

**Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

S/18164
17 June 1986

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON**

(for the period 10 April-17 June 1986)

Introduction

1. In its resolution 583 (1986) of 18 April 1986, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of three months, until 19 July 1986. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978); called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council by 19 June 1986.

Organization of the Force

2. As of June 1986, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Infantry battalions

Fiji	627
Finland	514
France	605
Ghana	560
Ireland	651
Nepal	800
Norway	648

Headquarters Camp Command

Ghana	70
Ireland	95

Logistics Unit

France	786
Ghana	60
Italy	51
Norway	216
Sweden	144

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In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL was assisted by 77 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). These unarmed observers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL.

3. Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, who had commanded UNIFIL since February 1981, relinquished his command on 7 May 1986. The Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier-General Jean Pons, was in charge of the Force until 1 June when Major-General Gustav Hägglund assumed command (see S/18032 and S/18033).

4. The deployment of UNIFIL as of June 1986 is shown on the annexed map. The military observers of UNTSO continued to man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. They also maintained a team at Tyre and another at Chateau de Beaufort, while the team at Metulla was withdrawn since there was no longer any operational need for it. In addition, the military observers operated seven mobile teams within the UNIFIL area of deployment.

5. The Lebanese internal security forces continued to co-operate with UNIFIL in maintaining order in its area of deployment and assisted it in special investigations of mutual concern. The Lebanese army unit serving with UNIFIL maintained a strength of about 100 all ranks. One part of the unit was stationed in Tyre and the other part was deployed in the UNIFIL area and attached to different battalions.

6. As before, logistic support for UNIFIL was provided by the French logistic battalion (comprising a supply company, a transport company, a maintenance company, a combat engineer company, a defence company, a movement-control unit and a postal unit), the Norwegian maintenance unit (second-line workshop), the Ghanaian engineer unit (construction), the Swedish medical company and the Italian helicopter unit. Because of continuing difficulties in transporting goods from Beirut to the UNIFIL area, much of UNIFIL's supplies had to be shipped through Tel Aviv and Haifa, but as many supplies as possible, particularly fresh rations, petroleum products and other commodities, were procured from Lebanese sources.

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7. The Italian helicopter unit continued to provide logistic support to UNIFIL as well as humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. On 20 May 1986, a UNIFIL helicopter was hit by one rifle round fired by an unidentified person north-east of Tyre. The round damaged a fuel tank, and the helicopter had to make an emergency landing at the French battalion headquarters near Ma'rakah. Fortunately there were no casualties.

8. In addition to its other tasks, the French engineer company demolished 11 roadside bombs, 20 Katyusha rockets and a number of other explosives discovered by UNIFIL patrols or local inhabitants.

9. On 14 April 1986, the Permanent Representative of France informed me that his Government had decided to withdraw the French logistic battalion and to offer in its place a second infantry battalion. I expressed gratitude for the offer of a second infantry battalion but explained to the Permanent Representative of France that there was no operational requirement for such a battalion at the present stage and that, given the need to replace the French logistic personnel, its acceptance would entail additional expenditures. Following further consultations with the United Nations, France decided to withdraw only the supply, transport and engineer companies (less the bomb disposal element) from the French logistic battalion, a total of 334 men. The French Government expressed the wish that their withdrawal should be completed by the beginning of October 1986, assuming that the Security Council decided to extend UNIFIL beyond 19 July 1986. I am undertaking the necessary consultations to obtain replacements for the French personnel and I am doing everything possible to ensure that the hand-over is completed in accordance with the timetable desired by the French Government.

10. During the period under review, three members of the Force lost their lives; one French soldier was killed in a traffic accident, while two soldiers, one Norwegian and one Finn died from natural causes. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 124 members of the Force have died; 47 of them as a result of firing and mine explosions, 57 in accidents and 20 from other causes. Some 164 have been wounded in armed clashes, shellings and mine explosions.

11. The discipline and bearing of the members of UNIFIL, as well as of the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force, have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, their commanders and their countries.

Situation in the UNIFIL area

12. Israel has continued to maintain in southern Lebanon a "security zone" which is manned by the so-called "South Lebanon Army" (SLA) with the assistance of elements of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). The boundaries of the "security zone" have remained the same as described in my previous report on UNIFIL (see S/17965, para. 12). In the area where the "security zone" overlaps the UNIFIL area, IDF and SLA maintained during the reporting period 18 positions, which are marked in red on the map annexed to this report. This total includes three IDF positions in the extreme eastern part of the Norwegian battalion sector which were inadvertently omitted from the last report (S/17965).

13. The UNIFIL area outside the "security zone" remained generally quiet. Within the "security zone", however, the situation continued to be tense although in certain areas there was a decline in the level of violence by comparison with the previous reporting period. Armed resistance groups launched frequent attacks against IDF and SLA personnel and positions, using small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and mortars as well as roadside bombs. UNIFIL recorded 24 such attacks in April, 22 in May and 15 in the first half of June 1986. There were also reported attacks in those parts of the "security zone" outside the UNIFIL area.

14. IDF and SLA personnel fired frequently from their positions in the "security zone". In a number of cases fire was directed at civilians travelling along roads or working in fields. On 10 May, IDF in their position overlooking the Akiya bridge fired two tank rounds at two pedestrians on the road to Frun, killing one and wounding the other. On 13 May a farmer was killed by small arms fired from an IDF position north-west of Shama. On 9 June, nine tank rounds were fired from the IDF position north-west of Shama, killing a man and two girls who were walking at a distance of about 1,500 metres from the IDF position. Three more civilians were wounded in the same incident.

15. A major trouble spot was the SLA position north-east of Yatar. Because of frequent firing from this position, villagers travelling to and from Yatar could move only under UNIFIL escort, and farmers were often harassed when working in the fields. One woman was wounded on 21 April and another on 24 May. On 25 May, the SLA fired eight tank rounds from that position towards Yatar and Kafra; one man was killed in the mosque at Yatar and six others wounded. On 15 June, three more civilians were wounded in Haris and Haddathah. The SLA position near Yatar was attacked by armed elements on 12 occasions during the reporting period and on 14 and 15 June roadside bombs exploded on the track leading to the position. The latter explosion killed one member of SLA and wounded three others.

16. UNIFIL continued its efforts to control movement by armed persons in its area of deployment and to prevent such persons from entering it. The population in the area has by and large co-operated with the Force in carrying out its tasks. However, on 24 May, armed elements attacked a UNIFIL night patrol travelling in an armoured personnel carrier between Abbasiyah and Dayr Qanun An Nahr. The vehicle was hit by numerous rounds but no one was hurt.

17. UNIFIL also continued its efforts to contain SLA activities in its area of deployment. During the reporting period, attempts by SLA personnel to enter the UNIFIL area decreased, except in the Kafra-Yatar area, where SLA personnel tried on several occasions to force their way through UNIFIL checkpoints on their way to and from the position referred to in paragraph 15. There were frequent incidents of firing close to UNIFIL positions and vehicles by SLA, more than half of them by personnel manning the position near Yatar. This harassment continued despite all United Nations demands of the Israeli authorities to have it stopped.

18. UNIFIL continued to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities, as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in extending assistance to the local population.

In some locations, UNIFIL escorted farmers so they could tend their fields without being fired at from nearby "security zone" positions. Many Lebanese were treated at UNIFIL medical centres, in addition to members of the Force. The Swedish staff at the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura performed 94 surgical operations and treated some 2,000 patients, including 178 in-patients.

19. During the period under review, the Commander of UNIFIL and his civilian and military staff maintained contact with the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese regional authorities. They also maintained contact with the Israeli authorities on matters pertaining to the functioning of the Force.

20. Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited the area twice, in April and May/June, and held discussions with government leaders and senior officials in Lebanon and Israel, as well as with other interested parties.

Observations

21. In its resolution 583 (1986) of 18 April 1986, the Security Council requested me to "continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Council by 19 June 1986".

22. Developments on the ground since resolution 583 (1986) was adopted are described in paragraphs 12 to 18 above. Two months is a rather short period in which to identify clear trends; in some parts of UNIFIL's area and the "security zone" maintained by Israel there has been a decline in the number of violent incidents; in others the level of hostilities has remained the same or increased. But what remains clear is that the continuing presence of IDF in southern Lebanon, quite apart from being contrary to resolution 425 (1978) and many other decisions of the Security Council, is not an answer to the problem of international peace and security in the area. On the contrary it escalates the level of violence. According to IDF figures, issued on 9 June, there have in the past 12 months been over 1,100 attacks against IDF and its SLA allies in Lebanon; over 500 rocket attacks have been launched, of which 46 reached Israel; and numerous attempts were made to infiltrate into Israel and 3 of these succeeded in reaching the international frontier. These figures confirm the judgement, expressed in my report of 9 April 1986 (S/17965) and in earlier reports, that Israel's continuing military presence in southern Lebanon is self-defeating and that the right way to restore international peace and security is for IDF to withdraw from Lebanon and for UNIFIL to be allowed to carry out its mandate in accordance with resolution 425 (1978).

23. At the Council's 2681st meeting on 18 April, members expressed very clearly their insistence that progress should be resumed towards full implementation of resolution 425 (1978). The same view is taken by the troop-contributing countries, whose worries on this and other scores were discussed in paragraph 47 of my last report (S/17965). I have accordingly in the last two months redoubled my efforts to achieve progress in the direction desired. As part of these efforts I twice

sent Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, and Mr. Jean-Claude Aimé, Director in the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, on missions to the area, from 25 April to 1 May and again from 25 May to 3 June. They had several rounds of discussions with government leaders in Israel and Lebanon and also visited the Syrian Arab Republic during their second mission. Their instructions were, first, to convey to the Government of Israel the insistent wish of the Security Council - a wish which in resolution 583 (1986) had for the first time been expressed unanimously - that resolution 425 (1978) be implemented without further delay; and secondly, to explore with those Governments how in practice progress could be made towards that end.

24. The Lebanese authorities said that they continued to attach great importance to the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and to the maintenance of UNIFIL. They insisted that Israel withdraw its remaining forces immediately, that it abandon its "security zone" and that SLA be disbanded. They stated that the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 provided adequate means to ensure security between Israel and Lebanon. They added that those forces in Lebanon which were combating Israel's continuing military presence there would have achieved their objective once that presence was ended and that they strongly opposed a return to the situation that had existed in the area before 1982. The Syrian authorities told Mr. Goulding and Mr. Aimé that they supported this latter view.

25. The Israeli authorities, for their part, reaffirmed that it was not their intention to maintain a military presence in Lebanon indefinitely, that they had no territorial designs in Lebanon and that their only concern was the security of northern Israel. In their view, UNIFIL under its present mandate did not have the capability to prevent hostile activities against northern Israel and, given the present difficulties in the way of the effective re-establishment of the Lebanese Government's authority in the southern part of the country, the Government of Israel had no alternative but to make its own arrangements for the security of northern Israel by means of the "security zone" and its alliance with the "South Lebanon Army". In these circumstances they were not prepared to allow UNIFIL to deploy to the border. Israeli Ministers nevertheless expressed a willingness to consider alternative arrangements if these would be at least as effective as the "security zone" in protecting northern Israel from attack. They also said that activity by IDF north of the international frontier would be reduced in response to any reduction in hostile activities against Israel. They cited as an example of that policy a recent reduction in IDF operations into the western part of the "security zone".

26. It will be clear to members of the Council that the positions of the parties are far apart. The Lebanese authorities demand the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and state that thereafter they would not permit a return to the situation which existed before 1982 when Lebanese territory was used for attacks against Israel. Israel on the other hand demands a cessation of attacks against its forces in Lebanon before it will withdraw them. There are also wide divergences of view between all concerned about what would happen to the "South Lebanon Army" after Israeli withdrawal. The

task of trying to bridge this very wide gap between the parties is further complicated by the tragic difficulties through which Lebanon is currently passing and by the declared intention of some armed groups operating in Lebanon to use Lebanese territory as a base for pursuing hostilities against Israel itself.

27. I therefore have to report frankly to the Council my assessment that the prospects for rapid progress towards implementation of resolution 425 (1978) are not good. However, I believe that it is essential for the international community to continue the effort to put into effect the solution which the Security Council adopted in 1978. The three elements in UNIFIL's mandate - the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the restoration of international peace and security, the return of the Lebanese Government's effective authority in the area - are so obviously in the interests of both countries that all concerned should continue to work for a solution on that basis. UNIFIL will be an essential part of any such solution. Meanwhile, moreover, it continues to be a critical force for stability in southern Lebanon, where it is seen as a symbol of the legitimacy of the Lebanese Government. If it were to be withdrawn, a vacuum would be created and the ensuing competition to fill that vacuum would inevitably lead to uncontrolled violence, with great detriment to the welfare of the civilian inhabitants.

28. As a result of the consultations held during the last two months with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel, I have come to the conclusion, subject to the Council's deciding to renew UNIFIL's mandate, that the United Nations should pursue a process of negotiation with each of the two Governments concerned in order to establish agreement with them on practical measures for UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate.

29. I believe that this is a realistic approach which offers the best prospect of achieving full implementation of resolution 425 (1978). But in the complex situation that exists today in southern Lebanon, progress will not be rapid or easy. There will be a need for sustained effort by the United Nations and for the full co-operation of all the parties concerned, as well as the full confidence and backing of the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries. These remain the essential conditions for UNIFIL to be able to fulfil its mandate and achieve the objectives set by the Council in 1978.

30. I shall make a further report to the Council in mid-July in order to bring members up to date on developments relating to UNIFIL before the Council considers whether to extend the Force's mandate beyond 19 July 1986. The Lebanese Government has informed me that it will ask for its renewal for six months. The position of the Lebanese Government and the considerations I have just outlined seem to me powerful reasons for extending UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months. I shall make my final recommendation on this matter in my further report to the Council in July 1986.

黎巴嫩南部 • SOUTHERN LEBANON
 LIBAN MÉRIDIONAL
 ЮЖНЫЙ ЛИБАН • LÍBANO MERIDIONAL

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
 32 20

- UNIFIL HQ
- FRENCH COG
- SWEDMED
- HQ COY
- ITALAIR
- MP COY
- DGL

NABOURA

LAB

NEP BATT

FRENCH BATT

FIJIBATT

GHAN BATT


IRISH BATT

FIN BATT

LEBANON

ISRAEL

Kerem Ben Zimra



وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان اعتباراً من حزيران/يونيه ١٩٨٦

一九八六年六月联黎部队部置情况

UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JUNE 1986

DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE JUIN 1986

ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ИЮНЬ 1986

DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN JUNIO 1986

2-12 * مركز مراقبة

观察所

Observation post

Poste d'observation

Наблюдательный пункт

Puesto de observación

* حاجز طرسي

路障

Road block

Poste de contrôle routier

Заграждение на дороге

Barrera de caminos

حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

联黎部队活动范围的界限

UNIFIL operational boundaries

Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force

Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ

Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza



وحدة لبنانية

黎巴嫩单位

Lebanese unit

Unité libanaise

Ливанское подразделение

Unidad libanesa

موقع لقوة الدفاع الإسرائيلية

以色列国防军阵地

Israel Defence Forces position

Position des Forces de défense israéliennes

Позиция израильских сил обороны

Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel

موقع "الجيش جنوب لبنان"

"南黎巴嫩军"阵地

"South Lebanon Army" position

Position de "l'Armée du Liban du Sud"

Позиция "южноливанской армии"

Posición del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

موقع لقوة الدفاع الإسرائيلية

و/أو "جيش جنوب لبنان"

以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"阵地

Israel Defence Forces and/or

"South Lebanon Army" position

Position des forces de défense israéliennes

et/ou de "l'Armée du Liban du Sud"

Позиция израильских сил обороны

и/или "южноливанской армии"

Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel

y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

لم تبيّن المواقع الخارجية عن نطاق منطقة وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

联黎部队部署地区以外的阵地未予标明

Positions outside UNIFIL area of deployment are not indicated

Les positions situées en dehors de la zone de déploiement de la FINUL ne sont pas indiquées

Позиции за пределами района размещения ВСООНЛ не указаны

No se indican las posiciones fuera de la zona de despliegue de la FPNUL