HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN MONTHLY REPORT



APRIL 2015

HIGHLIGHTS

- Rafah crossing closed for the whole of April and opened for only five days in 2015, particularly affecting Gaza medical patients.
- Progress on repairs to damaged medical and health facilities in Gaza hampered by shortage of construction materials and funding
- Plans to "relocate" Palestinian Bedouins in the central and southern West Bank advance compounded by demolition orders and seizure of vital infrastructure


APRIL FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	5
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	223
Structures demolished in the West Bank	23
People displaced in the West Bank	25

STRATEGIC RESPONSE **PLAN 2014**

705 million requested (US\$)

31.5% funded



Overview

This month's Bulletin highlights Israel's ongoing plans to "relocate" some 7,000 Palestinian Bedouin in the central West Bank, and another 450 in the southern Hebron governorate, combined with continuing practices that create a coercive environment for these vulnerable communities. These practices include demolition orders on the grounds of lack of building permits, in addition to the seizure of basic infrastructure such as solar panels. Most of the communities concerned are located to the east of Jerusalem in an area allocated for



the expansion of Israeli settlements, a factor noted by the UN Secretary-General, who added: "The Bedouins and herders are at risk of forcible transfer, a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as multiple human rights violations."1

The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains dire. The Egyptian-controlled Rafah crossing remained closed for the whole of April and has opened for only five days in





2015 to date, particularly affecting medical patients. Although there has been a significant increase in the number of people leaving Gaza through the Erez crossing with Israel in recent months, this has not offset the drastic reduction in passage through Rafah.

As we approach one year since the marked escalation of hostilities in Gaza, the first in a series of planned features focuses on the continuing impact of destruction and damage to health, education, and water and wastewater infrastructure. Although most of the damaged educational facilities have been – or are being – repaired, reconstruction has still to begin on six government and private schools and eleven kindergartens that were completely destroyed. Likewise, although progress has been made on repairs to damaged medical facilities, the rehabilitation of seven Ministry of Health hospitals and 12 clinics has been slowed or stopped due to the unavailability of construction materials. Although the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) is facilitating repair at an increasing rate, it was designed as a temporary measure to allow the entry of construction materials in the immediate post-conflict period, and is not a substitute for the lifting of all closures in Gaza.

In a recent report, the World Bank detailed the impact on the Gaza economy of recent shocks, primarily last summer's hostilities and the progressive closure of the smuggling tunnels – formerly Gaza's prime economic activity – by the Egyptian authorities since mid-2013. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Gaza contracted by 15 per cent in 2014 and real per capita income is now 31 per cent lower than it was 20 years ago. Unemployment reached 43 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2014, "probably the highest in the world." Particularly alarming is youth unemployment in Gaza which climbed to more than 60 percent by the end of 2014. However, the World Bank cautions that these statistics "fail to portray the degree of suffering of Gaza's citizens due to poor electricity and water/ sewerage availability, war-related psychological trauma, limited movement, and other adverse effects of wars and the blockade."²

The scale of personal suffering was also emphasized by the new UN Special Coordinator, Mr. Nikolay Mladenov, following his first visit to Gaza. In a briefing to the Security Council, Mr. Mladenov declared that "no one can remain untouched by the scale of devastation, the slow pace of reconstruction, and the vast needs to rebuild lives and livelihoods. Gaza is desperate and Gaza is angry. There is a clear moral and humanitarian imperative not just for the United Nations and the Palestinian authorities to prevent the implosion of Gaza." Mr. Mladenov reiterated "that the United Nations ultimate objective in Gaza is to see a lifting of all closures, within the framework of Security Council resolution 1860."³

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Gaza contracted by 15 per cent in 2014 and real per capita income is now 31 per cent lower than it was 20 years ago

RAFAH BORDER CROSSING CONTINUES TO BE LARGELY CLOSED FOR THE SIXTH MONTH IN A ROW

Medical cases especially affected by extended closure

The Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt has remained closed for the whole of April. The Border and Crossing Authority in Gaza estimates that over 30,000 people registered as humanitarian cases are on a waiting list, including cases of individuals seeking medical treatment and education abroad.

Due to longstanding restrictions associated with the blockade on the Israeli-controlled Erez crossing, the Rafah crossing became the primary exit point to the outside world in recent years for Palestinians from Gaza. However, severe restrictions have been imposed by the Egyptian authorities from June 2013 onwards in the context of political uncertainty and military operations in northern Sinai.

During the second half of 2013 the crossing was closed for a total of 97 days, compared with five days during the first half of the year; the number of Palestinians crossing declined by 28 per cent compared with 2012. In 2014, the crossing opened for only 158 days and less than 100,000 people traversed the crossing. Following an attack on 24 October 2014 in the Sinai Peninsula in which over 30 Egyptian military personnel were killed, Rafah was closed for the remainder of the year, with a few exceptional openings. In 2015, up to the end of April, Rafah had opened for only five days with only around 5,000 people crossing.

RAFAH BORDER CLOSURE PRESENTS HUGE OBSTACLE FOR GAZA PATIENTS SEEKING ACCESS TO EGYPT

Access to hospitals in Egypt can literally be a life and death issue for many Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. It is vital for patients who cannot be treated within Gaza and who have been denied or are ineligible for access to Israeli or West Bank health facilities through Erez, many of them patients requiring life-saving procedures.⁴ In a WHO analysis of the

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This piece was submitted by WHO



RAFAH CROSSING

The Rafah crossing was established in 1982 after the Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. The crossing was managed by the Israeli Crossings Authority until Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005. In November 2005, control of the crossing was transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was established to monitor the operation of the crossing as part of the USbrokered Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) between Israel and the PA.

In June 2006, following the capture of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, the Rafah crossing began to operate on an irregular basis. In June 2007 following the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, EUBAM suspended operations at Rafah, although the crossing continued to open two or three days each month for scheduled, but irregular, openings to allow for the limited passage of specified Palestinian pedestrians (see chart). In June 2010 in the wake of the Israeli attack on the Gazabound flotilla, the Egyptian authorities re-opened the crossing on a more regular basis in both directions, and also permitted humanitarian aid to enter Gaza through the crossing. The number of Palestinians crossing increased steadily over the following three years, with almost 420,000 crossing in both directions in 2012, when Rafah was open for a total of 312 days. This trend continued into the first six months of 2013, when 40,000 crossed monthly (in both directions).

Mohammed Madi, 36 years of age, lived with his wife and four children in Rafah. He quit his job as a driver in spring 2014 when he became ill and started losing weight. Mohammed spent months going to a number of physicians before finally being diagnosed as suffering from Hodgkin's lymphoma by a Shifa Hospital haematologist. He required chemotherapy, radiotherapy and a PET scan which are not available in Gaza. The Palestinian MoH



Mohammed Madi, one day before his death, 4 May (Watan video).

referral department referred Mohammed for advanced treatment at an Israeli hospital. When Mohammed applied for a permit to travel out of Gaza, this was denied by the Israeli authorities on the grounds that he did not hold an Israeli-issued ID card.

Mohammed had entered the Gaza Strip from Egypt in 2000 with an Israeli visitor's permit, married and applied for family reunification which was never granted. The DLO advised Mohammed to change his referral destination to Egypt, but with Rafah crossing closed, the chances of travelling to Egypt were minimal. Mohammed appealed through the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights in Gaza but was informed that such a case could take several months and may only waste time.

Mohammed's health deteriorated and he spent the last week of his life in Najjar Hospital in Rafah, unable to move, with his family still waiting for the border to open, until his death on 4 May.


504 Ministry of Health (MoH) referrals to Egypt from January to April in 2015, the main reasons for referral were nuclear medicine (15 per cent), orthopaedic surgery (11 per cent), neurosurgery (nine per cent) and ophthalmic surgeries (nine per cent). However, only 42 patients were recorded as crossing the Rafah terminal during the first four months of 2015 compared with 12,594 Gaza patients recorded in the first quarter of 2013, prior to the restrictions introduced in July 2013.

The District Liaison Office (DLO) of the MoH reported that access for patients who do not have Israeli-issued ID cards has recently become extremely difficult. Many Gaza residents have strong ties with relatives in Egypt and often inter-marry. However, Israeli processing of family reunification applications between Gaza residents and non-Gaza spouses was halted several times since 1993, and stopped completely after the 2008/2009 hostilities. An estimated 35,000 people are awaiting ID cards which would allow them to travel out of Gaza.

Movement of goods through Rafah also declines

From January 2013 to June 2014, an average of 713 truckloads per month, primarily of construction materials intended for Qatari infrastructure projects and aid supplies, were allowed to cross through Rafah into Gaza. No truckloads entered Gaza via Rafah after 3 July for the remainder of 2014, and this trend has continued into 2015. Only 13 truckloads of aid supplies had entered by the end of April, although some aid has been redirected through the Israeli-controlled crossing.

Number of people passing through Rafah crossing






INCREASE IN NUMBER OF CROSSINGS THROUGH EREZ

There has been an increase in the number of people leaving Gaza through Erez crossing with Israel in recent months. Since the beginning of 2015, an average of 12,600 people crossed Erez into Israel every month, up nearly 78 per cent from the monthly average of 7,120 recorded during 2014. This increase, however, has not offset the overall drastic reduction in passage through Rafah crossing and is still less than 30 per cent of the people who crossed monthly through Erez crossing in 2004.

Number of people passing through Erez crossing with Israel



This piece was submitted by the Education Cluster

OVERVIEW OF THE REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS IN GAZA

During the 51-day war in Gaza, air strikes and ground incursions resulted in major damage to the education sector. Six government and private schools, eleven kindergartens and three higher education institutions were completely destroyed. Some 450 education facilities (176 government and private schools, 263 private kindergartens and 11 higher education institutions) sustained minor, partial, major or severe damage, resulting in a loss of access by children to quality education and safe learning environments. In addition, 83 UNRWA schools were damaged, all of which have been repaired.

Between 7 July and 26 August, the Gaza Strip witnessed the deadliest escalation in hostilities since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. According to the Protection Cluster, a total of 2,220 Palestinians, including almost 1,500 civilians, were killed. Some half a million people were displaced at the height of hostilities and approximately 100,000 remain homeless. Public infrastructure, including educational and health facilities and water and sanitation installations, suffered heavy damage. As we approach one year since the outbreak of hostilities, OCHA will issue a series of articles in the Humanitarian Bulletin to highlight the continuing humanitarian impact.

After eight months, funding has been secured for all government schools reported by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) as damaged during the 2014 conflict and 160 of these schools have been repaired so far. However, construction has not begun on any of the government and private schools that were completely destroyed.

In addition, 74 kindergartens that sustained minor damage have been repaired by education cluster partners. Work on another 74 kindergartens is either in progress or planned. Funding is still required for the remaining 115 kindergartens, in addition to 11 which were totally destroyed. Funds for damaged and destroyed higher education institutions have been secured through UNDP and repairs to those that sustained minor damage are already in progress.

RECONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH SECTOR FACILITIES IMPAIRED BY SHORTAGES OF MATERIALS AND FUNDING

In the eight months following the 50-day conflict in Gaza in summer 2014, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of health facilities damaged during the course of the conflict has made only moderate progress due to the shortage of construction materials in Gaza and shortfalls in funding.

According to the *Detailed Needs Assessment and Recovery Strategy* for the health sub-sector, 13 health structures belonging to public and private health providers were destroyed and 104 were damaged during the conflict, comprising 20 hospitals, 57 clinics, 29

pharmacies, seven ambulance stations and laboratories, and four drug warehouses. The cost of repairing, reequipping and, in some cases, rebuilding has been estimated at US\$24 million, excluding other economic losses and development expenditures.

The Ministry of Health (MoH), the major health provider in Gaza, had nine hospitals and 44 primary health clinics affected to some degree by material damage, according to the UNDP/WHO/MoH damage assessment. This ranged from minor damage to total destruction, at a cost of US\$6.32 million to restore facilities to pre-conflict standards. Nine donors have contributed to the repairs and development work of all nine damaged hospitals and for




Al-Fukhari, an MoH clinic serving a poor community in eastern Khan Younis, still awaits a donor.

This piece was submitted by WHO

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Basic Construction Materials vs Other Construction materials (in # of truckloads) entering Gaza



36 of the 44 damaged clinics, including the rebuilding of five clinics that were totally destroyed.

However, the rehabilitation and new development work for seven of the MoH hospitals has been slowed or stopped due to the unavailability of construction materials. Rehabilitation work began on Shifa, Beit Hanoun, Durra, al Aqsa and Najjar hospitals, funded by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at a cost of US\$1.4 million, but work was forced to stop due to the shortage of materials. Construction work on Shifa, Nasser and the Paediatric Specialist hospitals, funded by Jordan, the Islamic Development Bank, Malaysia, UNDP and local contributions, intended for the construction of neonatal units, labs and an emergency department, has also been halted pending the delivery of building materials.

Work on 25 MoH clinics has been completed, but 12 clinics face problems due to unavailability of construction materials, and seven MoH clinics still require funding to cover repairs. Funds are still needed to cover an adequate supply of medicines (US\$14 million), medical equipment (US\$5.8 million), spare parts (US\$1 million) and fuel costs (US\$1 million) for one year.

This piece was submitted by UNRWA

ONGOING UNRWA CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN THE GAZA STRIP PROVIDE VITAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN A DEPRESSED ECONOMY

In addition to early recovery and rebuilding efforts in Gaza, humanitarian actors continue to implement construction and infrastructure projects unrelated to the most recent conflict. UNRWA's construction of schools and health clinics is part of its ongoing operations to assist and serve Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip. The total value of UNRWA infrastructure projects approved by the Israeli Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (CoGAT) totals US\$194.4 million since May 2014⁵ – excluding post-conflict shelter repair and (re)construction under the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM).⁶

UNRWA has recently completed two schools in Rafah and Khan Yunis in the southern part of Gaza. In Rafah, an existing small school was replaced with a new 32-classroom structure in February, and in Khan Yunis a new 26-classroom school was completed. Almost 2,200 students will study in the new buildings. Recently completed projects include the construction of the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent-funded housing project in Khan Yunis, which includes 449 housing units, plus sewage, drainage, water and electricity systems. This project, together with the construction of schools, health centres, water and sewage networks and homes in the Rafah housing project funded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (through the Saudi Fund for Development), is an example of crucial investments in Gaza infrastructure and the generation of much-needed employment opportunities.

UNRWA as primary job provider in the construction sector

Employment opportunities are desperately needed in Gaza, where yearly average unemployment increased by 11 percentage points to total 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014 - probably the highest in the world according to the World Bank. The figures for Palestine refugees in Gaza over the same time period are equally alarming at 44.1 per cent. Escalating unemployment rates are a direct result of the eight-year blockade on Gaza that has crippled the enclave's trade-oriented economy and its capacity to create jobs, pushing the majority of the population into poverty and aid dependency. In the fourth quarter of 2014, UNRWA created 5,058 full time equivalent (FTE) jobs through its construction programme – an eleven-fold increase from the previous quarter.

The estimated expenditure for UNRWA-contracted construction projects in the first quarter of 2015 amounts to US\$5.5 million and has created 1,615 FTEs. Due to funding disbursed by the Agency for self-help shelter repair under the GRM, an additional estimated 10,843 FTEs were created in the first three months of 2015. Hence, in total, UNRWA construction efforts have resulted in 12,457 FTEs in the first quarter of 2015, making the Agency the primary job provider in the construction sector.

120,000 PEOPLE ACROSS GAZA DISCONNECTED FROM THE WATER NETWORK DUE TO UNREPAIRED WAR DAMAGE

95 per cent of the water extracted from the aquifer is unfit for human consumption

Eight months after the August 2014 ceasefire, it is estimated that approximately 120,000 people across the Gaza Strip remain without a municipal water supply due to unrepaired damage sustained by the infrastructure during the summer hostilities. The affected households have become entirely dependent on water tankers. Those households with an operational connection to the network are supplied only two to three days a week, for a few hours each time. According to the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU), based on rolling power outages of up to 12 hours per day, the average water consumption in Gaza is 60-70 litres per capita per day.

Apart from the municipal water supply, which has high salinity levels, the majority of Gaza households rely on the purchase of desalinated water from unregulated private

In Gaza yearly average unemployment increased by 11 percentage points to total 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014 - probably the highest in the world according to the World Bank.

This piece was submitted by the WASH Cluster

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vendors for drinking and cooking purposes. Longstanding over-extraction from Gaza's underground aquifer - the sole water source for the 1.8 million inhabitants - has led to the intrusion of brackish water and sea water from deeper layers of the aquifer. Together with additional pollution sources (e.g. infiltration of untreated sewage), this has rendered nearly three-quarters of the wells in Gaza, which provide 95 per cent of the extracted water, unfit for human consumption due to the high levels of nitrates and chlorides.⁹

Large-scale damage to water and wastewater systems during the hostilities affected 20 to 30 per cent of Gaza's population. The CMWU, the Palestinian Water Authority and Gaza municipalities managed to address approximately 80 per cent of the basic repairs, particularly in the most densely-populated communities affected. However, most of these interventions were temporary¹⁰ and the water and wastewater infrastructure still requires major permanent repairs.

According to the CMWU, some of the post-hostilities projects designed for the recovery and further development of Gaza's water infrastructure have been delayed due to funding gaps and the slow pace of entry of the materials required. Additionally, part of the damage to water and wastewater infrastructure in areas that were particularly devastated during the hostilities is yet to be assessed as rubble removal is still ongoing.

The functioning of water and sanitation facilities has been further undermined since the hostilities by the increasing shortages and unreliability of the electricity supply. This is due to damage sustained by the Gaza Power Plant (GPP), which has only been partially repaired, and funding shortfalls related to some extent to internal Palestinian disputes. Chronic fuel shortages force the GPP to reduce production and shut down intermittently. The situation in Rafah governorate, which is partially dependent on the supply of electricity from Egypt, has been further compounded by the recurrent malfunctioning of the relevant feeding line. The scheduled power cuts severely impact public services, including the water supply and wastewater treatment process.

Due to the limited electricity power supply, water and sanitation facilities are dependent on back-up generators running on fuel. To maintain a minimum level of services, UNRWA, in coordination with OCHA and with the generous support of the International Development Bank, secured the provision of 130,000 litres of emergency fuel per month for critical WASH facilities for the rest of 2015.

While this addresses some of the most immediate energy gaps, Gaza requires a long-term energy solution. With power outages of up to 12 hours a day, the supply of emergency fuel by donors to keep hospitals, municipal services and water, sanitation and hygiene services running is unsustainable.

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PLANS TO FORCIBLY TRANSFER HERDING COMMUNITIES IN AREA C ADVANCE FURTHER

Recent developments affect a herding community in southern Hebron, in addition to Bedouin in the central West Bank

In April there were further developments in Israel's plan to "relocate" around 7,000 Palestinian Bedouin, around 70 per cent of whom are refugees, currently residing in 46

sites in the central West Bank,¹¹ and another 450 in the village of Susiya in southern Hebron. The residents strongly oppose these plans and have requested protection and assistance in their current location, including adequate planning and permits for their homes and livelihoods. The UN Secretary-General has stated that the implementation of the proposed relocation of Bedouin communities would amount to individual and mass forcible transfers and forced evictions, which are considered a grave breach of international humanitarian law.¹²

Three Bedouin communities at heightened risk

This month Dov Sedaka, a former head of the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) who was recently appointed as a coordinator on Bedouin issues, visited the Bedouin community of Abu Nuwar (Jerusalem) and officially informed its residents that the entire community is slated for transfer. He also indicated that 34 families should sign up to the Al Jabal relocation site by early May. The latter is one of three sites identified by the Israeli authorities for Bedouin relocation and where land leveling and infrastructure works have been ongoing for the past two months. The residents stated that they refused to relocate and demanded to remain in their current location, with access to proper services. Alternatively, they are prepared to return to their original homes and land in southern Israel, from which they were evicted in the early 1950s.

On two separate occasions during April, the ICA disassembled and seized donor-funded solar panels belonging to residents of Khan al Ahmar Abu al Helu (Jerusalem), another Bedouin community at risk of transfer, claiming that they were used for "illegal" construction in Area C.

Also this month, the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) heard the case of Jabal Al Baba, another community in the same area, who demanded the return of three shelters seized last year and the revocation of demolition orders against another 18 structures, all of which were provided as humanitarian assistance. The HCJ rejected the state's demand to dismiss the case and requested the petitioners to propose a solution to be considered by the state within the next two months prior to a ruling on the case.

The use of seizure orders against "illegal" structures in Area C has risen during the past two years; unlike demolition orders, these are executed summarily and cannot be challenged in advance. Combined with demolitions and access restrictions, the confiscation of essential equipment contributes to the creation of a coercive environment, encouraging residents to leave.

The three communities concerned are located to the east of Jerusalem in an area allocated for the expansion of Israeli settlements, including the E1 plan, which entails the construction of thousands of settlement homes and commercial units with the aim of creating a continuous built-up area between the Ma'ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem.

The UN Secretary-General has stated that the implementation of the proposed relocation of Bedouin communities would amount to individual and mass forcible transfers and forced evictions, which are considered a grave breach of international humanitarian law.

The case of Susiya

A similar legal battle is underway to determine the fate of the Palestinian village of Susiya in southern Hebron in Area C. The residents of Susiya requested that the Israeli High Court issue an interim injunction freezing demolitions pending a ruling on the residents' main petition to consider alternative planning in the area. On 5 May, the judge rejected this request without a hearing. This decision paves the way for the ICA to execute the demolition orders pending against virtually all of the existing structures in the community. Along with recent Israeli State Attorney's statements about the intention to relocate this community to a nearby site, this development raises concerns about the forcible transfer of Susiya's 450 residents, including 120 children.

In 1986, the main residential area of Susiya was declared an archaeological site by the Israeli authorities and approximately 60 families (approximately 300 people) were forcibly displaced from their homes. The displaced residents then settled on land that they own in the village, much of it agricultural. Subsequently, an Israeli settlement outpost, Suseya Synagogue, was established in the same area. The ICA has refrained from providing Susiya with adequate planning and has rejected various outline plans submitted by the residents, preventing them from building legally. As a result, the ICA has carried out multiple waves of demolitions, with at least 46 structures demolished since 2009, displacing or otherwise affecting the residents, some of them more than once.

Settler attacks targeting olive saplings that were planted or replanted in areas previously attacked have been on the rise during the past two years



On 5 May, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Protection Cluster organized a field visit for diplomats to the southern Nablus governorate to illustrate the protection and humanitarian concerns related to settlements and settlement expansion. During the visit, members of the Protection Cluster highlighted the role of both humanitarian and developmental programming in building the resilience of communities, while pushing for accountability and effective law enforcement. Members stressed the need and importance of addressing settlement expansion at a political level as well as the importance of political support in addressing settlement expansion. In a fact sheet prepared for the occasion, the Protection Cluster noted several methods of settlement expansion, including:

Retroactive authorization of outposts: In recent years the Government of Israel has adopted a silent policy aimed at establishing new settlements or expanding existing ones by retroactively approving outposts. In the Shilo bloc this has become apparent with the approval of Rehelim and Nofei Nehemia as new settlements. In addition, the Israeli authorities have initiated procedures to allow for the retroactive approval of Haroeh, HaYovel and Shvut Rachel outposts. Settlers who engage in the illegal establishment of communities and illegal construction in a process that often involves land grabbing and other violations of the rights of Palestinians are 'rewarded' with retroactive approval of these communities.

Archaeology and tourism as a means of land grab: Tel Shilo (Shilo settlement block): In 2014, building plans for Tel Shilo were submitted to the Central Planning Bureau [for the West Bank]. The plans feature a 11,000 m² visitors' centre – an unprecedented large facility for an antiquities site. According to the plan, the site would be developed into a conference, events and tourism centre with the capacity to accommodate 5,000 visitors per day. Its goal is to strengthen the settlements and the Israeli presence in the area through tourism.

Settler violence as a means of land takeover: Systematic attacks and intimidation of Palestinian residents by Israeli settlers, coupled with the lack of effective law enforcement by the Israeli authorities, ¹⁶ have resulted in a gradual reduction in access by Palestinian farmers to land that has not already been expropriated by the Israeli government or settlers. This is often followed by the takeover of land in areas of friction where incidents take place and its subsequent cultivation by settlers.

Residents are also regularly exposed to intimidation and abuse from the nearby settlement, including physical assaults and verbal harassment. Settlers have used violence and intimidation to prevent residents from accessing more than two-thirds of the approximately 6,000 dunums of Susiya's residential, agricultural and herding land.

Decline in incidents of settler violence since the start of 2015; increase in number of trees vandalized

In the first four months of 2015, OCHA recorded a total of 72 Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians and their property across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, of which 26 resulted in Palestinian injuries and 46 in damage to Palestinian property. On a monthly average, this represents a 33 per cent decrease compared to the monthly average for 2014 (18 vs. 27 incidents). The highest number of incidents during the first quarter of 2015 was recorded in Hebron governorate (29), followed by Ramallah governorate (13) compared with Nablus and Ramallah governorates during the equivalent period in 2014.

However, so far this year a total of 8,841 Palestinian trees and saplings were reportedly vandalized by Israeli settlers. On a monthly average, this represents the highest such figure since 2011 when OCHA began recording this indicator. The dramatic increase can be largely attributed to a single incident in January 2015, during which approximately 5,000 olive saplings planted in an area next to Turmusayya village (Ramallah) were uprooted, reportedly by settlers from the Shilo settlement outpost, Adei Ad. While the extent of damage in this incident was exceptionally high, settler attacks targeting olive saplings that were planted or replanted in areas previously attacked have been on the rise during the past two years, particularly around Shilo settlement and outposts (Ramallah), and around Susiya, Ma'on and Asfar settlements in Hebron governorate.

The second largest incident resulting in damage to Palestinian-owned trees this year took place on 28 March, The Palestinian owners of a plot of land on which 1,200 olive saplings had been planted discovered that 1,100 saplings had been stolen and 100 uprooted and broken, reportedly by settlers. The land was located between the settlement of Asfar and the outpost of Pnei Kedem, near Ash Shuyukh village (Hebron), which is accessible only by settlers or by residents. A similar attack was recorded in February, during which 550 saplings in the vicinity of Asfar were uprooted.

So far in 2015, OCHA recorded (based on Israeli media reports) a total of 71 Palestinian attacks on Israeli settlers and other Israeli groups. The monthly average of such incidents is consistent with the average for the whole of 2014 (18). The majority of incidents involved stone throwing at passing Israeli vehicles. In addition, there were two incidents involving a Palestinian vehicle running over Israeli civilians and a physical assault involving the stabbing of an Israeli settler in East Jerusalem, which in total resulted in 26 injuries. The highest number of incidents was recorded in Jerusalem governorate (47), East Jerusalem (44), and Ramallah governorate (11).

Endnotes

- Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jeru-8ecretary-General, A/HRC/24/45, salem, Report by the March 2015, para. 45. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/043/18/PDF/G1504318.pdf?OpenElement
- 2. World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 27 May, 2015. http://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/economic-monitoring-report-ad-hoc-liaison-committee-27-may
- 3. Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East, 19 May 2015. http://www.unsco.org/Documents/State-ments/MSCB/2008/Security%20Council%20Briefing%20-%2019%20May%202015.pdf
- 4. These include liver or kidney transplants; laser surgeries for laryngeal and other throat cancers; gamma knife surgery; radioisotope treatment and chemotherapy.
- 5. This number includes projects that are completed, ongoing, procured, contracted or under design.
- 6. The GRM is a UN-brokered temporary agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities to enable the Government of Palestine (GoP) to lead reconstruction efforts by the Gaza private sector of housing and infrastructure damaged and destroyed during the summer 2014 hostilities.
- World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, May 27, 2015. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/05/22/090224b082eb7780/3_0/Rendered/PDF/Economic0monit0oc0liaison0committee.pdf
- 8. Full time equivalent jobs correspond to an estimation of the number of jobs created by a given project within a predefined timeframe.
- 9. PWA fact sheet, March2015: Water crisis deepens without sustainable solutions, future at stake.
- 10. OCHA report: Gaza Initial Rapid Assessment, 27 August 2014. https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/gaza_mira_report_9september.pdf
- 11. OCHA Factsheet: Bedouin Communities at Risk of Forcible Transfer, September 2014. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_communities_jerusalem_factsheet_september_2014_english.pdf
- 12. Report by the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, A/67/372, 14 September 2012, para. 37.
- 13. All settlements are illegal under international law as they violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of the occupying power's civilian population into occupied territory. This has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the United Nations Security Council. Currently, there are about 150 settlements established by the Israeli government in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem; in addition to some 103 "outposts" erected by settlers without official authorization by the government of Israel, albeit with its acquiescence.
- 14. Partners who participated in the field visit included, JLAC, Yesh Din, Emek Shaveh, PU-AMI and MDM-France.
- 15. Fact Sheet: Settlement expansion, displacement and fragmentation in the southern Nablus Governorate.
- 16. Yesh Din monitoring of 1,045 Israel Police investigations into alleged offences by Israeli civilians against Palestinians and their property in the West Bank between 2005 and 2014, showed that 91.4 per cent of investigations concluded without indictment. Of these concluded investigations, 83.3 per cent were closed in circumstances suggesting investigative failure. See "Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the West Bank", Yesh Din, November 2014.

Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables Conflict-related casualties and violence

Direct Israeli-Palestinian	2011	2012	2013					2014	ļ					20	115	
conflict related casualties	Total	Total	Total	May	June	July	Aug	Sep*	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Palestinian deaths		_				-										
Gaza	108	264	П	0	6	1550	669	12	4	I	3	2256	0	0	I	0
West Bank (by Israeli forces and Israeli settlers)	17	8	28	2	7	17	8	4	4	4	2	58	2	I	I	5
Total	125	272	39	2	13	1567	677	16	8	5	5	2314	2	I	2	5
Of whom are civilians ²	62	136	32	2	8	1059	454	16	8	5	5	1573	2	I	2	5
Of whom are female	3	23	ı	0	0	207	87	3	0	0	0	300	0	0	0	0
Palestinian injuries																
Gaza	468	1485	83	20	39	10,	500	3	7	8	20	10739	4	2	10	10
West Bank (by Israeli forces and Israeli settlers)	1647	3175	3881	245	287	2210	640	206	282	1000	330	6023	118	165	165	213
Total	2115	4660	3964	265	326	13,	735	209	289	1008	350	17147	122	167	175	223
Of whom are civilians	2054	n/a	3959	264	324	NA	NA	206	291	984	347	NA	122	167	175	223
Of whom are female	151	n/a	158	17	26	21	42	4	24	6	5	2286	6	2	14	10
Israeli deaths																
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	7	4	0	3	7	Ί	0	2	8	0	85	0	0	0	T
Of whom are civilians	П	3	2	0	3	ţ	5	0	2	6	0	17	0	0	0	I
Of whom are female	0	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	I	0	2	0	0	0	0
Israeli injuries																
Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	345	151	28	5	24	37	22	32	55	15	2629	8	5	13	12
Of whom are civilians	56	60	74	9	4	83	7**	10	19	41	12	952	7	2	9	7
Of whom are female	3	7	10	6	0	NA	NA	3	6	2	3	27	2	0	7	2

^{*}September-December fatalities in Gaza include those who sustained injuries during the Israeli offensive on Gaza (July-August)
**See Magen David Adom's report: http://www.mdais.org/h/316/&mod=download&me_id=13228

Israeli-settler related	2011	2012	2013					2014	1					20	15	
incidents resulting in casualties or property damage	Total	Total	Total	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties ⁴	120	98	94	8	13	25	6	3	6	14	4	110	8	6	13	5
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	268	306	22	17	24	12	5	19	17	18	221	17	10	8	8
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	411	366	399	30	30	49	18	8	25	31	22	331	25	16	21	13
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	35	38	3	I	14	14	9	10	16	10	89	6	2	5	7
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages ⁵	13	15	12	10	11	9	7	27	27	20	23	140	11	25	9	8
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	36	50	50	13	12	23	21	36	37	36	33	229	17	27	14	15

Civilian Palesti	inians killed	2011	2012	2013	\int				2014	1					20	15	
or injured by ordnance in Ga	-	Total	Total	Total	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Adult	Injured	7	12	4	0	0	0	15	3	0	5	П	38	0	0	2	0
Adult	Killed	I	2	0	0	0	0	6	I	0	0	0	7	0	0	I	0
CLIL	Injured	17	19	19	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	7	19	0	3	I	3
Child	Killed	2	ı	3	0	0	0	0	0	I	0	0	ı	0	0	0	0
Grand Total		27	34	26	0	0	0	21	6	ı	7	П	65	0	3	3	3

Source: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Child Protection

Number of Palestinian	2011	2012	2013					201	4			Y		20)15	
children killed - direct conflict	Total	Total	Total	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
West Bank	2	2	4	2	I	2	2	I	2	0	2	13	I	0	0	I
Gaza Strip	П	44	I	0	I	367	174	3	0	I	I	548	0	0	0	0
Number of Palestinian chi	ildren inj	ured - d	direct	confl	ict											
West Bank	308	427	1232	65	76	283	201	74	58	113	108	1221	37	31	35	65
Gaza Strip	125	105	10	3	76	3,3	306	0	0	I	4	3416	0	0	0	4
Number of Israeli children	n killed -	direct o	conflic	ct												
oPt	I	I	0	0	2	ı	0	I	ı	I	0	7	0	0	0	0
Israel	I	I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Israeli children	n injured	- direct	t conf	lict												
oPt	0	3	8	I	0	NA	N/A	ı	0	I	3	7	I	0	3	0
Israel	0	2	0	0	0	NA	NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Palestinian chi	ldren he	ld in de	tenti	on by	Israel	li auth	oritie	S								
In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	198 monthly average	197 monthly average	214	202	192	201	128	163	156	152	185 monthly average	163	182	182	N/A
Number of Palestinian chi	ldren di	placed	by de	molit	ions											
West Bank, inc EJ	618	474	558	99	21	4	83	87	44	70	9	651	66	0	60	
Number of incidents resul	ting in t	1	_	of sc		19										
oPt	na	321	47	5	15	0	4	23	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5	4	14	N/A

Souce: OCHA, Defence for Children Inernational, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violatons affecting children in armed conflict

Access

	2011	2012	2013					20	14					20	15	
Access to healthcare - Gaza	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing 15	872	777	1148	1714	1,799	1,093	946	1561	1038	1,636	1,684	1513	1,489	1429	1615	1539
of which approved	721	719	1010	1470	1,436	716	783	1307	76	1,292	1,379	1246	1,202	1148	1329	1278
of which denied	19	7	3	14	56	70	20	41	213	44	56	39	52	63	27	18
of which delayed 16	83	17	135	230	307	307	143	213	15	300	249	228	235	218	259	243

Source:WHO

Movement of	2011	2012	2013					20	14					20	15	
humanitarian staff, West Bank	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Mon. Ave.	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint ¹⁷	38	37.5	40.1	21	41	12	33	38	31	39	30	29	17	28	54	42
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	22.3	6	11	3	21	14	4	6	6	8	4	7	6	4
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	18.5	41	52	10.5	19	26.5	9.5	32	15	25	5.5	13.6	16.2	14.2

Source: OCHA

Search and Arrest

	2011	2012	2013					201	14					20	15	
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Mon. Ave.	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon.Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	338	316	420	767	411	292	353	422	409	409	413	496	348	372	332
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	283	491	619		826	472	467	562	63 I	584	563	618	384	481	400

Source: OCHA

Palestinians under	2011	2012	2013					201	4					20	15	
Israeli custody (occupation related) ⁶	Monthly Average	Monthly Average		May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon.Ave.	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4,451	4227	5,053	5,318	5,383	5,505	5439	5477	5527	5,528	5258	5549	5609	5591	N/A
of whom are women	26	7	10	16	15	17	17	15	14	15	20	16	20	20	18	N/A
of whom are administrative detainees ⁷	240	245	132	196	363	446	473	468	457	461	463	327	455	424	412	N/A
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	897	1062	1,476	1,497	1,577	1,650	1623	1609	1534	1,511	1525	1526	1534	1499	N/A

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)


Demolition of Structures

Structures demolished⁸

	2011	Y2012	2013	\bigcap				2014						20	15	
	Total	Total	Total	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Арі
of which in Area C	571	540	565	70	30	6	25	58	27	37	24	493	76	15	77	21
of which in East Jerusalem	42	64	98	5	6	2	5	3	23	П	14	98	5	2	18	2
Area A	NA	NA		0	0	2	2	I	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Area B	NA	NA		0	0		5	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Grand Total	622	604	663	75	36	10	37	62	50	48	38	601	81	17	95	23

People Displaced due	2011	2012	2013					2014						20	15	
to demolitions?	Total	Total	Total	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	815	805	156	42	0	98	122	67	102	10	969	117	0	110	25
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	71	298	8	0	0	20	15	30	34	8	208	0	0	0	0
Area A	NA	NA	0	0	0	П	16	5	0	0	0	32	0	0	0	0
Area B	NA	NA	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
Grand Total	1094	886	1103	164	42	П	140	142	97	136	18	1215	117	0	110	25

Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel¹⁸



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

Strategic Response Plan(SRP) 2015:

Occupied Palestinian terriroty Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2015 as of 27 April 2015

		SRF	2015
	Cluster	Total request in USD	% of funds received
À	Coordination and Support Services	23,235,547	24%
\square	Education	20,330,672	20%
	Food Security	324,430,436	22%
***	Health and Nutrition	21,212,516	32%
\	Protection	51,935,541	37%
	Shelter/Non-Food Items	224,930,156	36%
=	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	39,213,897	43%
	Total	705,288,765	31.5%

^{*} Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

- Conflict-related casualties: includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli
 occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during
 demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the
 context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and
 internal Palestinian violence.
- 2. Civilians: includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a "continuous combatant function" as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
- 3. Tunnel related casualties: figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

- 4. **Incidents resulting in casualties**: includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
- 5. Incidents resulting in property damage/losses: ibid.

Search and Arrest

- 6. Palestinians in Israeli custody: includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a "security detainee/prisoner". Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a "regular" criminal offense.
- 7. Administrative detainees: Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

- 8. Structures demolished: includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
- 9. People displaced due to demolitions: includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
- 10. People affected by demolitions: includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

- **11. Permanently staffed checkpoints**: staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and 'agricultural gates' along the Barrier.
- 12. Partially staffed checkpoints: checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
- 13. Unstaffed obstacles: includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
- 14. 'Flying' or random checkpoints: checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

Access to health

- **15. Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
- **16. Delayed applications**: includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint: includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. Truckloads by type: for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.