-urgent medical cases, and for people over 60 to visit East Jerusalem for Friday prayers.

While the easing measures are a welcome step, the majority of the Gaza population remains ineligible to apply for a travel permit and the volume of goods allowed out of Gaza for commercial purposes remains an insignificant fraction of the equivalent pre-blockade volumes (see below).

### Upgrading of Kerem Shalom crossing

This month, both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities are carrying out infrastructure works at the Kerem Shalom commercial crossing to upgrade its capacity from 500 to 800 truckloads of goods per day. These works include the upgrading of pipes used for the transfer of cooking gas and fuel on the Israeli side of the crossing, and the expansion of the loading area on the Palestinian side.<sup>7</sup> The works, which are scheduled to be completed in the next three to four months, are expected to shorten the waiting time for the entry and exit of goods and will facilitate commercial transactions.

Following Israeli’s unilateral closure of another three crossings with Gaza since 2007 (Karni, Nahal Oz and Sufa), and Egypt’s almost total closure of Rafah crossing (used for imports of limited quantities of construction materials) since mid-2013, Kerem Shalom has become the single operational gateway for the transfer of goods in and out of Gaza.


Irrespective of the ongoing upgrade, the volume of goods processed through the Kerem Shalom crossing in recent months has been on the rise. In February, 6,134 truckloads of goods into Gaza were processed, up by 26 per cent compared with the monthly average for 2014. This increase is largely due to the greater volume of construction materials, including those designated as dual use items, for the repair and reconstruction of homes and infrastructure damaged during the summer hostilities (see also *Reconstruction*

*The Israeli and Palestinian authorities are carrying out infrastructure works at the Kerem Shalom commercial crossing to upgrade its capacity from 500 to 800 truckloads of goods per day.*

### Latest Developments

On mid March, Gaza-produced eggplants and tomatoes were allowed into Israeli markets for the first time since the imposition of the blockade in 2007. Further information and analysis on this development will be included in the March edition of the Humanitarian Bulletin





\*Figures include imports entering from all crossings and exclude goods smuggled through the tunnels under the border with Egypt.

section). However, February imports are still less than half of the monthly average during the first five months of 2007, just prior to the imposition of the blockade, entering via the four crossings.

In the last few months the volume of goods allowed out of Gaza has steadily risen as a result of the resumption of commercial transfers of agricultural produce from Gaza to the West Bank. During January and February a total of 148 truckloads left Gaza, the majority to the West Bank. While this is three times higher than the figure for the first two months of 2014 (48 truckloads), it remains only a fraction of the nearly 2,500 truckloads that exited Gaza in January and February of 2007, prior to the blockade.

## MORE GAZA PATIENTS REFERRED WITHIN OPT FOR HEALTH CARE; ONE IN FIVE FACE ACCESS CONSTRAINTS


In recent years, access to health care has become more restricted for Gaza patients. The Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH) relies on the procurement of specialized medical treatment from external health providers to fill gaps in its own health care system. Gaps are acute in Gaza due to the serious shortages in medicines, medical supplies, equipment and trained personnel.

Thousands of patients previously relied on Egypt as an accessible and affordable destination for medical services. However, Egypt's partial closure of the Rafah border with Gaza since mid-2013 has virtually severed access for private patients and significantly

While the volume of goods leaving Gaza for commercial purposes increased in January and February, it has remained only a fraction of the equivalent figures prior to the blockade.

This section was submitted by the World Health Organization

**Percentage of permit applications by patients denied or delayed**




reduced MoH referrals. This loss has been buffered in part by an increase in the number of MoH referrals of Gaza patients to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and to Israeli hospitals. The closure of Rafah has reduced the options open to private patients from Gaza for specialized health care.

To access West Bank and Israeli hospitals, patients and their companions require permits from the Israeli authorities to leave Gaza through the Erez checkpoint. In January and February 2015, 2,350 patients, or 80.5 per cent of all applicants, had their permit applications approved, averaging about 47 patients per day, slightly below the 81.7 per cent approval rate for 2014. The remaining 568 applications (19.5 per cent) were denied or delayed, resulting in patients missing their appointments and having to re-apply. Since the beginning of 2015, 32 patients were summoned for security interviews with Israeli officials, with some interviews lasting all day, as a precondition for their application to be processed.

Despite rapid population growth and the increasing level of need, annual referrals of Gaza patients between 2010 and 2014 has risen by only 1.3 per cent, although the destination of referrals has changed significantly. Overall, during the past four years, the number of Gaza patients referred outside of the oPt, particularly to Egypt, fell by 25 per cent, while referrals to Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in the West Bank have increased markedly since 2012.

**MoH referrals by destination**



*Egypt's partial closure of the Rafah border with Gaza since mid-2013 has virtually severed access for private patients and significantly reduced MoH referrals.*

Alongside the increase in the absolute number of patients who have obtained permits to leave Gaza through the Erez crossing in the past four years, the percentage of applications rejected or delayed has also increased.

## THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY'S FINANCIAL CRISIS UNDERMINES SERVICES AND LIVELIHOODS IN THE WEST BANK

Public employees receive only partial salaries for the third consecutive month

On 24 February, the Israeli government announced that it would withhold the transfer of tax revenues it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a third successive month in retaliation for Palestinian accession to the International Criminal Court. This brings the total amount withheld to over \$400 million. The Palestinian Minister of Finance has indicated that tax revenues represent some 70 per cent of the PA's budget.

As an interim measure, the PA has borrowed funds from private banks to pay a portion of the salaries of its civil servants for each of the last three months. Those earning up to 2,000 shekels receive their full salaries, while those earning more receive only 60 per cent, but no less than 2,000 shekels. The PA has also drastically reduced other expenditures, particularly on services.

This is having a negative impact on the Palestinian economy, which already contracted in 2014 for the first time since 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund.<sup>8</sup> This puts pressure on the PA at the very time when reduction expenditure has a negative impact on the delivery of its core functions, including the maintenance of law and order.

The Israeli Electric Corporation (IEC), which is the sole electricity supplier to the West Bank, has been cutting power for a few hours in some urban centers due to the PA's debts, claimed by the IEC to be some \$500 million. According to media reports, on 26 February the IEC reached an agreement with the Israeli Prime Minister's office to deduct

*“My sales dropped by 50 per cent last month. Look at the streets, they're empty. Most people depend mainly on salaries. You'll find government employees who cannot afford the cost of transportation from their villages to Ramallah. People can only afford the basics: bread, food, water and electricity. The number of people buying on credit is increasing; if this continues, I cannot continue selling goods... Without the PA salaries, there is no economy in the West Bank.”*

Abu Ehab (54 years old),  
owner of a mini-market in  
Ramallah city centre



*“I have ten children and have been working for the Ministry of Education for 26 years with a salary of about NIS 4,000. The salary crisis is humiliating all PA employees. It affects the teachers' performance and their ability to treat students properly. Some teachers come to school by public transportation on credit and sometimes are absent without notice or end classes before the assigned time. Students notice the tough situation and are affected too. I had to find an additional job to cover the needs of my family, but I feel embarrassed to be seen by my students and teachers working outside school”*

Adnan Hussein,  
Principal at a village school near Nablus



some \$75 million from the withheld PA tax revenues to pay for the past three months of electricity in the West Bank.

The crisis is further compounded by a ruling by a US federal court on 23 February ordering the PA and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to pay up to \$650 million in compensation to American victims and their families for attacks by Palestinian militants between 2002 and 2004.<sup>9</sup>

In his opening speech to PLO Central Council on 4 March, President Abbas referred to Israel's withholding of Palestinian tax revenues as "gangsterism" and claimed that Israel owes Palestinians some \$450 million in tax, health insurance and pensions contributions paid by Palestinians working in Israel.

In his briefing to the Security Council on 18 February 2014, the UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs stated: "Israel's action is a violation of its obligations under the Paris Protocol of the Oslo Accords and we, again, call for an immediate reversal of this decision."

## SHARP DECLINE IN DEMOLITIONS AND RELATED DISPLACEMENT IN AREA C DURING FEBRUARY


Humanitarian assistance provided to vulnerable communities served with stop-work orders

In February, the Israeli authorities demolished 17 structures in the West Bank on the grounds of lack of building permits. All of the targeted structures were livelihood-related or uninhabited, resulting in no displacement. This is the lowest number of demolitions recorded since July 2014 and the first month without demolition-related displacement since August 2011.

All but two of this month's demolitions were recorded in Area C of the West Bank, mainly in the Jerusalem (6), Hebron (4) and Nablus (4) governorates. These include two agricultural rooms and a water cistern in the village of Qusra (Nablus), and an irrigation pool in An Nuweimeh, all funded by international donors and affecting some 160 people.

In a separate incident on 18 February (not included in the total above), the Israeli authorities confiscated a concrete mixer funded by the Emergency Relief Fund (ERF) for the renovation of water cisterns in the community of Tell al Khashaba (Nablus, also known as Al Twayel), located in a closed military "firing zone". The community is not connected to the water network and residents (250 people) rely on rainfall collection and the purchase of expensive tankered water to meet their domestic and livelihood needs. During 2014, Israeli authorities demolished 41

Structures demolished in the West Bank  
Monthly average



*“I live with my wife and three children in a rented apartment and pay NIS500 per month. I have a loan from the Arab Bank and pay NIS1,200 per month. For the past three months I could not pay the rent; thank God, the owner understands the situation. I buy essential goods on credit, including vegetables in small quantities. Other products such as milk, yoghurt and cheese, I cannot afford.”*


Shadi Abu Laban, 36  
PA employee with the  
Ministry of Waqf and  
Religious Affairs

structures in this community, of which 16 were donor-funded, including an electricity network. Over 100 people were displaced.


This month saw a worrying increase in the number of donor-funded structures served with stop-work orders. Of the 27 structures placed at risk of demolition, 15 are located in the Palestinian Bedouin community of Hathroua (previously called Wadi al Qilt Ka'abneh, pop. 130). Eviction orders served initially on these structures were revoked following a legal intervention and replaced with stop-work orders, which entail a longer legal process prior to execution. Hathroua is one of the 46 Bedouin communities (pop. 7,000) in the central West Bank at risk of forcible transfer in an Israeli "relocation plan".

The Israeli authorities also began leveling and other infrastructure works this month in a section of Al Jabal (Jerusalem) - one of the three sites designated for the Bedouin relocation and which can accommodate approximately 50 families. The planning scheme for this part of the site has been endorsed and building permits issued. This site is adjacent to the current homes of another 150 Bedouin families "relocated" in the late 1990s to make way for the expansion of the Ma'ale Adumim settlement.

*This month saw a worrying increase in the number of donor-funded structures served with stop-work orders, with 27 structures are placed at risk of demolition.*



## ONLINE DEMOLITION TRACKING SYSTEM LAUNCHED



This month, OCHA launched an online system for humanitarian partners to track the demolition and confiscation of Palestinian property in the West Bank by Israel. It is designed to monitor humanitarian needs emanating from such incidents to allow a timely and targeted humanitarian response. The system features up-to-date information, including a full assessment and summary of needs for each incident. Information on responses is logged every two weeks. Three customized dashboards allow users to monitor responses and identify gaps. The system is unique in its integrated and collaborative nature, allowing humanitarian partners to rely on an integrated and agreed data set.

Other donor-funded assistance targeted this month included a prefabricated school, three mobile latrines and a drinking fountain in Khirbet al Majaz (Masafer Yatta area, Hebron). This is one of eight communities located in an area designated as a “Firing Zone 918” also at risk of forcible transfer.

## Endnotes

1. For further details on the GRM see OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, December 2014.
2. For an overview of the impacts of the ongoing salary crisis, see OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2015.
3. For more information, see OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2015 (p. 9).
4. See: UNFPA, Protection in the Windward, October 2014.
5. <http://www.cogat.idf.il/1043-11740-EN/Cogat.aspx>
6. Initial reports of 50 one-time permits to be issued for Gaza students to study in West Bank were later denied by COGAT as a clerical error.
7. The new area includes about 30 dunums to establish three new sections for unpacked cement, for outgoing agricultural produce, and for outgoing non-agricultural items such as textiles and furniture.
8. Statement at the end of an IMF Mission to the West Bank and Gaza. Press Release, January 2015.
9. See for example, The Washington Post, “Palestinians vow to appeal US ruling blaming PLO for terrorist attacks”, 24 February 2015.

*The Israeli authorities also began leveling and other infrastructure works this month in a section of Al Jabal (Jerusalem) - one of the three sites designated for the Bedouin relocation*



# Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

## Conflict-related casualties and violence<sup>1</sup>

### Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties

	2011	2012	2013	2014										2015		
	Total	Total	Total	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep*	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb

#### Palestinian deaths

Gaza	108	264	11	5	0	0	6	1550	669	12	4	1	3	2256	0	0
West Bank (by Israeli forces and Israeli settlers)	17	8	28	6	1	2	7	17	8	4	4	4	2	58	2	1
Total	125	272	39	11	1	2	13	1567	677	16	8	5	5	2314	2	1
Of whom are civilians <sup>2</sup>	62	136	32	7	1	2	8	1059	454	16	8	5	5	1573	2	1
Of whom are female	3	23	1	1	1	0	0	207	87	3	0	0	0	300	0	0

#### Palestinian injuries

Gaza	468	1485	83	19	37	20	39	10,500		3	7	8	20	10739	4	2
West Bank (by Israeli forces and Israeli settlers)	1647	3175	3881	209	265	245	287	2210	640	206	282	1000	330	6023	118	165
Total	2115	4660	3964	228	302	265	326	13,735		209	291	984	350	17125	122	167
Of whom are civilians	2054	n/a	3959	234	281	264	324	NA	NA	206	291	984	347	NA	122	167
Of whom are female	151	n/a	158	15	29	17	26	2142		4	24	6	5	2286	6	2

#### Israeli deaths

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	7	4	0	1	0	3	71	0	2	8	0	85	0	0
Of whom are civilians	11	3	2	0	1	0	3	5	0	2	6	0	17	0	0
Of whom are female	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	0

#### Israeli injuries

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	345	151	5	15	28	5	2437	22	32	55	15	2629	8	5
Of whom are civilians	56	60	74	1	6	9	4	837**	10	19	41	12	952	7	2
Of whom are female	3	7	10	1	3	6	0	NA	NA	3	6	2	27	2	0

\*September-December fatalities in Gaza include those who sustained injuries during the Israeli offensive on Gaza (July-August)

\*\*See Magen David Adom's report: [http://www.mdais.org/h/316/&mod=download&me\\_id=13228](http://www.mdais.org/h/316/&mod=download&me_id=13228)

### Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage

	2011	2012	2013	2014										2015		
	Total	Total	Total	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb

Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties <sup>4</sup>	120	98	94	10	10	8	13	25	6	3	6	14	4	110	8	6
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	268	306	24	28	22	17	24	12	5	19	17	18	221	17	10
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	411	366	399	34	38	30	30	49	18	8	25	31	22	331	25	16
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	35	38	0	3	3	1	14	14	9	10	16	10	89	6	2
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages <sup>5</sup>	13	15	12	1	4	10	11	9	7	27	27	20	23	140	11	25
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	36	50	50	1	7	13	12	23	21	36	37	36	33	229	17	27

### Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza

	2011	2012	2013	2014										2015		
	Total	Total	Total	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb

Adult	Injured	7	12	4	4	0	0	0	15	3	0	5	11	38	0	0
	Killed	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	0	0	7	0	0
Child	Injured	17	19	19	7	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	7	19	0	0
	Killed	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Grand Total		27	34	26	11	1	0	0	21	6	1	7	11	65	0	0

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

## Child Protection

### Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012	2013	2014											2015	
	Total	Total	Total	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
West Bank	2	2	4	1	0	2	1	2	2	1	2	0	2	13	1	0
Gaza Strip	11	44	1	0	0	0	1	367	174	3	0	1	1	548	0	0

### Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

West Bank	308	427	1232	67	90	65	76	283	201	74	58	113	108	1221	37	31
Gaza Strip	125	105	10	6	9	3	76	3,306		0	0	1	4	3416	0	0

### Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

oPt	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	0	7	0	0
Israel	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

oPt	0	3	8	0	0	1	0	NA	N/A	1	0	1	3	7	1	0
Israel	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	198 monthly average	197 monthly average	202	196	214	202	192	201	128	163	156	152	185 monthly average	N/A	N/A
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### Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

West Bank, inc Ej	618	474	558	21	90	99	21	4	83	87	44	70	9	651	66	0
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### Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools<sup>19</sup>

oPt	na	321	47	9	17	5	15	0	4	23	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
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Source: OCHA, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

## Access

### Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012	2013	2014											2015	
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing <sup>15</sup>	872	777	1148	1,806	1,677	1714	1,799	1,093	946	1561	1038	1,636	1,684	1498	1,489	1429
of which approved	721	719	1010	1,553	1,308	1470	1,436	716	783	1307	76	1,292	1,379	1163	1,202	1148
of which denied	19	7	3	33	31	14	56	70	20	41	213	44	56	55	52	63
of which delayed <sup>16</sup>	83	17	135	220	338	230	307	307	143	213	15	300	249	218	235	218

Source: WHO

### Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012	2013	2014											2015	
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Mon. Ave.	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint <sup>17</sup>	38	37.5	40.1	20	39	21	41	12	33	38	31	39	30	29	17	28
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	22.3	4	12	6	11	3	21	14	4	6	6	8	4	7
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	18.5	29	35	41	52	10.5	19	26.5	9.5	32	15	25	5.5	13.6

Source: OCHA

## Search and Arrest

	2011	2012	2013	2014											2015	
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	<b>338</b>	<b>316</b>	475	325	420	767	411	292	353	422	409	409	413	496	348
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	<b>283</b>	<b>491</b>	581	344	619	883	826	472	467	562	631	584	563	618	384

Source: OCHA

### Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)<sup>6</sup>

	2011	2012	2013	2014											2015	
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb
Total as of the end of the month	5326	<b>4,451</b>	<b>4227</b>	4999	5021	5,053	5,318	5,383	5,505	5439	5477	5527	5,528	5258	5,549	N/A
of whom are women	26	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>	18	18	16	15	17	17	15	14	15	20	16	20	N/A
of whom are administrative detainees <sup>7</sup>	240	<b>245</b>	<b>132</b>	186	191	196	363	446	473	468	457	461	463	327	455	N/A
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	<b>897</b>	<b>1062</b>	1471	1495	1,476	1,497	1,577	1,650	1623	1609	1534	1,511	1525	1526	N/A

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

## Demolition of Structures

### Structures demolished<sup>8</sup>



	2011	2012	2013	2014											2015	
	Total	Total	Total	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
of which in Area C	571	<b>540</b>	<b>565</b>	5	88	70	30	6	25	58	27	37	24	493	81	15
of which in East Jerusalem	42	<b>64</b>	<b>98</b>	9	4	5	6	2	5	3	23	11	14	98	5	2
<b>Area A</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>		0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	5	0	0
<b>Area B</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>		0	0	0	0		5	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>663</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>601</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>17</b>


### People Displaced due to demolitions<sup>9</sup>



	2011	2012	2013	2014											2015	
	Total	Total	Total	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	<b>815</b>	<b>805</b>	17	171	156	42	0	98	122	67	102	10	969	117	0
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	<b>71</b>	<b>298</b>	28	8	8	0	0	20	15	30	34	8	208	0	0
<b>Area A</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>	0	0	0	0	0	11	16	5	0	0	0	32	0	0
<b>Area B</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	6	0	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1094</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>1103</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1215</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>0</b>



## Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel<sup>18</sup>










Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

\* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

## Strategic Response Plan(SRP) 2015:

Occupied Palestinian territory Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2015 as of 20 March 2015

		SRP 2015	
Cluster		Total request in USD	% of funds received
	Coordination and Support Services	23,235,547	0.1%
	Education	20,330,672	0.0%
	Food Security	324,430,436	8.5%
	Health and Nutrition	21,212,516	5.0%
	Protection	51,935,541	1.7%
	Shelter/Non-Food Items	224,930,156	33.1%
	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	39,213,897	0.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>705,288,765</b>	<b>22.4%</b>

# Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

## Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

## Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

## Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

## Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

## Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

## Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

## Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

## Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

## Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.