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Source: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
22 June 2005



Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Mid-Year Review of the Humanitarian Appeal 2005 for Occupied Palestinian Territory

The CAP is much more than an appeal for money. It is an inclusive and coordinated programme cycle of:

a) strategic planning leading to a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP);
b) resource mobilisation (leading to a Consolidated Appeal or a Flash Appeal);
c) coordinated programme implementation;
d) joint monitoring and evaluation;
e) revision, if necessary; and
f) reporting on results.

The CHAP is a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region and includes the following elements:

a) A common analysis of the context in which humanitarian action takes place;
b) An assessment of needs;
c) best, worst, and most likely scenarios;
d) Stakeholder analysis, i.e. who does what and where;
e) A clear statement of longer-term objectives and goals;
f) Prioritised response plans; and
g) A framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary.

The CHAP is the foundation for developing a Consolidated Appeal or, when crises break or natural disasters occur, a Flash Appeal. The CHAP can also serve as a reference for organisations deciding not to appeal for funds through a common framework. Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the CHAP is developed at the field level by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Country Team. This team mirrors the IASC structure at headquarters and includes UN agencies, and standing invitees, i.e. the International Organization for Migration, the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs that belong to ICVA, Interaction, or SCHR. Non-IASC members, such as national NGOs, can be included, and other key stakeholders in humanitarian action, in particular host governments and donors, should be consulted.

The Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the annual preparation of the consolidated appeal document. The document is launched globally each November to enhance advocacy and resource mobilisation. An update, known as the Mid-Year Review, is presented to donors in June of each year.

Donors provide resources to appealing agencies directly in response to project proposals. The Financial Tracking Service (FTS), managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is a database of donor contributions and can be found on www.reliefweb.int/fts

In sum, the CAP is about how the aid community collaborates to provide civilians in need the best protection and assistance available, on time.











1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On the political front, there have been improvements since the drafting of the 2005 Consolidated Appeal (CAP). In the high-level meeting at Sharm al Sheikh in February 2005 between Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the two stated their intention to try to end the more than four years of violence between the two sides. Since then, the major Palestinian militant groups have committed themselves to maintaining tahdi'a (calm) for the time being. The Israeli government's approval of the Disengagement Plan - to withdraw approximately 7,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and 650 from the West Bank in August this year - is a further positive development.

As a result there has been a fall in casualties on both sides and a reduction in the number of house demolitions in the Gaza Strip. Movement restrictions around the West Bank have been eased by around 20% as of June 2005,(1) but more than 500 checkpoints and roadblocks on roads remain.

There is yet to be an overall improvement in the humanitarian situation. Access to health services and viable livelihoods is a major concern for communities located close to the Barrier. Impoverishment continues to grow, with about half the Palestinian population now thought to be in poverty in 2005, rising to 68% in the Gaza Strip.(2) Unemployment also remains high, with numbers increasing in the past two quarters.

The lack of real change in the humanitarian situation has meant that the planning scenarios outlined in the CAP remain valid.

As of 10 June 2005, 45% of the 2005 oPt CAP has been funded; a total of US$ 134,444,353 has been contributed or committed. The mid-year review led to a slight revision of some projects' budgets, bringing the total amount requested for 2005 to US$ 295,769,484. Thus, unmet requirements for the remainder of 2005 total US $ 161,325,131.

While the overall CAP funding level is approaching half of requirements, funding has varied greatly between sectors. Food Security (46% funded) and Economic Recovery / Infrastructure / Emergency Employment (51%) alone represent 81% of the funds received or committed, i.e. US$ 108,827,404. The water-sanitation sector also shows an above-average level of funding (56%). Other sectors have been notably under-funded: Education (2%), Health and Psycho-social Support (9%), Coordination (29%). Within sectors, funding of projects has also been uneven: in the Education sector, only 3 out of 11 projects have received funds; in Food Security, 4 out of 13 projects; in Health 4 out of 30 projects; and in Water-sanitation 3 out of 13 projects. This pattern could undermine the overall capacity of the CAP to address its priorities and result in an uneven achievement of objectives among sectors.

Despite the political situation in the first half of 2005 remaining relatively calm, humanitarian needs are likely to continue beyond the next six months, predicating the need for another consolidated appeal to meet needs in 2006.

2. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

Humanitarian Context

Four years ago, poverty affected one in five Palestinians. Today, almost half the population lives in poverty, as incomes have fallen and Palestinians' assets have been exhausted. Living conditions have been further eroded by the substantial decline in the quality of health and education services and the inability of Palestinians to access them. Approximately 3,496 Palestinians and 1,044 Israelis have been killed since the conflict began in September 2000. The experience of continual fear and violence will have a lasting effect on both populations.

The deteriorating humanitarian picture in the West Bank is largely a consequence of both conflict and the 'closure' measures that were established by Israel since 2000 with the stated intention to prevent the number of suicide bombers from targeting Israeli civilians. The closures consist of more than 500 checkpoints and physical barriers that block roads(3). In addition, the construction of the West Bank Barrier has sharply limited the movement of Palestinians in its vicinity. In Gaza, Palestinian movement is tightly restricted at all border crossings and within the Strip by checkpoints and other military infrastructure.

Unless the movement of goods and labour is eased, the economic situation cannot improve and the humanitarian situation will worsen.

Political developments - cause for cautious optimism

The election of Mahmoud Abbas as PA President on 9 January 2005 following the death of President Yasser Arafat on 12 November 2004 was greeted by the international community as an opportunity for rekindling negotiations

between the Palestinians and Israelis. In the high-level meeting in Sharm al Sheikh in February 2005 between the PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the two stated their intentions to try to end the more than four years of violence between the two sides. Since then, the major Palestinian militant groups have committed themselves to maintaining tahdi'a (calm) for the time being. A further positive development on the political stage has been the Israeli government's approval of the Disengagement Plan to withdraw approximately 7,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and 650 from the West Bank in August this year. These developments have had positive implications: a fall in casualties, a reduction in the number of house demolitions in Gaza and an easing of closure restrictions.

These positive steps, while welcome, remain fragile. The lack of any visible breakthrough in negotiations, in particular, concerning the West Bank, continued Barrier and settlement construction, and additional assassinations of Palestinian militants could trigger Palestinian violence. The firing of qassam rockets by Palestinian militants from Gaza into Israel may prompt further Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) incursions into Gaza, as settlement withdrawal in August draws closer. Meanwhile, localised clashes between Palestinian security agencies have been a feature of the past six months.

The four key areas of concern noted in the 2005 CAP remain relevant:

1. Impoverishment, growing vulnerability and aid dependency

Impoverishment continues to grow with about half the Palestinian population now thought to be in poverty in 2005, rising to 68% in the Gaza Strip.(4) Unemployment remains high, standing at 31.7% in Q1 2005, a level that is 10% higher than before the intifada.(5) Fewer than half of all men of working age and only 10% of women of working age are currently employed.(6) This has a detrimental impact on the young in particular - one in three persons aged 15-24 years and over half of those aged 25-29 years are not employed - creating a potentially fertile breeding ground for violence and extremism.

Chronic and new poor: A recent survey ofbeneficiaries conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) suggests that the new poor(7) are more exposed to shocks than the chronic poor(8) because of the survival strategies they use. All poor households are vulnerable to shocks - varying from the impact of the Barrier and restrictions on access to land, markets and work, to illness and irregular rains. For the chronic poor, relief assistance assures their essential needs are met, even if other survival strategies fail, thereby reducing their vulnerability.(9) But new poor are unable to depend on food aid and are forced to rely more on a wider range of high-risk strategies in their attempt to continue being productive.

2. Fragmentation of Palestinian economy and society

In the West Bank, there has been an 11% reduction of closure barriers (more than 500 physical closure barriers as of April) since November 2004.(10) While this has eased movement in parts of the West Bank, as yet it has not been translated into a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation. There has been a reported increase in flying or random checkpoints(11) and the Barrier has replaced other closure obstacles on roads in and out of some communities.



Closures in the West Bank, Dec 2003 - Mar 2005



Palestinian employment patterns have been greatly affected by the increasing fragmentation of the West Bank and Gaza. For example, the number of people in waged work has fallen while there has been a rise in the number of unpaid workers in family businesses or in self-employment. These new forms of employment largely in agriculture and trade are short-term crisis responses. They signal an increase in informal work and a move out of the cash economy. Only with a significant improvement in access to markets can these activities become more sustainable.

Increasingly, farmers are buying local rather than imported goods as a step towards greater self-sufficiency, enhancing local production capacity and lessening dependence on Israeli supplies. Similarly, there is a greater involvement of women in the labour market who are likely to continue to work and improve their employment status. These examples should provide the guiding elements in linking humanitarian and development initiatives for the international community.

3. Needs in acute crisis areas

Two areas of note are:

West Bank Barrier communities: The continued construction of the West Bank Barrier remains a key humanitarian concern. Large areas of land continue to be requisitioned for the construction of the Barrier.(12)



Total number of acres requisitioned for Barrier construction in 2005(13)



The damage caused to land and property will hinder Palestinian development should the political situation allow for this. The Barrier has made entry to Israel for employment more difficult and has cut access of small businesses to lucrative markets for goods in Arab-Israeli communities.(14) Humanitarian organisations are concerned that Palestinians in the 'closed areas' - areas of the West Bank between the Barrier and the Green Line - who can no longer regularly access their agricultural land on the other side of the Barrier may leave the area because their livelihoods are no longer viable. Economic deterioration in Jenin district since the construction of the Barrier raises further concerns about the viability of West Bank communities once the Barrier is completed.(15)

The Gaza Strip: Humanitarian organisations are planning for the evacuation of settlers from Gaza under Israel's Disengagement Plan. Acknowledging the need to pre-position supplies in areas affected by the prolonged shutdown during the evacuation of settlers from Gaza,(16) the IDF has improved access for humanitarian workers in the past four months.(17) Nevertheless, humanitarian organisations remain concerned about access to health care in the event of an emergency, as well as access to tertiary care in Egypt and Israel for Gazan patients more generally.

In Gaza, where the restrictions on the movement of workers to Israel eased since February 2005, unemployment has fallen modestly.(18) Nevertheless, the poverty rate, which is expected to rise to 72% by 2006, is unlikely to change if disengagement is accompanied by the sealing of Gaza's borders to labour and trade, according to the World Bank.(19)

Both Barrier communities and the Gaza Strip highlight the vulnerability of the Palestinian economy, which lacks an internal engine of growth and is highly dependent on donor assistance and employment in Israel to generate growth.

4. Protection of civilians

Casualties: There has been a significant reduction in civilian fatalities in recent months. Since November 2004, the number of deaths and injuries has declined, particularly in February and March 2005. Since February, there have been no large-scale incursions into the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and the major Palestinian militant groups have committed themselves to a tahdi'a (calm).



Palestinian and Israeli deaths November 2004 - April 2005(20)



House demolitions:
There has been a significant decrease in Gaza house demolitions. In 2004, 1,443 Palestinian buildings were demolished in the Gaza Strip resulting in the dispossession of 13,510 Palestinians. In 2005, there have been approximately 13 houses demolished in Gaza by the Israeli authorities up to 13 May 2005. In East Jerusalem, however, house demolitions have continued over the past months with 139 buildings demolished in 2004 and 26 buildings between January and May 2005.(21)


Proportion of West Bank House Demolitions in East Jerusalem (Sept 2004 - May 2005)



Gender:
The high number of imprisoned men and of female-headed households, together with the sharp rise in male unemployment has led to women taking on new responsibilities for income-generation in addition to childcare, domestic and agricultural tasks. Women's work tends to be poorly paid or unpaid and can have an adverse impact on girls' education, as some women take their daughters out of school to fulfil domestic chores.(22) Women from large households in rural areas need to be targeted with opportunities for empowerment.(23)

Humanitarian Access: After an improvement in humanitarian access for ambulances and relief agencies at the end of 2004, reported incidents of delays and denials of access climbed modestly but did not reach the levels experienced in the first half of 2004.(24)



Incident Reports (January 2004 - April 2005)





3. CHAP Review

3.1 Summary funding analysis

At the time of the mid-year review, the CAP oPt has been generally funded at a rate of 45% i.e. a total of US$ 134,444,353 has been received or pledged. In addition, after discussions between agencies and donors, the funding for some projects is under way, but not pledged; therefore it cannot be reflected in the mid-year review monitoring matrixes. The mid-year review led to a slight revision of some projects’ budgets bringing the total amount requested to US$ 295,769,484. The revisions reflect changing costs in existing projects, rather than a changing context.(25)

There are, however, significant funding discrepancies to be highlighted among sectors, number of projects and agencies.

Two sectors show a good level of funding: Food Security (total of 27% or, when broken down by agencies providing food assistance: WFP 32% and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA] 26%); and Infrastructure and Emergency Employment (51%). These sectors alone represent 81% of the funds received or pledged i.e. US$ 108,827,404 million. The Water sector also received good funding (56%) while others have received very poor funding: Education (3%), Health and Psycho-social Support (9%). As for the Coordination sector, it has received limited funding (29%).

Within each sector, the proportion of projects funded is also worrying low: in the Education sector, only 3 out of 11 projects have received funds. In the Food Security sector, 4 out of 13 projects have received funds. In the Health sector, 4 out of 30 projects have received funds. In the Water sector, 3 out of 13 has received funds.

Well-funded agencies such as UNRWA, WFP, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contrast with others (the World Health Organization [WHO], the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], the United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], the United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], the United Nations Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM] and the Department of Safety and Security [DSS], which are facing critical funding gaps at this time of the year. Of greater concern is the lack of funding for the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Whereas Save the Children UK (SC UK), Oxfam GB, Acción Contra el Hambre (ACH) have received some funds, others such as Care International and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society did not.


3.2 Scenarios

Two scenarios were put forward in the CAP 2005. Scenario 1, which highlighted a gradual worsening of the humanitarian situation, was considered most appropriate. Scenario 2 envisaged an improvement in the humanitarian situation. While there have been encouraging signs which may tend towards scenario 2, there has been no shift in the underlying causes of the humanitarian situation. This leads to the conclusion that scenario 1 continues to best describe the current situation.

Among the contributing factors to the increase in violence, the following can be highlighted:

· Barrier construction continues at a fast rate and settlements are rapidly expanding.

· There is a lack of significant and visible progress in the negotiation process between Palestinians and Israelis, which could increase frustrations among Palestinian populations and create disenchantment with President Abu Mazen.

· Developments initiated by the Israelis with regards to Jerusalem (Barrier; absentee property laws; greater restrictions on issuance of permits for West Bank Palestinians to access Jerusalem) suggest that movement between the West Bank and Jerusalem may become more problematic in the near future. This undermines negotiations on final status issues and threatens to anger Palestinians who view Jerusalem as their capital.

· United Nations (UN) agencies that are based in Jerusalem are likely to face greater problems in managing and implementing projects in the West Bank.

· The relative weakness of the PA in enforcing the law may promote further informal and potentially violent ways of ‘resolving conflicts’ within Palestinian society. This may be evidenced by the spate of “honour” killings this year. There is also an observed increase of incidents where weapons are used to solve disputes.

· Particular attention should be paid to possible outbreaks of violence in the period of July (Palestinian legislative elections), August/September (implementation of the disengagement) and October/November (post disengagement). Increased violence and provocations from Israeli settlers have been observed recently.

· The Israeli security forces are on high alert for a possible attack by Israeli right-wing activists on the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, which could trigger violent reactions among the Palestinian and Israeli communities. In addition, the Israeli army has announced that it is preparing for the possibility of renewed violence in the West Bank following disengagement.


3.3 Strategic priorities

Funding levels combined with the absence of substantial change in the underlying causes did not allow the strategic priorities to be fully addressed at mid-year: 1) preventing further decline in humanitarian and development indicators; 2) increasing awareness on the root causes of the oPt crisis; 3) improving humanitarian coordination and targeting; 4) increasing the participation of the population; 5) building national capacity; 6) supporting sustainable development initiatives.

Some of these priorities have been addressed with the implementation of projects, especially in the food security and emergency infrastructure and employment sectors. In the second part of 2005, the reinforcement of sectoral coordination through the pilot implementation of the Needs Analysis Framework should improve the monitoring of indicators, and the targeting and sustainability of the action.

On-going efforts have been made to enhance dialogue and cooperation with the Palestinian Authority through line ministries, specialised bodies and the Ministry of Planning, thus contributing to further national capacity building.


3.4 Sector response plans

3.4.1 Emergency Infrastructure and Employment Sector


Sector lead: UNDP/UNRWA
Jobs created under the CAP framework have provided labour opportunities for low-wage workers throughout the West Bank and Gaza. From January 2005 to date, an estimated 35,000 job-days have been created under the CAP projects. UNDP’s programmes have been implemented by directly hiring workers listed unemployed in local municipalities and village councils. (26) These workers are paid a minimum wage equal to US$ 16-20 a day, and often lie in the income group hovering just below or clustered around the poverty line.

The projects include the construction of community centres, agricultural roads, access to safe water supply, additional classrooms, sanitary units and new schools. All the programmes are benefiting clusters and communities that suffer from poor access to basic services and low rates of unemployment.

Funding shortages threaten the sustainability of infrastructure projects. Only low levels of private investment are available to stimulate the economy.

Significant unmet needs remain, such as the creation of sustainable income and employment generation schemes, employment for medium skilled workers, the creation of employment as opposed to job-days, and the overcoming gender difference divide (as existing job creation schemes focused on infrastructure target male workers, while women have recourse often to unpaid labour or be absorbed into the informal market).

In the first quarter of 2005, the rising prices of raw materials in Gaza due to the closure have placed a significant burden on donors executing job creation schemes, as the costs of some of these projects are likely to increase, adversely affecting the creation of job days. The lack of private sector growth and development remains a great challenge in the present situation.

Housing, road networks, improving access to safe water supply, and ensuring that the livelihoods of workers in the Gaza Strip as well as basic infrastructure are safeguarded, are urgent priorities in the coming months with the likely disengagement of Israeli settlers from Gaza.


3.4.2 Education


Sector lead: UNICEF
The CAP objectives for education remain the same. However, new facts on the ground including Israel’s Disengagement, Barrier construction, upcoming Palestinian National Authority (PNA) elections and continuing tensions in the West Bank mean that new education needs may emerge. For children who cannot reach their schools, alternative education projects may need to be set up, and existing emergency projects such as ‘Remedial Education’ may need to be expanded in areas under closure. Pre-positioning of educational supplies, remedial worksheets, and ‘Back to School’ supplies for children with restricted access to their schools will be planned.

It is also important to address the gender aspects of these variables to protect the most vulnerable groups. Maintaining the levels of girls’ enrolment will be a major challenge. Girls in West Bank rural areas are the most vulnerable. Parents concerned about their daughters’ safety often prevent them from commuting because of the perceived fears in crossing checkpoints. Advocacy with Israeli and Palestinian authorities is important in ensuring the protection of children on their journey to and from school. Awareness-raising within the local communities is also important to ensure that they continue to send their children to school.
Improving the quality of education for children in schools as well as for those that do not attend school for crisis-related reasons will continue to be vital. Focus will continue on the development and use of low-cost resources and techniques for active learning in the home and use of child-centred teaching/learning methodologies. Education and protection work will contribute toward the improvement of the school environment, teaching methods and teacher-child, child-child and parent-child relationships in order to provide a safe environment for children.

Where the daily life of children is interrupted by conflict, activities promoting resilience and psychosocial well-being will be critical. New teaching methodologies incorporating life skills in the curriculum that deal with stress, conflict management, aggression and peer pressure will be provided. The provision of supplies to facilitate teaching and learning for students and teachers such as ‘School-in-a-Box’ kits will facilitate the rapid return of children to school and restore structure in their lives.


3.4.3 Psychosocial Support


Sector lead: UNICEF
The second part of 2005 is expected to be characterised by extreme volatility in Gaza, and continuing tensions in the West Bank. As part of UN Agencies and NGO contingency planning related to Israel’s Disengagement, it will be crucial to address psychosocial needs as well as possibly expanding and intensifying emergency services.

Psychosocial support and mental health services will continue to be an integral part of recovery. Once the immediate threat has disappeared, psychological wounds tend to surface. Economic strain will also continue, adding pressure on households. In the longer term, emergency projects in the psychosocial sphere are an investment in the development of a social welfare system in the oPt. Well-established and accepted psychosocial projects have created a strategic entry point to address violence, abuse and exploitation.

The two objectives in the CAP should be slightly modified to reflect progress and read:

· To set up and maintain an emergency preparedness and response system providing psycho-social support to families, with a special emphasis on children, in all areas most affected by the conflict;
· To set up and maintain child friendly spaces and set up family crisis centres providing psychosocial support to families in emergency situations.


3.4.4 Food Security


Sector lead: WFP
A recent WFP survey(27) showed that natural shocks linked to economic weakness has devastating consequences on food insecurity, especially in the backdrop of insecurity resulting from the conflict; incursions, high levels of human disease, the Barrier, limitations on access to land, work or markets are the greatest causes of loss of income and assets.

In the West Bank, limited access to rangelands and eastern slopes has caused a reduction of grazing areas available to farmers. Livestock farmers cannot afford buying concentrated animal feed, thereby reducing productivity. Fishermen are not able to market their fish or carry out maintenance work on their boats. In spite of good strawberry crops in Gaza, the produce cannot be sold outside the Strip. The unavailability of sugar on the market prevents jam production. In addition, flooding in the northern West Bank has resulted in vegetables and fruit tree losses; frosts have caused the loss of crops.

The above mentioned WFP survey also showed that ‘new poor’ (NP) and Bedouins in the Gaza Strip suffer most due to shocks while the Social Hardship Cases (SHC) are least affected as they remain chronic poor. Approximately 33% of WFP’s caseload relies on food of humanitarian assistance to varying degrees with a higher reliance in Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Social Hardship Cases relying on aid the most, and NP the least. Those receiving more aid are best able to plan their expenditures.

Concerning malnutrition of children under five a forthcoming report on The State of Nutrition, Gaza and the West Bank(28) and a review of WFP(29) has led to rethinking programme initiatives. The current acute malnutrition rates do not necessitate supplementary feeding. Levels of acute malnutrition remain unchanged (Gaza Strip) or modestly increased (West Bank) between 1996 and 2004.

Relatively low malnutrition rates do not alter that food insecurity is a critical issue in the West Bank as nutritional levels measured as daily intake of nutrients have decreased since 2002 mainly due to the consumption of food items such as meat and vegetables, which has dropped. Current malnutrition trends indicate a reduction of dietary variety, which may over time aggravate micronutrient deficiencies.

Micronutrient deficiencies currently are among the most crucial nutritional problems to be approached through various means, including wheat flour fortification, salt iodisation and increasing awareness amongst women on dietary diversification to promote fruit and vegetable production as well as small scale animal production.


3.4.5 Health


Sector lead: WHO
Despite high immunisation coverage, at the present time the West Bank health sector is facing two major epidemics: mumps and rubella. More than 4,000 cases of mumps as well as hundreds of cases of rubella have been reported. In 2003, a serological survey indicated failures in the immune response in children under five. These are signs that the immunisation system – and the public health system generally – is continually challenged and vulnerable to disruption.

The coverage of emergency needs through budget support to the PA remains low. Moreover, new data show that a high proportion of the health expenditure is private i.e. supported by the users, which could limit health care access. At the same time, with no improvement in the economic situation, poverty will not decline and access to health care will be restricted as the population will not be able anymore to afford the private expenditure.

Movement restrictions continue to affect the utilisation, quality and availability of health services. The completion of the Barrier construction around Jerusalem will prevent about 20,000 registered refugees residing in the western villages of Jerusalem and a similar number residing in Bethany and vicinity from accessing UNRWA health services.

The planned withdrawal from settlements could affect the access to health, especially (a) patient capacity to reach health facilities and particularly patients who have to cross borders to receive specialised treatment abroad; b) health workers' access to their work places; c) delivery of drugs and medical supplies to health facilities, and; d) the ability of patients to cross borders to receive specialised treatment abroad.

As such, new sector priorities are:
· Conduct emergency immunisation against measles, mumps and rubella in order to control the outbreaks and to ensure sustainable elimination of measles;
· Ensure availability of critical supplies and focused upgrade of facilities in areas susceptible to closures and to acute crisis;
· Conduct mass initiatives for micronutrients administration to prevent further degradations of the H&N status;
· Ensure flexible, multivalent capacity to response to crisis on the basis of a multiple scenarios concurrence.


3.4.6 Water


Sector lead: Oxfam GB - main contribution from the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG)
There has been no major change in the water and sanitation situation in the oPt and the CAP objectives for this sector remain unchanged. In communities that lack water networks – 37% of the oPt – rainwater harvesting in cisterns has become a main source of supply. Sufficient water was collected this winter due to a higher rainfall compared to recent years and supplies will cover basic household needs until June 2005. However, the quality of this water remains a major concern. Water shortages, as in previous years, are expected during the summer months (July to September) when many communities, often the poorest, will be forced to rely on more expensive tankered water.

In the last six months, there has been an outbreak of water borne diseases including amoeba and Hepatitis A in a number of communities, such as in Burin (Nablus) where 450 cases were registered, and Bruqin and Kafr ad Dik (Salfit). In the absence of permits issued by the IDF to construct sanitary solid waste landfill sites, and other alternatives, local authorities continue to dump solid waste and untreated wastewater on the outskirts of towns and villages and in wadis contributing to the pollution of the groundwater. There have also been problems in a number of areas with waste water from Israeli settlements polluting Palestinian water sources.

An added burden on some of the poorest communities is the isolation of agricultural wells west of the Barrier in the northern West Bank, where farmers continue to face difficulties in accessing their land and wells through “gates” in the Barrier. IDF land requisition also continues for Barrier construction affecting, for example, around 1,000 dunums of agricultural land and three surface springs in Wadi Fukin (Bethlehem).

With no improvement in the economic situation, many Palestinian households are increasingly unable to pay their water bills or buy supplies from tankers, many of which are privately owned. The Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) is working on developing an enforcement system to ensure that tankers meet the required quality standards for domestic consumption. Limited domestic supplies inevitably adversely affect the health and hygiene of communities.


3.4.7 Coordination, Awareness and Security


Sector lead: OCHA
In light of the complexity and uncertainty of the current context, the coordination sector seeks to maintain its monitoring activities of the humanitarian situation on the ground, to reinforce the production of reliable and focused information to reflect humanitarian and security facts, and to tighten the coordination linkages among the humanitarian community, emphasising the analysis of the needs of the Palestinian communities, and the efforts towards emergency preparedness and contingency planning.

The creation of the inter-agency “Who does What Where” database, has allowed OCHA in cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs to monitor the funding and implementation progress of CAP projects. This has enabled the humanitarian community to react to shortages and to assist the donor community in identifying gaps and priorities.

As in 2004, OCHA still maintains its role as secretariat to both the UN system’s operational planning and policy co-ordination bodies on humanitarian affairs. The Operational Co-ordination Group (OCG), chaired by UNRWA, has continued to meet regularly, especially for preparation of the contingency plan related to disengagement plan in the Gaza Strip and Northern West Bank. The Inter-Agency Advocacy Group, which in April 2005 was re-structured and re-named the Advocacy and Public Information Group (API Group), still meets on a regular basis. The API Group has consolidated a calendar of events, where lead agencies prepare and implement the events.

The coordination sector will focus its work to cope with unknown and unpredictable context changes. Coordination efforts have already been made to address the dilemmas related to mitigating or not the impact of the Barrier and the closure regime on Palestinian livelihoods. OCHA, in cooperation with all CAP partners, the donor community and the Palestinian institutions will be implementing the Needs Analysis Framework (NAF) in order to strengthen the analysis of the humanitarian situation and to forecast the changes in needs in relation to the changes in context until the end of 2005.


4. Projects Review

Out of the 83 projects included in the CAP 2005, 26 received funding (30% of the projects) and therefore could start. Some agencies used carry over funding from 2004 to implement projects. The main progress occurred in the sector of Infrastructure and Emergency Employment (10 out of 11 projects– UNDP and UNRWA) and Coordination (3 projects out of 5 projects – OCHA and UNRWA).

The monitoring matrix in annex 2 provides more detailed information of the status of progress for each project.


5. Conclusion

The current situation remains volatile and there is uncertainty about the situation during and following the Disengagement Plan.

While the global CAP funding level is satisfactory, some sectors remain poorly funded that could undermine the overall capacity of the CAP to address its priorities.

The likely result is an uneven implementation of the strategy and achievement of objectives among sectors.

Despite the political situation in the first half of 2005 remaining relatively calm humanitarian needs are likely to continue for the next six months, predicating the need for another consolidated appeal to meet needs in 2006.

























Notes:

(1) As of March 2005, there was an 11% decrease since November 2004. The trend since March shows further reduction, estimated now at 20%.
(2) World Bank, Stagnation and Revival: Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, December 2004.
(3) As of March 2005, there has been an 11% decrease, with a total of 605 obstacles remaining. However the trend since then shows further reduction, estimated at 20%
(4) World Bank, Stagnation and Revival, Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, December 2004.
(5) Adjusted rate. Data is compared with Q1 2000 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Labour Force data).
(6) The Situation of workers in the occupied Arab territories, International Labour Conference, 93rd Session, 2005, International Labour Office, Geneva.
(7) The new poor include those households that were previously getting by but which have been made destitute by closure-related income loss.
(8) The chronic poor include those, largely 'Social Hardship Cases', who were poor prior to the intifada, and who for the main part, receive food aid and assistance.
(9) WFP, Livelihoods, Shocks and Coping Strategies of WFP Beneficiaries in the occupied Palestinian territory, Baseline Survey; September - November 2004.
(10) For more detailed information, see OCHA, West Bank Closure and Access Update -- April 2005. This report shows that the majority of the closure obstacles that have been lifted existed in Jenin, Bethlehem and Hebron governorates.
(11) OCHA, Weekly Briefing Notes; Field visits. The increase in flying checkpoints is particularly apparent in Jenin, Tubas and Ramallah districts.
(12) The loss of agricultural outputs due to land confiscations and access restrictions is estimated to cost Palestinians approximately US$ 320 million. World Bank, Stagnation or Revival? Israeli Disengagement and Palestinian Economic Prospects, December 2004.
(13) Data is based on Barrier requisition orders, which are monitored by OCHA.
(14) United Nations Special Coordinator (UNSCO), Economic Adaptation and Fragmentation in the rural West Bank, (unpublished).
(15) OCHA, Humanitarian Update, April 2005.
(16) Communities affected will be those situated close to settlements, those along the evacuation route and in the enclaves of Al Mawasi in Gush Katif settlement block and Siafa in the northern settlement block.
(17) See Gaza Disengagement - UN Contingency Plan (May 2005)
(18) PCBS Labour force data Q1 2005.
(19) World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and Settlements, June 2004.
(20) OCHA Weekly Briefings on the Protection of Civilians.
(21) Data from the Operation Support Officer Programme, UNRWA.
(22) UNSCO, Economic Adaptation and Fragmentation.
(23) UNFPA Situation Analysis, Chapter 3.
(24) OCHA Humanitarian Monitoring reports, January 2004 - April 2005.

(25) Total net decrease: US$ 6,732,405. WFP immediately after the completion of the CAP 2005 revised its requirements from approximately US$ 41.6 million down to US$ 32.6 million. UNRWA has a net increase of US$ 2.1 million (some budgets have been decreased, others increased) and WHO a decrease of US$ 6,000.
(26) PCBS reported a slight decrease in the unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip, from 35.2% in the fourth quarter of 2004 to 34% in the first quarter of 2005.
(27) “A Baseline survey: Livelihoods, Shocks and Coping Strategies of WFP Beneficiaries in the oPt., VAM WFP oPt, October to November 2004.
(28) By the MoH with the support of WHO and NGOs
(29) “Review of nutrition activities under EMOP 10190.2 in oPt., WFP, December 2004


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