

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

*Official Records**



SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
47th meeting
held on
Wednesday, 7 December 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 47th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. STARČEVIĆ (Yugoslavia)
later: Mr. RODRIGUEZ MEDINA (Colombia)

CONTENTS

AGENDA ITEM 69: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 75: ISRAEL'S DECISION TO BUILD A CANAL LINKING THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA TO THE DEAD SEA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 71: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (continued)

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/SPC/38/SR.47
16 December 1983
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

14 p.

The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 69: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/SPC/38/L.35)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.35, which had been introduced by the representative of the Sudan at the 41st meeting of the Committee. Bangladesh had become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

2. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to proceed to a vote on the draft resolution.

3. It was so decided.

4. Mr. LEVIN (Israel), explaining his vote before the vote, said that Ziad Abu Eain was a terrorist who had been accused of planting a bomb which had killed two adolescents and wounded 36 passers-by in a Tiberias market-place on 14 May 1979. His case was now within the competence of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Israeli authorities. In addition to the 4,500 detainees whom it had released on the night of 23 November 1983, Israel had also released the condemned prisoners whose names had been on the ICRC list at Ben Gurion airport and had permitted their transfer to Algiers.

5. Mr. ABDALLA (Sudan), speaking on a point of order, said that the voting procedure had begun and that statements were therefore out of place.

6. The CHAIRMAN requested the representative of Israel to limit his remarks to the explanation of his delegation's vote.

7. Mr. LEVIN (Israel) said that his delegation would vote against the draft resolution because the Israeli Government felt that its release, in exchange for six Israeli prisoners, of more than 4,500 prisoners, not counting the condemned criminals whose names had been on the list given to ICRC at Ben Gurion airport, was sufficient proof that it had honoured the agreement reached with ICRC. Any further contacts and discussions should take place outside the Special Political Committee, which might be used by some as a forum for propaganda, which could only have an adverse impact on the contacts being made between ICRC and the Israeli Government. His delegation felt it necessary to remind the Committee of the nature of the individuals who were now demanding the release of a criminal, while other members of his organization had, on 6 December 1983, engaged in an act of indescribable cruelty which had caused the death of four people and wounded 46 others, 28 seriously, in an attack on a bus in Jerusalem. That was the true face of terror. His delegation would therefore vote against draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.35.

8. Mr. DAVIS (United States of America) said that the information provided by the observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization was diametrically opposed to that furnished by the representative of Israel. In order to take a position on the

(Mr. Davis, United States)

question, the Committee needed an independent statement, giving all the necessary details, from ICRC. Without such information, members of the Committee could not make a considered judgement on the matter. The United States would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

9. Mr. MANSOUR (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) said that that very day he had received a communiqué from ICRC indicating that the name of Ziad Abu Eain had been on the list of people who were to have been released under the agreement on the exchange of prisoners signed by the PLO and Israel. He would make that communiqué available to members of the Committee.

10. Mr. DAVIS (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that the observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization could not speak at that stage of the proceedings, because he was not participating in the vote.

11. The CHAIRMAN said he had thought it wise to give the floor to the observer for the PLO because his statement might help to clarify the point raised by the United States representative.

12. Mr. MANSOUR (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) said that as soon as he had finished his statement, he would hand over to the Chairman the document provided by the representative of ICRC which affirmed that the name of Ziad Abu Eain had been on the ICRC list. Furthermore, Reuters had revealed that The Jerusalem Post of 7 December 1983 had cited numerous sources which had been involved in the negotiations on the exchange of prisoners and which all confirmed that the name of Abu Eain had been on the list of prisoners.

13. Mr. LEVIN (Israel) said that the observer for the PLO had referred only to information from the press but that there had been several lists of prisoners.

14. Mr. ABDALLA (Sudan), speaking on a point of order, said that the Committee was ready to vote and that he did not understand why Israel was being allowed to make a second statement.

15. The CHAIRMAN requested the representative of Israel to finish his statement quickly.

16. Mr. LEVIN (Israel) said that there had been confusion between the lists. The definitive list was the one drawn up by ICRC, and the name of Abu Eain was not included on it among the names of prisoners released and transferred to Algiers.

17. The CHAIRMAN read out the following portion of the communication from ICRC provided by the observer for the PLO:

"After ICRC had checked the lists of prisoners who had embarked at Tel Aviv and landed at Algiers, it became clear that the above-mentioned prisoner had not been released, although his name was on the list of prisoners to be released approved by the State of Israel. Efforts are being made to find a solution to this problem and to clarify other individual cases."

18. At the request of Mr. Davis (United States of America), the Committee decided to reproduce the communication from ICRC provided by the observer for the PLO in extenso.

19. The text of the communication from ICRC reads:

"LF/1

NEW YORK

213

GENEVA - OP/MO

7 December 1983

MCX/LF-AO/CTT

Attn: Harald Schmid de Grúneck

Enclosed please find the text which our spokesman has been instructed to read to journalists seeking information on the case of Abu Eain.

Quote

Immediately after the release of Israeli prisoners held by the PLO and of the prisoners held by the State of Israel, ICRC was contacted by the PLO because Ziad Mohamed Abu Eain had apparently not been released.

After ICRC had checked the lists of prisoners who had embarked at Tel Aviv and landed at Algiers, it became clear that the above-mentioned prisoner had not been released, although his name was on the list of prisoners to be released approved by the State of Israel.

Afforts are being made to find a solution to this problem and to clarify other individual cases.

Unquote

Regards, Michel Cagneux

LF/2".

20. Mr. LEVIN (Israel) pointed out that the cable just read out by the Chairman did not say if it concerned the final list of prisoners to be freed.

21. The CHAIRMAN said he understood that the Committee wished to vote on draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.35.

22. A recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.35.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, China,

Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Canada, Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay.

23. Draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.35 was adopted by 75 votes to 3, with 30 abstentions.

24. Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation did not question the humanitarian considerations which had inspired the sponsors of the draft resolution. However, it felt obliged to note that the draft resolution which had just been adopted did not fall within the terms of reference of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. Since Sri Lanka was a member of the Special Committee, its vote would have a bearing on the work of the Committee and, in the longer term, on the human rights and interests of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. That was why his delegation had abstained.

25. Mr. ALMOSLECHNER (Austria) said that he wished to state his country's special interest in the exchange of prisoners in question. The Austrian Government regretted that Ziad Abu Eain had not been freed and hoped that it was simply a mistake. Austria requested Israel to free him as soon as possible, in accordance with the agreements reached.

26. Mr. ARTAN (Somalia) said that, had he been present at the time of the vote, he would have voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.35.

27. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had completed its consideration of agenda item 69.

AGENDA ITEM 75: ISRAEL'S DECISION TO BUILD A CANAL LINKING THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA TO THE DEAD SEA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/38/502 and Add.1; A/SPC/38/L.45, L.47)

28. Mr. GREGORIADES (Greece), speaking on behalf of the States members of the European Economic Community (EEC), said that the Ten welcomed the Secretary-General's report on the question (A/38/502) because it was a valuable study carried out by a group of experts. Israel's project raised not only human, ecological and economic problems but also legal and political problems. From the point of view of international law - and especially the provisions of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 - the occupant could exercise only a temporary right to administer the territory which it occupied and could make no changes in that territory beyond those necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation. The construction of the projected waterway could in no way be considered a purely administrative act. Moreover, Jordan, which was a riparian State, objected to those changes which would affect its interests. The Ten therefore considered that the execution of the project would not only be illegal but would also constitute a serious obstacle to progress towards a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace settlement, and they requested the Israeli Government to re-examine the project and not to pursue it in the present circumstances.

29. Mr. AL-FARSI (Oman) said that his delegation had studied the report of the Secretary-General (A/38/502) very carefully and paid tribute to the Secretary-General and to the group of experts which had contributed to its drafting.

30. The international community was now aware of the various aspects of the Israeli project and the dangers it presented both for the occupied Palestinian territories and for neighbouring Jordan. Oman could not but express its deep concern at that situation. By preventing the group of experts from visiting the site of the project, on the futile pretext that that visit might be unproductive (A/38/502, para. 10), Israel was flaunting its contempt for the resolutions of the United Nations, as well as for international public opinion. It also revealed its true intentions, which were to pursue its policy of aggression and expansion in the region. Jordan, on the other hand, had adopted a completely different attitude by giving the experts full co-operation and supplying the information they needed to establish the report.

31. With regard to the legal dimensions of the question, Oman fully endorsed the opinions expressed in chapter II of the report, namely that in the light of international instruments and in particular the Hague Convention of 1907, Israel had no right to dig a canal in the occupied territories. Also, as stated in paragraph 3 of the report, the proposed operations were not to be carried out solely in Israeli territory and would have effects in territory not belonging to Israel. Israel had no right to carry out a project which would affect the Dead Sea, only a quarter of which bordered its territory.

32. In addition to the legal aspects, the project might have considerable political, economic and military consequences for the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jordan and might seriously compromise the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

(Mr. Al-Farsi, Oman)

33. The report clearly showed the adverse effects the project might have on the Jordanian economy. It had been shown in particular that a rise in the level of the Dead Sea would lead to flooding of historical sites and vital industrial projects such as the potash production factory.

34. The project therefore revealed Israel's true intentions, which were to continue to occupy the Palestinian territories as well as the other Arab territories and to pursue its policy of fait accompli. His delegation therefore wondered what the international community was waiting for before imposing mandatory sanctions on a country which did nothing but flout international opinion. Oman was convinced that so long as nothing was done to put an end to Israeli arrogance, there would be no stability in the Middle East region.

35. Mr. AL-QAYSI (Iraq) said that, as his delegation had pointed out at the preceding session of the General Assembly, the Israeli project should be placed in its true context, which was a political one. The project had its origins in the Zionist schemes for the total colonization of Palestine and the Arab territories as a step towards establishing a Greater Israel stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, which could not be achieved without a total grip on the natural and human resources of Palestine and the other Arab territories. That had been Israel's aim when it had launched the war of waters, as the representative of Jordan had reminded the Committee at a preceding meeting.

36. His delegation had studied the report of the Secretary-General (A/58/502) with great interest. That report had been prepared in response to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 37/122, which had requested the Secretary-General to monitor and assess, on a continuing basis, all aspects of the effects of constructing a canal linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea. It could therefore safely be assumed that the report before the Committee was only a first step in that process. That idea also seemed to underlie the thinking in paragraph 1 of annex to the Secretary-General's report, which said that the mission of experts believed that the results of the investigations undertaken by it did help to shed light on the nature, magnitude and significance of several potential impacts of the Israeli projects and indicated more clearly the kinds of studies that needed to be carried out if a full appreciation of such consequences was to be attained. Much, therefore, still had to be done to complete the assessment of the possible consequences of the project. Iraq thought it important to make those comments in the light of the inconclusive character of some of the findings of the report, especially paragraphs 32, 46, 49 and 53.

37. In connection with the legal dimensions of the issue dealt with in chapter II of the report, Iraq had no comments on subsection A, which it considered adequate. Subsection B, however, seemed to have been based on the legal rules derived from the application of the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. It had to be remembered that the standard of "appreciable" damage resulting from the application of that principle involved both quantitative and qualitative aspects. The report indicated that that principle was applicable to international watercourse systems, but it should not be forgotten that the Israeli canal project amounted to the artificial creation of a watercourse system, and that made the requirement concerning the consent of adversely affected States of crucial importance.

(Mr. Al-Qaysi, Iraq)

38. In regard to the conclusions of the experts contained in chapter III of the report, his delegation welcomed the conclusions contained in paragraphs 51 and 52. The observation in paragraph 54 was of a political nature, and it was to be regretted that the experts had not emphasized the illegality of the project instead of expressing vague hopes.

39. Mr. LEVIN (Israel) reminded the Special Political Committee that it was discussing the question of the Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal project for the third time and that, as was usually the case with such subjects, the representatives of the Arab States were emphasizing the purely negative aspects which, astonishingly, were positive from their point of view. Anything which could remotely help Israel ensure a better life for its own population and even for neighbouring peoples was anathema to the Arabs.

40. Israel deplored such a sterile attitude which was damaging not only for Israel but also for the Arab countries themselves because the Arab Governments were then obliged to suppress their own plans if they in any way resembled those of Israel. A case in point was the Jordanian project to build a canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea, a project which Jordan had triumphantly announced in Nairobi at the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy (A/CONF.100/NR/61) but whose publication had soon afterwards been cancelled for the reasons already mentioned.

41. It had always been Israel's position that the project was designed to contribute to the well-being of the area's population as a whole. It was not unusual for neighbouring countries to make joint use of shared water resources to their mutual advantage. In that connection, Israel regretted that the parallel project of the Government of Jordan had not been discussed by the Committee at all. The study of that plan might have helped produce a better understanding of the issues raised by the project. All those issues could be resolved if they were only considered by both countries in a spirit of mutual understanding. The two projects had the same objective. The basic problem was to tackle the continuous dropping of the water level of the Dead Sea; there was a danger that the Dead Sea would cease to exist, with harmful consequences for the environment. If the waters of the Mediterranean could damage the chemical composition of the Dead Sea, the waters of the Red Sea would have an identical effect. By loudly broadcasting its complaints about the Israeli project, the Government of Jordan was also condemning its own project and putting to shame its own experts who had proposed the plan at Nairobi. In fact, the Israeli project and, presumably, its Jordanian twin would not endanger the environment but would preserve it. It would promote the interests of the potash works on both sides of the Dead Sea and would be beneficial in many other ways as well. As far as his delegation could see, there was no harm in co-operating in the execution of such a project, and nothing justified its rejection.

42. The Israeli delegation had carefully considered the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/38/502. It had many reservations regarding the content of the report, particularly regarding chapter II on the legal dimensions. It nevertheless welcomed the fact that the experts had shown a certain objectivity and had not rejected the project, as the Jordanians had done, for purely political

(Mr. Levin, Israel)

reasons. The riches of the Dead Sea must be exploited, in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation, for the good of the inhabitants of the area. In that connection, Israel welcomed the comments contained in the last paragraph of the report which stated that the opponents of the project had drawn attention mostly to the losses they would sustain, while if a broader approach was taken the net gains of each co-riparian would be much greater than was likely to result from the present approach.

43. The calculations and remarks presented in chapter III of the report indicated that the Dead Sea would attain a level of -390 metres by the year 2003. That was a regrettable error. In fact, that level would not be reached until 2015. In addition, paragraph 23 stated explicitly that, in 2016, that level would be required even if there were no inflow from the Mediterranean. Account had to be taken of the fact that the rise in the water level would make it possible to save on the energy required to pump the water into the evaporation pans. In any event, no critical damage would result from the raising of the water level over an extended period of time. The effect of the project would be to return the water level to what it had been 40 years earlier. No climatic change could therefore be expected. It was very difficult to assess possible damage to agriculture, water resources, settlements, development projects, infrastructure and archeological sites. Many of the arguments presented by Jordan were baseless. All such problems could easily be resolved.

44. Israel suggested that the plans in question should be examined within the general framework of a joint Israeli-Jordanian project. The establishment of a stable water level in the Dead Sea could make an important contribution to regional planning and in particular to the promotion of tourism. It would also help to preserve the potash industry.

45. With regard to the Arab contention that the cooling of nuclear power stations by Mediterranean Sea water could possibly cause radioactive pollution of the environment surrounding the Dead Sea, Israel could affirm that such allegations were completely unfounded. First, the planning of nuclear energy in Israel was entirely independent of the canal project. Second, Israel would be the first to provide all necessary safeguards against any possible danger of contamination which would affect its own citizens and which, in any case, was highly hypothetical.

46. Israel considered that the current debate was pointless since the project concerned two neighbouring States which should be able, in normal times, to look forward with enthusiasm to finding ways of providing for the needs of their peoples. Unfortunately, that did not seem to be the case with Jordan. The Jordanian statement on 5 December did not do justice to the importance of the issue. His delegation nevertheless hoped that wisdom would eventually prevail and that the countries concerned would find a way of extricating themselves from the current impasse.

47. Mr. Rodriguez Medina took the Chair.

48. The CHAIRMAN said that he wished to inform delegations of the outcome of the consultations he had held on document A/38/502/Add.1. They had proved fruitful as a result of the spirit of co-operation shown by the representatives of Jordan and Syria and the representative of the Secretary-General. In order to settle the question it had been decided that an addendum to document A/38/502 should be issued, to be worded in the following manner:

"In answer to the concern expressed in the Special Political Committee, the Secretary-General would like to confirm the following:

"The Secretary-General received Israel's answer on 8 August 1983, as a result of his efforts to obtain the co-operation of that country in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/122. These endeavours started with the exchange of letters in March, May and June 1983.

"The response of Israel dated 8 August 1983 was received, unfortunately, after the Group of Experts had completed its work, as contained in document A/38/502. The publication of the response of Israel under the symbol A/38/502/Add.1 is obviously made without prejudice to the position of the Group of Experts as reflected in its report and does not imply any evaluation of the information provided by Israel."

49. He intended, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee and as the person responsible for the negotiations which had been held on the question, to meet with the Secretary-General in order to request him to assess the full significance of the misunderstanding and, in particular, to urge him to ensure that a situation such as that created by that misunderstanding would not recur. Knowing the Secretary-General's sense of responsibility and fairness, he was certain that he would do whatever was necessary.

50. Mr. LEVIN (Israel) said that, in the view of his delegation, the steps taken by the Chairman had not been necessary and had cast doubt on the independence of the Secretary-General and of the Secretariat. At the previous session, the representative of Jordan had requested the Secretariat to issue the text of a private communication between the Secretary-General and Israel. At the current session, he had done exactly the opposite. Israel therefore protested against those steps, which had not been in conformity with normal procedure.

51. The CHAIRMAN said that the object of his consultations had been precisely to safeguard the independence of the Secretariat as well as that of the Committee, and that that object, as the Committee had noted, had been achieved.

52. Mr. BURAYZAT (Jordan) said that, contrary to the claims made by the representative of Israel, who, in accordance with his usual tactics, sought to sow doubt within the Committee, neither the Jordanian delegation nor any other had the intention of calling into question the independence, credibility or integrity of the Secretary-General. Jordan wished to express its gratitude to the Chairman and to all those delegations which had contributed to solving the problem.

53. Mr. ABOUCHAER (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had the greatest respect for the Secretary-General and for the Secretariat. He wished to emphasize that, in the view of his delegation, the clarifications provided by the Secretariat and the statement of the Chairman had been aimed at correcting the mistake made in issuing the Israeli document as an addendum to the report of the Secretary-General. His delegation would have preferred the document in question to be reissued and assigned a new document symbol in order to reflect the actual situation; however, it was satisfied with the present arrangement.

54. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objection he would take it that the statement of the Secretary-General would be issued as addendum 2 to the report issued as document A/38/502.

55. It was so decided.

Draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.45

56. Mr. BURAYZAT (Jordan), introducing draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.45, said that no rhetoric could conceal the illegal and destructive nature of Israel's decision to build a canal linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea.

57. The illegal nature of the undertaking had been denounced by various speakers taking part in the debate and had been confirmed by the report of the Secretary-General (A/38/502). The Israeli project was contrary to the principles of international law relative to belligerent occupation of territory.

58. The destructive nature of the Israeli project had also been pointed out in the Secretary-General's report. The economic, political, ecological and other rights and interests of Jordan would suffer serious damage, the magnitude of which had been indicated in the report of the experts and in the statements made by his delegation and others.

59. Consequently, draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.45 sought to avoid the undesirable effects of the implementation of the Israeli project. He hoped that the Committee would be able to adopt the draft unanimously.

60. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that a recorded vote had been requested on the draft resolution.

61. After a first vote had been declared void because of an error in the way the vote was taken, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.45.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,

Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: None.

62. Draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.45 was adopted by 112 votes to 2.

63. Mr. LEVIN (Israel) requested the Secretary of the Committee to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the error which had caused the cancellation of the first vote.

64. Speaking in explanation of vote he said that his delegation could not support a draft resolution which gave no indication of any effort having been made to examine the actual situation objectively. Moreover, the Committee had not requested clarifications from Jordan on its project for a canal linking the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, the implementation of which would have exactly the same effects as the Israeli project. That was a very important point, but no interest in it whatsoever was reflected in the draft resolution.

65. Mr. AMARI (Tunisia) said that had he been present during the vote he would have voted in favour of draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.45.

66. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had concluded its consideration of item 75 and that the Rapporteur would submit the Committee's report to the General Assembly at the proper time.

AGENDA ITEM 71: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS; REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (continued) (A/SPC/38/L.46)

67. Mr. SHEHATA (Egypt) said that after consultations between the sponsors and various members of the Committee, his delegation had been authorized by the sponsors of draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.46 to withdraw that draft and to submit a new one the text of which would be circulated to the Committee members on the following day. He began to read out that new draft.

68. Mr. CABALLERO-RODRIGUEZ (Cuba), speaking on a point of order, observed that as all the Committee members had draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.46 before them, it would save time if the representative of Egypt would simply indicate where changes had been made.
69. Mr. SHEHATA (Egypt) stressed that the text was not an amended one but a completely new draft resolution.
70. Mr. SMIRNOV (Union of Soviet Social Republics), speaking on a point of order, noted that draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.46 had been withdrawn and that the representative of Egypt wished to submit a new draft resolution on item 71, but said he understood that a deadline had been set for the submission of new draft resolutions and that for the Special Political Committee that deadline had passed. He asked for clarification on that point.
71. The CHAIRMAN stated that the deadline for submitting new drafts had been extended to 9 December 1983 and that the new draft resolution, which would be circulated as document A/SPC/38/L.48, was therefore receivable.
72. While it was customary to circulate the text of a draft resolution to the Committee members, it was also permissible for any delegation to submit a draft resolution orally.
73. Mr. SHEHATA (Egypt) read out draft resolution A/SPC/38/L.48 and asked the Committee to reach a decision on that draft at its morning meeting on 9 December.
74. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) thanked the representative of Egypt and the other sponsors of the new draft resolution for their last minute efforts to draft a text which would attract broad support among the Committee members. Nevertheless, the current wording had not succeeded in overcoming certain doubts, particularly regarding the Special Committee's mandate and future and the financing of peace-keeping operations. Also, the draft had not been the subject of the extensive and thorough consultations which such a sensitive matter required. Because the Committee's time was short, he asked the sponsors to refrain from pressing their draft resolution and to choose another approach, one which might gain the Committee's unanimous support. They might reproduce, mutatis mutandi, the very modest resolution adopted in the previous year on that item.
75. Mr. CAPPAGLI (Argentina) said that his delegation had problems with certain paragraphs of the new draft resolution. The draft in its current form would not expedite the Committee's work, which could not progress unless the members gave proof of political will and a spirit of compromise. He therefore agreed with the representative of Mexico that it would be advisable to revert to the text adopted in the previous year.
76. Mr. ABOUCHAER (Syrian Arab Republic) asked the sponsors not to insist on their draft resolution. It would be better to choose another method which would enable the Committee to reach a consensus.

77. Mr. CABALLERO-RODRIGUEZ (Cuba) said that many delegations and even many members of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, had not been consulted on the draft resolution submitted by Egypt. The question of peace-keeping operations was extremely complex and the shortage of time available to the Committee prevented it from holding the thorough consultations which were needed in order to take into account the difficulties which the draft raised for certain delegations. He therefore supported the proposal of the representative of Mexico, which would make it possible to have a consensus text.

78. Mr. BAALI (Algeria) said that a rapid reading of the new draft resolution submitted by Egypt led him to conclude that that text too presented serious difficulties for his delegation. Furthermore, it was too late to seek instructions from his Government. It was therefore better to revert to the text adopted in the previous year, which could obtain the Committee's endorsement.

79. Mr. LOGOGLU (Turkey) said he reserved the right to make further comments on the terms of the draft resolution if it became necessary. He fully supported the suggestion of the representative of Mexico, who had indicated a possible solution.

80. Mr. ABOUASSI (Lebanon) said that his delegation was favourably inclined toward the new draft resolution submitted by Egypt insofar as it took into consideration the substance of the observations expressed the day before by his delegation regarding operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution issued as document A/SPC/38/L.46.

81. Mr. SHEHATA (Egypt) said that his delegation had taken careful note of the observations of the representatives who had spoken. He observed, however, that the delegations which had expressed their opposition to the new draft resolution were among those that had voted in 1978 in favour of resolution 33/114, which went well beyond the current draft.

82. Mr. BAALI (Algeria) explained that in 1978 Algeria had been among the 10 countries which had abstained in the vote on the resolution on that item in the Special Political Committee, and among the 19 countries which had abstained in the vote in the General Assembly. Any delegation was free to change its position if it felt it was necessary to do so.

83. Mr. LESSIR (Tunisia) said that his country was among the States that had voted in favour of resolution 33/114 in 1978, which did not mean that it would not change its position on similar resolutions, in the light of the development of the world situation. His delegation would have been ready to submit positive amendments to the new draft resolution, but given the lack of time and the fact that some delegations had stated that they had no instructions from their Governments, it felt that the draft should be withdrawn.

84. The CHAIRMAN appealed to Egypt and the other sponsors of the draft resolution to make every effort to seek agreement on a text which would attract the maximum number of votes. In order to allow delegations time to hold the necessary consultations, he suggested that a final meeting should be planned for Friday, 9 December, in order to take a decision on the draft resolution relating to item 71.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.