




United Nations Development Programme  
Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People  
برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي / برنامج مساعدة الشعب الفلسطيني

# Inside Gaza

## Attitudes and perceptions of the Gaza Strip residents in the aftermath of the Israeli military operations

Inside Gaza: Attitudes and perceptions of the Gaza Strip residents in the aftermath of the Israeli military operations





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


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## INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Immediately after the unilateral ceasefire was declared, all efforts have been geared towards assessing the damage of the 27 December 2007 – 18 January 2008 Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, as well as providing much needed assistance to the affected population. In a move to complement the assessments in the Gaza Strip, UNDP/PAPP commissioned a large-scale public opinion survey that included over 1,800 households.<sup>1</sup>

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The aim of the survey and this report is to provide local and international organizations, authorities, donors, and decision-makers with baseline information from a people's perspective on the current living conditions, needs, damages, and destruction in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Israeli military operations. Fast dissemination of such information is crucial for policymakers and practitioners alike at the outset of an intense early recovery and reconstruction period as it will help to better inform responses and targeted interventions.

The voices and views of the people in the Gaza Strip in the current context are of critical importance: although they are at the centre of events that are mostly beyond their control, they are currently facing the consequences, and they will be the core beneficiaries of the reconstruction efforts. Therefore, throughout this report, UNDP/PAPP aims to provide a comprehensive snapshot, from a human perspective, about the main issues and challenges faced by Gazans today. These issues range from poverty and unemployment, security, damages and needs for assistance to health-related issues, and main challenges faced by the youth. They form the seven chapters in this report.

The survey for this report was conducted between 25 January and 1 February 2009, using simple random sampling.<sup>2</sup>

The sample size of the survey consists of 1,815 successfully interviewed households from the five governorates in the Gaza Strip. About 360 households were selected from each governorate. In the analysis, the data used on


<sup>1</sup> UNDP/PAPP through sub-contracting Near East Consulting, conducted a comprehensive computer assisted telephone survey (CATI) in the five governorates of the Gaza Strip, whereby random digit dialling were used to select a random sample of households.

<sup>2</sup> As this is a landline phone survey, collapsed houses could not be reached.

the governorate level were not weighted, however the data for other independent variables, including refugee status, place of residence, poverty level, and sex and age of the respondents, were weighted proportional to the actual size of each governorate. All the survey questions analyzed in this report were tested in their relationship with independent variables, and when relevant correlations were found, they are presented throughout the report.

The demographic distribution of the un-weighted data for each sub-group is visualized in the below figure.

Figure 1: Demographic distribution of the un-weighted data



The margin of error for the total sample is +/- 2.3, and the confidence level is 95%. The margin of error increases and varies when analysing the survey results according to the different subgroups of society in the Gaza Strip. These variations in the margin of error, when the results are cross-tabulated by different independent variables, were considered throughout the analysis, and are detailed in the below table.

Table 1: Margin of error for the total sample and the explanatory variables

Variable	Label	Margin of error
<b>Total sample</b>		<b>+/- 2.3</b>
Governorate	All five districts	+/- 5.2
Sex		+/- 3.3
Poverty	Extreme poor	+/- 4.0
	Below poverty	+/- 4.6
	Above poverty	+/- 4.2
Place of residence	City	+/- 2.9
	Village	+/- 9.3
	Refugee camp	+/- 4.7
Refugee status	Refugee	+/- 2.9
	Non-refugee	+/- 4.1

# MAIN FINDINGS

## POVERTY

The income poverty rate in the Gaza Strip is 65%. In real numbers, this means that out of an estimated 1,416,543 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, approximately 920,750 live in poverty. Of those, 524,120 are extremely poor. An estimated 8% of households are still above the poverty line,<sup>3</sup> however they are at high risk of falling into poverty. Poverty forces many families to rely on coping mechanisms, but these alternatives, including selling jewellery and reducing household expenditures, are largely depleted in the Gaza Strip: 72% of families, affecting about 1,019,910 people, do not have any alternative ways to face daily financial hardship, let alone pull themselves out of poverty.

## EMPLOYMENT

Before the recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, unemployment levels had already reached unprecedented high levels. In comparison to before the latest flare-up in the conflict, unemployment levels in the labour force increased from 36% to 43%. Even the fully employed are not necessarily protected against poverty, as 28% of them belong to households with a monthly average income that falls below the poverty line. The unemployment rate remains high in the agricultural, manufacturing, and construction sectors. This directly and negatively affects the poverty rate of those households whose breadwinners are involved in these sectors. Similarly, self-employed Gazans include a high proportion of unemployed, resulting in many of these families belonging to the poorest in the Gaza Strip.

## SECURITY

Over 1 million of roughly 1.4 million, or 75% of the Gazan population, feel insecure for one of three reasons: (i) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (42%); (ii) Israeli control over borders (27%) which prevents movement of persons and goods; and (iii) inter-Palestinian tensions.

6 Nearly 40% of the surveyed households were displaced as a result of the Israeli military operations. Approximately, 70% left their homes due to fighting in their neighbourhoods, 15% left because they were warned to leave, and 13% left because their homes either sustained severe damage or were destroyed. A large majority displaced during the 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009 Israeli military operations, 79%, moved to a family member's house, while 9% sought shelter in a friend's house, and 7% left their homes to an UNRWA shelter. Approximately 2% sought refuge in uninhabited buildings.

The majority of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, 69%, believe that since the ceasefire there is control on the streets. Of these, 37% believe that the situation is tense, while 32% see it as calm. A modest majority of 54% evaluate control in the streets positively.

Since the ceasefire, 32% of the people surveyed have detected remnants of war.

## NEEDS AND ASSISTANCE

Security is by far the largest **household** need in the Gaza Strip, distantly followed by the need for food, electricity, and employment. At the **community level**, security is identified as the most important need, and is similarly followed by the need for food, social cohesion, and employment.

Less than one fifth of households in the Gaza Strip received assistance during the recent Israeli military operations and in the first week after the ceasefire. By far, UN agencies (39%) are considered the most important source of

<sup>3</sup> Below the poverty line: Households of two adults and four children with a monthly income of approximately NIS 2,000 (US\$ 500) or less fall below the poverty line.

this assistance; the United Nations is followed by charities (19%), Arab governments (13%), and international NGOs (8%).

Over 60% of the households in Gaza currently need assistance. This need is specifically influenced by the poverty status of households: (i) 82% of **extremely poor** households require assistance; (ii) 63% of **poor households** need it; and (iii) 44% of households **above the poverty line** require some form of assistance. Currently, psychosocial support is the most needed form of assistance in 25% of households, while financial assistance is necessary for 17%, and food aid for 16% of households in Gaza.

## DAMAGES

Nearly half of the households across the Gaza Strip, 45%, reported damages to their residences as a result of the recent Israeli military operations. The majority of people with damaged homes have shattered windows (67%); 16% incurred damage from bullets or artillery shells; and 12% had the main structure of their residence damaged. Three percent mentioned that their homes had collapsed. In the second week after the ceasefire took effect,<sup>4</sup> 10% of households still did not have access to clean water and electricity.

## YOUTH AND CHILDREN

49% of survey respondents view psychosocial support as the most important need for children in their households. Reported signs of stress in children, such as anxiety, aggressive behaviour, lack of interest in socializing, bedwetting, and nightmares, have tripled and in some cases quadrupled since the recent Israeli military operations.

Of the respondents, 40% are witnessed to violence against children in their environment. In the year running up to the most recent Israeli military operations, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the lack of internal security in the Gaza Strip were viewed as the main two sources of violence against children: 41% and 37% respectively. Nowadays, 71% of Gazans consider the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be the main source of violence against children in the Gaza Strip, while 17% continue to see the lack of internal security as the main source of violence.

The inability of parents to meet the care and protection needs of their children has more than doubled since the Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip: from 26% to 64%. These results not only highlight the difficult plight of adults in their households, but also point to a large number of children in the Gaza Strip who remain vulnerable as their needs for care and protection are unmet. In addition, in 82% of households, most adults need psychosocial support.

## HEALTH CARE

During the recent Israeli military incursions into the Gaza Strip, 37% of households were in need of **primary** health care. However, more than one fourth of these households could not access these services. Of those needing medical care, including primary health care, 72% faced problems, as only a mere 18% had health care provided to them without delays or restrictions.

14% of households surveyed include at least one disabled member. Physical impairment is prevalent with 16% of reported disabilities being conflict-related. The most frequently mentioned types of assistance that households with disabled persons need are: (i) rehabilitation and mobility skills (22%); (ii) financial assistance (20%); (iii) aids, devices, and technologies (17%); (iv) adapted employment (11%); (v) access to education for those with special needs (9%); and (vi) psychosocial support (6%).

<sup>4</sup> The results reflect the situation in terms of household access to water and electricity at the time when the survey was conducted (from 25 January to 1 February 2009).



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## CHAPTER ONE: POVERTY AND COPING STRATEGIES

# Income poverty, poverty evolution, and coping mechanisms


Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger is the first Millennium Development Goal set by the United Nations. Yet, in the Palestinian case and especially in the Gaza Strip, households' welfare and economic vulnerability have been compromised in varying degrees for years. The chronically high income poverty levels have pushed many Palestinians to rely on other than financial means to cope, leading to increased levels of exhaustion of coping mechanisms in many households.

This chapter will provide a detailed overview on (1) the current poverty situation in the Gaza Strip, (2) how Gazans view their financial situation, and (3) the status of coping mechanisms available to Gazan households.

## 1.1 Income poverty<sup>5</sup>

The majority of the Gazan population, 65%, live below the income poverty line<sup>6</sup>, and more than half of them, 37%, live in extreme poverty. Extreme poverty is when a household of two adults and four children live on NIS 1,000 (US\$ 250)<sup>7</sup> per month or less, about NIS 5.5 (US\$ 1.375) a day per person. In real numbers, a poverty rate of 65% means that out of an estimated 1,416,543 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, about 920,750 live in poverty. Of those, 524,120 live in extreme hardship.

Figure 1: The constructed income poverty variable



The poverty rate in the Gaza Strip does not vary significantly across the five governorates. As detailed in table 1, however, there are some indicative variations: the Rafah governorate, for example, has the highest percentage of extreme poverty (42%), and the lowest percentage of households with an average monthly income above the poverty line; the Gaza city governorate has the lowest proportion among the governorates of extreme poverty.

5 The poverty analysis used in this publication is based on income, not on consumption. The poverty level is constructed on the basis of the reported household income and the household size, whereby the poverty line established by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) is used to establish which households are poor and which ones are not.

6 Below the poverty line: Households of two adults and four children with a monthly income of approximately NIS 2,000 (US\$ 500) or less fall below the poverty line.

7 True to the US\$/New Israeli Shekel exchange rate on 1 February, 2007.

Table 1: Poverty level in the five governorates of the Gaza Strip

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>Extremely poor</b>	40%	35%	42%	38%	38%
<b>Below poverty line</b>	28%	29%	28%	28%	26%
<b>Above poverty line</b>	32%	35%	31%	34%	36%

According to place of residence, a higher percentage of extremely poor are living in refugee camps (41%) than in cities (36%) and villages (37%). Conversely, there are fewer households with an average monthly income above the poverty line in refugee camps (29%) than in villages (33%) and cities (36%). At the same time, however, the determining factor for poverty is the residence in camps rather than the refugee status. As indicated in the table below, there is a slightly higher percentage of extreme poor non-refugees (40%) than refugees (36%), although the overall poverty rate between those two subgroups of society is very similar.

Table 2: Poverty according to place of residence and refugee status

	Place of residence			Refugee Status	
	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Refugee	Non-refugee
<b>Extremely poor</b>	36%	37%	41%	36%	40%
<b>Below the poverty line</b>	28%	30%	30%	29%	27%
<b>Above the poverty line</b>	36%	33%	29%	35%	34%

10 For planning and targeting interventions, it is important to consider households that are technically above the income poverty line, but are at high risk of falling into poverty.

The objective poverty rate is based on a monthly household income of NIS 2,000 (US\$ 500) for households of two adults and four children. All depending on the actual household size, a proportion of households with a monthly income between NIS 2,000 (US\$ 500) and NIS 3,000 (US\$ 750), which is technically above the poverty line, are at risk of dropping below the poverty line if socio-economic indicators remain unchanged or deteriorate any further. The results show that 8.5% of the households with two adults and four children in the Gaza Strip fall in this income category. In real numbers, these borderline cases represent 16,271 households, or about 120,406 individuals, in the Gaza Strip who are at risk of falling into poverty. They are average-sized Palestinian households that live off between NIS 11.1 (US\$ 2.8) per person a day, up to NIS 16.6 (US\$ 4.2) per person a day.


## 1.2 Income poverty evolution and vulnerability

People's perception about their household's ability to keep up financially provides an indication about their income security, financial outlook on the future, and perceived vulnerability to income poverty.

Of the people surveyed, 19% do not have enough to live on, while 33% are barely managing on their incomes. Less than one-fifth, 18%, reported that they can manage financially for another few months. Another 10% said

they can cope financially for about a year. The remaining 20% are confident they can keep up financially for more than one year.

Figure 3: Ability to keep up financially in the future




Responses to the question on the ability to keep up financially are very similar across the different subgroups in the Gaza Strip, whether it concerns analysis according to governorate, place of residence, or refugee status. The exception to these homogenous results concerns the analysis of this question according to the poverty level of the household. As the results in the table below indicate, a far larger percentage of the extremely poor than those above the poverty level can barely manage or do not have enough to live. Still, about 32% of households with an average household income level above the poverty line cannot or can barely cope financially. In real numbers this entails that close to 61,256 above the poverty line households or roughly 453,293 individuals in the Gaza Strip are at risk of falling below the poverty line if their economic conditions do not improve in the near future.

Table 3: Ability to keep up financially in the future: according to poverty level

	Poverty		
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>For more than one year</b>	9%	18%	33%
<b>For about one year</b>	6%	9%	13%
<b>For only a few months</b>	16%	24%	22%
<b>We can barely manage</b>	40%	35%	23%
<b>We do not have enough to live on</b>	29%	14%	9%

Figure 4: Ability of borderline poverty households to keep up financially in the future




When narrowing down the poverty analysis to the 8.5% of Gazan households that were categorized as above the poverty line, but are borderline cases, nearly half, 47% cannot or can barely cope financially. In fact, their inability to financially cope bears more similarities with the households with an average monthly income below the poverty line than with those above the poverty line in the Gaza Strip.

### 1.3 Coping mechanisms

Poverty forces many families to rely on coping mechanisms. These are resources drawn upon other than the main household income. This analysis does not give a detailed overview of the most commonly used coping mechanisms, such as remittances; selling gold, jewelry, property, or land; reducing household expenditures, etc. Rather, it aims to provide a general picture of the availability or exhaustion of coping mechanisms in the household.

Some 53% of households in the Gaza Strip never had coping mechanisms at their disposal, and another 19% have exhausted all other means to cope with hardship. Consequently, 72% of families, affecting about 1,019,910 people, in the Gaza Strip do not have any alternative ways to face daily financial hardship, let alone pull themselves out of poverty. A smaller number of Gazan households, 11%, draw on other resources, but are at risk of falling into poverty as their alternative means will be depleted soon. In the Gaza Strip today, only 17% of households still have coping mechanisms at their disposal to relieve hardship, without being concerned that those will be exhausted soon.

Figure 5: Status of the coping mechanisms in the household utilized to relieve the hardship



The overall picture in terms of the status of coping mechanisms in the Gaza Strip paints a picture of a society in dire straits and on the brink of collapse. More detailed analysis on the status of coping mechanisms among

“65%, live below the income poverty line, and more than half of them, 37%, live in extreme poverty”



different subgroups in society reveals that the depletion of alternative means is widespread, but affects some households even more than others. The results in the table below, for example, show that the proportion of households without coping mechanisms is relatively lower in the Gaza city governorate than in the other governorates. Also, in line with the results on the poverty rates, the Rafah governorate holds the lowest percentage of households with available means to cope with the hardship (12%).

*Table 4: Status of the coping mechanisms in the household utilized to relieve the hardship in the five governorates of the Gaza Strip*

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>Those coping mechanisms are still available</b>	16%	19%	12%	14%	17%
<b>Those coping mechanisms will be soon exhausted</b>	13%	14%	10%	8%	9%
<b>Those coping mechanisms are already exhausted</b>	20%	25%	17%	17%	10%
<b>No coping mechanisms were ever available to our household</b>	51%	43%	61%	61%	63%

The availability of coping mechanisms diminishes with increased income poverty levels, but being above the poverty line does not necessarily safeguard households against poverty in the future. As detailed in the table below, a higher proportion of households above the poverty line than those below the poverty line still have other means than income at their disposal, but, at the same time, a large number of those households above the poverty line are also vulnerable to poverty as 18% of them already exhausted these alternative means to relieve hardship and 46% never had such options at their disposal.

*Table 5: Status of the coping mechanisms in the household utilized to relieve the hardship; according to the poverty level*

	Poverty		
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Those coping mechanisms are still available</b>	10%	18%	24%
<b>Those coping mechanisms will be soon exhausted</b>	12%	11%	12%
<b>Those coping mechanisms are already exhausted</b>	20%	20%	18%
<b>No coping mechanisms were ever available to our household</b>	58%	52%	46%

The status of coping mechanisms in households does not significantly change when analyzing the results to this question according to place of residence or refugee status. This further exemplifies how the availability of coping strategies has become a widespread challenge that affects various subgroups within the Gazan society equally.

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## CHAPTER TWO: EMPLOYMENT SITUATION

# Employment situation

Productive and decent employment is central in accelerating poverty reduction. Since the second Intifada, however, unemployment rates in the oPt have been persistently high, with the Gaza Strip being continuously worse off than the West Bank. Particularly since 2006, the Gaza Strip has been subjected to prolonged closures and severe restrictions in movement and access for people and goods, which have paralyzed the economy and further undermined the employment situation and business environment there.


This chapter will provide a snapshot of the labour market in the Gaza Strip as it was emerging from the 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009 conflict, and compare it to the situation before this most recent crisis. Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the status of the main breadwinner in the Gaza households, and draw a modest profile of the main breadwinner in the Gaza Strip.

## 2.1 The respondent

The labour market variable is constructed from a question in the survey that asks respondents about their employment status. In order to obtain a comparable overview of the status of the labour market, respondents were asked to state their current employment status, but also their employment status before the 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009 conflict.

Overall in the Gaza Strip, in a month's period, the employment situation has worsened. As illustrated in the figure below, unemployment in the Strip during this time has increased by six percent, while full-time employment has decreased by 5%. However, even before the latest flare-up in the conflict, unemployment levels in the Gaza Strip had already reached unprecedented high levels. Although the second half of 2008 witnessed a six-month ceasefire between Hamas and the Israeli government, the closure imposed on the Gaza Strip had remained harsh, and a very negative business environment kept unemployment rates high.


Figure 1: Employment status of the respondent since the ceasefire compared to prior to the Israeli military operations





Even before the recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, unemployment hit harder in some of the governorates than in others, and, since then, the labour market has evolved differently in the various governorates of the Gaza Strip. Prior to the most recent conflict, unemployment rates in the governorate of Deir al-Balah were the highest (42%). Since the ceasefire, unemployment in Deir al-Balah has reached 46%, but this time unemployment rates in the Rafah and North Gaza governorates have increased to the same percentage. The unemployment rates in the Gaza city governorate are the lowest, both prior to the Israeli military operations (33%) and since the ceasefire (40%).

Figure 2: Employment status of the respondent prior to the Israeli military operations compared to since the ceasefire: according to governorate



There is a very strong and obvious correlation between employment and income poverty rates. The results show that in the past month more than before, even the fully employed are not necessarily protected against poverty. Prior to the Israeli military operations 72% of the fully employed belonged to households with a monthly average income above the poverty line, compared to 67% since the ceasefire. Nowadays, 66% of the unemployed are extremely poor: an increase from 56% prior to the recent Gaza conflict.

16 The results in the tables below also detail that the unemployment rate in refugee camps prior to the recent conflict was higher than in cities and villages, and continues to be higher after the ceasefire.

Prior to the recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, unemployment was also more widespread among refugees than non-refugees, but the results show far less marked gaps between the two population groups since the ceasefire as a higher proportion of non-refugees than refugees seem to have joined the unemployed in the past month.

“66% of the unemployed are extremely poor: an increase from 56% prior to the recent Gaza conflict”



The results in the tables below show that the employment status of men and women in the labour market<sup>8</sup> is very similar as there are no statistically significant differences between the two categories. Still, tentatively the results indicate that in the past month a slightly higher proportion of men than women in the Gaza labour market lost their full time employment and became unemployed.

*Table 1: Employment status of the respondent prior to the Israeli military operations: according to poverty level, place of residence, refugee status, and sex*

	Poverty			Place of residence			Refugee Status		Sex of the respondent	
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Refugee	Non-refugee	Male	Female
<b>Employed full-time</b>	22%	56%	72%	50%	55%	48%	50%	50%	51%	48%
<b>Employed part-time</b>	22%	16%	6%	15%	15%	13%	12%	18%	14%	16%
<b>Not employed</b>	56%	28%	22%	35%	30%	39%	38%	32%	35%	37%

*Table 2: Employment status of the respondent since the ceasefire: according to poverty level, place of residence, refugee status, and sex*

	Poverty			Place of residence			Refugee Status		Sex of the respondent	
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Refugee	Non-refugee	Male	Female
<b>Employed full-time</b>	18%	49%	67%	46%	44%	43%	46%	44%	45%	45%
<b>Employed part-time</b>	16%	15%	6%	12%	20%	9%	10%	14%	11%	13%
<b>Not employed</b>	66%	36%	27%	42%	36%	48%	44%	42%	44%	42%

## 2.2 The main breadwinner


During the survey, in addition to the questions about their personal employment status, interviewees were asked several questions about the main breadwinner. As many respondents in the latter case no longer speak about themselves<sup>9</sup>, their responses could be less precise. In terms of employment status, the questions asked about the respondents were also asked about the main breadwinner of the household. The results of the breadwinner questions are very similar to those about the employment status of the respondent, and will therefore, not be analyzed in detail below. Only the results related to the main breadwinner in the household that have an added value will be discussed in this section.

In the Gaza Strip, 5% of the main breadwinners in the households are women; the remaining 95% are men. Since the ceasefire, about 3% of Gaza households have no main breadwinner. The unemployment rate among the main breadwinners in the Strip increased from 34% prior to the recent Israeli military operations to 38%. In the same time-frame, full-time employment among the main breadwinners dropped from 51% to 48%.

<sup>8</sup> Of the Gazans involved in the labour market, 63% are men, and 37% are women.

<sup>9</sup> In the survey, 41% of the respondents were also the main breadwinners of the household; 59% were not.


Figure 3: Employment status of the main breadwinner since the ceasefire compared to prior to the Israeli military operations, and sex of the main breadwinner



Nearly 70% of the Gaza Strip’s main breadwinners’ areas of employment fall into the following sectors: (1) education (16%), (2) services (12%), (3) civil service (11%), (4) security (11%), (5) trade & commerce (10%), and (6) health (9%).

Involvement of the main breadwinners in the employment sectors of education, civil service, and security seem quite evenly spread over the five governorates in the Gaza Strip. Detailed results according to governorate further indicate that involvement in the sectors of trade and commerce, and health is most concentrated in the Gaza city governorate, while involvement in services is most pronounced in the north Gaza governorate.

Figure 4: Employment sector of the main breadwinner (even if currently unemployed)




Employment rates of the main breadwinners vary considerably across the various listed employment sectors, and have a critical impact on the poverty status of the breadwinners’ households.

As detailed in figure 5, there is a high unemployment rate in the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, and construction, which directly and very negatively affects the poverty rate of the households whose breadwinners are involved in these sectors.

Furthermore, a comparatively low proportion of the breadwinners linked to the health, education, and technology sectors are unemployed, which reflects positively on the poverty status of their households.

The exception to this link between the employment sector of the main breadwinner in the household and the poverty status of the household, concerns those breadwinners who are involved in the civil service and security sectors. As indicated in the figure below, even with a large proportion of the breadwinners unemployed in the civil service and security sectors, the poverty status of their households are not as negative as could be expected. These results have a political explanation: Many Gazans in the civil service and security sectors stopped working after the Hamas de facto take-over of power in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, but they continued to receive salaries and to be on the payroll of the PA in the West Bank.

*Figure 5: Employment sector of the breadwinner (even if currently unemployed): poverty level and employment rate in each sector*




When involvement of the main breadwinner is examined in terms of employment categories rather than in specific sectors, two main categories emerge: (1) government employees (38%), and (2) a combination of several types of self-employed people (37%). Involvement in the private sector takes up 14% of the pie.



Photo credit: UNDP/PAPP Archive

Involvement by the main breadwinner in the employment category of “government employee” seems to be most concentrated in the Deir al-Balah governorate (54%), while the “self-employed” main breadwinner is least spread in that same governorate. Involvement by the main breadwinner in the private sector sees the highest concentrations in the Gaza city governorate (20%), followed by the north Gaza governorate (16%).

Figure 6: Employment category of the main breadwinner. (even if currently unemployed)



Employment rates of the main breadwinners within the listed employment categories are very different, and provide a strong indication about the economic vulnerability of the households of those breadwinners.

The results in figure 7 show that main breadwinners involved with international agencies and NGOs, local NGOs, and to some extent the private sector, are least unemployed, and therefore, belong to households in the Gaza Strip that are least vulnerable to poverty.


The self-employed breadwinners include a high proportion of unemployed, resulting in many of the families of these self-employed belonging to the poorest in the Gaza Strip.

Once again, the exception to the strong correlation between involvement of the main breadwinner in a certain employment category, on the one hand, and the poverty level of his/her household, on the other hand, are the breadwinners who are linked to the government sector. Although the results in figure 7 show a relatively high unemployment rate (40%) among government employees, the poverty rate of the households they belong to is still 13% below the Gaza Strip’s current income poverty rate of 65%. As mentioned before, these results should be understood in the current political setting of the oPt: Since the Hamas de facto take-over of power in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, many Gazan government employees stopped working, but they continued to receive salaries and remained on the payroll of the PA in the West Bank.

“5% of the main breadwinners in the households are women; the remaining 95% are men in the Gaza Strip”



Figure 7: Employment category of the main breadwinner, (even if currently unemployed): poverty level and employment rate in each sector



As a final note on the profile of the main breadwinners involved in certain employment categories, a significantly higher proportion of refugees than non-refugees are linked to the government sector and international agencies, while a higher proportion of non-refugees than refugees are self-employed or linked to the private sector.

Table 3: Employment category of the main breadwinner (even if currently unemployed): according to refugee status

	Refugee Status	
	Refugee	Non-refugee
Government employee	42%	30%
Employed in international agency	5%	1%
Employed by local NGO	2%	1%
Employed in private sector	13%	19%
Self employed	24%	31%
Other self- employed	9%	10%
Employed by international NGO	3%	4%
Self employed in petty trade (agriculture )	1%	2%
Self employed in petty trade (manufacturing)	1%	3%

# Inside Gaza

Attitudes and perceptions  
of the Gaza Strip residents  
in the aftermath of the  
Israeli military operations

## CHAPTER THREE: SECURITY

# Security


In the aftermath of Israel's largest-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip, and particularly since access to the Gaza Strip remains restricted, it is critical to obtain basic security-related information from the population. Therefore in this chapter, answers to the following questions will be provided:

- How insecure do the people in the Strip feel, and what are their main reasons for feeling insecure?
- Have people been displaced during the conflict? If yes, what was the main reason behind this displacement? Where did they go?
- Have the people noticed any UXO's? Do they know how to identify these? Do they know of anyone who was injured or affected by UXO's?
- Is the situation on the streets calm or is there chaos? Is there control? How do the people evaluate this control? How does control over the streets since the ceasefire compare to control before the Israeli military operations?

## 3.1 General feeling of security

Overall, 75% of the Gaza population or over 1 million out of roughly 1.4 million people feel insecure. This feeling of insecurity is quite evenly divided over all subgroups of society, but there are some noticeable differences. For example, the Gaza city governorate contains the highest proportion of people feeling secure. Also, villagers feel more secure than camp and city dwellers, and women in the Gaza Strip are slightly less secure than men. There is no difference in the level of feeling insecure between refugees and non-refugees, and, nowadays the poverty status of the households does not affect people's sense of insecurity.

Figure 1: General feeling of security: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, place of residence, and sex






### 3.2 Reasons for insecurity

The four main reasons for feeling insecure are related to political and security issues. In declining order, these reasons behind people’s sense of insecurity are: (1) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (42%), (2) Israeli control over borders (27%), (3) inter-Palestinian tensions (11%), and (4) regional insecurity (10%). In the aftermath of the Israeli military operations, issues such as health, poverty, and socio-economic improvement were still less on people’s mind.

Figure 2: The main reason for feeling insecure



The prevalence of one reason above another for feeling insecure differs from one governorate to the other. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most often mentioned as a reason for insecurity in the Khan Younis governorate (52%), while this is the case with regard to regional insecurity in the Gaza city governorate (15%). Inter-Palestinian tensions are most frequently referred to as the main reason for feeling insecure in the Khan Younis (16%) and Deir al-Balah (14%) governorates. The highest proportion of people reporting that the continuing Israeli control over borders is the main reason for their sense of insecurity live in the Rafah governorate (38%): the governorate in the Strip which borders Egypt.

Table 1: The main reason for feeling insecure according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
No signs of socio-economic improvement	3%	2%	1%	0%	1%
Israeli-Palestinian conflict	41%	38%	37%	44%	52%
Inter-Palestinian tensions	9%	6%	10%	14%	16%
Regional insecurity	8%	15%	8%	7%	8%
Continuing Israeli control over borders	31%	24%	38%	32%	22%
Poverty	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%
Health reasons	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Fear for safety of the children	3%	6%	3%	1%	1%
Other reasons	4%	5%	2%	2%	0%

The extremely poor include the highest proportion of Gazans who are mainly insecure because of continuing Israeli control over borders (31%), while those who are relatively better off financially include the highest percentage of people who are mainly insecure as a result of the inter-Palestinian tensions (14%).

Villagers (55%) are more often than city (41%) and camp dwellers (43%) insecure because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A higher proportion of women than men in the Gaza Strip are mainly feeling insecure because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (44% versus 39%), and the continuing Israeli control over borders (30% versus 25%). Men, twice as often than women, cite the inter-Palestinian tensions as their main reason for feeling insecure (14% versus 7%).

*Table 2: The main reason for feeling insecure: according to poverty level, place of residence, refugee status, and sex*

	Poverty			Place of residence			Sex of the respondent	
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Male	Female
<b>No signs of socio-economic improvement</b>	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	3%	2%	2%
<b>Israeli-Palestinian conflict</b>	41%	46%	44%	41%	55%	43%	39%	44%
<b>Inter-Palestinian tensions</b>	9%	8%	14%	10%	13%	13%	14%	7%
<b>Regional insecurity</b>	8%	10%	11%	11%	5%	9%	10%	11%
<b>Continuing Israeli control over borders</b>	31%	24%	24%	28%	21%	25%	25%	30%
<b>Poverty</b>	1%	2%	0%	2%	0%	1%	2%	0%
<b>Health reasons</b>	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%
<b>Fear for safety of the children</b>	2%	5%	3%	3%	2%	4%	4%	3%
<b>Other reasons</b>	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	3%	3%

"75% of the Gaza population of roughly 1.4 million people feel insecure"



Photo credit: UNDP/PAPP Archive


### 3.3 Displacement

Nearly 40% of the respondents belong to households that were displaced as a result of the Israeli military operations.

The results in the figure below indicate that in the north Gaza governorate the highest proportion of households were displaced during the conflict (49%); the lowest percentages of household displacement were noted in the governorates of Khan Younis (27%) and Deir al-Balah (24%).


A lower percentage of households with an average monthly income above the poverty line (33%) than the poorer households (41%) reported displacement as a result of the Israeli military operations.

Figure 3: Household displacement as a result of the Israeli military operations: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, and poverty level



Nearly 70% left their homes because there was too much fighting in the neighbourhood, 15% left as they were warned to leave, and 13% left elsewhere because their houses sustained damage or were destroyed.

Figure 4: The main reason behind displacement



In the Gaza city governorate, the highest proportion of families that left their home did so because there was too much fighting in the neighbourhood (72%); conversely, the Gaza city governorate contains the lowest percentage of displaced citizens who left their homes because they were warned to do so (8%). A much lower percentage of people in the Deir al-Balah governorate than in other governorates reportedly left their homes as a result of damage or destruction.

Table 3: The main reason behind displacement: according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
Too much fighting in the neighbourhood	65%	72%	58%	67%	66%
We were warned to leave the house	12%	8%	26%	24%	20%
Our house was damaged or destroyed	15%	14%	12%	4%	12%
Other reasons	8%	6%	4%	4%	2%

The highest percentage of people who reported leaving their homes after they were warned to do so was recorded in refugee camps (20%) and among refugees (16%). Non-refugees (73%) much more than refugees (64%) gave fighting in the neighbourhood as the main reason behind their displacement.


Table 4: The main reason behind displacement: according to poverty level, place of residence, refugee status, and sex

	Place of residence			Refugee Status	
	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Refugee	Non-refugee
Too much fighting in the neighbourhood	70%	67%	60%	64%	73%
We were warned to leave the house	13%	10%	20%	16%	12%
Our house was damaged or destroyed	12%	21%	13%	14%	12%
Other reasons	5%	2%	8%	6%	4%

The large majority, 79%, of the displaced people during the 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009 Israeli military operations moved to a family member’s house, 9% sought shelter in a friend’s house, and 7% left their homes to an UNRWA shelter. About 2% sought refuge in uninhabited buildings.

The highest proportion of displaced households seeking refuge in an UNRWA shelter was recorded in the north Gaza governorate (12%). In the remaining governorates in the Gaza Strip, 5% to 7% reported that they left home to an UNRWA shelter during the recent Israeli military operations.

Figure 5: If you have been displaced, where did you go?



UNRWA reportedly provided shelter to a higher percentage of extremely poor displaced households (11%) than those who are relatively better off (3%). The latter show a higher proportion of the displaced leaving their home to a family member’s house (87%).

City dwellers and non-refugee respondents also most frequently mentioned moving to a family member's house during the hostilities. 11% of camp dwellers and 10% of refugees who were displaced reported that they sought refuge in an UNRWA shelter.

Table 5: Place of shelter: according to poverty level, place of residence, and refugee status

	Poverty			Place of residence			Refugee Status	
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Refugee	Non-refugee
<b>Family's house</b>	73%	78%	87%	81%	69%	73%	75%	85%
<b>Friends' house</b>	13%	10%	5%	8%	14%	12%	11%	7%
<b>UNRWA shelter</b>	11%	7%	3%	6%	13%	11%	10%	3%
<b>We stayed in an uninhabited building</b>	2%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	3%	1%
<b>Other</b>	3%	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%	4%

### 3.4 UXO's/Remnants of war

Since the ceasefire took effect, 32% of the respondents have detected remnants of war.

The highest percentages of people who noticed UXO's were recorded in the north Gaza governorate (40%) and in the Rafah governorate (36%); significantly lower percentages of people who noticed UXO's were recorded in the Deir al-Balah governorate (23%) and the Khan Younis governorate (27%).


A higher proportion of extremely poor (35%) and poor (32%) Gazans than those in households above the poverty line (28%) have detected UXO's since the ceasefire on 18 January 2009. This is also the case for a higher percentage of camp dwellers (36%) than city residents (31%) and villagers (31%).

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The results in figure 6 also demonstrate that a higher percentage of men (36%) than women (28%) have noticed remnants of war since the ceasefire went into effect.



Figure 6: Since the ceasefire, have you noticed any remnants of war/UXO's: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, poverty level, place of residence, and sex




Most people, 74%, know how to identify unexploded artefacts of war and to stay away from them. This knowledge is particularly widespread in the Rafah (88%) and north Gaza (83%) governorates, and detectably higher among the better-to-do (79%) than among the poorer segments of society.

Refugee camp residents (83%) are the best informed about UXO identification and how to stay away from them. A higher proportion of men (78%) than women (69%) in the Gaza Strip know how to identify UXO's and how to stay away from them.

“The highest proportion of households were displaced during the conflict (49%) are in the north Gaza governorate”



Figure 7: Knowledge of how to identify UXO's and stay away from them: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, poverty level, place of residence, and sex



Half of the people in the Gaza Strip know about UXO's through previous experience with conflict situations, 10% know through information supplied by the UN, and 9% because the children in the household received information about UXO's at school. Nearly one third, 30%, know about unexploded ordinance through a combination of experience with conflict, supplied information by the UN, and the children in the household receiving information at school about UXO's.


The results of the survey showed a significantly higher proportion of the respondents in the north Gaza (16%) and Khan Younis (16%) governorates than in other governorates (between 6% and 9%) reporting that they were supplied information by the UN about UXO's. This is also the case for a higher percentage of the refugee respondents (11%) and those residing in refugee camps (17%).

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The highest percentage of respondents who indicated that they knew about UXO's because the children in the household were told about them at school is recorded in the Gaza city governorate (17% versus 1% to 8% in other governorates).


A significantly lower percentage of city dwellers (47%) than camp residents (58%) and villagers (54%) know about UXO's through previous experience with conflict situations.

Figure 8: Source of information about UXO's



More than one fourth of the respondents know about someone who has been injured or affected by unexploded remnants of war. This is the case for a higher percentage of respondents in the north Gaza governorate (32%) than those in the other governorates of the Gaza Strip (between 23% and 26%).<sup>10</sup>

Figure 9: Knowledge about anyone who has been injured/affected by unexploded remnants of war




### 3.5 Situation on the street since the ceasefire

The majority of people in the Gaza Strip, 69%, believe that there is control on the streets since the ceasefire took effect. However, of these 69%, 37% believe that the situation is tense, while 32% see it as calm. 31% do not agree that there is control on the streets: of those, 23% consider the situation to be chaotic, and the remaining 9% believe it to be calm.

The Deir al-Balah governorate contains the highest proportion of people who believe that since the ceasefire there is no control over the street (41%). Opinions on this issue in the other governorates do not significantly vary from each other.<sup>11</sup>

Figure 10: Description of the situation on the street since the ceasefire has been in effect



10 No other significant differences were found in the answers to this question when examined according to the household's poverty status, the place of residence, the refugee status, or the sex of the respondent.


11 No other significant differences were found in the answers to this question when examined according to the household's poverty status, the place of residence, the refugee status, or the sex of the respondent.



When asked to compare control over the street since the ceasefire with control before the start of the Israeli military operations on 27 December 2008, 43% of the respondents said that control remained the same, 33% believed it to be less strict, and the remaining 24% said that control became stricter than before the latest flare-up in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The highest percentage of respondents who said that control over the street has become less strict, reside in the Deir al-Balah district (41%). These results are consistent with the findings in the previous question where more Deir al-Balah respondents had already specified that there is no control over the street since the ceasefire took effect.<sup>12</sup>


Figure 11: Comparison of control over the street before the Israeli military operations vs. since the ceasefire



As people are divided over the issue of control over the streets in the Gaza Strip, and the extent of this control, they are also split in their evaluation of this control. A modest majority of 54% evaluate control over the street since the ceasefire positively, and 46% evaluate it either negatively (30%) or very negatively (16%).

Respondents in the Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates evaluate control over the street since the start of the ceasefire most negatively (59% and 53%).<sup>13</sup>

32 Figure 12: Evaluation of control over the street since the start of the ceasefire



12 No other significant differences were found in the answers to this question when examined according to the household's poverty status, the place of residence, the refugee status, or the sex of the respondent.

13 No other significant differences were found in the answers to this question when examined according to the household's poverty status, the place of residence, the refugee status, or the sex of the respondent.



Photo credit: UNDP/PAPP Archive

Inside Gaza: Attitudes and perceptions of the Gaza Strip residents in the aftermath of the Israeli military operations

# Inside Gaza

Attitudes and perceptions  
of the Gaza Strip residents  
in the aftermath of the  
Israeli military operations

## CHAPTER FOUR: NEEDS AND ASSISTANCE

# Needs and Assistance

The Gaza Strip has been receiving assistance for years, ranging from emergency assistance to humanitarian aid, to early recovery and development interventions. The type of aid to the Gaza Strip has varied depending on the conditions at the time. Now, immediately after the large Israeli military operations, it is paramount to acquire up-to-date information about the needs of the people in the Strip: both on a household level and on a community level. This will help assistance providers in the targeting of aid.

This chapter, from a people’s perspective, will overview the most important household and community needs, and will examine which sectors in the Gaza Strip are most in need of assistance. Furthermore, this chapter will provide information about the assistance the Gaza population has received during and immediately after the Israeli military operations, the assistance providers, the household’s dependence on this assistance, and the most needed assistance by the household.


## 4.1 Household needs

Respondents were asked to state the two most important household needs from a predetermined list. The results are detailed in the figure below.

Whether the two most important household needs are examined together, or the first most important household need is considered separately, four household needs stand out. In declining order, they are: (1) security, (2) food, (3) electricity, and (4) employment.

In a context where most households in the Gaza Strip have suffered from limited access to basics such as food, water, electricity, sanitation, and money, the high stated need for security, which is less concrete, as a first household need (42%) is striking.

Figure 1: The current two most important household needs



For ease of analysis, the first and second most important household needs have been added up in the tables below. The first table gives a detailed overview of the differences in the importance of some household needs in the five governorates in the Gaza Strip. The second table details how some household needs are more important to some households than others depending on the income poverty status of these households.

Lastly, it is important to note that the place of residence of the respondents, their refugee status, or their sex did not influence the answers to the household needs question.

Although by far *security* is the most important household need, households in the north Gaza and Gaza city governorates give it less importance than those in the Rafah, Deir al-Balah, and Khan Younis governorates.

The need for *food* in the household is lower in the Gaza city and Khan Younis governorates than in the other governorates.

*Health* related household needs are less important in the Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates than in the north Gaza, Gaza city, and Rafah governorates.

*Water* as a household need is more than three times more important in households in the Gaza city governorate than in the other governorates.

*Electricity* is less of an important household need in the Rafah governorate than in the other governorates in the Gaza Strip.

In terms of the household needs of *employment, financial assistance, housing, and sanitation*, there are no significant differences in the level of need across the five governorates.

Table 1: The current two most important household needs: according to governorate

		Governorate				
		North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
FIRST + SECOND IMPORTANT HOUSEHOLD NEED	Employment	23%	25%	22%	21%	25%
	Food	30%	25%	30%	33%	24%
	Health	15%	16%	18%	11%	11%
	Financial assistance	13%	16%	16%	12%	12%
	Housing and re-housing	11%	8%	9%	10%	10%
	Water	14%	22%	6%	7%	9%
	Electricity	29%	31%	17%	24%	31%
	Security	49%	43%	69%	67%	63%
	Sanitation	5%	3%	2%	0%	0%
	Others	9%	10%	13%	18%	18%

As highlighted in the table below, the level of importance of some household needs differ considerably depending on the poverty status of the household. The household needs for employment and financial assistance, for example, are much more prevalent in extremely poor households than in households that are financially relatively better-off. The household need for security is more frequently viewed as very important in households above the poverty line than in poor or extremely poor households.

“Most households in the Gaza Strip have suffered from limited access to basics such as food, water, electricity, sanitation, and money, but their highest need now is security”


Table 2: The current two most important household needs: according to poverty level

		Poverty		
		Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>FIRST + SECOND IMPORTANT HOUSEHOLD NEEDS</b>	<b>Employment</b>	30%	20%	18%
	<b>Food</b>	29%	26%	28%
	<b>Health</b>	12%	17%	14%
	<b>Financial assistance</b>	16%	15%	11%
	<b>Housing and re-housing</b>	8%	8%	8%
	<b>Water</b>	12%	17%	13%
	<b>Electricity</b>	25%	32%	28%
	<b>Security</b>	54%	53%	61%
	<b>Sanitation</b>	3%	2%	2%
	<b>Others</b>	12%	11%	18%

## 4.2 Community needs

Security is also considered to be the most important community need. Again, food, financial assistance, and employment follow in second, third, and fourth rank of importance. On a community level, the need for law and order, and community cohesion are also considered quite important, and, if addressed through interventions, could help substantially in boosting the sense of security that such a great part of the Gaza population lack. The combination of the importance given to housing and re-housing, and infrastructure as community needs underpin the perception of people that it is important to repair the damages inflicted during the most recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.

Figure 2: The current two most important community needs



Again in the tables below, the first and second most important community needs have been added up for ease of reference.<sup>14</sup>

14 The place of residence of the respondents, their refugee status, or their sex did not influence the answers to the community needs question.

As was the case in the governorates for the household need of security, it is considered to be less of an important community need in the governorates of north Gaza and Gaza city. In those two governorates, the community needs of health, law and order, sanitation, and education are perceived as very important by a larger proportion of the population than in the governorates of Rafah, Deir al-Balah, and Khan Younis. Community needs as housing and re-housing, infrastructure, and social cohesion are seen as most pressing in the north Gaza governorate. Financial assistance has more importance as a community need in the governorates of north Gaza, Gaza city, and Rafah than in the Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates. Psychosocial support is perceived important by a higher percentage of the populations in the Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates than in the other governorates. Comparatively, in the Rafah governorate, more people consider food as an important community need.

Table 3: The current two most important community needs: according to governorate

		Governorate				
		North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>FIRST + SECOND IMPORTANT COMMUNITY NEEDS</b>	<b>Employment</b>	20%	21%	15%	17%	17%
	<b>Food</b>	23%	22%	22%	29%	23%
	<b>Health</b>	11%	14%	9%	5%	7%
	<b>Financial assistance</b>	21%	22%	22%	13%	15%
	<b>Housing and re-housing</b>	15%	9%	14%	9%	8%
	<b>Infrastructure</b>	11%	17%	10%	16%	16%
	<b>Law and order</b>	18%	16%	8%	8%	4%
	<b>Security</b>	48%	44%	61%	61%	67%
	<b>Sanitation</b>	6%	5%	1%	2%	1%
	<b>Education</b>	9%	11%	5%	3%	4%
	<b>Community cohesion</b>	10%	15%	17%	17%	15%
	<b>Psychosocial support</b>	6%	4%	9%	12%	14%
	<b>Others</b>	0%	1%	7%	10%	10%

The poverty status of the households affects the opinions of people about the importance of several community needs. As indicated in the table below, a higher percentage of people in poor and extremely poor households than those in households above the poverty line believe that financial assistance, and housing and re-housing are the most important community needs. In contrast, a higher percentage of people who are relatively better-off than those who are poor and extremely poor consider the reconstruction of infrastructure, and law and order to be the most important community needs. Overall, sanitation is not very often seen as a very important community need, except among the very poor in society.



Table 4: The current two most important community needs: according to poverty level

		Poverty		
		Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>FIRST NEED + SECOND IMPORTANT COMMUNITY NEEDS</b>	<b>Employment</b>	19%	19%	16%
	<b>Food</b>	24%	22%	24%
	<b>Health</b>	8%	12%	9%
	<b>Financial assistance</b>	20%	21%	15%
	<b>Housing and re-housing</b>	10%	10%	14%
	<b>Infrastructure</b>	12%	14%	18%
	<b>Law and order</b>	9%	11%	15%
	<b>Security</b>	54%	53%	53%
	<b>Sanitation</b>	6%	1%	2%
	<b>Education</b>	8%	7%	5%
	<b>Community cohesion</b>	16%	14%	12%
	<b>Psychosocial support</b>	8%	9%	10%
	<b>Others</b>	5%	6%	5%

### 4.3 Reception of assistance and the source of the received assistance

Less than one fifth of the households in the Gaza Strip received assistance during the recent Israeli military operations and in the first week after the ceasefire.<sup>15</sup> The reception of assistance, however, varied significantly across different subgroups under study. As illustrated in figure 3, a slightly higher percentage of households in the north Gaza governorate than in other governorates received assistance. A higher proportion of extremely poor and poor households than those above the poverty line received assistance. In comparison with villagers and refugee camp residents, fewer city dwellers received assistance. Twice the proportion of refugees than non-refugees received assistance during the Israeli military operations and after the ceasefire came into effect.

<sup>15</sup> The survey used in this report started on 25 January 2009.


“86% believe that food aid was the most important type of received assistance both during the Israeli military operations and in the week after the ceasefire took effect”



Photo credits: UNDP/IFAPP/Archive




Figure 3: Reception of assistance by the household during the Israeli operations and after the ceasefire: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, poverty level, place of residence, and refugee status



By far, UN agencies (39%) are considered to be the most important source of the received assistance during the Israeli operations and (in the week) after the ceasefire. They are followed by charities (19%), one of the Arab governments (13%), and other international NGOs (8%).

Figure 4: Most important source of received assistance to the household during the Israeli operations and after the ceasefire



A substantially higher percentage of households in the Deir al-Balah (55%) and Khan Younis (58%) governorates than in the other governorates reported receiving assistance during and after the Israeli military operations from a UN agency. Charities were mentioned by a higher proportion of people in the north Gaza, Gaza city, and Rafah governorates than in the other governorates as the most important source of received assistance. The Gaza government was referred to as the most important source of assistance by a considerably higher percentage of people in the north Gaza and Rafah governorates. In the latter, the Ramallah government was also mentioned most, although it was not mentioned by anyone in several of the other governorates. Assistance from Arab governments seems to have been most concentrated in the Gaza city governorate (28%).

Table 5: Most important source of received assistance to the household during the Israeli operations and after the ceasefire: according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>UN agency</b>	33%	30%	29%	55%	58%
<b>Other international NGO</b>	10%	2%	16%	8%	12%
<b>Local NGO</b>	4%	2%	3%	8%	10%
<b>Charity</b>	24%	22%	21%	16%	8%
<b>Religious institution</b>	0%	7%	2%	5%	4%
<b>Family &amp; friends</b>	4%	7%	5%	2%	2%
<b>The Gaza government</b>	10%	2%	10%	3%	4%
<b>The Ramallah government</b>	3%	0%	9%	0%	0%
<b>One of the Arab governments</b>	13%	28%	5%	3%	2%

UN agencies were most frequently referred to as the most important source of received assistance to the household during the Israeli military operations and immediately after by those in households above the poverty line (57%), villagers (56%), and refugees (48%). Five times the proportion of refugees (10%) than non-refugees (2%) mentioned other international NGOs as their most important source of received assistance. Charities, Arab governments, and family and friends were recorded as the most important sources of assistance among a higher proportion of non-refugees than refugees. One of the Arab governments as the most important source of assistance was mentioned by a significantly higher percentage of extremely poor (14%) and poor (13%) people than by those who are relatively better-off (5%).



Photo credit: UNDP/PAPP Archive


Table 6: Most important source of received assistance to the household during the Israeli operations and after the ceasefire: according to poverty level, place of residence, and refugee status

	Poverty			Place of residence			Refugee Status	
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Refugee	Non-refugee
<b>UN agency</b>	36%	36%	57%	37%	56%	39%	48%	11%
<b>Other international NGO</b>	10%	5%	8%	4%	9%	14%	10%	2%
<b>Local NGO</b>	7%	7%	4%	4%	4%	8%	6%	6%
<b>Charity</b>	16%	24%	14%	20%	20%	19%	18%	24%
<b>Religious institution</b>	4%	3%	4%	6%	0%	3%	2%	7%
<b>Family &amp; friends</b>	6%	6%	2%	6%	2%	3%	2%	13%
<b>The Gaza government</b>	6%	5%	5%	6%	0%	4%	6%	4%
<b>The Ramallah government</b>	2%	2%	0%	1%	0%	2%	1%	2%
<b>An Arab government</b>	14%	13%	5%	15%	9%	8%	6%	32%

#### 4.4 Type of received assistance


Food aid (86%) was the most important type of received assistance both during the Israeli military operations and in the week after the ceasefire took effect. Some 7% of the respondents referred to other types of received assistance than food, in-kind assistance, medical aid, and financial assistance. The phone operators who conducted the survey specified that this other type of assistance mainly consisted of gas for heating or cooking. This was mostly referred to by respondents in the Gaza city governorate, city dwellers, and non-refugees.

Figure 5: Most important type of received assistance



Nearly half of the people, 48%, who received assistance during and immediately after the Israeli military operations slightly depended on this assistance. Another 22% depended to a great extent on the received assistance, and 13% fully relied on it. 18% of the assistance recipients did not at all depend on this received aid. The extent to which recipients of assistance depended on it was very similar across the five governorates of the Gaza Strip.

Figure 6: Extent of dependence on the received assistance



Dependency on received assistance climbs with increased levels of hardship faced by the households. For example, whereas 21% of extremely poor households fully depended on the received assistance and 9% did not rely on it at all, this is the case for respectively 3% and 30% of the households above the poverty line.

The extent of dependency on food was not influenced by the refugee status of the respondents or their place of residence.

Table 7: Extent of dependence on the received assistance: according to poverty level

	Poverty		
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Fully</b>	21%	12%	3%
<b>To a great extent</b>	28%	22%	15%
<b>Slightly</b>	42%	51%	52%
<b>Nothing</b>	9%	15%	30%

### 4.5 Need for assistance


Over 60% of the households in the Gaza Strip nowadays need assistance. This is particularly the case for households in the north Gaza and Deir al-Balah governorates (67%), and slightly more so for households in refugee camps (67%) than those in cities (61%) and villages (64%).



Photo credit: UNDP/PAPP Archive


The poverty status of the household very much influences the need for assistance: whereas 82% of extremely poor households need assistance and 63% of poor households need it, 44% of households above the poverty line are in need of it.

Figure 7: Household need for assistance: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, poverty level, and place of residence



Nowadays, psychosocial aid is the most needed assistance in the 25% of the Gazan households, while it is financial assistance in 17% of the households, and food aid in 16% of them. Employment is the most needed assistance in 9% of the households. Less than one fifth of households in the Gaza Strip, 18%, do not need assistance.

Figure 8: Most important type of assistance needed by the household today



The Gaza city governorate contains the highest proportion of households that are not in need of assistance (21%), and the lowest percentage of households that need food assistance (10%). The need of food assistance seems to be the highest in the Deir al-Balah governorate (24%), while the need for psychosocial assistance is the highest in the north Gaza governorate (30%). The need for in-kind assistance such as clothes and blankets is minimal across all governorates.

Table 8: Most important type of assistance needed by the household today: according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>Food assistance</b>	15%	10%	19%	24%	21%
<b>Financial assistance</b>	17%	17%	20%	17%	18%
<b>Employment assistance</b>	10%	8%	8%	11%	7%
<b>Medical assistance</b>	6%	6%	5%	5%	5%
<b>Housing and re-housing</b>	4%	4%	4%	3%	3%
<b>Psychosocial assistance</b>	30%	27%	24%	22%	23%
<b>In-kind assistance such as clothes, blankets</b>	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%
<b>Education assistance</b>	4%	6%	3%	6%	3%
<b>We do not need assistance</b>	13%	21%	17%	13%	19%

Food, financial, and employment assistance are considered to be the most important types of aid needed in a much higher proportion of extremely poor households than in poor and relatively better-off households. To the opposite, a higher percentage of households above the poverty line (29%) and moderately poor households (26%) than extremely poor households (19%) see psychosocial assistance as the most important type of aid needed by the household. Also, nearly one third of the households above the poverty line, 31%, do not need any type of assistance compared to a mere 7% of the extremely poor households in the Gaza Strip.

Although not portrayed in the below table, a much smaller proportion of camp residents (11%) and, more generally refugees (16%) than villagers (20%), city dwellers (20%), or non-refugees (21%) belong to households that do not need assistance.


Table 9: Most important type of assistance needed by the household today: according to poverty level

	Poverty		
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty
<b>Food assistance</b>	22%	17%	11%
<b>Financial assistance</b>	24%	18%	10%
<b>Employment assistance</b>	13%	6%	6%
<b>Medical assistance</b>	5%	4%	6%
<b>Housing and re-housing</b>	3%	5%	3%
<b>Psychosocial assistance</b>	19%	26%	29%
<b>In-kind assistance such as clothes, blankets</b>	1%	2%	0%
<b>Education assistance</b>	4%	5%	5%
<b>We do not need assistance</b>	7%	17%	31%

More generally, the sector in the Gaza Strip that is considered most in need of assistance is education (28%), followed by housing (15%), the financial sector (14%), public infrastructure (11%), and psychosocial support (10%).

In the Gaza city governorate and in comparison with the other governorates, psychosocial support is seen as the least important sector in need of assistance (6%), while the educational sector is considered to be most in need of assistance (33%).


Figure 9: Sector most in need of assistance today



## 4.6 Food assistance

In times of crises, food assistance is often the first and main type of aid reaching the population. Earlier in this chapter, the results showed that food in the Gaza Strip is seen as both the second most important household and community need. The results further indicated that food consisted 86% of the received aid during and immediately after the recent Israeli military operations. Still, at the time the survey was conducted (in the second week after the ceasefire), 78% of households in the Gaza Strip reportedly relied primarily on their own income for food. At the time, another 8% primarily relied on support from their extended family to obtain food, and 14% primarily relied on relief assistance for food.

Figure 10: The main source of food in the household today



The results on the main source of food were very similar across the five governorates in the Gaza Strip. However, as indicated in table 10, reliance on relief assistance for food is much higher in extremely poor (26%) and poor (13%) households than relatively better-to-do families. There is also a noted higher reliance on relief assistance among refugees (16%) than non-refugees (11%) for the main source of food in the household.


Table 10: The main source of food in the household today: according to poverty level, place of residence, and refugee status

	Poverty			Refugee Status	
	Extremely poor	Below poverty	Above poverty	Refugee	Non-refugee
<b>HH relies primarily on relief assistance for food</b>	26%	13%	3%	16%	11%
<b>HH relies primarily on support from extended family</b>	11%	6%	5%	7%	8%
<b>HH relies primarily on its own income for food</b>	63%	81%	92%	77%	80%

As for the most needed food item in the household, three fourth of the households refer to basic commodities, such as flour, sugar, tea, or rice, while 11% mentioned baby food. For 5% of the households milk and other dairy products are the most needed food item, and for respectively 4% it is either meat and poultry, or fruits and vegetables. Canned food is the least need food item in the household.

The results on the first most needed food item in the household are very similar across the board in the Gaza Strip. The only exception is that extremely poor households more than the moderately poor and the better-to-do families see basic commodities as the first most needed food item, while fewer of the households living in hardship consider fruits and vegetables as the first most needed food item.

Figure 11: The first most needed food item in the household



“25% of the Gazan households believe that psychosocial aid is the most needed assistance”






Photo credit: UNDP/PAAP Archive

# Inside Gaza

## Attitudes and perceptions of the Gaza Strip residents in the aftermath of the Israeli military operations

### CHAPTER FIVE: DAMAGES

# Damages

Ever since the ceasefire, national and international teams have been assessing the damages inflicted to public infrastructure, homes, and businesses in the Gaza Strip.

The results reflected in this chapter modestly try to complement the information gathered on the ground through the *perceptions* of ordinary citizens in the Gaza Strip on several issues, including: (1) the existence of various services in the neighbourhood prior to the Israeli operations, (2) the extent of the damage to those services in the neighbourhood resulting from the Israeli operations, (3) households' access to clean water and electricity since the start of the Israeli operations, (4) damages to residences as a result of the Israeli operations, the type of sustained damaged, and an estimation of the cost, (5) the evolution in households' living conditions since the Israeli military operations.


## 5.1 Existence of several services prior to the Israeli operations versus damage done since the Israeli operations

Before the 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009 Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, respondents reported that the following services were *fully extended* in their neighbourhoods: (1) landlines (85%), (2) solid waste collection (64%), (3) sanitation (62%), (4) paved roads (58%), (5) running water (48%), (6) health services (47%), and (7) electricity (12%). As detailed in figure 1, even if these services were not *fully extended* before the recent flare-up in the conflict, they were largely *partially extended*, and 4% to 11% of services were reportedly *not extended* in the neighbourhoods of the respondents before the war.

The existence of those services does change significantly across the five governorates of the Gaza Strip. Still, more detailed results do show that running water and solid waste collection were least extended to the full in the Gaza city governorate. Also, in villages, full extension of sanitation services and paved roads were least prevalent before the recent Israeli operations. Electricity was more often *fully extended* in cities than in villages and camps.

Reported *full damage* of several services in the respondents' neighbourhood as a result of the recent Israeli military operations in declining order is as follows: (1) landlines (49%), (2) sanitation services (36%), (3) paved roads (24%), (4) solid waste collection (23%), (5) running water (22%), (6) health services (18%), and (7) electricity (8%). The perceived percentages of these services that were not at all damaged in the neighbourhoods of the Gaza Strip vary from 12% to 27%, and are detailed in figure 1.

Figure 1: Existence of several services prior to the Israeli operations, and inflicted damage to these services during the Israeli operations



The results in table 1 detail, from the respondents' perspectives on the damages to services in their neighbourhoods, that the services under study, with the exception of landlines, most often escaped damage as a result of the Israeli military operations in the Gaza city governorate.



Table 1: Extent of damages inflicted on several services during the Israeli operations: according to governorate


		Governorate				
		North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
Running water	Fully damaged	25%	16%	28%	25%	22%
	Partially damaged	50%	44%	55%	57%	61%
	Not damaged	25%	40%	17%	18%	16%
Solid waste collection	Fully damaged	20%	15%	31%	28%	29%
	Partially damaged	34%	35%	38%	39%	45%
	Not damaged	46%	50%	31%	33%	27%
Electricity	Fully damaged	4%	8%	13%	6%	7%
	Partially damaged	59%	44%	65%	73%	67%
	Not damaged	37%	48%	22%	20%	26%
Paved roads	Fully damaged	19%	18%	33%	36%	27%
	Partially damaged	48%	40%	44%	41%	46%
	Not damaged	34%	42%	22%	22%	27%
Sanitation services	Fully damaged	36%	32%	45%	46%	31%
	Partially damaged	42%	40%	39%	36%	49%
	Not damaged	22%	28%	16%	18%	19%
Health services	Fully damaged	13%	16%	26%	20%	20%
	Partially damaged	65%	54%	62%	62%	62%
	Not damaged	21%	31%	13%	18%	17%
Phone-lines	Fully damaged	46%	47%	52%	52%	49%
	Partially damaged	43%	39%	36%	32%	41%
	Not damaged	11%	14%	12%	16%	10%

In the households, access to clean water and electricity were difficult during the Israeli military operations. Only 24% and 6%, respectively, did not have any disruptions in the water and electricity supply. More than 60% of households in the Gaza Strip had disruptions in the water supply for a few days, while this was the case for 83% of the households in terms of electricity. In the second week after the ceasefire took effect,<sup>16</sup> 10% of households still did not have access to clean water and electricity.

"More than 83% of households in the Gaza Strip had disruptions in the electricity for a few days"

<sup>16</sup> The results reflect the situation in terms of household access to water and electricity at the time when the survey was conducted (from 25 January to 1 February 2009).

Figure 2: Household access to clean water and electricity since the start of the Israeli operations<sup>17</sup>



Households in the Gaza city governorate suffered most from disruptions to the water supply, while this was the least the case in homes in the Rafah governorate. At the time the survey was conducted, the highest percentage of households that still had no access to water was recorded in the Gaza city governorate (13%).

A higher proportion of villagers in the Gaza Strip (38%) than people residing in refugee camps (28%) and cities (22%) reported that since the start of the Israeli military operations they had no disruptions to their water supply.

Table 2: Household access to clean water since the start of the Israeli operations: according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>No disruptions to the water supply</b>	27%	13%	35%	31%	29%
<b>Disruptions in water supply for a few days</b>	62%	72%	54%	56%	59%
<b>We still do not have any water</b>	10%	13%	6%	7%	9%
<b>Other</b>	1%	2%	5%	6%	4%

The highest percentage of households that reported no disruptions to their electricity supply since the start of the Israeli military operations are located in the Rafah governorate (13%). The north Gaza governorate contains the highest percentage of households (18%) that still had no electricity at the time the survey was conducted.

17 The results in the figure show that a small percentage of respondents chose to answer "other". The interviewers conducting the survey explained that the respondents opting for "other" with regard to access to clean water specified that they had used bottled water, while the respondents opting for "other" in terms of access to electricity had explained that their household had a generator.

Table 3: Household access to electricity since the start of the Israeli operations: according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
No disruptions to the electricity supply	3%	5%	13%	6%	5%
Disruptions in electricity supply for few days	78%	84%	80%	87%	85%
We still do not have any electricity	18%	10%	6%	6%	9%
Other	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%


## 5.2 Damage to residences resulting from the Israeli operations

Nearly half of the households across the Gaza Strip, 45%, reported damages to their residences as a result of the recent Israeli military operations.

The reported residential damages are the highest in the north Gaza governorate (61%). In the Deir al-Balah (23%) and Khan Younis (27%) governorates a significantly lower percentage of residences were damaged as a result of the recent Israeli military operations.

A higher percentage of extremely poor (50%) than poor (42%) and relatively financially better-off (40%) reported that their residences had been damaged.


Figure 3: Residential damages resulting from Israeli operations: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate and poverty level



The majority of people with damaged residences reported that they have shattered windows (67%) as a result of the recent Israeli military operations; 16% reported damage from bullets or artillery shells; and 12% reported that the main structure of their residence had been damaged. Three percent mentioned that their homes had collapsed.<sup>18</sup>

18 A note of caution is required when looking at the results on collapsed houses. As the survey was conducted over the phone using landlines, the likelihood of reaching severely damaged houses was lower.

Figure 4: Type of inflicted residential damages resulting from Israeli operations, and the perceived cost



The lowest percentage of residences with damage to the main structure was recorded in the Gaza governorate (7%). Reported damage to houses from bullets or artillery shells is much higher in the Gaza city (22%) and north Gaza (16%) governorates than in the other governorates (7% to 9%). There are more accounts of residences with shattered windows in the Deir al-Balah (76%) and Rafah (73%) governorates than in the other governorates.

The highest percentage of reported damage to the main structure of the house was in villages (25%). Reported damage to houses from bullets or shells is higher in cities (18%) than in refugee camps (13%) and villages (6%).

Table 4: Type of the inflicted residential damages: according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
Shattered windows in the residence	67%	65%	73%	76%	69%
Damage from bullets or artillery shells in the residence	16%	22%	8%	9%	7%
No electricity in the residence	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
No water in the residence	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%
Main structure of the house is damaged	13%	7%	15%	13%	20%
Damaged furniture and appliances in the residence	0%	2%	1%	0%	0%
Collapsed residence	4%	4%	3%	0%	4%

The average estimated cost to fix the damage in the residences in the Gaza Strip is NIS 4,759 or about US\$ 1,189. These are average costs based on the estimations and perceptions of the respondents residing in a damaged house. Therefore, these results should only be used as an indication, not as fact.

When looking at the estimated value of the damage to residences according to the governorate respondents live in, estimated costs are markedly higher in the north Gaza (NIS 6,888), Gaza city (NIS 5,820), and Rafah (NIS 5,506) governorates than in the Khan Younis (NIS 2,097) and Deir al-Balah (NIS 1,226) governorates. The estimated value of damages on houses is slightly lower in villages (NIS 4,040) than in cities (NIS 4,946) and refugee camps (NIS 5,249).

*Table 5: Estimated value of the damage in your residence: according to governorate, place of residence, and refugee status*


			Estimated value on the damage in your residence in NIS
<b>Governorate</b>	<b>North Gaza</b>	<b>Mean</b>	6888
	<b>Gaza</b>	<b>Mean</b>	5820
	<b>Rafah</b>	<b>Mean</b>	5506
	<b>Deir al-Balah</b>	<b>Mean</b>	1226
	<b>Khan Younis</b>	<b>Mean</b>	2097
<b>Place of residence</b>	<b>City</b>	<b>Mean</b>	4946
	<b>Village</b>	<b>Mean</b>	4040
	<b>Refugee Camp</b>	<b>Mean</b>	5249
<b>Total</b>		<b>Mean</b>	4759

### 5.3 Household living conditions

Damages to infrastructure and services in the neighbourhood and damage to residences negatively impacted households' living conditions. In comparison to before the most recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, 52% describe their living conditions nowadays as worse, and about one third do not think that their living conditions changed.

The perceptions on the evolution of living conditions since the Israeli military operations are very similar across the five governorates in the Gaza Strip. A higher percentage of people in cities and refugee camps (respectively 53%) than in villages (41%) feel that their living conditions have deteriorated. This is also the case among a higher proportion of very poor (63%) and poor (55%) households than among those above the poverty line (41%).

*Figure 5: Description of the household's current living conditions in comparison to before the Israeli military operations: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to poverty level and place of residence*






# Inside Gaza

Attitudes and perceptions of the Gaza Strip residents in the aftermath of the Israeli military operations

## CHAPTER SIX: YOUTH AND CHILDREN



# Youth and children

More than half the population in the Gaza Strip is below the age of 18. As the youth and children of today will be the drivers of Palestinian society in the future, they are an important group that cannot be ignored in any analysis in the aftermath of the 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009 conflict in the Gaza Strip.


This chapter will highlight the needs of children in the household, and compare the manifestation of several signs of stress before and after the recent Israeli military operations. It will also examine whether or not there are many children in the Gaza Strip who face violence, and compare the sources of violence before and after the recent conflict. This chapter will also present results on the ability of parents to meet the needs of children for care and protection, and the adult need for psychosocial support as the well-being of children and youth are highly influenced by the well-being and care of adults in their environment.

## 6.1 Needs

Psychosocial support is by far the most important need for children nowadays, 49%. Another 29% see regular attendance of school by children in the household as their most important need, and 15% believe that safe opportunities for the children to play with friends is the most important need. Respectively 4% and 2% consider the improved quality and quantity of the children’s food intake as the most important need.

There is a broad consensus across all subgroups in the Gaza Strip in terms of the perceptions on the needs of children in the household, and the high importance attached to the need of children to receive psychosocial support in the aftermath of the recent Israeli military operations.

Figure 1: The most important need of the children in the household




## 6.2 Signs of stress in children

Common signs of stress in children, such as anxiety, aggressive behaviour, lack of interest in socializing, bedwetting, and nightmares have tripled and in some cases quadrupled since the recent Israeli military operations.

As detailed in figure 2, whereas in the year prior to 27 December 2008, 21% of the children felt anxious, this is now the case for 88% of them. In the same time-frame, perceived aggressive behaviour in children increased from 20% to 65%, lack of interest in socializing from 19% to 58%, and bedwetting from 20% to 64%. While in the year prior to the recent Israeli military operations, one fifth of households in the Gaza Strip had children with regular nightmares, this is the case for 75% of households post December 2008.

Figure 2: Signs of stress in children: In the year prior to the Israeli military operations versus since the Israeli military operations



Prior to the Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, more children in refugee households and those in refugee camps manifested signs of stress. The proportion of households in the Khan Younis governorate with children suffering from any of the five signs of stress under study was the lowest among all governorates in the Gaza Strip pre December 2008.

Table 1: Signs of stress in children in the year prior to the Israeli military operations: according to refugee status, place of residence, and governorate

	Refugee status		Place of residence			Governorate				
	Refugee	Non-refugee	City	Village	Refugee Camp	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>Anxiety</b>	23%	19%	21%	21%	24%	25%	23%	26%	22%	10%
<b>Aggressive behaviour</b>	22%	17%	20%	18%	22%	23%	23%	27%	20%	5%
<b>No interest in socializing</b>	20%	17%	19%	17%	21%	22%	23%	25%	17%	2%
<b>Bedwetting</b>	21%	17%	20%	16%	22%	24%	23%	27%	15%	3%
<b>Nightmares</b>	22%	17%	20%	17%	23%	23%	24%	27%	17%	3%

Signs of stress in children since the most recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip skyrocketed, but more so in some locations than others. For example, all five signs of stress in children nowadays are more prevalent in households in cities than those in villages and refugee camps. In addition, children behaving aggressively, having no interest in socializing, bedwetting, and suffering from nightmares are most often reported about in households in the Gaza city and Rafah governorates.

“49% see that psychosocial support is by far the most important need for children nowadays”


Table 2: Signs of stress in children since the Israeli military operations: according to place of residence, and governorate

	Place of residence			Governorate				
	City	Village	Refugee Camp	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>Anxiety</b>	91%	82%	84%	69%	93%	95%	95%	92%
<b>Aggressive behaviour</b>	69%	54%	56%	39%	82%	86%	60%	52%
<b>No interest in socializing</b>	64%	47%	45%	29%	78%	83%	53%	41%
<b>Bedwetting</b>	67%	52%	57%	44%	80%	87%	53%	52%
<b>Nightmares</b>	78%	66%	69%	56%	85%	89%	74%	70%

### 6.3 Violence against children


Of the respondents, 40% see violence against children in their environment. Exposure of children to violence is the highest in the north Gaza governorate (45%) and in refugee camps (45%). Also, a slightly higher percentage of people in households above the poverty line (43%) than those in poor (41%) and extremely poor households (38%) perceive that there is violence against the children around them.

Figure 3: Presence of violence against children in your environment: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, poverty level, and place of residence



A comparative look at the main source of violence against children prior to the Israeli military operations and since these operations is telling. In the year running up to the most recent Israeli military operations, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (41%) and the lack of internal security (37%) in the Gaza Strip were viewed as the main two sources of violence against children. Nowadays, 71% consider the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be the main source of violence against children in the Gaza Strip, and 17% continue to see the lack of internal security as the main source of violence. Also, violence from relatives within the household and from teachers against children were perceived more often as the main sources of violence against children prior rather than since the Israeli military operations.

Figure 4: The main source of violence against the children: in the past four weeks versus in the year prior to the Israeli military operations



There were no noteworthy differences in the perceptions on the main source of violence against children across the five governorates or across the other subgroups of society in the Gaza Strip, with the exception of perceptions on the issue according to people’s place of residence. As detailed in the table below, both before and since the most recent Israeli military operations, villagers more so than camp and city residents consider the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as the main source of violence against children, and significantly less so the lack of internal security in the Gaza Strip.

Table 3: The main source of violence against the children: in the past four weeks versus in the year prior to the Israeli military operations: according to place of residence


	During and since the Israeli military operations			In the year prior to the Israeli operations		
	Place of residence			Place of residence		
	City	Village	Refugee Camp	City	Village	Refugee Camp
<b>Teachers</b>	2%	2%	2%	5%	3%	8%
<b>Friends</b>	2%	3%	5%	1%	0%	6%
<b>Relatives within the household</b>	5%	3%	3%	8%	6%	8%
<b>The Palestinian-Israeli conflict</b>	72%	81%	68%	41%	60%	36%
<b>Lack of internal security</b>	17%	8%	18%	40%	26%	35%
<b>Others</b>	2%	2%	4%	4%	5%	6%

## 6.4 Parents’ ability to meet the needs of children for care and protection

The inability of parents to meet the needs of children for care and protection has more than doubled since the Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. Whereas in the year prior to 27 December 2007, 74% of households could meet the needs of children for care and protection, this is the case for 36% nowadays. These results not only highlight the difficult plight of adults in the households, but also point to a large number of children in the Gaza Strip that are vulnerable nowadays as their needs for care and protection seem unmet.

The decline in the ability of parents to meet the needs of the children is evenly spread across all subgroups of society in the Gaza Strip. There is not one group of households that seems to be better placed than others to care for the needs of children for care and protection.


Figure 5: The ability of households to meet the needs of children for care and protection: Comparison since the Israeli military operations versus in the year prior to the Israeli military operations



### 6.5 Adult need for psychosocial support

In only 18% of Gazan households there is no need for psychosocial support to adults. In 65% of the households most adults need psychosocial support, and in another 18% some adults need it.

Figure 6: Need among adult members in the household for psychosocial support



Although the results show that psychosocial support to adults in the Gaza Strip is very much needed, the least need for such support can be found in households in the Rafah governorate, where in 23% of the households no adults need psychosocial support.

As detailed in the table below, not only do a higher percentage of women than men believe that there is a need for psychosocial support to adults in the household, but they also more so than men consider that this support is needed for most adults in the household.

Table 4: Need among adult members in the household for psychosocial support: according to governorate, and sex of the respondent

	Governorate					Sex of the respondent	
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis	Male	Female
Yes, most adults need	65%	66%	63%	66%	67%	61%	69%
Yes, some need	20%	17%	18%	18%	10%	17%	16%
No, none need	15%	17%	18%	16%	23%	22%	14%

Family is the preferred option to receive psychosocial support (35%). Community centres would be the preferred venue to access needed psychosocial support in 27% of the households, followed by a health centre (17%), the mosque (8%), and friends (7%).

A higher percentage of men than women would prefer to access needed psychosocial support in a community centre (30% versus 24%) or a health centre (19% versus 15%). A higher percentage of women (40%) than men (29%) would prefer to receive psychosocial help from family members.

Figure 7: Preferred venue of adult members to access the needed psychosocial support






Photo credit: UNDP/PAPP Archive




Photo credit: UNDP/PAAP Archive

# Inside Gaza

Attitudes and perceptions  
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## CHAPTER SEVEN: HEALTH




# Health

In the aftermath of any conflict it is important to capture health-related issues. Therefore, this chapter will concentrate on the experiences of Gazans in terms of health during the 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009 crisis. More specifically, this chapter will shed some light on: (1) health problems, injuries, and deaths during the military operations, (2) need for care and access to medical care when needed, and (3) sources of primary health care when needed during the conflict. In addition, this chapter will have a section that deals with the issue of disability as people with disabilities constitute a vulnerable group that should not be overlooked when focussing on the recovery and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

## 7.1 Health problems, injuries, and deaths in the family during the Israeli military operations

More than one third of households in the Gaza Strip, 37%, faced illness or health problems during the recent Israeli military operations. This was more the case in extremely poor (42%) and poor (39%) households than in households with an average monthly income above the poverty line (28%). There was a higher frequency of health problems in households in refugee camps (40%) than in those in cities (34%) and villages (34%).

Figure 1: Occurrence of illness and other health problems in the household during the Israeli military operations




Of the respondents, 11% reported that someone in their family had been injured and 8% reported a death in the family during the recent Israeli military incursions<sup>19</sup>

There were no major differences across the various subgroups in the Gaza Strip on the issue of injuries and deaths in the family during the Israeli military operations. Still, as an indication, a higher percentage of respondents in the north Gaza (14%) and Gaza (16%) governorates than in the Rafah (6%), Deir al-Balah (6%), and Khan Younis governorates mentioned injuries in their families during the 27 December – 18 January period.

19 In this respect, it is important to note that these percentages are only meant to be indicative as “family” does not merely refer to the “household”, but also goes beyond that to include “extended family”. According to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, 1,380 Palestinians were killed and over 5,380 were injured during the recent Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.


Figure 2: Injuries and deaths in the family during the Israeli military operations



## 7.2 Need for primary health care and provider of such care during the Israeli military operations


During the recent Israeli military incursions into the Gaza Strip, 37% of households were in need of primary health care. Comparatively, a higher proportion of households in the north Gaza governorate (47%) than in other governorates (34% to 36%) needed primary health care during this period. Also, a higher percentage of extremely poor (42%) and poor (38%) households than those who are financially relatively better-off (35%) were in need of primary health care during the recent Israeli military operations. Households in refugee camps (46%) more so than those in cities (35%) and villages (34%) were in need of such care.

Figure 3: Need for primary health care during the last Israeli military operations: Overall in the Gaza Strip, and according to governorate, poverty level, and place of residence



More than one fourth of the households in the Gaza Strip in need of primary health care during the Israeli military operations could not access these services. Of those who could access such care, 39% received it in a hospital, 30% in an UNRWA clinic, and 18% from a neighbourhood doctor. Some 10% received assistance from a health professional over the phone.

Figure 4: Source of primary health care during the last military operations



The proportions of households across the Gaza Strip that could not access the needed primary health care are quite evenly divided among the subgroups under study. Of all of them, the lowest percentage that could not access these services when in need was recorded in the Khan Younis governorate (16%).

The results in table 1 exclude those households that needed primary health care in the recent Israeli military operations, but could not access this care. As such, the analysis only includes those households that were actually provided the needed primary health care during the conflict.

Primary health care to households who needed it in the Rafah governorate was mostly provided in a hospital (52%). In the other governorates this percentage was considerably lower (31% to 43%). A higher proportion of households in the Deir al-Balah governorate (44%) than in the other governorates (25% to 31%) received the needed primary health care during the Israeli military operations from an UNRWA clinic. Neighbourhood doctors were mostly called upon by households needing primary health care in the Gaza city governorate (24%). This is also the case for the proportion of households who received assistance from a health professional over the phone (18%).



Photo credit: UNDP/PAPP Archive

Villagers more so than camp and city residents received the needed primary health care during the Israeli December-January incursion in a hospital or from a neighbourhood doctor. The highest percentage of advice from a health professional over the phone in terms of primary health care was received by households in cities (15%). Refugee camp residents (35%) more so than city dwellers (29%) and villagers (19%), received the necessary primary health care in an UNRWA clinic. The same holds true for refugee households (33%) in comparison to non-refugee households (25%). The latter (25%) more so than refugee households (15%) were helped out by a neighbourhood doctor in the delivery of primary health care during the Israeli military operations.

Table 1: Source of primary health care during the last Israeli military operations: according to governorate, place of residence, and refugee status

	Governorate					Place of residence			Refugee Status	
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis	City	Village	Refugee Camp	Refugee	Non-refugee
<b>Hospital</b>	40%	31%	43%	32%	52%	37%	54%	40%	41%	38%
<b>UNRWA clinic</b>	31%	27%	29%	44%	25%	29%	19%	35%	33%	25%
<b>Neighborhood doctor</b>	17%	24%	17%	10%	18%	19%	22%	16%	15%	25%
<b>Received professional assistance over the phone</b>	12%	18%	11%	14%	5%	15%	5%	10%	11%	13%

### 7.3 Obstacles in accessing medical care

Of those needing medical care, including primary health care, during the Israeli military operations, 72% faced problems as a mere 18% had care provided to them without delays or restrictions. For more than one third, 34%, it was too insecure to access medical care, and one fifth received the needed care with a delay. As detailed in the figure below, 28% were denied the medical care that was needed in the household.

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Figure 5: During the Israeli military operations, if your household needed medical care, including primary health care, was the service denied, restricted or not at all?



The rate of denied medical care was the highest in the Gaza city governorate (36%). Least cases of delayed medical care (15%) and of too much danger to access the required medical assistance (31%) were recorded in the Rafah governorate. In contrast, this governorate includes the highest proportion of households that accessed required medical care without delay or restriction.

Table 2: During the Israeli military operations, if your household needed medical care, including primary health care, was the service denied, restricted or not at all?, according to governorate

	Governorate				
	North Gaza	Gaza	Rafah	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis
<b>It was denied</b>	27%	36%	27%	21%	22%
<b>There was a delay</b>	21%	17%	15%	22%	25%
<b>It was too insecure to access medical assistance</b>	34%	33%	31%	37%	33%
<b>Medical care was provided without delay or restriction</b>	18%	14%	27%	20%	21%


There were no significant differences between the other subgroups under study in terms of the rate of households that faced obstruction in accessing needed medical care during the recent Israeli military operations.

## 7.4 Disabilities in focus<sup>20</sup>

Households with disabled persons are more vulnerable than most in the best of times, let alone after the recent three week military crisis. The questions about disabilities that were included in the survey were not meant to be exhaustive. Rather they aimed to bring attention to this vulnerable group in society, introduce some up-to-date information about disabilities, and encourage further in-depth assessments and profiling that could help in targeting interventions towards them in the future.

According to the survey results, 14% of households in the Gaza Strip include at least one disabled member. As illustrated in the figure below, of the 14 % of households, 77% include one disabled member, 15% include two disabled persons, and 7% have three or more disabled persons.


Figure 6: Number of disabled household members



When households were asked about the type of disability of the most severely disabled person in the household, 65% specified that this disabled person was physically impaired, 25% referred to mental impairment, 5% to visual impairment, and another 5% to frail elderly.


20 As the number of households with disabled persons in the total sample of the survey was limited, the results will not be broken down according to different independent variables (such as governorate, place of residence, and refugee status) in order to avoid presenting an analysis on disabilities in the Gaza Strip with large margins of error.

Figure 7: Type of impairment of the most severely disabled household member<sup>21</sup>




The most reported reason for impairment of the most severely disabled household member is impairment since birth (53%). Another 17% were disabled after an accident, 14% by old age, and 16% of the mentioned disabilities were conflict-related. Of the 16% of respondents who specified that the impairment of the most severely disabled person in the household was caused by conflict, 15% were related to the recent three week Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, and the other 85% were related to previous conflicts.

Figure 8: The reason behind the impairment of the most severely disabled household member



In terms of received support to help care for the disabled household member, 43% received psychosocial support, 14% received financial support, and 3% received support in having a disabled-adapted living space. Nearly one third of the household with a disabled person, 33%, only received help to care for that family member from the family, while 5% received no support at all.


Figure 9: Type of received support to help the household care for the disabled family member



21 As the questions on disabilities were only a small part of a large questionnaire that was meant to provide baseline information after the three week Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, respondents in households with disabled persons were only asked specific questions about the most severely disabled household member. Therefore, the results on disabilities provide indications, but do not provide the complete picture.


The reported types of help that households with disabled persons need to assist them are numerous, and detailed in the figure below. The most frequently mentioned types of assistance in declining order of importance are: (1) rehabilitation and mobility skills (22%), (2) financial assistance (20%), (3) aids, devices, and technologies (17%), (4) adapted employment for disabled persons (11%), (5) access to education for those with special needs (9%), and (6) psychosocial support (6%).

Figure 10: Type of help needed to assist the household care for the disabled family member



Forward looking into the reconstruction period of the Gaza Strip and beyond the needs within the household parameters towards public infrastructure, the majority of the respondents in households with disabled persons (63%) believe that investing in the health sector, particularly in terms of rehabilitation and special care would mostly benefit people living with disabilities. Another 28% consider the elimination of obstacles and barriers in public infrastructure as the most beneficial intervention to assist disabled persons during the reconstruction period. The options of transport, and adapted information and communication technologies were mentioned by fewer respondents as important changes that could assist disabled people.

Figure 11: In the reconstruction period, what changes to public infrastructure would most assist people living with disabilities?







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